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(Oats of 1814) 
pTwdmm of Harvard CotUgo 



Li- VI » • . 

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CmCAGO Ü. S. A. 



/<^^ /0.3.3 


The thmnki of the Author and Traiialator are 
tendered to Dr. Paul Casus, for his help in the 
Pablication of thii work; to Mr. E. T. Stubokt 
for Taloable aid in reTiting the manoBcript; and 
to Dr. J. Bruhx and Mr. Lbopold Corvikus for 
he^ daring the printing of the English version. 

Translator's Preface. 

Mj dear Professor Deussen, 

WBXNy writing to me of your pilgrimage to India and your 
many friends in that old, sacred land, you suggested that I 
should translate Das System des Vedänta for them, and I most 
willingly consented, we had no thought that so long a time 
must pass, ere the completed book should see the light of day. 
Now that the period of waiting is ended, we rejoice together 
orer the finished work. 

I was then, as you remember, in the Austrian Alps, seek- 
ing, amid the warm scented breath of the pine woods and the 
many-coloured beauty of the flowers, to drive from my veins 
the lingering fever of the Ganges delta, and steeping myself 
in the lore of the £astem wisdom: the great Upanishads, the 
Bhagavad Oitd, the poems of Qankara, Master of Southern 

Your book brought me a new task, a new opportunity. 
For in it I found, most lucidly set forth, the systematic teach- 
ing of the Vedänta, according to its greatest Master, with 
many rich treasures of the TJpanishads added. 

ShaU we say that the great Upanishads are the deep, still 
mountain tarns, fed from the pure water of the everlasting 
snows, Vt by clear sunshine, or, by night, mirroring the high 
serenity of the stars? 

The Bhagavad OUä is, perhaps, the lake among the foot- 
hills, wherein are gathered the same waters of wisdom, after 
flowing through the forest of Indian history, with the fierce 
of the Children of Bharata. 

YI TnmiUtor't Preface. 

Then, in the Brahma Sutras, we have the reserroir, four- 
square, where the sacred waters are assembled in ordered 
quiet and graded depth, to be distributed by careful measure 
for the sustenance of the sons of men. 

What shall we say, then, of the Master Qankara? Is he 
not the Guardian of the sacred waters, who, by his Oommen- 
taries, has hemmed about, against all impurities or Time's 
jealousy, first the mountain tarns of the UpanishadSy then the 
serene forest lake of the Bhagavad OUäj and last the deep 
resenroir of the Sutras; adding, from the generous riches of 
his wisdom, lovely fountains and lakelets of his own, the Crest 
Jewdj the Awakening ^ the Discernmerd'i 

And now, in this our day, when the ancient waters are 
somewhat clogged by time, and their old courses hidden and 
choked, you come as the Restorer, tracing the old, holy streams, 
clearing the resenroir, making the primal waters of life potable 
for our own people and our own day; making them easier of 
access also, and this is near to both our hearts, for the chil- 
dren's children of those who first heard Qankara, in the sacred 
land where he lived his luminous days. 

So the task is done. May the Sages look on it with favor. 
May the sunlit waters once more flow in life-restoring streams, 
bringing to the world the benediction of spiritual light 

Believe me, as ever, 

CordiaUy yours 




I. Literary Notes 3—46 

1. The Kftine YedanU, p. 3.-2. Some Remarks on the 
Yedft, p. 5.-3. The Philosophical Systems, p. 19.^ 
4. Fonn of the Brahma-sütras; Qankara's Commentary, 
p. ^,^b. The Quotations in Qaflkara's Commentary, 
p. 29.-6. Some Bemarks on Qafikara, p. 35.^7. Ana- 
lysis of the Contents of the Brahmasutras with Qafl- 
kara's Commentary according to adhyäya, päda and 
adhikaranamy p. 89. 

XL Aim of the Vedänta: The Destruction of an 

innate error 47—59 

1. The fondamenUl Thought of the Yed&nU and its 
preTious History; a Glance at allied Theories in the 
West, p. 47.-2. Analysis of Qa&kara*s Introduction 
p. &8. 

ILL Who is called to the Study of the Vedänta? 60—76 

1. The indispensable Condition, p. 00.-2. Exclusion of 
the Qüdras, p. 00.— 8. Admission of the Gods; their 
Bole in the Vedänta System, p. 65. — 4. Episode: on the 
Yedantic Philosophy of Language, p. 72. 

ly. Qualifications of those called to the Study of 

the Vedanta 77—87 

1. The Study of the Yeda, p. 77.-2. The four Require- 
ments, p. 79.-3. Relation of the System to that of 
Justification by Works, p. 82.-4. I^iberation through 
''the Grace'' oLSnowledge, p. 86. 

y. Source of the yed&nta 88—96 

1. General Remarks on the Lidian Pram&naa or Canons 
of Knowledge, p. 88.-2. Insufficiency of the secular 
Canons of Knowledge, p. 89.-3. The Reyelation of the 
Yeda, p. 94. 

YUl Contents. 


VI. Exoteric and Esoteric Yedänta Doctrine . . 97—116 

1. Justification of Exoteric Metaphysics, p. 97.-2. Exo- 
teric and Esoteric Form of the Yedanta, p. 98.-3. Ap- 
pendix: Qaflkara's Esoteric Philosophy, trans- 
lated from 4; 9,44,-^) Do the liberated go to Brah- 
man? (b) Esoteric Cosmology, (o) Esoteric Psycho- 
logy, (d) Esoteric Morality, (e) Esoteric Esohato- 
logy* (0 Esoteric Theology, p. 109. 




yU. Prefatory Remarks and Arrangement . . . 119 — 182 

1. On the Names of God, p. 119. — 2. Arrangement of 
the Theology, p. 120. 

VIIL Proofs of the Existence of God 123—128 

1. Prefatory Remark, p. 123.— 2. Definition of the 
Brahman, p. 123. — 3. Gosmological Proof, p. 124. — 
4. Physico- theological Proof, p. 125.— 5. Psychological 
Proof, p. 126.— 6. Cogito, ergo sum, p. 127. 

IX. The Brahman in itself 129—144 

1. Brahman as the non-Existent, p. 129.-2. Brahman 
as the primordial Light, p. 130. — 3. Brahman as the 
last, unknowable Origin of the Existent, p. 181. — 
4. Brahman as pure Intelligence, p. 134. — 5. Brahman 
as Bliss, p. 137.— 6. Brahman as Free from all Evil, 
p. 140.^7. Brahman as Free from Causality and Af- 
fliction, p. 141. 

X« The Brahman as Cosmic Principle 146 — 161 

1. Brahman as Creator of the World, p. 145.— 2. Brah- 
man as Ruler of the World, p. 148.— 3. Brahman as 
Destroyer of the World, p. 150. 

XL The Brahman as Cosmic and at the same 

time Psychic Principle 162 — 171 

1. Brahman as the very Small and very Great, p. 152. — 

2. Brahman as Joy {kam) and as Amplitude (Aeftom), 
p. 164.-3. Brahman as the Light beyond HeaTen and 
in the Heart, p. 167.— 4. Brahman and the Soul dwell- 
ing together in the Heart, p. 170. 

Contents. IX 

XIL The Brahman as Soul 172—197 

1. Bnhman m the Self (ätman), p. 172.— 2. Brahman 
as Fräna (Breath, Life), p. 177.— 3. Brahman as the 
Sonl in deep Sleep, p. 183.— 4. Brahman as the Soul 
in the State of Liberation, p. 188. 

Xin. The Brahman as the highest Goal .... 198—204 

1. Brahman as Object of Meditation, p. 198.— 2. Brah- 
man as the Place of the Liberated, p. 200.— 3. Brah- 
man as Attainment of absolute Unity, p. 201. 

XIV. Esoteric Theology 206—216 

1. Preliminary Remark, p. 205.— 2. The differentiated 
and undifferentiated Brahman, p. 206.— 3. Character- 
iatics of the esoteric Brahman, p. 210.— 4. On the 
Possibility of Knowing the esoteric Brahman, p. 213. 
—6. On certain figuratire Expressions used of Brah- 
man, p. 214. 




XV. Preliminary Remarks and Arrangement . . 219 — 221 
XVL Brahman as Creator of the World .... 222—229 

1. The Motive of Creation, p. 222.-2. Brahman is the 
efficient and at the same time material Cause of the 
World, p. 223.— 3. Brahman creates without Instruments, 
p. 2^.-4. Brahman and the Powers of Nature, p. 227. 

XVIL The exoteric Picture of Creation .... 230—249 

1. General, p. 230.— 2. The Origin of Space (iJtöpa), 
p. 282.— 3. The Origin of Air, Fire, Water, Earth, 
p. 235.-4. Incidental Remark on the Destruction of 
the World, p. 287.-5. Organic Nature, p. 238.-6. Phy- 
siological Remarks, p. 240.*-7. The ControTersy with 
the Buddhists concerning the Reality of the outer 
World, p. 241. 

XVIII. Cosmological ProblemB , . 260—264 

1. The Problem of Causality, p. 250.— 2. The Problem 
of the One and the Many, p. 252.-3. The Moral Pro- 
blem, p. 252. 

X Contents. 

XIX. The Idea of Causality 255—260 

1. The Gaaie penista in the Effect, p. 256.-2. The 
Effect exists before its Manifestation, namely, as Cause, 
p. 256.-3. What is the Difference between the Effect 
before and after Manifestation? p. 257.-4. The Effect 
is prefigured in the Cause, p. 257.-5. The Activity of 
becoming manifest must hare a Subject, p. 258. — 
6. The Activity of the Agent is not superfluous, p. 258. 
— 7. Generality of the Identity of Cause and Effect, 
p. 258. — 8. The Activity of the Agent must have an 
Object, p. 259.-9. Result, p. 259.— 10. Illustrative Ex- 
amples, p. 259. 

XX. The Doctrine of Identity 261—272 

1. Introductory, p. 261.— 2. ""Tat tvam a«t"— That art 
thou, p. 262. — 8. The Doctrine of Identity in the Ye- 
danta System : a) The Extinction of Plurality in Brah- 
man, p. 267.— b) The Relation of Unity to Plurality, 
p. 268. — c) How is the Knowledge of Unity possible, 
from the Standpoint of Plurality? p. 270. — d) The 
Value of the Doctrine of Unity, p. 271.— e) Criticism 
of Anthropomorphism, p. 271. 

XXI. Solution of the Cosmological Problems . . 273—281 

1. The Problem of Causality, p. 274.-2. The Problem 
of the One and the Many, p. 277.-3. The Moral Pro- 
blem, p. 278. 




X2ÜX Proofs of the Immortality of the Soul . . 285—292 

1. Preliminary Remarks on Psychology, p. 286.-2. Ar- 
gpiments of the Materialists against the Immortality 
of the Soul, p. 287.-3. Proofs of the Immortality of 
the Soul, p. 288. — 4. On the Doctrine of Immortality 
in general, p. 290. 

XXIII. Origin and Nature of the Soul .... 293—296 

1. Origin of the Soul, p. 293.-2. Nature of the Soul, 
p. 295. 

Content!. XI 


XXiy. Relation of the Soul to God 397—306 

L Non-Identity and Identity, p. 297.-2. lUaiion of 
ell Pain, p. 299.-3. Subjection to end Freedom from 
Law, p. 300.— 4. How are the individual souls separated 
from each other? p. 301. — ^5. Brahman and the Upadhis, 
p. 302. 

XXV. Relation of the Soul to the Body .... 306—314 

1. The Opinion of the Jainai that the Soul is as large 
at the Body, p. 306.— 2. The Opinion that the Soul is 
of minute (anu) size, p. 908. — 3. The Soul is infinitely 
great (vibhu), p. 310.— 4. Connection of the Soul with 
the Intellect (buddhi), p. 312. 

XXYL Relation of the Soul to its Actions . . . 316-323 

1. Preliminary, p. 316. — 2. Beasons for Supposing the 
Soul to be essentially an Agent (t. e, exercising Volition), 
p. 316. — 3. The Soul is naturally not an Agent (exer- 
cising Volition), p. 317.— 4. Freedom of the Will and 
Determinism, p. 321. 

XXVIL The Organs of tiie Soul 324—341 

1. Preliminary Survey, p. 324.-2. Origin and Nature 
of the Organs of Life {prdna), p. 327.-8. The System 
of the conscious Life: Organs of Relation, p. 329.— 
4. The System of the unconscious Life: Organs of 
Nutrition, p. 333.-6. Mutual Relation of the Systems 
of the conscious and unconscious Life, p. 336.-6. The 
Cooperation of the Gods, p. 337.-7. Retrospect, p. 338. 

XXYIIL Special States of the Soul 342—354 

1. Dream -Sleep, p. 343.-2. Deep Sleep, p. 346.— 

8. Swooning, p. 862.-4. Metaphysical Significance of 
Death, p. 863. 



xxiit. The Eschatology of the Yedanta .... 357—360 

I. The main Phases of Indian Eschatology, p. 857.— 

9. Exoteric and Esoteric Eschatology, p. 358.^3. No 
Transmigration from the ESsoteric Standpoint, p. 8&9. 


zn Content!. 

XXX. The Vedic Doctrine of the Five Fires . . 361—366 

1. Introduction, p. 861.— 2. The Five Sacrificial Offer- 
ingi, p. 861.-8. The Path of the God (devayäna\ 
p. 862.-4. The Path of the Fathers (pitriydna), p. 868. 
—6. The third Place, p. 864.-6. Epilogue (only in 
Chandogya-Up.), p. 864.-7. On the two Recensions of 
the Doctrine of the Five Fires, p. 866. 

XXXI. The Passing of the Soul from the Body . 367—380 

1. The Vedic Basis, p. 867^2. The Involution of the 
Organs, p. 867.-8. The subtle Body, p. 870.— 4. Moral 
Determination of the transmigrating Soul: a) Prefatory 
Remark, p. 874.— b) The Karma - afrayOj p. 876.— 
e) ytdyä'karma-pürvaprajnä, p. 876.— d) The ApQ/rvam, 
p. 877.— e) The Qrad^ p. 878.-5. The Path into the 
Beyond, p. 879. 

XXXIL The Destinies of the Soul in the Body . 381—386 

1. Contradictions of the Vedic Texts, p. 381.— 2. The 
Punishments of Hell, p. 882.-8. The Third Place, 
p. 888.-4. Felicity on the Moon, p. 885. 

XXXIII. The Cause of the Return to Earthly 
Existence ' 387—393 

1. Prefatory Remark, p. 387.-2. In Retribution a 
Residue remains {anufaya), p. 887.— 8. How is this 
Residue to be conceived? p. 889.-4. Ritual and Moral 
Work, p. 890. 

XXXIV. The Descent of the Soul for a new 
Embodiment 394—398 

1. The Stages on the Way, p. 894.-2. Duration of the 
Descent, p. 894.-8. The Soul sojourns in the various 
Stages only as a Guest, p. 895.-4. Retrospect, p. 896. 




XXXV. The Path of Liberation 401—417 

1. Definition of Liberation, p. 401.— 2. Liberation im- 
possible through Works, p. 402.-8. Liberation im- 
possible through moral Improvement, p. 408.— 4. Know- 
ledge without Works liberates, p. 405.— 6. How is this 

Contents. xm 

MTing Knowledge brought about? p. 408.— 6. Works 
M Meant to Knowledge, p. 411.— 7. Devout Meditation 
(ttpdMiiam) as Means to Knowledge, p. 413. 

XXXYL Condition of the Sage in this Life . . 418—426 

1. Characteristics of the Sage, p. 418.— 2. The De- 
struction of Sin, p. 421. — 3. Destruction of Good Works 
also, p. 42S.— 4» Why the Body, in spite of Liberation, 
■till continues to exist, p. 424. 

XXXVn. The dying Sage 427—431 

1. His Soul does not depart, p. 427.-2. The Dissolution 
of the Psychic Apparatus, p. 428.-8. Can the Liberated 
assume a new Body? p. 480. 

XXXyin. Condition of the Sage after Death . . 432—436 

1. Entrance into the highest Light, p. 432.-2. Charac- 
teristics of him who has obtained absoluteness, p. 433. 
—3. The Unio myttieoy p. 434. 

XXXIX. The Passing of the Pious to Brahman . 436—443 

1. The Characteristics of the Pious, p. 436.-2. The 
Departure of the Soul of the Pious, p. 439.-3. The 
Stages on the Path of the Gods, p. 440.— 4t Brahman 
as Qoal of the Path, p. 442. 

XL. Hearenly Lordship and Final Liberation of 

the Pious 141 14 8 

1. Lordship (aifvaryam), p. 444. — 2. The Existence of 
those who hare obtained Lordship, p. 445. — 3. Limits 
of Lordship, p. 446.-4. Final Liberation of the Pious, 
p. 447. 

Concordance 449 

I. Short Surrey of the Vedänta System .... 463 — 478 

1. Introductory, p. 463.-2. Theology, p. 456.-3. Cos- 
mology, p. 469.-4. Psychology, p. 467.-6. Trans- 
migration, p. 471.— 6. Liberation, p. 474. 

IL Lidez of all Quotations in Qankara^s Commen- 
tary on the Brahmasütras 479—500 

HL Lidex of the proper names in Qankara's Com- 
mentary 501 — 604 

ly. Terms of the Yedanta 506—613 

Upanishad Passages Quoted. 

The miinben on the right are those of the present work« 

BrOi. 1, 1 » 8 

» 1, 3, 28 = 82 

, 1, 5, 3 -» 331 

. 2, 4 -» 172ff. 

, 2, 4, 5 » 52 

. a, 2, 13 » 375 

, 8, 4— 5 -= 141 fif. 

„ 3, 7 « 149 

, 3, 8 » 132 

^ 4,3-4»»188ff. 

, 4, 4, 28 « 80 

, 4, 5 » 172ff. 

ff 8f 2 es 361 ff« 
ChiBd. 1, 6 » 140 
, 1, 8, 9 -= 146 
^ 1, 11, 5 = 147 

3, 12-13 = 167 
^ 3, 14 « 60. 162 
« 4, 1-2 «= 61fif. 
« 4, 4 » 63ff. 

. 4, 5-9 » 64 

4, 10-15 » 64. 164 ff. 

5, 3-10 = 361 ff. 

5, 11—24 =» 156 
, 6, 1, 4 « 52 

6, 1—7 — 262ff. 230 
6, 8— 16»268ff. 

, 7 — 201fif. 
. 8, 1-6 »» 159 ff. 
8, 6, 6 — 379ff. 

Ch&nd. 8, 7—12 » 51. 183 ff. 432 

„ 8, 14 = 146 
'KÄ\lL 2, 23 = 409 

n 2, 24—25 » 150 

„ 3, 1 = 170ff. 

„ 4, 10—11 = 52 ff. 

„ 4, 12—13 » 155 

„ 5, 1-3 =. 50 

„ 5, 7 = 373 

„ 6, 1 =- 148 

„ 6, 17 = 155 
Mund. 1, 1, 5 » 131 

n 2, 1, 1 =r 131. 291 

„ 2, 2, 5 = 200 

„ 2, 2, 8 » 200ff. 

„ 2, 2, 10 » 130 

„ 3, 1, 1 = 171 

„ 3, 2, 8 « 201 
Pra^na 5 »== 198 

„ 6, 5 »- 429 
Taitt 2, 1-7 = 51 ff. 129. 187 

„ 2, 1 = 230 
Ait 1, 1 = 230 
Kauah. 3 » 177 ff. 

„ 4 = 181ff. 
Kena 11 = 408 
1^ 1, 6 » 52 
gvet 1, 11 = 87 

„ 3» 8 » 313 

, 4, 3 « 298 


L literaiy Notes. 

1. The Name Yedanta. 

Tedänia means literally **the end of the Veda'' and 
signifies originally the theologico-philosophical treatises which 
appear as the closing chapters of the single Brähma9a's of 
the Veda, and which are afterwards generally called l^aniBhadf 
that is, "(secret) stance," "secret doctrine.'' > — Farther on, the 

* Vedanta may originally mean either 1. *<End of the Veda," or 
2. **Dogmaa of the Veda" (cf. siddMnta, räddhänta), or 3. «Final Aim of 
the Veda." Max Müller declares himself in favor of the latter view 
(Upaniahadt I, p. LXXXVI N.); bot this preiapposei an appreciation of 
the dogmatic at the expense of the ritual part, which it is difficult to 
accept for the time at which the word arose (we find it already rigidly 
fixed in TA. p. 817, 2 — Mund. 3, 2, 6 — Eair. 3 and Qvet 6, 22). Hence 
the view given above (for which we must of course not rely on TA. 
p. 890, 1) recommends itself as the simplest and most natural. The 
remarkable circumstance that the etymological meaning of both vedänta 
and ypamahad cannot be proved by quotations may be explained, if we 
assume that both were originally popular terms in the language of the 
papils, and first received a definite sense when they were transferred to 
the language of the higher style. After the Brahmacarin had learnt the 
formulas of prayer {mantra) necessary for his future calling, and the 
manner of their application in the cult {bandhu, brähinanam\ at the 
conclusion of the course (Ind. Stud. X, 128 cf. Chänd. 4, 10—15;— 
a chapter like B|ih. 6, 4 was of course possible only at the end of a 
period of study) the Guru might communicate to him certain things easy 
to misinterpret, and therefore secret, concerning the metaphysical power 
of the prayer (brahman) which supported and maintained the g^s, and 
the resulting superiority of the own Self of the knower (ätman) over all 
the powers of nature, whence in course of time arose the Brahmavidya, 
Ataaridya, which the pupils might joyfully hail and greet as iheVedäntat 
that is^ as "the end of the studies," and of the (not seldom severe [Mahft- 
bbarmtam I« 745]) period of pupilage. These communications to the An- 
tevisin took place in a confidential stance, that is (in contrast with 


4 Introdociion. 

name Vedänta in the sense of ^ Final Aim of the Yeda'' is 
applied to the theologico-philosophical system founded on the 
Upanishad^, which may fitly be tenned the Dogmatics of 
Brahmanism, and the exposition of which is to occupy us 
here. In order not to mix things historically distinct, we base 
this exposition exclusively on the standard work of the Ved- 
&nta School, the Qärtrakchmimänsä'SÜtra's of Bädaräya^a 
together with Qankara's Commentary thereon. As for the 
present a separate treatment of these two authors does not yet 
seem practicable, we consider the work as an indivisible whole 
for the purpose of our systematic exposition, and shall quote it 
in the sequel either with three numbers according to adhyaya, 
päda and sütram or with two numbers according to page and 
line in the edition of Roer and Blima Näräya^a Vidyäratna 
in the Bibliotheca Indica, Calcutta, 1863.^ 

To characterise the position of this work and its two 
authors in Sanskrit Literature, it may be well to recall briefly 
certain facts. ' 

pariahady samsad), in an upanishad, an expression which then adopted the 
meanings of ^secret meaning, secret name, secret teachings" just as the 
word "Collegium" adopted in German has heen transferred from the idea 
of ** assembly" to that of an ''object of study" which can be ''read" or 
« heard." 

3 Unfortunately no translation of this work exists as yet, (1883) since 
neither the aphorisms of the Vedänta by Ballantyne (Mirzapore, 1851) 
nor the translation by Banerjea (Calcutta, 1870), nor that in the Shad' 
darganorcintanikä (Bombay, since 1877) have up to the present got beyond 
the beginning. A Dutch rendering by A. Bruining in the "Bijdragen 
tot de Taal-, Land- en Yolkenkunde van N.-Indie" only goes as. far as 
the end of the first Adhyaya. ' 

[The whole work has now been translated: into German by the author 
of the present work (Leipzig 1887), and into English by G. Thibaut (Ox- 
ford 1890-96)]. 

* Cf. with the following: Colebrooke, On the Vedas or sacred 
writings of the Hindus, As. Res., VIII, 869—476; On the philosophy of 
the Hindus, Transact, of the B. As. Soc, I, 19-48. 92—118. 489—461, 
II, 1—39, I, 649-679 (in the Misc. Ess.*, II, 8ff; 239ff.); A. Weber, 
Indische Litteraturgeschichte', 1876, S. 8ff., 249 ff., where the literatuire 
up to the most recent times (1878) is to be found brought together in 
the notes and supplements ; Max Müller, A History of Ancient Sansknt 
Literature^ 1860. 

L literary Notes. 5 

3. Some Bemarks on the Veda. 

ft) General view. 

The great and not yet folly accessible complex of writings 
which bears the name of Veda, that is, "(theological) know- 
ledge," and whose extent exceeds that of the Bible more than 
six times orer, falls in the first place into four divisions, the 
Bigveda^ Sämaveda, Tajurveda and Atharvaveda; in each of 
these four Yedas we have to distinguish between three different 
classes of writiogs, according to content, form and age: 1) The 
Samhiid, 2) The Brähmanam, 3) The Sütram; moreover the 
greater part of these twelve divisions exists in different, more 
or less divergent recensions, as used by the different schools 
for whose study they served, and these are commonly spoken 
of as the Qäkhä% that is, "the branches," of the Yeda-tree. 
For an understanding of this complicated organism it will be 
Qsefiod to distinguish between the form in which the Veda 
exists at present, and the historical development through which 
it has grown to this form. 

b) The literary materiale of the Veda. 

In the first place the four Yedas, in the form in which 
they come to us, are nothing else than the Manuals of the 
Brahmanical Priests (ritvij), providing them with the 
materials of hynms and sentences necessary for the sacrificial 
cult, as well as teaching them their right use. To each com- 
plete sacrificial ceremony belong, in fact, four chief-priests 
distinguished according to their courses of studies, and their 
functions: 1) the Hotar, who recites the verses (rtc) of the 
hymns, in order to invite the gods to the enjoyment of the 
Soma or other offerings, 2) the Udgätar, who accompanies 
the preparation and presentation of the Soma with his chants 
{8äman)f 3) the Adhvaryu, who performs the sacred ritet 
while he mutters the corresponding verses and sacrificial sen* 
tences (yajus), 4) the Brahm&n, to whom is confided the 
sQ^rintendiog and guiding of the whole. The canonical book 
for the Hotar is the Eigveda (though the Eigveda-saqihita 
has from the outset a wider import, not merely ritual but 
also literary), that for the Udg&tar is the S&maveda, that 

6 Introdaetion. 

for the AdhTaryu the Yajurveda, while on the contrary the 
Atharvaveda has nothing to do with the Brahm&n,^ who 
must know all the three Yedas, and to whom the Atharra- 
veda is only referred for the sake of appearance, in order to 
help to raise it to the dignity of a fourth Veda, which was 
for a long time refused to it^ It finds its practical application 
on the one hand in the domestic cult (hirth, marriage, burial, 
sicknesses, blessing the haryest, incantations over cattle and 
so forth), on the other hand in certain official acts (inauguration 
of the king, blessing before a battle, cursing of the enemy and 
so on) ; in the latter aspect it is the Veda of the Kshatriya caste, 
as the three others are of the Brahman caste,^ and might stand 
in the same relation to the Ihirohita (prince's family priest) 
as that which the others hold to the Ritvifa (cfl Y&jnavalkya 
1, 312). 

Each of the priests named required in his duties, first, a 
collection of prayer-formulas (mantra) and, second, directions 
for the right liturgical and ritual application of these {bräh- 
manam). With the exception of the black Yajurveda, we find 
these two more or less completely separated and relegated to 
two different divisions. 

L The SAHHTrA of each Veda, as the name indicates, is a 


^collection" of the Mantra's belonging to it, which are either 
verses (fie) or chants (säman) or sacrificial sentences (yajus), 

* Apftstamba-^rauta-sütram 24, 16 — 19: rigvedena hotä huroÜ, 
sämavedena udffätä, yajurvtäma adhvarpuh^ sarvair brahmä, — M ad ha- 
ft ü da na (Ind. Sind. 1, 16, 8): tatra hautra-prayoga* riffvedena, ädhvaryava- 
frayogo gqjurvedenat audgätra-prayogah sämavedena, brähfna-yßjamäna- 
prayogau tu atra eva antarbhütau; afharvaveda» tu, yajfia'afvupaiyulldah^ 
^nti 'pauihHka -abhieära -ädi- karma -prat^pädakatvena a^fonta - vilakaha- 
nä' eva* 

* Gopatha-brahmanam I, 2,24: rigvidam eva hotaram vrinUkva, 
yajurvidam adhvaryum, sämavidam udgätäram, athatv&figiravidam hrah- 
m^iiam.— Atharva-pari^ishtam 1 (Ind. Sind. I, 296, 28): raMänti 
raloBhati brahmä, brahmä iaamäd atharvavit-^CL Viahnupuränam III, 
4 (p. 276, Wilson).— An indirect acknowledgement of the fourth Veda by 
Qankara ii found on p. 289, 2. 

* It is perhaps to be understood in this sense, when Bfih. 6, 13 
(Qatap. Br. 14, 8, 14) kshatram appears as fourth along with «litt^iN, 
yajui and aäman. 

I. Literary Notes. 7 

Thus the KigTeda-saqxhitä consists of 1017 hymns in 10680 
Terses, from which the Hotar has to select the required in- 
Tocation for the purpose in view; the Sämaveda-saiphitä 
contains a selection of 1649 yerses (or with repetitions 1810), 
either from the Bigveda-saiphitä, or from the materials on 
which it is hased; all these excepting only 78, are also 
found in the Rigreda. They are modulated in numerous ways, 
for the purposes of the chant (säman); the Samhitä of the 
white YajurTeda contains both prose sacrificial sentences 
(yojuM) and verses, the latter of which are in great me&sure 
taken from the materials of the Sigreda; on the other hand, 
the AtharraTeda-saqihitä consists merely of 760 Hymns, only 
about one sixth of which are common to it and the Sigveda, 
while the remainder occupy an independent and in many 
respects quite peculiar position in the total of the Yedic 
Mantra literature, of which later. Each of these four Saqxhitäs, 
according to the Qakhffs or Schools, in which it is studied, 
is extant in different recensions, which, howeyer, do not, as a 
rule, differ materially from one another. It is otherwise, as 
will presently be shown, with the second division of Yedic 

n. The Brahxanam, whose most direct purpose generally 
is, to teach the practical use of the materials presented in 
the Saiphitä, in its widest scope often goes far beyond this 
immediate purpose, and draws within its sphere what (with 
Madhnsüdana) we may include in the three categories of vidhi, 
arthaväda and vedänta. 1) As vidhi (i. e., precept) the Bräh- 
mapam enjoins the ceremonies, explains the occasions of their 
use, aa well as the means for carrying them out, and finally 
describes the process of the sacred rite itselfl 2) With this, 
under the name of arihaväda (i. e., explanation) are linked the 
most various discussions, whose purpose is, to support the 
content of the precept by exegesis, polemic, mythology, dogma 
and 80 fortL 3) The consideration of the subject here and 
there rises to thoughts of a philosophical character, which, as 
they are found for the most part towards the end of the 
Brähmapa's, are called vedänta (i. e., Veda-end). They are the 
chief content of the appendixes to the Brähmapa's which are 

8 Introdaction. 

called Äranyaka% and whose original purpose (though not 
strictly maintained) was to serve for the life in the forest 
{ara7iyam)f which was enjoined upon the Brahmans in old age, 
to serve as a substitute for the ritual which, if not completely 
left behind, was yet very much limited. However this may 
be, it is the fact that in them we meet abundantly a wonder- 
ful spiritualising of the sacrificial cult: in place of the practical 
carrying out of the ceremonies, comes meditation upon them, 
and with it a symbolical change of meaning, which then leads 
on farther to the loftiest thoughts. ^ 

7 Let the opening passage of the Brihad-äranyakam (which is 
intended for the Adhvar3ni), in which the Horse Sacrifice is treated, serve 
as an example: 

«Om!— Dawn verily is the head of the sacrificial horse, the sun 
'^is his eye, the wind his breath, his mouth is the all-pervading fire, the 
''year is the hody of the sacrificial horse; heaven is his back, space is his 
** belly, the earth is his foot- stool (Qafik.). The poles are his loins, the 
^ intermediate quarters are his ribs, the seasons are his limbs, months and 
*< half-months are his joints, day and night are his feet, the stars are his 
« bones, the clouds are his flesh. The deserts are the food which he con- 
"sumes, rivers are his entrails, the mountains hisjliver and lungs, plants 
''and trees his hair; the rising sun is his forequarters, the setting sun is 
** his hindquarters ; when he yawns, that is the lightning, when he neighs,, 
''that is the thunder, when he waters, that is rain; his voice is speech. 
*^ Day verily arose after the horse as the sacrificial vessel, which standab 
''before him: its cradle is in the eastern ocean; night verily arose as the 
" sacrificial vessel, which stands behind him : its cradle is in the western 
"ocean; these two sacrificial vessels arose to surround the horse. As a. 
" racer he carried the gods, as a war-horse the gandharvas, as a steed the 
" demons, as a horse mankind. The ocean is his companion, the ocean his 

Here the universe takes the place of the horse to be offered, perhaps 
with the thought in the background, that the ascetic is to renounce the 
world (cf. Brih. 3, 6, 1. 4, 4, 22), as the father of the family renounces the 
real sacrificial gift. In just the same way, the Chandogya-Upanishad 
(1, 1) which is intended for the Udgatar, teaches as the true udgithai to 
be recognised and honoured the syllable " om,'* which is a symbol of 
Brahman {paramätmarpratlkam)\ and the vktham (hymn) which belongs 
to the Hotar is subjected to a like transformation of meaning in A it a* 
reya-äranyakam (2, 1, 2).-~Gompare Brahmasütra 3, 8, 65—66, where 
the thought is developed that symbolical representations (jprafyaya) of 
this kind have validity not only within the Qäkh4, in which they are 
found, but also in general. 

I. Idtermry Notes. 9 

The most important parts of these Äravyaka's were later 
detached from them under the name Upanishad, and were 
brought together from the different Veda^s into a single whole ; 
but originally, as we must admit» each Vedic school had its 
special ritual textbook, and together with this a more or less 
rich dogmatic textbook, and if there were in reality, as the 
MuktikärXJpanishad (Ind. St III, 324) afQrms, 21 + 1000 + 109 
+ 60 — 1180 Qäkhä's, it follows that there must have been 
1180 XJpanishad^s. In reality, however, the matter is much 
simpler, since the number of the Qäkhä's, which we really 
know, is limited for each Veda to a very small number, whose 
textbooks present the common ritual and dogmatic material 
in differing order, treatment and elaboration. Thus we are 
acquainted with only two Qäkhä's of the Eigveda, that of 
the Aitareyin^s and that of the Kau8hitaJcin% each of which 
possesses one Brähmanam and one Äranyaham^ the latter 
containing the Upanishad of the school.--For the S&maveda 
we know up to the present for the Brahmapa section only one 
Qäkh& accurately and completely, that of the TSi,ndin\ to 
which belong the following writings: a) the ib^lcatnnfa-brAA- 
inafiam\ b) the Shadvin^-brähmanam^ whose name already 
characterizes it as an addition to the former; c) we must also 
attribute to the school of the Täpdin's the hitherto incom-* 
pletdy known Chänd4)gyarhrähnumam^ since Qankara under this 
name quotes a passage, p. 892, 9, which according to fiJjen- 
dralala Mitra (The Ghändogya-Üp., Introduction, p. 17 N.) 
forms the beginning of the Chändogya-brähma^am; d) finally 
Qankara repeatedly quotes the Chändogya-upanishad as belong« 
ing to the TäQ^in's; thus Cband. 3, 16 (quoted p. 889, 10. 
890, 8) 8, 13, 1 (p. 899, 3. 907, 7. 908, 6) 6, 8, 7 (p. 923, 8).— 
A second independent book of ritual for the Samaveda is 
possibly the Talavakara-brdhmanam of the Jaiminiya-f&khä 
(et Qankara's statement on Kena-Dp., p. 28, and those of 
Bumell in MoUer's Upanishad's I, p. XG), according to BumeU 
in five Adhy&ya's, the last but one of which contains the 
well-known short Kena- Upanishad (quoted p. 70, 1. 4 10. 163, 
3. 808, 10), while the last consists of the Ärsheya-brähmanam 
(quoted p 301, 8). The four remaining Brfthmapa's of the 

10 Introdaetion. 

Samayeda (Sämavidhäna, Yaiiga, DevaiädhyätfO, Samhitopanu 
shcuC) can make no claim to the name of independent text- 
books of the school — ^For the Yajurveda we have to distin- 
goish two forms, the black (that is, unarranged) and the white 
(arranged) Yajurreda. The former contains Brähma^a-like 
materials mingled with the Mantra's in the Saqihitä; in this 
form the schools of the Taittiriyaka^s (whose Brahmapam and 
AraQyakam are merely continuations of the Saiphitä), the 
Kaiha^s and the Maiträyaniya's hare handed the Yajurreda 
down to us. The Taittiriya-äranyakam contains at its close 
two üpanishad's, the Titutiriya-Upanishad (Book VIL VIII. 
IX) and the Näräyaniya- Upanishad (Book X). To the school 
of the Katha's belongs the Käthaka- Upanishad, which we now 
possess only in an Athanran recension, whereas in Qankara^s 
time it seems to have formed a whole with the other texts of 
the Kapha's, of which more will be said later; under the name 
Maitrir Upanishad we have received a late product of very 
apocryphal character ;& the name of a fourth Qäkhä of the 
black Yajnrveda, the Qvetäfvatara% is that of a metrical 
Upanishad of secondary origin, which, however, is largely 
quoted by Qankara as *^ Qvetä(vataränäm mantrapanishad" 
(p. 110, 6, c£ 416, 1. 920, 4) and seemingly also already by 
B&daräya^ia (1, 1, 11. 1, 4, 8. 2, 3, 2). 

In contrast to the Qäkhä's of the black Yajnrveda, the 
Väjasaneyin% the chief school of the white Yajnrveda, separated 
the Mantra's and Brahmaxia's after the manner of the remain- 
ing Veda's; the former are collected in the Yäjasaneyi-Baqi- 
hitä, the latter form the content of the Qatapafha-brahmamnij 
the concluding part (B. XIY) of which contains the greatest 
and most beautiful of all the Upanishad's, the Brihad^ran- 
yakatn. A piece closely related to it (probably only on account 
of its metrical form) has been added to the VSjasaneyi* 
saiphitä as Book XL, and is called, from its first word, tiie 
Igd-upanishad] in the version of Anquetil Duperron four ad- 

• Qafikftra nowhere quotes it {Maitres/ibrähmanam p. 385, 8. 1006, 5 
meani the lection Bfih. 2, 4 » 4, 5); moreover the term Stishumnä (Maitr. 
6,21) it not yet to be found in the Commentary to the Brahmasütn*». 

I. Literary Notes. 11 

ditional sections of the same Saiphitä, Qatarudriyam (B. XVI), 
PurnshasÜktam (XXXI), Tadeva (XXXII), and Qivasamkalpa 
(XXXIV, the beginning) are classed as Upanishad's. — Besides 
the Väjasaneyin's Qankara thirteen times quotes an other school 
of the White Yajurveda, the Jäbäla^s; nine of these quotations 
(p. 222, a 223, 1. 417,11. 988, 8 »991, 4. 999,6. 1000, 1,3. 
1026, 8) are found, with important variants, in the JdMla-Upa- 
nishad, which is to-day included among the Atharva-Üpanishad's, 
four others (924, 7 » 1059, 1. 931, 4-» 933, 4) are not, so that, 
as it seems, Qankara had a more complete work of this school 
before hioL Whether Badarayapa quotes the same work (1, 2, 
32. 4, 1, 3) remains uncertain.*— To the Atharvaveda belongs 
the Oopatha^Shmanam, a work which has preponderatingly 
the character of a compilation and is without close relation to 
the Athanra-saiphita. We find no quotations from it in Qan- 
kara; the circumstance that at 3, 3, 24, p. 889 ff., he does not 
also consider Gopatha-br. II, 6, 4, increases the probability that 
he did not know or did not recognize this work. Finally, to 
the Atharvaveda, which could most probably not be guarded 
against new invasions by supervision of the guild as were the 
other Veda's, has been attached a long series of Upanishad's 
for the most part short, many of which have a wholly apo- 
cryphal character and are nothing more than the textbooks of 
later Indian sects. Two Upanishad's of the Atharyan are of 
special significance for the Vedänta, the Mundaka- and the 
IVagna-Upanishad, both of which are frequently quoted by 
Bädaräya^a and Qankara, while we strangely find no certain 
quotation from the MändÜkya'Upanishad which is so abun- 
dantly used in the Vedäntasära. 

IIL A third and last stage of the Vedic literature is formed 
by the Sutba's, likewise divided according to Veda's and 
<^akhä's (whose relations however seem to be somewhat un- 

* (^kara understands 1, 2, 32 as the Jabalopanishad 2, p. 439 and 
4. 1, 3 as a text of this school unknown to us; on the other hand accord- 
ing to «he Veddntorgaiva-lMshyam (Pandit, Jane 1872, p. 19) 1, 2, 82 and 
according to the Vedänta'hnutubha-prabhä (Pandit, August 1874, p. 55) 
4. 1, S are not to be referred to the Jabala^s. 

12 Introdaetiom 

fixed); they bring together the contents of the BrähmaQa's, on 
which thej are based, condensing, systematizing and completing 
them, for the purpose of practical life, in very compendious 
form, and in tiie lapidary style which is often quite incom- 
prehensible without a commentary, a style to which also the 
grammatical, and, as we shall shortly see, the philosophical 
literature of India has adapted itself. There are three classes 
of Vedic Sutra's: 1) the QravJta-sijitra^ which regulate public 
worship, 2) the Orihya'Sütra% which regulate domestic cere- 
monies (at birth, marriage, and the funeral), and 3) the 
Dharma»8ütra% in which the duties of the Castes and 
Agrama's are set forth in detail, and from which the later 
lawbooks of Manu and so on are derived. As the Qrauta*sütra's 
are based on the Qruti (that is. Divine Revelation), the two other 
classes in like manner rest on the Smfiti (that is. Tradition) 
and Äcära (that is. Custom); more will be said further on of 
the meaning of these expressions in the terminology of the 

c) Of the QenetiB of the Veda. 

The most ancient monument in this extensive circle of 
literature (and perhaps also the most ancient literary monu- 
ment of the human race) is formed by the Hymns of the 
Kigveda, since, as regards the great bulk of them, they go 
back to a time when their possessors were not yet in the 
valley of the Ganges, but lived among the tributaries of the 
Indus, had as yet no Castes, no privileged worship, no Brah- 
manical system of goTemment and life, but belonged to small 
tribes (vig) under kings most of whom were hereditary, tilling 
their fields, pasturing their herds, fighting among themselves, 
and enjoying a primitive life. The Hymns of the RigTeda 
unfold a graphic picture ^^ of all these relations, but especially 
we can follow in them the genesis of the primitive nature 

** Cf. on thii point the mutually supplementary works: Zimmer, 
Altindisches Leben, Berlin 1879; Ludwig, Die Mantra-Litteratur und 
das alte Indien (in the third volume of Ludwig's ^gveda), Prague 1878; 
Kaegi, Der ^gveda, Leipsig 1881; Oldenberg, Die Beligion des Veda, 
Berlin 1894; Hillebrandt, Vedische Mythologie, Breslau 1891—1902. 






I. Literary Notes. 13 

religion of India through its different phases, in part even 
from the moment when the gods are crystallizing under the 
hand of the poet out of the phenomena of nature, to the point 
at which belief in them for the thinking part of the nation 
begins to grow dim,^^ and is being replaced by the first 
stirrings of philosophical speculation, the latter especially in 
the later hymns chiefly found in the last Mav^&la, many of 
which, as for example the Hymn of Purusha, Rigv. 10, 90 
(VS. 31. AY. 19, 6. TA. 3, 12), already show an immigration 
into the Ganges yalley with the consequent derelopment of 
the Caste system. 

For after the Indians through many battles and struggles, 
whose poetical reflections are contained for us in the Mahä- 
bharatam, had won a permanent dwelling place for themselves in 
the paradise-like plain between the Himalaya and the Vindhya, 
their manner of life took on a form essentially different from the 
earlier one, owing to its altered external relations : an insurmount- 
able barrier was in the first place erected between the Qüdra% 
the repressed population of the aborigines, and the immigrant 
Aryans; then further, above the Väigya% that is, the collective 
mass of Aryan tribes, were raised on the one side, as possessors 
of material might, the K8hatriya% the warrior-nobility with the 
kings at their head, and on the other side the real or pre- 
tended descendants of the old Vedic poet-fiimilies, who called 
themselves Brähmana^s (offerers of prayer, priests), and suc- 
ceeded in making their family privilege not only the Yedic 
hymns and the worship bound up with them, but by and 
by also the whole national education. It is true that, as 
before, all members of the three upper castes, so far as they 

>* There are hynmi in the l^igveda which treat religion with open 
tcom. ThM smong others (e. g. l^igv. 7, 108) the hymn $igv. 9, 112, 
which not withont humour develops the thought that even the god 
lodra, like msnkind, lelfishly followi his own profit; and which very 
efieetivdy nect a constantly recorring refrain, borrowed apparently from 
a reUgioni hymn, ^'tndr^d indo paritrava,^^ It is true that Grassman 
baa omitted this refrain, in which the whole point lies. — ^The ^'Liturgy of 
the Dogs'* (fcmoa udgWia) Ch6nd. 1, 12 seems to own its origin to 
^iaaikr motives. 

14 Introduction. 

were Dvijä's C^twice-born/' reborn through the sacrament of the 
Upanayanamy the admission into the Brahmanical church) had 
to offer, and in part also to perform, sacrifices, but only the 
Brahmans could eat the sacrificial food, drink the Soma, and 
receive the sacrificial gift without which the sacrifice was not 
efficacious; they only could be Bitmfs (sacrificial priests for 
another for hire) and I\trohita^s (permanent family priests of 
the princes). Of these caste privileges the Brahmans were 
able in time to make a more and more extended use. In 
proportion as, through the consolidation of their settlements, 
the prosperity of the princes and the people grew, the external 
pageantry of worship increased; the number of the participat- 
ing priests augmented, the names Brahman, Hotar, Adhvaryu, 
Udgatar, which we see emerging in the Bigveda at first sporadi- 
cally and without strict distinction, were bound up into a 
system, and by the. side of each of these Bitvij^s at a great 
sacrifice stood a series of accolytes. 

Now the more complex the system of worship became, the 
more imperatively it demanded a special training, and this 
practical need was the decisive factor in the arrangement of 
the Yedic literature, — if indeed this word can be employed for 
a condition of things in which no written record is to be 
thought of. 12 Little by little, a firm tradition grew up about 
the verses and sentences with which the Adhvaryu had to 
accompany his manipulations (Tajurveda), as about the songs 
which the Udgatar chanted at the sacred operations (Säfna- 
veda), and lastly it was no longer enough for the Hotar to 
know the songs hereditary in his own family; the separate 

IS Even the UpaniBhads seem originally to have been handed down 
only orally. On the one hand we find passages in them which only become 
intelligible by an accompanying gesture (e.^., Bfih. 1, 4, 6: aiha iti 
abhyamanthat-j 2, 2, 4: iman eva [the ears] Gautama- Bharadvdjau, ayam 
eva OautamOt *yatn Bharadvajahj and so on); on the other hand, e.ff,, 
Chänd.8, 3, 5 aatyam is treated as a trisyllable, Brih. 6, 14, 1, bkümir 
antarik$hain dyatth and 6, 14, 3 präno 'pano vyänah are treated as eight 
syllables.'For the rest, the question of a written record in India has not 
the importance which we, judging by our own position, are inclined to 
give it. 

I. Literary Notes. 16 

collections of hymns were gathered into circles {mandalam)^ 
the circles into a single whole (Rigveda)^ which then for a 
certain further period still remained open for additional new 
productions. — ^Not all the old hymns were admitted into this 
canon; many had to be excluded, because their contents were 
thought to be offensive or otherwise unsuited; others because, 
sprung from the people, they were not supported by the 
authority of some famous bardic family. To these were con- 
tinually added new blossoms which the old stem of Yedic 
lyrics bore in the Br&hmaQa Period, and which bear clear 
testimony to the altered consciousness of the time. From 
these materials, which had to be handed down for a long time 
outside the schools in the mouths of the people (to which fact 
their frequent and especially metrical negligence bears testi- 
mony), there came into being in course of time a fourth col- 
lection {Aiharvaveia), which had to struggle long before gain- 
ing a recognition which always remained conditional. 

Meanwhile the other older collections had become the basis 
of a certain course of study, which in course of time took a 
more and more regular form. Originally it was the father 
who initiated his son into the sacred lore handed down by 
the family, as best he could (Brih. 6, 2, 4 Chänd. 6, 3, 5), 
soon, through the growing difficulty of understanding the old 
texts, the more and more complicated form of the ritual, the 
perpetually extending circle of studies, this became too difficult 
for him; it became necessary to look for the most approved 
authorities for each of the theories (vidyä) that had to be 
learned, travelling scholars (caraka) went further afield (Brih. 
3. 3, 1), celebrated wandering teachers moved from place to 
place (KausL 4, 1), and to many teachers pupils streamed» 
^like the waters to the deep" (Taitt 1, 4^ 3). Later custom 
demanded that every Ärya should spend a series of years 
(according to Apast. dharma-sütra 1, 1, 2, 16 at least twelve) 
in the house of a teacher, the Br&hma^a's, to prepare themselves 
for their foture calling, the Kshatriya's and Vai^ya^s, to receive 
the influences which were to mould their later thought and 
life. We must assume (even if we have no quotation at hand 
to prove it) that the imparting of this instruction became in 

16 Introdaoiion. 

course of time the exclusive priyilege of the Brahmans: only 
thus can be explained the unparalleled influence over the life 
of the Indian peoples which the Brahmans succeeded in 
winning and maintaining. As the outward apparel of the 
scholars of the different castes differed, so also probably did 
their instruction. As payment for it, the scholars performed 
the household and field labour of the teacher; they tended 
the sacred fire (Chand 4, 10, 1), herded the teacher's cattle 
(Chänd. 4, 4, 5), collected the customary gifts for him in the 
Tillage and brought him presents at the conclusion of the 
course. In the time left free by these manifold obligations 
{guroh karma-atifeshena^ Chand. 8, 15) the Veda was studied. 
On the whole, it was less a time of study than a time of 
discipline, as the name Agrama implies, intended for the 
practice of obedience to the teacher (of which extravagant 
examples are handed down) and strenuous self-abnegating 
activity. It was the tendency of Brahmanism to mould the 
whole life to such an Agrama, Not all, after the termination 
of the time of study, set themselves to found a family: many 
remained in the teacher's house to the end of their lives (naish- 
ihika); others betook themselves to the forest to devote them- 
selves to privations and penance; others again disdained even 
this Yorm of regular existence, and cast away every thing 
(samnyäsin), to roam about (parivrdjaka) as beggars (bhikshu). 
The different kinds of " Jfraiwo," or "religious exercise," were 
further bound together in a whole, in which what appears as 
an abrupt command in St Matthew's Gospel XTX, 21, seems 
to have been expanded into a vast system embracing the whole 
of life. Accordingly the life of every Brahmapa, and even the 
life of every Dvija,^^ was to be divided into four stages, or 
Ägrama^s; he was (1), as Brahmacärin, to dwell in the house 
of a teacher, then (2), as Orihastha, to fulfil the duty of foimd» 
ing a family, then (3) to leave it in old age, as a Vdnaprastha 
(forest hermit), to give himself up more and more to increasing 

1' A limitation to the Brahmana caste does not seem to follow with 
certainty from Manu VI, cf. v. 38. 70. 97 hrähmana, v. 29. 32. 93 mpra\ 
on the other hand v. 2 grikasthoB tu^ and so on; v. 40. 86. 91. 94 düifa. 

I. Litenry Notes. 17 

penances, and lastly (4), towards the end of his life, as a 
Satmyäsin (ShiJahu, Burivräjakä) to wander free from all 
earthly ties and live on alms. — We do not know how far the 
reality corresponded to these ideal claims. 

While Brahmanical teaching and conduct of life were sur- 
roonding the existence of the Indian peoples in ever denser 
toils, we see ripening on the branch of Brahmanism itself a 
world concept which, though outwardly bound up with it, was 
inwardly opposed to it in its yery basis. — Already in the Rig- 
veda sti'ong movements of a certain philosophical tendency 
make themselves manifest We perceive a special seeking and 
asking after the unity which finally lies at the basis of all 
dirersity; we see many attempts being made to solve the 
riddle of creation; to grasp through the motley changes of 
the world of appearances, through the more and more richly 
developed variety of the Vedic pantheon, the one form- 
less principle of all that has form, — until at last the soul 
finds and lays hold of unity where alone unity is to be found 
— in the soul itselfl Here, in the mysterious depths of his 
own heart, the seeker, raised above his own indiriduaUty by 
the fervour of aspiration (brahman) discovered a power which 
he felt to transcend all the other powers of creation, a god- 
like might which, as he felt, dwells within all earthly' and 
celestial beings a^ inner ruling principle (antaryamin) on which 
all worlds and all gods rest, through fear of which fire bums, 
the sun shines, the storm, wind and death perform their work 
(Käfh. 6, 3), and without which not a straw can be burned 
by Agni, or carried away by Yayu (Kena 3, 19. 23). A poetic 
formative power had clothed Agni, Indra and Yayu with per- 
sonality; this power it was by which that power of fervour, 
** that which in the narrow sphere expanding to all sides grows 
^ mightily, as a delight of the great gods, that which extends 
**as a god to the gods from afar and embraces this universe" 
(Rigv. II, 24, 11) was raised above aU gods first in a very 
transparent personification as Brihaspati, Brahmanaspati, but 
afterwards more truly, boldly, philosophically as Brahman 
(prayer), as Atman (Self), and from this power the gods and 

th« whole world besides were derived in endlessly varied play 


18 Introduction. 

of phantasy.— We may hope that thanks to the wealth of tcxü 
preseired in the Bigyeda, Atharvaveda, and Brähmapa's, we 
may be able to trace step by step how the sparks of philo- 
sophic light appearing' in the Rigreda shine out brighter and 
brighter nntil, at last, in the üpanishad's, they burst out in 
that bright flame which is able to light and warm us to-day. 

Numerous indications intimate that the real guardians of 
these thoughts were originally not the priestly caste, absorbed 
in their ceremonial, but rather the caste of the Kshatriyas. 
Again and again, in the Upanishad's, we meet the situation 
that the Brahman begs the Kshatriya for instruction whicb 
the latter, after several representations of the unseemliness 
of such a proceeding, imparts to him (cf. Brih. 2, 1. Kausb. 
4, 1. Brih. 6, 2. Chänd. 5, 3. Chänd. 5, 11. Kaush. 1, 1).— How- 
ever this may be, the Brahmans appropriated this new teach- 
ing of Brahman and its identity with the Self, and attached 
it, as best they could, to their own system of justification bj 
works, in a way of which we shall say more in the sequel 
Both systems, the ritual and the philosophic, were propagated 
in the Yedic schools, became inside and outside the school 
(at public festivals, at the courts of kings and so forth) the 
subject of keen debate and a not seldom vehement polemic; 
both su£fered manifold transformations and exchanges in these 
contests and mutual accommodations; at last, as the precipitate 
of this rich spiritual life, the Brähmam^s and the Upanishai^ 
in which they issue, were formed and brought into their present 
shape and finally (probably after their practical meaning had 
already long been transferred to the Sutra's) recorded in writ- 
ing. It is to be hoped that in time it will be possible to 
reconstruct from them, even if not in every detail, the course 
of development which found its conclusion in them. 

We have already seen how to the older Upanishad's, which 
are the philosophic text-books of the different Qakba's, were 
added a long series of younger products of the same name; 
in these we can follow the further extension of religious con- 
cepts, and, hand in hand with it, the development of a special 
tendency to accomplish even in this life the union with the 
All-spirit, through a certain practical process (called Yoga), 

I. Literary Notes. 19 

down to the time of the Indian sects. These texts, as it 
seems, have a purely external connection with the Atharrayeda. 

3. The Philosophical Systems. 

Parallel with this development of the Yedic theories there 
early arose side by side in India, from the germs contained 
in the Brahma^a's and older üpanishad's, a whole series of 
philosophic systems, which stand in very varied, sometimes 
convergent, sometimes hostile, relations to the Vedas and to 
each other, and in which we can trace every shade of philo- 
sophical concept of the world, from the crass and cynical 
materialism of the Cärväka's up to the orthodox faith in the 
l^er of the Vedas. Six among them were able to obtain 
the reputation of orthodoxy, that is, of a harmony between 
their teachings and the Yedic faith, or at least an appearance 
of it; the others, and among them Buddhism, were held to 
be heterodox and heretical. The. six orthodox systems (a 
name to which, in its full sense, only the two Mimähsä's can 
lay claim) are as follows: — 

1) The Sankhyam of Kapila, which served, as some 
believe, as the basis of Buddhism, a highly spiritual theory 
of the unfolding of the world to the end of self-knowledge 
and thence resulting liberation, which, however, falls into an 
irreconcileable dualism between the unfolding primitive matter 
{prakrÜi, pradhänam) and an original plurality of individual 
spirits (puriLsha). 

2) The Yoga of Patanjali, which, interpreting the San- 
khya-system theistically, undertakes to point out the way of 
attaining a union with God, treating it in four parts, 1. of 
contemplation (samädhi), 2. of the means of attaining it (sädha- 
iKim), 3. of the mastery over nature thereby gained (vibhüH), 
4. of the condition of absoluteness (kaivalyam).^^ 

I« The relation of thii teaching to the Yog^üpaniihad^s has yet to 
be inTMtigated; in the Samkshepa-Qafikara-jaya 1, 21— S7 (Qilde- 
meiiter, Anthologia', p. 88) are distingaished three parts of the Veda, the 
karma kända, ßläna-käifda, and j^a-kä^da, to which the three systems 
of JosMtiM, Bädaräi^atfa and Bataf^ali refer; the latter appears as an in* 
carnation of Qeaha (this throws light on Cowell^s remark on Colebrooke 
M. E.>, p. 247, n. 2> 


20 Introduction. 

3) The Nyäya of Gotama, a system of logic, which, how- 
ever, draws within its sphere all the subjects of Indian thought 
and treats of them under its sixteen categories (pramänam 
proof, prameyam what is to be proved, samgaya doubt, and 
so on). 

4) The Vaigeshikam of Kanada, frequently (e.g^ inthe 
Bhäshäpariccheda, in the Tarkabhäshä) woven together with 
the Nyäya into a single whole, which teaches the growth of 
the world from atoms (paramänü) and undertakes a classi- 
fication of existence, according to natural science, under the 
six categories of substance, quality, action, identity, difference, 
and inherence (dravyam, gunOj karman, sämänyam, vigeshOj 

The gradual growth and consolidation of this and other 
systems may have instigated the stricter adherents of the Veda 
also, on their side, to a scientific, systematic investigation 
(mttnänsä) into the contents of the Veda, whence arose 

5) The Karfn€i»fnimänsä, Pürvchtnimähsä, or, as it is usually 
simply called, the Mimäüsä of Jaimini, as a system of wor- 
ship through works, which investigates the duties (dhartna) 
enjoined by the Veda, together with the rewards (phalam) 
attached thereto, and 

6) The Qartraka-mtmansa, Uttara-mtmänsäj or, as it is 
mostly called from its source, Yedanta of fiädaräya^au 
which unites the contents of the üpanishad's in a theologico» 
philosophical system« 

The two Mimäüsä's may have arisen together, since Jaimini 
and Bädaräya^a quote each other, often agreeing, often op- 
posing; the two systems complete each other in that together 
they exhibit the totality of Vedic theology (since in particular 
the Yedanta holds fast throughout to the system of rewards 
of the Karmar-mimäiisä cfl 2, 3, 42. 3, 1, 26. 3, 2, 9 and 
p. 1076, 13), and their principles are in a thorough-going anti« 
thesis, which has its foundation in the Veda itself. For the 
Veda falls (as Qankara on Brih. p. 4ff. shows), according to 
the concept of the Yedanta, into two parts, which show a far- 
reaching analogy with the Old and New Testaments, a Part 
of Works {karfna^känd<^)t which includes the Mantra's and 

I. Literary Notes. 21 

Br&hma^a's in general, and a Part of Knowledge (jMna' 
känd^)t which includes the Upanishad's and what belongs to 
them (e.g,, the Agnirahasyam, Qatap. Br. X« for which compare 
3, 3, 44—62, p. 943—962). The former enjoins works, such as 
sacrifices and other ceremonies, promising like the Old Testa- 
ment, rewards and threatening punishments, with this di£ference 
howcTer that, for the most part, by relegating these to the 
other world, it evades the conflict with experience; the in- 
restigation of these circumstances, of the religious works and 
the merit obtained by them, which enters as a ^new moment '' 
(apürvam) into the complex of deeds necessitating a requital 
in the other world, forms the essential content of Jaimini's 
Karma-mimäAsä, which precedes the Vedänta not so much in 
time as in order, and is largely quoted by Qankara in his 
Commentary on the Yedänta-sütras as ^ the first part," ^the 
first book" (e.g., p. 848, 6. 897, 1. 919, 9. 944, 4. 961, 3. 1011, 12). 
Howeyer, as we shall see (Chap. IV, 3), a knowledge of it is 
not necessary for the study of the Vedänta, which bases itself 
entirely on the ''part of knowledge" of the Veda's, that is, on 
the Upanishad's. The work of Bädaräyapa stands to the 
Upanishad'a in the same relation as the Christian Dogmatics 
to the New Testament: it investigates their teaching about 
God, the world, the soul, in its conditions of wandering and 
of deliverance, removes apparent contradictions of the doc- 
trines, binds them systematically together, and is especially 
concerned to defend them against the attacks of opponents. 
As such appear not only the heterodox philosophers, the Bud- 
dhists (whose teachings 2, 2, 18—32 in their various forms are 
examined« and entirely rejected as an outcome of hatred 
toward the human race p. 681, 2), the Jaina's (2, 8, 33—36), the 
Pa^upata's (2, 3, 37—41) and the Päncarätra's (2, 2,42—46), 
but also the adherents of the other orthodox systems; inas- 
mach as Bidaräya^a, 2, 1, 11, declares himself fundamentally 
against any possibility of discovering the truth by meaus of 
reflection (tarka). This will be further treated in Chap. V, 2. — 
For the purpose of fixing Bädaräya^a's time, it is 
important to note how he treats the four non-Yedic systems. 
The Ny&ya is not mentioned by Bädaräyava at all, and only 

22 Inirodaction. 

twice casually quoted by Qankara (p. 67, 6. 594, 1), but with 
approbation, perhaps because it lent no support to his polemics 
(but compare on Brih. p. 801, 8); the Yoga appears, as far as 
we see (1, 1, 19 the word has another meaning), with the exception 
of 4, 2, 21 (where, however ** Yoginah^ refers in the first place to 
Bhag. G. 8, 23) only at 2, 1, 3, where it is briefly dismissed with the 
remark, that what has been said against the Sankhyam applies 
to it also; the Vai^eshika-teaching is confuted at 2, 2, 11 — 17 
with the remark that no attention need be paid to it, since no 
one adopts it (2, 2, 17: aparigrahäc ca atyantam anapekshä)^ a 
proofs that in Bädaräya^a's time or country Ka^äda's teach- 
ing was in disrepute. On the other hand, we must conclude 
from the way in which he treats the Sankhyam that this 
system (recommended by authorities like Manu and the Mahä- 
bbäratam) was held in high regard in his time. At eTery 
opportunity he recurs to it, in part in long discussions (as 
1, 1, 5—11. 1, 4, 1—13. 2, 1, 1—12. 2, 2, 1—10), in part in single 
references (1, 1, 18. 1, 2, 19. 1, 2, 22. 1, 3, 3. 1, 3, 11. 1, 4, 28. 
2, 1, 29. 2, 3, 51. 4, 2, 21), to which others are sometimes 
attached (2, 1, 3 and 4, 2, 21, the Yoga; 2, 1, 29, and 2, 3, 51, 
the Vai^eshikam; 2, 1, 4 — 11, the systems of reflection in general), 
and repeatedly (1, 4, 28; 2, 1, 12) the remark is made, that 
with the Sankhya system the others are also dealt witL<^ It 
is worthy of remark, that Bädaräya^a does not mention bj 
name any of the other systems (except the Yoga, 2, 1, 3 and 
the Yogin's 4, 2, 21, which in fact stand nearer to the Veda) 

!• Gf. QanUra od 1, 4, 28, p. 403: ""From tkshater na afabdam (1, 1, 5 
onwardi the teaching of the Pradhanam [primitive matter of the SafikhyaV, 
as the caose of the world has been again and again examined and refuted 
in the Sutra's [not only in the Commentary]; for this assertion finds t 
support in certain passages of the Vedanta [Upanishad's], which apparently 
speak for it, and this might at first sight deceive the inexpert Also the 
said teaching approaches the teaching of the Vedanta, in that it recogrnises 
the identity of cause and effect, and is therefore recognised by Devals, 
and other composers of Dhamuuüträ't'f therefore so much more effort 
has been expended on refuting it, than on refuting the atomism [ol 
Kanada] and other teachings."— Cf. p. 440, 6: "The atomic teaching and 
others [contrary to the Safikhyam], have not even been accepted in part 
by sages like Manu and Vyasa." 

L Literary Notes. 23 

or any of their founders, and even avoids repeating the usual 
terms for their chief ideas; so, instead of praähänam (the 
primitive material of the S&nkhya's), he says rather miärtam 
(1, 8, 19), anumanam (1, 1, 18. 1, 3, 3) anumänikam (1, 4, 1} 
^ the traditional,'' ** the hypothetical," while on the other hand 
pradhanam with him 3, 3, 11 means the Brahman. But the more 
careful he is to allow the names of his opponents to fall into 
obliyion, the more frequently, for the most part when investigat- 
ing small differences between them, does he name the teachers 
of the two Mim&Äs& schools. As such appear in his work: 
Bädaräyana (1, 3, 86. 1, 3, 33. 3, 8, 41. 3, 4, 1. 3, 4, 8. 3, 4, 19. 
4, 3, 15. 4^ 4, 7. 4, 4, 12). Jaimini (1, 2, 88. 1, 8, 31. 1, 3, 31. 
1, 4, 18. 3, 8, 40. 3, 4, 8. 3, 4, 18. 3, 4, 40. 4, 3, 18. 4, 4, 6. 4, 4, 
11), Bädari (1, 8, 30. 3, 1, 11. 4, 3, 7. 4, 4, 10), Äudulomi (1, 4, 
21. 3, 4, 46. 4, 4, 6), ÄfinaraOiya (1, 8, 89. 1, 4, 80), Eäfakritsna 
(1, 4, 82), KärOinäjini (3, 1, 9), and Ätreya (3, 4, 44).— These 
are in fact with two exceptions (1, 1, 30. 1, 3, 35), the only 
proper names that appear in Bädaräya^a's Sutra's. 

As sources of knowledge our author makes use of the 
Qruti^ and in the second rank for confirmation and without 
binding force, the 8mjrü%\ and in doing so he in a very curious 
way uses the names which serve in the other systems to in- 
dicate the natural sources of knowledge, with an altered mean- 
ing in his own, so that with him pratyaksham (perception) 
repeatedly stands for Qruti, and anumanam (inference) for 
Smriti (1, 3, 88. 3, 8, 84. 4, 4, 80), and this as Qankara, p. 887, 
11 escplains, because the latter requires a basis of knowledge 
{prd$nänyam), and the former not Under Qruti (revelation, 
holy scripture) Bädaräyax^a understands, not only the older 
Upanishad's, Brihadärapyaka, Chändogya, Kathaka, Käushitaki 
(2, 3, 41), Aitareya (1, 1, 5), Taittiriya (1, 1, 15) and the rest, 
bat also certain üpanishad's of the Atharvaveda, as especially 
the frequentiy quoted MuQdaka and Pra^na, even products of 
SQch late origin as the QvetaQvatara (1, 1, 11. 1, 4, 8. 8, 3, 88), 
and perhaps even the Jäbäla XJpanishad (1, 8, 38. 4, 1, 3); 3, 
3, 25 refers to an unknown XJpanishad of the Atharvaveda. 
It is also worthy of note, that the Sutra 2, 3, 43 alludes to a 
ferse of the Atharvaveda which is not found in the printed 

24 Introduction. 

editions. Under Smriti (tradition) our author, according to 
Qankara, on whose explanations we are completely dependent 
for all quotations, understands the Sankhya and Yoga systems 
(4, 2, 21), the Mahäbhäratam, especially its episode called the 
Bbagayadgita, the law-book of Manu, and perhaps other books 
(cf. 4, 3, 11). Beside it appears, 3, 4, 43, custom {äcära; c£ 
3, 4, 3; 3, 3, 3). As perfectly known, are mentioned the recen- 
sions of the same Qruti work, differing according to the Yedic 
schools (gäJdiä^s): thus Bädaräya9a considers in particular the 
agreement and divergence in the Kkjyra, and M&dhyandina 
recensions ^^ of the Brihadära^yaka Upanishad (1, 2, 20 ubhaye; 

1, 4, 13 asati anne), as also the frequently appearing ^some*^ 
(eke) refers for the most part to the differences of the Yedic 
schools (1, 4, 9. 3, 2, 2. 3, 2, 13. 4, 1, 17, and likewise anye 
3, 3, 27), but at times also means different passages (4, 2, 13. 

2, 3, 43) and teachers of the Mimänsä (3, 4, 15. 3, 4, 43) and 
once eyen (3, 3, 63) something quite different, namely, the 
materialists. —His own work our author quotes with the words 
*^tad uktam" (about this it has been said), by which at 1, 3, 21 
he points back to 1, 2, 7, further at 2, 1, 31 to 2, 1, 27, and 
at 3, 3, 8 to 3, 3, 7, just as through the. equivalent ^tad vyä' 
khyätam^^ at 1, 4, 17 to 1, 1, 31. — But the same formula ^tad 
uktam^^ is further frequently used to indicate the Karmasütra's 
of Jaimini, thus 3, 3, 33 (Jaim. 3, 3, 9), 3, 4, 42 (Jaim. 1, 3, 
8-9), 3, 3, 26 (p. 903, 9: dvädafalaJcshanyäm) 3, 3, 43 (p. 942, 6: 
sankarshe), 3, 3,44 tadapi (Jaim. 3, 3, 14), 3, 3, 60 (p. 951, 3: 
praihame kände), from which it may perhaps be concluded that 
the works of Jaimini and Bädaräyapa, each of whom quotes 
both himself and the other by name, may have been com- 
bined by a later editor into one work, and provided with 
the additions already mentioned and others. ^^ To such an 

1* The two are dietinguished by Qafikara p. 1098, 14 as different 
Qäkha*8, while on the other hand p. 882, 6 Bfih. 5, 6, 1 in the Kanva 
recension and Qatap. Br. 10, 6, S, 2 in the Mädhyandina recension 
(perhaps identical with the Kanva recension?) are quoted ai belonging 
to the same Qäkha of the Vajasaneyin^s. 

17 In this unified form the work of Jaimini and Bädarayana seems 
to have been commented on by Upavarsha, on whose work the com* 

I. Literary Notet. 2S 

editor the name Vyäsa (the arranger), occurring (according to 
Colebrooke M. K', p. 352) in connection with BädaräyaQa, 
wonld be admirably suited, and he might very well be Vyasa, 
the father of Quka, the teacher of Gäudapäda, the teacher 
of GrOTinda, the teacher of Qankara, and thus be 200 — 300 years 
older than his commentator, Qankara (Windischmann, Sane, 
p. 85), though Qankara understands by Vyasa in all the pass- 
ages where this name occurs (p. 313, 9. 440, 6. 690, 11. 764, 10 
and Vedavyäsa, p. 298, 5, cf. Mahäbh. XII, 7660), only the 
editor of the Mahäbhäratam while he calls the author of the 
Sutra's, p. 1163, 8, bhagavan Bädaräyana-äcäryn. 

4. Form of the Brahma-sütra's; Qankara's Commentary. 

After these indications, which can only be of use after a 
determination, only possible later on, of the date when our 
work was composed, let us turn to a consideration of its form, 
which is a very singular one. It is composed, as are also the 
fundamental works of the other Indian philosophic systems, 
in a series of sütra% which word means "thread" (from siv 
— Lat suere)j and is here best understood as the warp of 

mentarie« of Qabarasvamin and Qafikara may rest, cf. p. 958, 2: ''We 
"pro ce ed now to an invettigation of the immortality of the lou], for the 
"purpose of the teaching of its bondage and deliverance. For did the 
'soul not endure beyond the body, the commandments which promise a 
"reward in another world wtfuld not be i>ermis8ible, and still less could 
*it be proved that the soul is identical with Brahman. But was not the 
"existence of the soul beyond the body, and its enjoyment of the fruit 
" promised in the teaching of the scripture already settled at the beginn- 
"ing of the book in the first pada [that is, on Jaim. 1, 1, 5]? — Certainly, but 
"only by the commentator (bhäshyakrit), and there is no sutram there on 
"the continued existence of the soul. Here, on the contrary, its con- 
"tiaiied existence is, after previous mention of objections, confirmed by 
" the composer of the sutra's (siUrakrit) himself. It was from here that 
"the teacher Qabarasvamin took it and explained it in the Pramina- 
• lakshanam [the first book of Jaimini, at viz. 1, 1, 5 p. 18-24]. The vener- 
"able Upavarsha also, in the first book, where he declares the continued 
"existenoe of the sou], points to this also, since he says: *In the Qkn- 
"'imkam [that is, in the Brahmasütra's] we shall explain it' And so here, 
" aller eooaideration of the honours resting on prescription, the continued 
"exietenoe of the soul is taken into consideration, in order to show that 
"this tf^^hhig is in eonformity with the whole of our canon." 

26 Introduction. 

threads stretched out in weaving to form the basis of the 
web, but which will become the web only when the woof is 
added,^^ just as the Sutra's become a connected whole only 
through Üie explanations interwoven among them by oral or 
written exposition. For without this the 656 Sutra's, consisting 
for the most part of two or three words each, in which our 
author lays down the whole Yedanta system, are utterly un- 
intelligible, especially as they contain, not so much the leading 
words of the system, as the catch words, for the memory to 
grasp, and these seldom exhibit the main matter, but frequently 
something quite subordinate, have often a quite general, in- 
determinate form, which fits the most different circumstances and 
leaves everything to the interpreter. Thus the same Sutra often 
recurs: thus for instance Sfnriteg ca 1, 2, 6. i, 3, 11; gnUef ca 
3, 4, 4. 3, 4, 46 ; dargayati ca 3, 3, 4. 3, 3, 22 ; sva-pd/csha-doshäc ca 
2, 1, 10. 2, 1, 29; ubhayathä ca doshat 2, 2, 16. 2, 2, 23; darganac 
ca 3, 1, 20. 3, 2, 21. 3, 3, 48. 3, 3, 66. 4, 3, 13, that is, five times, and, 
in fact, if we are to believe the CommentAtor (as indeed we must), 
in different meanings, since darganac ca generally (3, 2, 21. 4, 3, 13 
c£ 1, 3, 30) means ^because the scripture teaches it," while in 
3, 1, 20. 2, 2, 16 and 4,2, 1 it means: "because experience shows 
it/' and 3, 3, 48: "because it is perceived (from the indications).*^ 
In the same way we twice have tiie sMrsLgaunyammbhavat (2, 3, 3. 
2, 4, 2), and this, as Qankara himself says (p. 706, 9), in quite con- 
trary meanings. Thus anumänam generally means " the Smriti ^ 
{e,g. 1, 3, 28. 3, 2, 24. 4, 4, 20), then it is also for a change the 
synonym of prcuOiänam (primordial matter of the Sankhya's) in 
1, 3, 3; thus, again, itara, 1, 1, 16. 2, 1, 21, means the individual, but, 
2, 3, 21, the highest soul, and again, 4, 1, 14, "the good work"; 
and prakaranät, 1, 2, 10 and 1, 3, 6, " because it is spoken oC but, 
4, 4, 17, " because he is charged with it" This is accompanied by 
a special leaning to rare words and phrases in which another 
word is frequently chosen, than that used in the passage of the 
Upanishad taken for consideration, which is sometimes indicated 

1« Gf. p. 622, 2: tathä sütrair ürrtä-ddibhic ca vieiträn kambaUtn 
vttofioate.— Compare also our ^'text," from texerCt to weave, and the 
Chinese kinfft "warp of a web" (Schott, Chin, Litt,^ p. 8). 

L Literary Notes. 27 

only by this word; thus 1, 1, 24 carana for päda (Ohänd. 3, 12, 6) ; 
1, 3, 1 sva for ätman, bhü for prithivi (Mu^d. 2, 2, 6); 1, 3, 2 upa- 
sarp for upa-i (Mu^d. 3, 2, 8); 1, 3, 10 anibara for äkäfa (Brih. 
3, 8, 7); 1, 3, 39 kampana for ejati (Käth. 6, 2); 1, 4, 24 abhidhyä 
for akämayata (Taitt. 2, 6), aikshata (Chänd. 6, 2, 3) ; 4, 2, 4 upor 
gama for abhisatnäyanti (Brih. 4, 3, 38) ; 4, 3, 2 a6da for aamvatsara 
(Chänd. 6, 10, 2) ; 4^ 3, 3 tadit for vidyui (Chand. 6, 10, 2) and so on. i » 
This condition of the Brahmasütra's cannot be sufficient- 
ly explained either by striving after brevity or a predi- 
lection for characteristic ways of expression. Rather must we 
admit that the composer, or composers, intentionally sought 
after obscurity, in order to make their work treating of the 
secret doctrine of the Veda inaccessible to all those to whom 
it was not opened up by the explanations of a teacher. From 
such explanations, which conformably to this intention were 
originally only oral, may in the course of time have arisen 
the written Commentaries on the work whioh Colebrooke (Misc. 
flss. 1 p. 332, 334) enumerates, and of which only that of Qan- 
kara is now accessible to us. We must therefore at present 
renounce the attempt to keep Bädaräya^a's teaching and 
Qankara's interpretation of it separate from each other, so 
that our exposition, strictly taken, is one of the Yedänta system 
from the standpoint of Qankara only. However, he is nowhere 
in contradiction to the Sutra's (if we omit 1, 1, 1 9, about which 
we shall treat, Chapter IX, 5, and perhaps also p. 870, 5, 

>* At rare, words end phraseB in part found nowhere else we note 
the foUowing: 1, 1, 5 and 1, 8, 13, thshaH as substantive; 1, 1, 25 nigadax 
1, 1, 31 mpd»ä for upäBonä'y 1, 2, 4 karma-kartri lor prapya-prapaka-j 
1. 8, 7 arbhaka; okaB\ 1, 2, 26 driMi; 1, 1, 80 ffistra-drishH, 1, 3, 4 
pränabhrü, ««individaal soul;" 1, 3, 84 piic; 2, 1, 16 avaram for käryam 
(effect); 2, 1, 26 kapa shaking (of the authority of scripture); 2, 8, 1 viyat 
for äkäga\ 2, 3, 8 mätarifvan for od^; 2, 8, 10 t^'aa for agni; 2, 4, 9 
kriyd, organ, for karanam\ 2, 4, 20 Mf^jnä-mürtukfipti for the usual 
nätma-ri^'kaipanam'y 3, 1, 1 rahhati\ 3, 1, 8 anugaya * remainder of 
work'' (bhiktaphaiät karmam *tiriktam karma Qafik. p. 760, 5); 8, 1, 21 
samfokqfa for 9vedqja\ 8, 1, 22 aäbhävya; 8, 2, 10 mugdha for mdrchita 
: faint); 8, 8, 8 «am; 8, 8, 25 vedha; 8, 3, 57 bhüman '^ samaata; 4, 2, 4 
adkyakAa ** individual sool;" 4, 2, 7 griti way; 4, 2, 17 ^ha consequence; 
4, 8, 1 pratkiH proclamation; 4, 8, 7 kdryam for aparam hrakma. 

28 iDtroduction. 

where ädhyänäya is explained by samyagdarfana^artJiamj and 
p. 908, 12, where the interpreter for ubhayathä substitates 
id>hayathä'Vibhägena)f although 3, 1, 13, p. 764, 3 we have the 
strange case that, in considering Käth., 2, 6, Qankara refers 
the words punah punar vagam dpadyate me, with Bädaräya9a, 
wrongly to the penalties of hell, while, in his Commentary on 
Käth., 2, 6, p. 96, 14, he rightly understands the same words 
as referring to repeated birth and death. Here and there 
his explanation of a Sütram is given with reserve {e>g. 2, 4, 12. 
3, 2, 33) ; in the following , places he (or the different hands 
that have redacted them) give a double explanation : 1, 1, 12-19. 
1, 1. 31. 1, 3, 27. 1, 4, 3. 2, 2, 39—40. 2, 4, 5—6. 3, 1, 7. 3, 2, 22. 
3, 2, 33. 3, 3, 16—17. 3, 3, 26. 3, 3, 35. 3, 3, 64; at 1, 1, 23 he 
combats (p. 141, 7ff.) the reference of the Sütram to Brih. 4, 4, 
18, Chand. 6, 8, 2 instead of to Chand. 1, 10, 9; at 1, 4, 26 he 
remarks that many treat it as two Sutra's; at 1, 2, 26 and 

2, 1, 16 he discusses a variant reading of the Sütram; at 2, 4, 2. 

3, 3, 38 and 3, 3, 67 another interpretation of it; 3, 2, 11—21 he 
treats as connected, and rejects, after a very detailed dis- 
cussion, the opinion of those who make two sections {adhi- 
karana)f namely 11 — 14 and 15^21, of it; yet more remarkable 
and indicative of profound differences of principle among the 
interpreters is it, that Qankara, p. 1124, 9, mentions and further 
amply refutes, the opinion of others who find the Siddhanta 
(the final opinion) expressed, not in the concept of Badarayaua 

4, 3, 7 — 11, but in the subsequent one of Jaimini, which seems 
to presuppose that, for them, Bädaräya^a was not the 
final author of the work, and would be in harmony with 
the above-mentioned indications of the Karma^mimäüsä as a 
part of the same work, and of the author as Vyäsa. 

Qankara's Commentary has, there is reason to believe, suffered 
many interpolations, particularly in the first part, where they 
are generally introduced with the words apard Ska. The pur- 
suit of this subject would lead us too far, so that we only 
name briefly the passages in which we believe ourselves to 
detect additions from a foreign hand: 1) p. 122, 9 — 129, 5, which 
we shall treat of in Chap. IX, 5; 2) p. 141, 7—142, 3, seems to 
be a polemic addition of another, cfl p. 138, 12; 3) p. 150, 

I. Literary Noiet. 29 

10 — 151, 6, without doubt an interpolation; 4) p. 163, 5—154, 2 
an ^Ojpara^ who took offence at the saying that Brahman is 
in Heayen instead of beyond Heaven, repeats Qankara's words, 
while correcting them; 5) p. 163, 11 there follows, with the 
words ^aOiava — asya ayam anyo *rthah,^^ a quite different ex- 
planation of the Sütram, possibly from a different hand; 6) p. 184, 
1 — 185, 17 : an *'apara" contests the previously made application 
of the verse Mu94- 3, 1, 1 and explains it in another sense, 
with an appeal to the Paingi-rahasya-brähma^am; here he 
quotes Brih, 4, 5, 16 according to the Madhyandinas, while 
Qankara is usually wont to quote this passage according to 
the Eanvas (or instead 2, 4, 14 Madhy.), p. Ill, 4. 199, 12. 
393, 3. The motive of this excursus seems to be taken from 
p. 232, 12; it is ignored at 3, 3, 34, just as much as the addition 
p. 122, 9->129, 6 at 3, 3, 11— 13; 7) p. 228, 2—6 an evident addition 
of an interpolator, according to whom the bridge ^'sdu^' in 
Mnod 2, 2, 5 is the knowledge of Brahman, and not Brahman 
itself, to which, however, the expression is referred before, 
p. 227, 10, and again later, p. 834, 11; 8) p. 247, 3 (perhaps 
only to 247, 7) an ^^apara^^ asserts that the jivaghana is not 
the jivOy as already explained, but braJimaloka. On a fusion 
of both views seems to rest the apprehension of ßvaghana as 
Hira^yagarbha in the Commentary on Praf na 5, 6. 

5. The Quotations in Qankara's Commentary. 

It is of special interest to trace back to their sources the 
numerous quotations, introduced for the most part by a ^'(rüyaU?^ 
or ^smaryaUT and so on, without further statement of their origin, 
though in general verbally correct, in which Qankara's Com- 
mentary in all its parts is so rich, partly because a full under- 
standing of the text becomes thereby possible for the first 
time,^^ partly because an accurate determination of the writ- 
ings which Qankara did and did not use may support many 

3* Thus, to give only one example, Bftnerjea (TraiuL p. 84) hat com- 
pletely mitondentood the' words p. 87, 11 *" Btkita'pm^iUuya kä hhäihä," 
because he did not recognise them as a quotation from the Bhag. 0. 2, 54, 
aad Braining (Transl. p. 29) does not make matters better by leaving 
tbe passage in qaestion out altogether (cf. further p. 395, 5. 1061, 9). 

30 IntroduotioD. 

raltt&ble conclusions as to the genuineness of the other works 
which are attributed to Qankara, as to certain interpolations 
in the Commentary, as to the incorporation of older preparatory 
works in it, and so forth. 

Not without labour, we have prepared an Index of all the 
quotations occurring in Qankara's Commentary, together with 
a statement of their source, which is added at the end of this 
work, and will serve as a welcome aid to the study of the 
Brahmasütra's. However, it is to be used with a certain care ; 
for on the one hand the quotations sometimes show more or 
less important deviations from their sources, and it cannot in 
every case be satisfactorily decided whether these deviations 
are due merely to inaccuracy, or to difference of reading, or, 
finally, to the fact that Qankara had before him, not the 
passage quoted by us, but a parallel passage from another 
Qäkhä; on the other hand we must leave a (relatively small) 
number of quotations undetermined, whether it is that they 
are taken from lost writings, or that we have not yet come 
across them, or have overlooked them in the writings which 
we have. We shall indicate them the more exactly, because 
the conclusions which can be drawn from the other facts have 
validity only so far as they are not traversed by the quotations 
not yet recognised. 

According to an estimate, which within certain bounds 
(according as things connected are joined or separated) is 
subjective, we count in the whole Commentary, all repetitions 
and simple references included, 2, 523 quotations, of which 
2, 060 are derived from the Upanishad's, 150 from other Yedic 
scriptures, and 313 from non-Vedic literature. 

a) Upanishad Quotations. 

The Upanishads, arranged according to the frequency with 
which they are used, provide quotations in the following num* 
bers: Chandogya (quoted in 8, not in 10 prapäthdkcis, p. 106,1) 
810; Brihadarapyaka (the fourth Adhyäya of which is 
quoted, p. 330, 4, as shashtha prapäthaka, and as its beginning 
p. 893, 3, Qatap. Br. XIY, 1, 1, 1, therefore, according to the 
Madhyandina's) 567, eight of which (p. 198, 8. 366, 9. 386, 3. 

L Literary Notes. 31 

677, 7. 682, 18. 686, 10. 893, 3. 1098, 13) are only found in 
the Madhyandina recension (Qatap. Br. XIV), while the others 
are mostly quoted according to the Kartva's, but also some- 
times according to the Madhyandina's, without showing any 
fixed principle«*; Taittiriya (Taitt ar. VII, VIII, IX), 142; 
Mnpdaka 189; Kä(haka 103; Eaushltaki 88 (which agree 
now with the first, now with the second recension of Cowell, 
but often diverge from botb, as for example Kaush. 3, 3 is 
quoted p. 140, 15 and again exactly the same p. 299, 7 contrary 
to both recensions which makes it very probable that Qankara 
iiad before him a third recension of this work, which he 
quotes comparatively seldom; Qvetagyatara (quoted p. 110, 5 
as '^ Qvetägvataränäm tnantropanishad," cf. p. 416, 1. 920, 4) 53 
A gnirahasya (Qatap. Br. X) 40 (mostly found on pp. 214—222. 
943—962); Pra^na 39; Aitareya (Ait. är. II, 4-6) 22; 
Jäbäla 13, nine of which (p. 222, 8. 223, 1. 417, 11. 988, 
8 — 991, 4. 999, 6. 1000, 1. 3. 1025, 8) are found in the 
Jabalopanishad, but the four others (924, 7 -» 1059, 1. 931, 
4 — 933, 4) not; Naraya^iya (Taitt. är. X) 9 (890, 2, 13. 
891, 1. 5. 6. 10. 892, 1. 998, 2. 998 4); tgä (Vaj. saiph. XL) 

't Very remarkable is the disproportion with which the two great 
Upmuhad^s, Bribadaranyaka and Chandogya, are used. According to the 
external extent and internal importance of these two works, as well as 
the treatment which Qaflkara bestows on them in his Commentaries 
< where the Bfih. numbers 1096, the Cband. 628 pages, including the text), 
one would rather expect a contrary relation of the numbers of quotations. 
This one-sided preference for the Chand. Up. is in harmony with the 
leading role which it plays in the whole design of the Brahmasutra^s; 
thoa of the 98 Upanishad passages in connection with which the theology 
in the first Adhyaya is discussed, Chand. provides 12, Bph. 4, £ath. 4, 
Mund, and Pra^na together 4, Taitt. and Kaush. together 4, (on this cf. 
Chap. VII, 2). In the case of parallel texts, as for example in the Paflcslg- 
nividya Bjih. 6, 2, Chand. 6, 8—10), as a rule, the (mostly secondary) 
readings of the Chand. are preferred ; finally, it is remarkable that where 
a passage it quoted with the bare addition: "t^ brähmanam,** "tathä 
brakmanam^'* with two exceptions (p. 1115, 8. 1116, 11) as far as we 
know, the Chindogya is always to be understood (p. 143, 6. 240, 11. 262, 
12. 367, 7. 390, 4. 906, 8. 1014, 11) as though it were the Brahmanam, 
x«-^ ^i^X^ '^^ ^^^^ ^^ P* ^^t ^ Chand. VI is quoted with the words 
" AaMha-prcgfäthake " without further addition, as if it were self-evident 
that it only could be meant. 

32 IntrodaotioiL 

8 (66, 4. 74, 1. 395, 5. 414, 1. 979, 9. 986, 12. 986, 2. 1126, 
10); Paingi 6 (184, 2, 7. 185, 4. 889, 10. qaoted as PUififfi' 
rahasyorbrahmanamy 232, 12 [» 184, 2] as BcUngy-upanühad, 
undetermined 903, 3); Ken a 5 (70, 1. 4. 10. 163, 3. 808, 10). 
Besides, p. 892, 7 (perhaps only because the Sütram required 
it) an Atharya-Upanishad unknown to me (or the unknown 
beginning of a known one) is quoted with the words äihar- 
vanikanam-upanishad'arambhe). We leave undetermined the 
seven times quoted passage: *^äkägavat sarvagatag ca nityaih^* 
(130, 12 = 172, 5 = 610, 3 - 624, 8 = 652, 7 -= 838, 9 -= 1124, 
12), which, according to the Commentator of Chand. Up. p. 409, 8 
is ascribed to the KiLthakam (by which he understands the 
Upanishad [p. 409, 6] as well as the Saiphita [p. 139, 4]), hardly 
with justice; as also the following Upanishad-like passages: 
87, 9. 112, 8 (= 1047, 12 « 1135, 6). 113, 3. 182, 7. 610, 6. 

7. 613, 4. 679, 8. 717, 10 (=- 719, 8 — 939, 7). 741, 10. 
832, 8, and, as especially worthy of notice, 808, 11 and 982, 
11. If we overlook these not yet discovered quotations, we 
can state as result that no upanishad except those above 
enumerated occurs; that is, neither Märidükya (69, 2. 77, 6 
occur also in Brih.), nor Maitri nor any of the Atharva^a- 
Upanishad's, since 810, 1 is indeed to be found in Brahma- 
vindüp. 12, but probably also in Mahäbh. XTT, and was taken 
probably from that work. 

b) Other Yedic Qaotations. 

Ei^eda-samhitä: Book I) 138, 1. 211, 13. 403, 2. 11) 960, 

8. IX) 341, 7. X) 151, 13. 208, 13. 211, 11. 215, 6. 298, 3. 
304, 4. 426, 12. 495, 7. 716, 7. 764, l.—Aitareya-brahmanam: 
I) 901, 9. Ill) 74, 8. 313, 2. V) 43, 2. VII) 990, 10.— 
Äitareya-äranyakam: II) 103, 10. 872, 10. 924, 6. 958, 4. 1000, 
9. 1002, 9. iri) 150, 6. 450, 7. 450, 8. 783, 9. 852, S.—Kaushitaki- 
brähmanam perhaps 893, 4. (Under the same name Käush. 
Up. is quoted 378, 2. 865, 3: perhaps Qankara regarded both 
as a single work). — Perhaps the supplements of the Banäyaniya's 
(kliüa), quoted 887, 9, may be counted to the Sämavedarsani'' 
hitä.—Pancavinga-brähmanam X) 319, 9. 319, 10. XXI) 919, 
5. 960, l.—ShadvinfO-brahmamm: I) 892, 9 (cf. Bajendralala 

I. Literary Notes. 33 

Mitra, Chan<L Up., introd., p. 17 n.) — ÄrsheyipMihmanamf p. 3 
(Burnell): 301, 8. — According to the Glossator 288, 1 also 
comes from a Brahma^am of the Chandogas (cf. Rigv. IX, 
62, 1); presumably also the passage quoted with "iti brähmanam^*\ 
1115, 6.— Väjasaneyi'Samhitä: I) 960, 1 ? XXI) 960, 5 ? XXXII) 
1123, 7. — Qaiapaiiha'brähmanam (besides books X and 
XIV): I) 1033, 10. VI) 310, B. 422, 9. 701, 7. 901, 8. VIII) 
1098, 3. XI) 320, 7. 749, 1. XII) 980, 1. XIII) 609, 10. 
1005, S.—TaütiriyO'Samhitä: I) 51, 5. 52, 2. 146, 12. 362, 11. 
747, 4. 990, 8. II) 311, 12. 412, 8. 704, 3. 858, 5. 858, 6. 
941, 9. 942, 1. 975, 4. 992, 5. 1006, 8. 1011, 10. Ill) 312, 1. 
935, 4. 971, 4. 975, 2. V) 709, 5. 6. 12. 711, 15. 712, 3. 
951, 12. 1077, 2. VI) 975, 3. VII) 315, 11. 960, ^.-^TaUtiriya- 
brikmanam: I) 902, 1. II) 289, 6. Ill) 146, 9. 304, 7, 418, 1.— 
TaMirtya-^ranyakatn (with exception of books VII, VIII, IX, 
X): III) 111, 8. 390, 6. 454, 14. 686, 9.—Käthakam: 311, 5 
and 1016, 11. (^ EaOiänäm samhitayam'') 859, 12; C" agnihotra- 
dar^Orpürna-mäsorädipiäm käthalia-dca-granthaparipathitänäm*^), 
893. 1 (" Kaihänäm^)] the latter passage belongs to those 
which according to 893, 10 stand ^^upanishad-granthänäm 
samipe;'^ let it be remembered that the Käth. up. is repeatedly 
(335, 6. 852, 5. 869, 2) quoted as ^Käthakam,'' and it follows 
almost certainly that for Qankara it still formed a whole with 
the K&XhakBxn.^ Maiträyant'Samhitä: 959, 14; 960, 3 (accord- 
ing to the Glossator). — Atharvaveda'Sanihüä: no certain quo- 
tation; 171, 4. 686, 7 are far more probably to be referred 
to C^öt; the verse 686, 2. (^ ätharvanikä brahmasükte'*) is 
not found in our recension; for 851, 11 cf. A. V. 10, 9. Kau^. 
64ff.— That the Gqpatha'brähmanam is ignored, we have al- 
ready seen above, p. 11. — The following brahmana-like quotations 
remain undetermined; 43, 1 (» 370, 1 » 483, 1 ^ 849, 13). 75, 1. 
81,8. 83. 4. 112, 1. 141, 15. (cf. schol. Katy. 7, 1, 4, p. 625, 23). 
MO. a 747,8. 846,2. 960,4 994,6. 1001,4. 1017, 10. Probably 
many of them may yet be found in the Taittiriya tezts.^^ 

2' ^mflkara quotes, p. 412, 8 not "Manur vat yat kihca avadat, tad bhh 
»ftajarn fiftt*' (KäfhAka 11, 5. Ind. Stud. Ill, 463), bat "yad vat kifkca 
Mamr aoadat, tad bhahe^am'' (Taitt. S.2, 2, 10, 2};-p. 747, 4 not "äpo 
cm fraddkd*' (Maitray. 8. p. 59, 3 Schröder), but "fraddhd vd' dpah" 


34 Introduction. 

Mention is further made of other Yedic schools, in part 
with quotations: KauthumaJca 846, 1; QiUydyanaka 846, L 
893, 1. 899, 7 ^ 907, 8 » 1082, 16. 902, 10; BhaUavin 902, 9. 
903, 6; Ärcäbhin 903, 4. 

From the Sutra-Literature occur: Afvalayana 894, 10. 
897, 5; Käty&yana 931, 11. 932, 8. 1020, 1; Äpagtamba 410, 6. 
754, 3. 1026, 7? 1036, 4. 1130, 9.— To the same source may 
belong: 322, 5. 6. 9. 11. 692, 4. 4. 5. 761, 6. 1016, 6. 1030, 1. 

c) Non-Vedic Quotations. 

Bhagavadgita in 56 passages; Mahäbhäratam (with many 
variants): I) 310, 4. Ill) 276, 7. 412, 6. VI) 1107, 14. XIIj 
133, 5. 213, 12. 283, 9. 288, 6. 288, 10. 298 5. 302, 7. 304, 12. 
305, 1. 322, 14. 409, 6. 409, 9. 413, 1. 413, 2. 413, 4. 413, 7. 
638, 1. 660, 1. 677, 9. 690, 13. 692, 5. 758, 1. 809, 6. 828. 3. 
915, a 1025, 5. 1048, 1. 1101, 6. XUI) 338, 12. 1022, 5.- 
Undetermined, Mahäbhärata-like: 214, 3. 309, 10. 362, 7. 
726, 11. 809, 14. 828, 6. 916, 3. 917, 1. (— 1122, 1) 1009, 6. 
1041, 8, 12. 1057, 6. 1075, 11. 1101, 9. 1B.—Bämäyanam: 
1036, 6. — Märkandeyorpuränam XLV) 208, 15. 872, 8.- 
Furana's: 410, 1. 427, 3 -»482, 6. 495, 10. 633, 12, perhaps 
713, i^—Manu: I) 196, 13. 289, 1. 1093, 14. II) 730, 5. 1023, 
3. IV) 322, 10. 907, 12. X) 321, 2. 321, 3. 1016, 4. XII) 
412, 10. 437, 3.—Dharmagä8tra'hke: 1024, 4. 1027, 3« 1030. 
6. 1031, 1. 

Yäska (p. 31, 15 Roth) 39, 2.—Pänini: 234, 3. 366, 1. 

(Taitt. S. 1, 6, 8, l);-p. 1077, 2 not ''taraH sarvam pdpmanam'' and so 
on, (^atap. Br. 18| 3, 1, 1) but ^sarvam papmanam tarati" and ao oo 
(Taitt S. 5, 3, 12, 1);— p. 709, 5, not **8apta vai ^irshan pratM'^ (Ait 
Br. 3, 8, 1) or "sapta ^raai pränäh'' (Pafic. Br. 22, 4, 8) or "»apia wn 
firshanyäh pränäh" (Qat Br. 18, 1, 7, 2\ but "sapta vai finkanyäk pränä. 
dväv aväficau" (Taitt. S. 5, 8, 2, 5).— A glance at the above oompariioDt 
shows farther, that (excepting the Upanithad^s and what pertains to them^ 
Qaflkara quotes from the other Qakha^s only occasionally, but from thsl 
of the Taittiriya^s constantly. Perhaps in the future, from this fact, and 
conversely from the above mentioned preference for the Chand. Up. 
(note 21), which runs through the original web of the work, oerttia 
eondasions may be drawn as to its .compilation from elements of different 

I. Litarary Notes. 36 

399, 10; mentioned as a „smritir anapav€idantyä'^ 416, 6. — 
JPärMäthä to PaQini (8, 3, 82) 1122, 9. 

Säfüchya-Mrikä: 356, 12. 361, 4. 718, 2.— No certain quo- 
tation from the Sänkhyct-^ütra^S] cf. however 417, 9. 447, 11. 
485, 7. — Other Sankhya quotations are perhaps 346, 10. 346, 1. 
480, 13.— Toffa8ütra's: 314, 6. 723, 12; not in our text 416,4; 
cL also 1072, d.—Nyäyasütra's: 67, 6. 694, h^Vaieesliikasütra's: 
I) 539, 13. IV) 626, 1. 634, 6. 634, 7. 536, 2. VII) 624, 1. 
634, 2 and again 624, i.—Mimahsäsüträ'B: I) 50, 6. 68, 4. 
52, 1, again 58, 4. 80, 1. 61, 7. 89, 2. 285, 3. 411, 2. 1002, 3. 
1028, 10. II) 100, 5. 848, 6. lU) 897, 1. 944, 4. 919, 10. 
995, 1. 1011, 12. VI) 278, 3. 1027, 1; presumably from book 
XI— XH) 903, 9. 906, 3. 942, 5. 961, a— Similar: 58, 2. 
79, 9. 963, 6. 963, 9. 77, 14— öaudapÄda: 375, 3. 433, 1.— 
Unknown 89, 10. 1003, 1.— Buddhistic: 555, 6. 558, 7. 563, 4.— 
Bhagavata's: 601, 3. 602, 6. 14. 604, 6. S.—Svapnädhyäyavidah: 
783, 11.— Indian proverbs: 823, 10 -» 825, 5; unknown 978, 3. 

To these are added 99 quotations and references to the 
Sutra's of fiadarayaoa himself, and eight passages about which 
it is doubtful if they contain a quotation (61, 8. 157, 10. 
238, 4. 301, 6. 367, 9. 369, 9. 1026, 4 1094, 13), which raises 
the sum total to 2523 quotations. 

6. Some Remarks on Qankara. 

The date of Badaraya^a and the circumstances of his life 
are entirely unknown to us. Of Qankara it seems to be certain 
that he lived about 700 or 800 A. D., founded a famous school 
in Qringagirif where perhaps also he was bom, as an ascetic 
pilgrim (paramahansaf parivräjaka)^ undertook journeys as far 
as Kashmir, to work for his doctrine, and died in Känd.^* 

» Golebrooke, M. £. & p. 882; Wilson, Sanskrit Diet » p. XVlff; 
Windischmann, Sane. p. 89— 48. — According to the AryaYid7äsadh&- 
kara p. 826 and the qootations there given, Qafikara was bom in the Tillage 
of KSlapi in the territory of Eerala as son of (i^ivagunt^arman in the 
year S889 of the Kaliyuga (which began 18th February 8109 B.C.), in 
the year 845 of the Vikramaditya era (beginning 56 B.C.), which 
brings ns to 787—789 A. D. as the year of his birth. The passage runs : 
* 8A ^fam adkifäima^vi^^ Kaii-käla-wicät krifatvam äpannä api, ^fnac' 
OkmiUtara^äeäryairbrakmatütrarupamiakad'bka^ brah- 




36 Introduction. 

From teaching, by which a new impetus was given to the 
Yed&nta doctrine in India, arose a great number of writings 

mavvdya-praUpMaka-grantheahu hhäahyorädin praaanna-gambhtran maha- 
nibandhän mracya samupabrinhita. Tad anu Vigvarupacarya- VäcaspaU- 
migra-prabhritibhir dcärya-gishya-praQishya'ädibhir värttUca-vivarana-hha- 
mati'pramukhän udära-nibandha-nicayän äbadhya supraHshthäpität iti 
j^eyafn, Oankara-äcärya-prädurbhävas tu Vdoramärka-samayäd aitU 
(%iJb)pahca'Catväring<idHidhika'0L8hUiQatimiU8am KeraUa-dege KälapH- 

gräme Qivagurugarmano bhäryäyäm aamahhavat Tathä ca aampradäya- 
vida* ähur: 

Nidhi-naga-ibha-vahny-CLbdet vibhave, man mädhave^ 
^ukle tiihau, dagamyäm tu ^ankara'ärya'udayah-8mrita\ iti. 
• Nidhinägebhavahngabde»: (3889) navti-agiti'UttarcHuhtaQatt'^dhika' 
trisafuiarimite varshe, iti arthah, KcUiyugaayat iti geshah,-— Tathä Qankara' 
mandära-saura^e NUakantha-bhattä^ api evam eva ähuh: « Präaüta tishya- 
garadäm atiyätavatyäm elcädaga-adhika-gata-üna-catuhsaJuuryäm » itirädü — 
« Tishya-garadäm », Kali-ynga-varshänäm, iti arthah,^^ 

n After this science of the highest spirit had saffered diminution 
" through the sway of the Kali age, it was supplied with new force by 
^'the illustrious Qafikara-acary a, in that he composed luminous and pro- 
" found commentaries and the like of great compass to the Brahmasutra's. 
*'the Upanishad's, the Bhagavadgita and other scriptures which handed 
"down the teaching of Brahman. These were then further fortified by 
^ Vigvarüpäcarya, Väcaspatimigra, and other pupils and pupils' pupils of 
" the master, through the composition of a mass of excellent works, auch 
^'as scholia, interprepations, explanations and the like; that is the fact 
" The birth of Qafikara from the wife of Qivagurugarman happened in the 
"territory of Kerala in the village of Kalapi after the 846th year of the 
"era of Yikramarka [Vikramaditya] had gone by. And thus the knowers 
"of the tradition say: ^ 

"In the year sea-elephant-mountaii^east-fire, 
"In the increasing year, in the month Madhava, 
"On the tenth day of the bright fortnight, 
"There came to the world the noble Qankara. 
" In the year sea-elephant-mountain-beast-fire , that is in the year 3889, 
" meaning, as must be supplied, of the Kali era. — So too says the Master 
"Nilakantha in the work called *the fragrance of the tree of heaven 
"Qafikara' *He was bom in the myrobalan harvest while the four 
"thousandth year less a hundred and eleven years was rolling by.' The 
" myrobalan harvests mean the year of the Kali era." 

Further it is circumstantially explained that Manikya (who according 
to Merutufiga, lived about 1150 of Vikramaditya's era) in his commentary 
to the E^vyaprakaiga, quotes Kumarila-bhatta as a commonly recogniaed 
authority; the latter must therefore have lived long before 1160 (<m1094 

I. Literary Notes. 37 

which bear his name, whose genuineness still remains to be 
inrestigated. His master-piece is the Commentary on the 
Brahmasütra's, numbering 1166 pages together with the gloss 
of GrOTindananda (for 3, 4 of Anandagiri) in the Bibl. Ind., 
which gives a substantially complete and sufficient picture of 
his system, and from which alone we draw our exposition of 
it, in order in this way to form a safe standard by which the 
genuineness of the other works attributed to Qankara, the 
minor writings, as well as the Commentaries to the Upanishad's, 
may subsequently be tested. From the examination of the 
latter, weighty conclusions can then again be drawn as to the 
time when the different Upanishad's came into existence, and 
as to their authority. We belieye we have made a contri- 
bution toward this in the demonstration, of course still con- 
ditional, that has already been given, that Qankara, in the 
Commentary to the Brahmasütra's, used no other upanishad's 
except Aitareya, Kaushitaki; Chandogya, Kena; Taittiriya, 
Kathaka^ Qvetägvatara^ Igä, Brihadaranyaka; Munddkaf ProQna 
(and incidentally jRitn^i, Agnirahasya^ Jäbäla, Näräyaniya and, 
once, an Atharva Up.)^^ The Commentaries published in 
the Bibl. Ind. (Vol. II, UI, VII, VKI.) to BrihaMranyaka, 
Chandogya^ Taittiriya, AitareyOj Qvetägvatara, Igä, Kena, 
Kathoj Rragna^ Mtinddkay Mändükya, are handed down under 
(Jankara's name; it is remarkable that KatisMtaki is not among 
them. 2» Besides these, he is said to have commented on 
AtharvofUchä (Weber, Ind. Stud., II, 63, L, (J. 2, p. 182), 
Srisifihatapaniya (Colebr.S p. 96) and Atharvagiras (Ind. St. 

A.D.), and therefore also Qankara, who had a meeting [very problema- 
tictl, however] with Kumärila-bhatta in Prayaga. 

s< The VäMeala-Dpaniahad, etül existing in 1636 A. D., he cannot 
well hsTe known, as otherwise he would quote the Myth of Indra as a 
ram, p. 310, 2, according to it, and not according to Shadv. 1, 1. For 
the remarkable passage 808, 11, there is no place in the Vashkala Up., 
as we know it according to Anquetil Duperron. 

^ According to Weber (L. G. >, p. 56) he also commented on Kaushitaki ; 
yet thii statement most be erroneous, so far as it rests (Ind. St, I, 892) 
only on the Berlin ManuscripU, No. 88-84 (Chambers, 292 a, 294 i, not 
2S2); the Commentary contained in them bears the name of ^ankara- 
ämamda, pupil of the Anandätmant and ii identical with that published by 

38 Introduction. 

I, 383, L. G.^ p. 188). Other works going under his name 
are: Äptavajrasüd (ed. Weber, Berlin 1860) and Tn/mii, 
which are both counted as XJpanishad's (Weber, L. 6.^ p. 179), 
Upadefosdhasri (Colebr.S p. 335, Hall, Bibliogr. Index, p. 99), 
Atmabodha (ed. Calc. 1868), Mohamudgara (Hall, p. 103), 
Bälabodhant (ed. Windischmann in Sane, Bonn 1833), Bala- 
hodhini (BerL Ms. No. 618, 2) and a series of other writings, 
which will be found enumerated by Windischmann and Hall 
(cfl Begnaud, Mat6riauz, p. 34. Weber Verz. der Berliner H. S., 
p. 180, It. G-.^, p. 205, n. Lassen, BhagavadgUd, p. XII). 

Characteristic 2> for Qankara's period as well as for his 
theological conception is a passage of his Commentary on the 
Brahmasütra's, p. 313, 8ff., which we translate here: 

^For also, what is for us imperceptible was perceptible for 
^the ancients; thus it is recorded, that Yyasa [the author of 
^the Mahabhäratam] and others used to meet the Gods and 
''[Bishis] face to face. But if some would assert that, as for those 
^now living so for the ancients also it was impossible to meet 
^with gods and the like, they would deny the yariety of the 
''world; they might also maintain that, as at present, so also 
^ in other times, there was no world-swaying prince (sarvabJum- 
*^mälj^ kshatriyiih) and thus they would not acknowledge the 
''injunctions referring to the consecration of kings; they might 
"further assume that, as at present, so also in other times, the 
"duties of castes and A^rama's had no stable rules, and 
" thus treat as vain the canon of law which provides rules for them. 
"We must therefore believe that the ancients, in consequence 

>* Ab stylistic cariosities from Qafikara^s Commentary may be qaoted : 
pratkama-tara, p. 137, 4, 148, 12 (also on £rih. 273, 5); up(^adyate4tträm 
144, b; na-taräm 931, 8; akalpaU 815, 2 and avj/acakshtta 819, 8 (a privativ« 
with a verb) and, to read it so, also avirudhj/eta 265, 3; janimatah 888» 14; 
janyate 844, 7; akihcitkaratvät 141, 5; arddhajaratiya 122, 18, 176i 11 (read 
so); rnvkhya* eva pränaaya dhannah (for mukhyapranasya eva dharmah) 
161,8; grutariihasyasya vijndnasya (for ^ruta-rahasya'V^fiäfuuya) 191,7. 
Frequent enough is the use of the 3rd pers. sing. pres. as substantive: earaiih 
769, 4; grijaHh 707, 10; dhydyatih 1071, 11; tkahaH-ädi-^ravanam 109, 7; 
karoti-arthadSltA; dhyayatt-artha 1071,10; also in the genitive: fomMaoaler 
680, 3; apnoter 1132, 9; tarateli präpnoti-arthah 834, 14 and tven prapaSkea- 
yiihyaUr 99, 5, which is, however, retracted in the Qaddhipatram« 

I. Literary Notes. 39 

^ of pre-eminent merits, held visible converse with Gods and 
^[Rishis]. The Smriti also says [Togasülra 2, 44]: ''through 
^ study [is gained] union with the beloved godhead." And 
''when it further teaches, that Yoga bestows as reward the 
^ mastery of nature, consisting [in the freedom from embodied 
*" being and its laws, and thereby] in the ability to become as 
'^ small as an atom and the like [2, to become light, 3, to 
^become large, 4, to reach everything, 6, to realise every wish, 
" 6, to rule all being with one's will, 7, to possess creative power, 
"'S, to penetrate all, Oaudap, on Sänkhyak. 23, Vedavyäsa on 
"*• Togas. 5, 44\ this is not to be rejected out of hand by a 
^mere dictatorial sentence.'' 

7. Analysis of the contents of the Brahmasütra's with 
Qankara's Commentary according to adhyäya, päda 

and adhikara9am. 

We conclude with an analysis of the contents of the 
Brahmasütra's, which will be useful not only for our exposition 
of the system, but also in the study of the original work. 
The work (in which the number four everywhere plays an 
important role, cf. Chap. VII, 2) falls, as we have it, into 
four Adhyäya's (Lectures) of four Päda's (Feet or Quarters) 
each, a division which calls to mind the four fourfold feet of 
Brahman (Chand. 4, &-8) and the sixteenfold Spirit (Praf na 6^ 
cC Chand. 6, 7, Qvet 1, 4, Brih. 1, 6, 16). The numbers at 
the beginning of the lines indicate the 666 Sutra's of the work, 
their unions the Adhikara9as or chapters, of which, following 
the appended Adhikaraxiamala, we count 192 (not with Cole- 
brooke 191). 

I, 1 

Introduction: concerning Avidya and Vidya. 

1. Preliminaries to the Vedftnta. 

2. That, from which the world has sprung, is Brahman. 

3. Belation of Brahman to the Veda. 

4. Belation of the Yedanta to the Mimansa. 

5-*ll. The Principle of the world is conscious» not, as the Sankhya^ 

teach, unconscious. 
l:f--19. The iimimdamaya Taitt. 9, 5 is Brahman. '^ 

20—21. The outer MUye Chand. 1, 6, 6 is Brahman. 

40 Introduction. 

22. The äkä^ Gband. 1, 9, 1 is Brahman. 

23. The präna Chand. 1, 11, 5 is Brahman. 

24 — 27. The paro divo jyotis Chand. 3, 13, 7 it Brahman. 
28—31. The präna Kaash. 3, 2 is Brahman. 

I, 2. 

1—8. The manomaya pränafarira Chand. 3, 14, 2 is Brahman. 
9-10. The attar Kath. 2, 25 is Brahman. 

11 — 12. The ffuhäm praviahtau Käth. 3, 1 are Brahman and Jiva. 
18 — 17. The antara Chand. 4, 15| 1 is Brahman. 
18—20. The antaryämin Brih. 3, 7, 3 is Brahman. 
21—23. The adregyam Mund. 1, 1, 6 is Brahman. 
2^—d2. The ätman vaigvänara Chand. 5, 11, 6 is Brahman. 

I, 3. 

1—7. The äyatanam Mund. 2, 2, 5 is Brahman. 

8—9. The bhüman Chand.'?, 23 is Brahman. 
10—12. The aksharam Brih. 3, 8, 8 is Brahman. 

13. The object of om Pra^na 5, 5 is Brahman. 
14—18. Ther dahara Chand. 8, 1, 1 is Brahman. 
19—21. The satnprasada Chand. 8, 12, 3 refers to Brahnuw. 
22—23. The na tatra 8Üryo bhäti Mund. 2, 2, 10 refers to Brahman. 
24—25. The afigushtha-mätra Käth. 4, 12 is Brahman. 
26—33. Claim of the gods to the Vidya. Eternity of the Veda. 
34—38. Exclusion of Qudra's from the Yidyä. 

39. The präna Kath. 6, 2 is Brahman. 

40. The jyoiis Chand. 8, 12, 3 is Brahman. 

41. The akaga Chand. 8, 14 is Brahman. 
42—43. The vijhanamaya Brih. 4, 3, 7 is Brahman. 


1—7. The avyaktam Käth. 3, 11 is not the Matter of the Säfikhyas 
(pradhänam) but ^'the subtle Body" {sükshmam gofiram), 
8—10. The aja Qvet 4, 5 is not the Sankhya Matier but Nature. 
11—13. The pafica pahca-janah Bpih. 4, 4, 17 are not the 25 Principles 

of the Säftkhyas, but Breath, Eye, Ear, Food and Manas. 
14'— 15. Consistency of the Yedanta. The Nonbeing, from which in Taitt. 

2, 7 the world arose, is only relative. 
16—18. The kartar Kaush. 4, 19 is Brahman. 
19—22. The ätman Brih. 2, 4, 5 is Brahman. 

23—27. Brahman is the eaiua effieiens and eau$a materiaiia of the world, 
28. The refutation of the Säükhya Matter holds good also for the 

I. Litenry Notes. 41 

n, 1. 

1—2. Why the Safikhya's do not mention Brahman. 

3. This applied also to the Yoga. 
4—11. Brahman is also the causa materialU of Nature. Objections of 
reflection rebutted. 

12. This rebnttal extended also to the atomists and others. 

13. Subject {bhoktar) and Object (bhog$fam) one in Brahman. 
14—20. Identity of Cause and Effect, Brahman and World. -'-^ 
21—23. The Origin of EviL The soul, although not the author of creation,- 

bears all the guilt for it. Ulnsory character of the Samsära. 
24 — 25. Brahman works without tools, although he is pure Spirit ^^ 
26—29. Brahman is transformed into the world, and yet remains whole 

and undivided, as a dreamer, a magician makes forms and yet 

remains one. 
30 — 31. Brahman as Creator has many powers and yet remains without 

32 — 33. Motive of creation: Brahman, self-sufficing, creates only for sport. 
SI — 36. Brahman neither unjust nor cruel; inequality of creatures due to 

themselves by their earlier forms of being. Beginninglessness 

of the Samsära. 
37. Hecapitulation concerning Brahman as Creator. 

II, 2. 

1—10. Befutation of the Safikhya^». Fhysico-theological proof. 

11. An objection of the Vai^eshika^s answered. 
12—17. Refutation of the Vaifeshikä'B. Impossibility of the atonu 
18—27. Refutation of the Buddhists of reMsHe tendency \ persistence of 

subject and substance. 
28—38. Refutation of the Buddhisits of idealistic tendency \ the reality of 

the outer world demonstratäi. 
33-36. Refutation of the Jaitia's; how great is the soul? 
37— 4L Refutation of the Fägupata^^. 
42—46. Refutation of the Fdkcarätra^B, 

n, 3. 

1—7. The Skä^ was evolved. Not so Brahman. CogitOt ergo sum. 
3. From the ak&^y the vdyu was evolved;— 
91 Brahman was not evolved; cosmological proof;— 

10. From the vdyu, the agni was evolved, 

11. From the ayni^ the äpas^ 

12. From the dpas^ the annam^ that is, the earth. 

13. Not the elements, but Brahman in them is the creating agent 

14. Reabeorbtion of the world in reverse order. ^ 

16. Evolution of the soul-organs: indoya^^, m^BM buddhi, 
16. The individual soul was not evolved. Moral grounds. 

42 Introduction. 

17. Connter-reasons weighed. Identity of the son! with the BrahmAn. 

Only its upadht'n are evolved and disappear. 

18. The soul is conscious essentially (as the Saftkhya^s) not 

accidentally (as the Vaigeshika^s teach). 

19^32. Relation of soul to body; it is not anu but tfibhu. 

33—39. Of the kartritvam (actorship) of the souL 

40. Its kartritvam is not sväbhävikam, but upädhi-nimittam. 

41—42. The soul is not free and is guided in acting by God (l^oom) ac- 
cording to its former works. 

43—53. The soul identical and not identical with £rahman« Illutory 
character of all individual existence and its pains. 

n, 4. 

1—4. The pränas (organs of relation) also evolved from Brahman. 

5 — 6. Eleven of them: 5 buddhirindriyä'Sf 5 karma-indriya'Sj 1 fmmas. 

7. On their extension in space. 

8. The mukl^a präna (organ of nutrition) also created. 
9—12. Of its nature and five functions. 

18. Of its extension in space. 
14—16. Connection of the präna^s with the soul. Collaboration of the gods. 
17—19. Belation of the mukhya präna to the other pränas. 
20—22. Relation of the body and its organs to the elements. 

in, 1. 

1 — 7. Departure of the soul with its organs after death. 
8—11. Why must it re-enter a new body? 

12—21. Punishment of evildoers; different destinies of the soul after death. 
The four classes of (organic) being^. 

22. Retam through the äkäga and other stations. Relation to them 

that of a guest 

23. Of the duration of the halts at these stations. 

24—27. Animation of plants. Return of the soul through plants, food, 
seed, womb to embodiment« 

III, 2. 

1—6. Of the nature of dream; difference from waking. 
7—8. Nature of deep sleep; it is an. entering into Brahman. 

9. Why is he who wakes identical with him who went to sleep? 
10. The swoon; difference from deep sleep and death. Metaphysical 

meaning of death. 
11—21. Brahman is free from all differences, determinations and attributes. 
22—30. Brahman is never object, because eternally subject {tdkahiny 
31—37. Of certain figurative expressions used of Brahman. 
38—41. The fruit of works comes from God, who takes account of former 

works. On the apürvam. 


I. Literary Notes. 43 

ni, 3. 

1— *4. There is unity of knowledge in the Sagunä Vtdyäh alto. Consistency 
of the YedanU texts. 
&. Union of the different Vijftäna'B therefore necessary. 
6— a Of the differences in the präna-samväda Chind, 1, 3, Bph. 1, 3. 
9. Relation between am and udffitha Ohand. 1, 1, 1. 
10. The parallel passages Bfih. 6, 1, 14, Ch&nd. 6/1, 13, Kaush. 8, 14 
on the präna-»amväda to be combined. 
11 — 18. Qualities of Brahman of general and those of occasional validity, 

explained by Taitt 2. 
14 — 15. In K&th. 3^ 10—11 no gradation of powers but only the pre- 
eminence of ^ruiha is intended. 
16—17. To Brahman applies Ait. 1, 1 [or Bfih. 4, 3, 7—4, 26 and Chand. 
6, 8-16]. 

18. Chand. 6, 2, B|ih. 6, 1 vätov{jfkänam, not äcatnanam is recom- 


19. The gändilya-vidyä of Qat. Br. 10, 6, 3 to be combined Bph. 6, 6. 
20 — ^0. But Bfih. 6, 6 ahar and aham to be separated. 

S8. Also the vibhüH's in the Ranayaniya-Khila's and Chand. 8, 14. 

SM. Also ihepuntskayajha of the Ta^din's, Faingin's, and Taittiriyaka's. 

26. Different opening passages of the Upanishad^s, not part of the Yidya. 

26. Chftnd. 8, 13, Mun^. 3, 1, 3 etc. to be completed by Kaush. 1, 4. 
27 — 28. The shaking off of good and bad works at death. 
29 — 80. The devayäna valid only in the sa^nä tridyäh. 

31. But in this nnirersally. Of the difference of satyam (Bph. 6, 2, 16) 
and tapa$ (Chand. 6, 10, 1) in the Pafieägnuvidj/ä» 

38. Possibility of a new body in the case of one liberated, for the 
purpose of a mission.— Direct certainly of liberation. 

88. The passages (Bph. 3, 8, 8, Mund. 1, 1, 6), of akaharam, mutu- 

ally complementary. 
84. The passages ritam pibantau (Kath. 3, 1) and dva Buparnd (Mun^. 
3, 1) belong to each other. 
38—36. Also Bfih. 3, 4 and 3, 6. Brahman free from (1) causality, — 
(2) suffering. 

37. Brahman and the worshipper separated for the purpose of 


38. Bfih. 5, 4 and 6, 6 [not Bfih. 6, 4, 6 and Chand. 1, 6, 7] are 

one Yidya. 

89. Unity and difference of Chand. 8, 1, 1. 6 and Bph. 4, 4, 22. 
40—41. Rttual questions concerning the Vaifvänara-vidyä Ch&nd. 6, 11-24. 

4S. Relation of conceptions like Chand. 1, 1, 1 to works. 

43. Bph. 1, 6, 21-23 and Chand. 4, 3 adhydimam and adhidaivam 

are to be separated for purposes of adoration. 
44 — 62. In the Agnirahasyam manafcit etc. Qat. Br. 10, 6 belongs to 

the Yidya. 

44 Introduction. 

53—54. Episode on the immortality of the sonl. 

55—56. Conception connected with works like Chand. 1, 1, 1. 2, 2, 1. 
Ait är. 2, 1, 2, 1. Qat Br. 10, 5, 4, 1 are valid not only for 
their own Qäkhä, but, like the Mantraps etc. generally. 

57. Chand. 5, 11-24 the 8ama8t€i, not the vyasta is to be wonhipped. 

58. Passage where unity of dogma, difference of method. 

59. For the last, choice, not union holds good. 

60. Teachings referring to special wishes can be united. 
61 — 66. For those mentioned 55 — 56 either anion or choice. 

m, 4. 

1—17. The üpanishad teaching without works leads man to the goal. 
Position of the sage to works. 
18—20. Difference between Jaimini and Bädaräyana about the Ägrama%, 
21—22. Passages like Chand. 1, 1, 8. 1, 6, 1. Qatap. Br. 10, 1, 2, 2. Ait 

&r. 2, 1, 2, 1 are not mere sfu^t, but part of the «pdsaiiam. 
23—24. Limited yalidily of the legends Bph. 4, 5, Kaush. 3, 1, Chand. 4, 1. 

25. Besume of 1—17: knowledge without works leads to the goaL 
26—27. Yajfi<h dänam^ tapcu etc. as means to knowledge. 
28 — 81. In mortal danger neglect of the laws as to food is lawful. 
32—35. He who does not strive after knowledge, must also perform the 
äframa-karfnäntj which only further, but do not produce, 
36-89. Those who through want have no ägrama are also called to 
40. Charcicter indekbUi» of the Ürddhvareta$ vow. 
41—42. How far is penance possible for a fallen Brahmaeärin7 

48. Exclusion of him after nuMpätakä's and upapätaka'9. 
44—46. Whether the updaana'n belong to the yajamäna or the rüvijt 
47^49. How far Bph. 8, 5, 1 are the Äp'ama^n to be understood? 
50. ''idv t^Vj 7ivt)o0e «be xd icai8(a . . ."— "Xd9e ßtd>oac." 
51« Knowledge as fruit of this means follows here, where there is 

no stronger atindriyä Qaktih, otherwise in the next life. 
Tt2. A ^'more" or '^less/' according to the different strength of the 
tädhana^B exists only in the aagunä vidyäh, not in the tMyunä 

IT, 1. 

I "7. The pratyaya of the dtman is to be practised, until Intuition 

is reached. 
H, Then follows identity of self and Brahman; for the awakened 

there is no evil, no perception, no Veda. 
4r 'Thou shalt not make to thyself any image {pratlkttm)V^ 
\ If» Chand. 3, 19, 1 (^'ddi^o brahma'') brahman is predicated of 


I. Liicrazy Notes. 46 

6. Bat Oh&nd. 1, 3, 1 ädifya is predicated of ud^ttha. 

7 — 1<X Üpä8a$uifn is to be practised sittiniir, not lying or standing« 

11. Place, time, direction are indifferent, only entire freedom from 

disturbance necessary. 

12. The upäsanä'u have as aim partly samyagdar^nam partly ahkyud' 

aya\ the former are to be practised till the goal is reached, 
the latter till death. 

13. On attainment of knowledge, former sins are destroyed, farther 

sins impossible. (The power of karman is paralysed.) 

14. Destruction of good works also. Why? 

15. Persistence of the body, in spite of liberation, until the extinction 

of works entered on. Potter's wheel; double moon. 
16 — 17. Sacrifices etc. are not binding for the Brahmamd, though they 
are for the Sayunavid. 

18. Purifying effect of sacrifices etc. with, but also without knowledge. 

19. After expiation of karman: Death and with it Kaivaiyam. 

IT, 2. 

1 — 2. (Aparavidyä,) At death the indriya^B enter manat, 

3. the manas enters the präpui, 
4 — 6. the Präna enters the v^fiänätman {jtva\ this enters the elements. 

7. Hence the Avidvan goes to re-embodiment, the Vidvän to im- 

mortality: This amritatpom is apek^ikam. 
H — 11. Persistence of the ** subtle body." Its nature described. 
12^14. {Bttravidyä.) For the Akämat/amäna (Parabrahmavid) there is no 
departure of the soul; he is already Brahman. 

15. His pram's enter Brahman, the coarse becomes earth etc. 

16. His dissolution is without residue, not, as otherwise, with a residue. 

17. (J^ravidyä.) The Vidvän (he who knows exoterically) goes out 

through the 101*' channel (the others through others); 
Id— 19. Thence by a sun ray, which, by day and night, 
90 — 91. in summer and winter, ever exists. {Sdnkhya'Toffa differ.) 

IT, 3. 

1. Stations on the way: nddt, — ragmi, — areii,— 

2. aKar,^äpüryamänapak8ha,—yän shad udaü eti,^iamvat$arat — 


3. eandrat-'vidyuti—varuncJokaj — indrat—prqjäpati. 

4 — 6. These are guides of the soul whose organs, as they are enveloped 
do not act. 
7 — 14. Terminus: Brahman, not the all-present iKimifi hrahma^ but the, 
aparam, sagunam brahman, which as käryam is transitory* 
16—16. But those who worship Brahman under a pratUeam, hare other 

46 Inirodaetion. 

IT, 4 

1—3« (Paravidyä.) Identity of the liberated soul with the tonl bound 
in ignorance, suffering, perishableness. 
4. Umo myttiea. 
5—7« (Äparavidyä,) Characteristics of the (imperfectly) liberated. 
8—9. The "wishes" (Chand. 8, 2) of the liberated sonl Then freedom. 
10—14 Does the liberated possess organs (manas etc.)? 
15—16« His wonderfal powers; animation of seyeral bodies together. 
17—23« His aifvaryam and its limits. Description of Brah$naloka. After 
be has there gained Sam$faffdarganam he also enters the erer- 
iMtingf perfect Nirvänam. 


V v^^' '^"^ ,•'''•' 

IL Aim of the Vedanta: The destruction of 

an innate error. 

1. The fundamental thought of the Vedanta and its 

previous history; a glance at allied 

theories in the west. 

Ih the introduction which Qankara prefixes (p. 6-23) to his 
Commentary on the Brahmasütra's, he introduces us at once 
to the fundamental concept of the system, declaring all em- 
pirical, physical knowledge to be ignorance {Avidyä)^ to which 
he opposes the metaphysics of the Vedanta, as knowledge 
{Viäyä). — Before we approach this thought in detail, let us 
call to mind certain truths suited to throw light on its philo- 
sophic meaning, and thereby on the Vedfinta system of which 
they are the root 

The thought that the empirical view of nature is not able 
to lead us to a final solution of the being of things, meets us 
not only among the Indians but also in many forms in the 
philosophy of the west More closely examined this thought 
is OTen the root of all metaphysics, so far as without it no 
metaphysics can come into being or exist For if empirical 
or physical investigation were able to throw open to us the true 
and innermost being of nature, we should only have to con- 
tinue along this path in order to come at last to an under- 
standing of all truth; the final. result would be Physics (in 
the broader sense, as the teaching of f uotc, nature), and there 
would be no ground or justification for Metaphysics. If, there- 
lore, the metaphysicians of ancient and modem times, dis- 
satisfied with empirical knowledge, went on to metaphysics, 
this step is only to be explained by a more or less clear 
conaciousness that all empirical investigation and knowledge 

48 Introdoctioiu 

amounts in the end only to a great deception grounded in 
the nature of our knowing üaculties, to open our eyes to which 
is the task of metaphysics. 

Thrice, so far as we know, has this knowledge 'reached 
conYiction among mankind, and each time, as it appears, bj 
a different way, according to conditions of time, national 
and individual character; once among the Indians, of which 
we are to speak, again in Greek philosophy, through Parme- 
nides, and the third time in the modern philosophy through 

What drove the Eleatic sage to proceed beyond the world 
as ''xi |ii] Sv** to the investigation of ^the existent" seems to 
have been the conception, brought into prominence by his 
predecessor Xenophanes, of the Unity of Being, that is, the 
unity of nature (by him called 6e6<), the consequence of which 
Parmenides drew with unparalleled powers of abstraction, 
turning his back on nature, and for that reason also catting 
off his return to nature. 

To the same conviction came Kant by quite another way, 
since with German patience and thoroughness he subjected 
the cognitive faculties of mankind to a critical analysis, really 
or nominally only to examine whether these faculties be really 
the fitting instruments for the investigation of transcendent 
objects, whereby, however, he arrived at the astonishing dis- 
covery that, amongst others, three essential elements of the 
world, namely. Space, Time and Causality, are nothing but 
three forms of perception adhering to the subject, or, if this 
be expressed in terms of physiology, innate functions of the 
brain; from this he concluded, with incontestable logic, that 
the world as it is extended in space and time, and knit together 
in all its phenomena, great and small, by the causal nexus, in 
this form exists only for our intellect, and is conditioned by 
the same; and that consequently the world reveals to us 
'^appearances" only, and not the being of '^things in them- 
selves.'' What the latter are, he holds to be unknowable, 
regarding only external experience as the source of knowledge, 
so long as we are restricted to intellectual fekculties like 

IL Aim of the Tedänta: the deatraction of an innate error. 49 

These methods of the Greek and German thinkers, admir- 
able as they are, may seem external and cold, when we com- 
pare them with the way in which the Indians, as we may 
assume even in the present condition of research, reached the 
same concepts. Their pre-eminence will be intelligible when 
we consider that no people on earth took religion so seriously, 
none toiled on the way to salvation as they did. Their reward 
for this was to have got, if not the most scientific, yet the most 
inward and immediate expression of the deepest secret of beiqfg. 

How the development which led them to this goal is to 
be conceived in detail, we cannot yet accurately determine; 
it seems to us specially matter of question how the historical 
relation between Brahman and Atman^ the two chief con- 
cepts on which Indian metaphysics grew, and which already 
in the ITpanishad's, so far as we see, are used throughout as 
synonyms, is to be considered: whether the concept o{ Ätman 
developed itself from that of Brahman through a mere sharpen- 
ing of the subjective moment lying therein, or whether we have 
rather to distinguish between two streams, the one, more 
ecclesiastical, which raised Brahman to a principle; the other, 
more philosophical, which did the same for Atman^ until both, 
closely connected in their nature, were led into a common 
bed. Putting aside these questions for the present, let us 
briefly, by a few selected examples, indicate the steps along 
which the Indian genius probably raised itself to the conception 
of the world, which we are then to set forth. 

1. We have already pointed out how the Indians, setting 
out from the worship of personified powers of nature, recog- 
nised in that raising of the feeling above the consciousness of 
individual existence which occurs in prayer, that is, in the 
Brahman^ the central force in all the forces of nature, the 
shaping and supporting principle of all Gods and all worlds; 
the word Brahman in the whole Kigveda never meaning any- 
thing else than this lifting and spiritualising power of prayer. 
(With the history of this concept may be compared that of 
the Logos (Aifoc) of the fourth Gospel, which rests on a 
similar abstraction and hypostasis.) From the standpoint of 
this apprehension of the Brahman as a cosmic potency inherent 


60 Introduction. 

in the subject, the Taittiriya-Brahmanam (2, 8, 9, 6) for example, 

takes up a question put in the Bigveda (X, 81, 4) and answers 

it as follows: — 

"Where was the tree and where the wood, 

''From which the heaven and earth were shaped? 

''Musing in mind seek that, ye wise, 

"Whereon the bearer of them stoodl" {Rigv. 10, 81, 4) 

"The Brahman was the tree, the wood, 

"From which the heavens and earth were shaped, 

"Musing in mind, I say, ye wise, 

"On Him the bearer of them stood!" 

2. To this is joined the idea that Brahman is the inner- 
most and noblest in all the phenomena of the world; it is, as 
the Kafhaka^Up. (6, 1 — 3) expresses it, changing and deepening 
the sense of the Terse Rigv, 4, 40, 6, the sun in the firmament 
{hatisah giicishad), the God (vasu^ the good) in the atmosphere, 
the Hotar at the altar, the guest at the threshold of the 
house, it dwells everywhere, is bom everywhere, — but he only 
is free from sorrow and sure of liberation, who honours it, the 
unborn, unassailable spirit, in '^the city with eleven doors*" 
(the body), wherein it dwells, with the powers of life round it,— 

"And in the middle sits a dwarf, 
"Whom all the godlike Powers adore/' 

3. Here ''in the lotus of the heart" the Brahman is now 
nothing else than the AtmaUy that is, the soul, literally ^'the 
self.^ We select an example from Chändogya- Up. 3, 14: 

''Verily this universe is Brahman; as Ihjjalän [in it be- 
"comingy ceasing, breathing] it is to be adored in silence. 
"Spirit is its material, life its body, light its form; its decree 
"is truth, its self endlessness [literally aether]; all-working is 
"He, all-vnshing, all-smelling, all-tasting^? comprehending the 
"All, silent, ungrieved: — this is my soul (ätman) in the inmost 
"heart, smaller than a grain of rice, or of barley, or of mus- 
"tard-seed, or of millet, or a grain of millet's kernel; — Üiis is 
" my soul in the inmost heart, greater than the earth, greater 

>• Otherwise Max Müller and Olden berg (Buddha S p. 31); of. how- 
ever Brih. 4, 3, 24 and the ouXoc opa, ou>.oc It voei, ouXoc ^i t* Axo*^ct 
of Xenophanes. 


II. Aim of the Vedanta: the destruction of an innate error. 51 

^than the atmosphere, greater than the heaven, greater than 
^ these worlds.— The all-working, all- wishing, all-smelling, all- 
** tasting, embracing- the- All, silent, ungrieved, this is my soul 
^in the inmost heart, this is Brahman, into him I shall enter 
^on departing hence. — He to whom this happens, he, verily, 
'^doubts no more! — Thus spoke Qa^dilya, Qa^dilya." 

4. The last-mentioned entering into the true Self after 
death presupposes the consciousness of a difference between 
the empiric self, that is, the bodily personality, and the highest 
Self (paramätinan)f which is the Soul, that is, God. This 
diflference is the subject of a lesson, which Prajapati gives to 
Indra, Chändogya^Up. 8, 7 — 12, and in which he leads him up 
step by step to ever truer knowledge. To the question: "What 
is the Self?" comes as the first answer: 1) "The Self is the 
body, as it is reflected in the eye, in water, in a mirror." 
To the objection, that then the Self is also affected by the 
defect and dissolution of the body, follows the second ex- 
planation: 2) "The Self is the soul, as it enjoys itself in 
dream." To the objection that the dreaming soul, if it does 
not suffer, still believes itself to suffer, it is replied: 3) "When 
**he who has sunk to sleep has come altogether, fully, and 
"wholly to rest, so that he beholds no dream, — that is the 
**Sel( the undying, the fearless, the Brahman." To the ob- 
jection that in this condition consciousness ceases, and that 
it is like entering into nothing, Prajapati at last answers: 
4) ** Mortal, verily, O Mighty one, is this body, possessed by 
'^ death; it is the dwelling-place of that undying, bodiless Self. 
^'The embodied is possessed by pleasure and pain, for while 
''be is embodied, there can be no escaping of pleasure and 
*^ pain. But pleasure and pain, do not touch the bodiless one. — 
^ Bodiless is the wind; — clouds, lightning, thunder are bodiless. 
-*Now as these arise from the atmosphere [in which they are 
** bound, like the soul in the body], enter into the highest light, 
**and thereby appear in their own form, so also this full rest 
*-[that is, the Soul, in deep sleep] arises from this body, enters 
**iDio the highest light and reaches its own form; that is the 
-highest Spirit"' 

la similar fashion the Taittiriya-Up, 2, 1 — 7 leads from the 


52 Introdoction. 

bodily self^ by stripping one coTering after another off it, at 
last to the true Self. It distinguishes: 1) the Self consisting 
of food; in this, as in a case, is held 2) the Self of breath, 
in this 3) the Self of manas, in this 4) the Self of know- 
ledge, in this finally as innermost 5) the Self of bliss. 
''Verily, this is the Essence (rasa); he who reaches this 
''essence, is filled with bliss; for who could breathe and who 
''could live, if this bliss were not in space? — For he it is that 
"causes bliss; for when one finds peace and support in this 
"invisible, bodiless, unspeakable, unfathomable one, then has 
"he entered into peace; but if he in this also [as in the four 
"first] recognises a hollow, an "other," then he finds unrest; 
"this is the unrest of him who thinks himself wise." 

5. The Self, in this sense, is, according to Chändogya-Up. 
6, 2, 1 '*the existent," "the One without a second," and, answer- 
ing to this, Bfihadaranydka- Up. 2, 4, 5 refers and limits all 
iuTestigation to the Self: "The Self, verily, o Maitreyi, must 
"be seen, heard, thought on, and investigated; he who sees, 
"hears, thinks on, and investigates the Self, has understood 
"all this world." "These worlds, these Gods, these beings, all 
"these are what the Self is." It is the point of union (e&d- 
l/anam) for all, as the ocean for the waters, the ear for sound, 
the eye for forms, and so on; all outside it is as devoid of 
being as the sound that goes out from a musical instrument; 
he who has laid hold on the instrument has therewith also 
laid hold on the sounds that spring from it (loc dt., 2, 4, 6 — 11). 
It is, according to Chdndogya- Up. 6, I, 4, that from which all 
the world has come into being, as a mere transformation of it: 
he who knows this One, therewith knows all, "just as, oh dear 
"one, by a lump of clay, all that is made of clay is known; 
"the transformation is a matter of words, a mere name; in 
"reality it is only clayl"— 

6. In conformity with this, the Igd-Up. 1, 6 bids us "sink 
the whole world in God," that is, in the Self: 

"Who, seeking, finds all being in the Self 
"For him all error fades, all sorrow ends;" 

and the Kathaka-Up. (4, 10—11) warns us not to admit a 
multiplicity, anything different {nana) from the soul: 

IL Aim of the Yed&nta: the destroction of an innate error. 63 

''For what is here is there, and what is there is here; 
**From death to death he hastes who here another knows! 
"In spirit shall ye know, here is no manifold; 
''From death to death is he ensnared who difference sees." 

7. It was a simple coDsequence of these conceptions when 
the Yedanta declared the empirical concept which represents 
to us a manifold existing outside the Self, a world of the 
Object existing independently of the Subject, to be a glamour 
(mäffä), an innate illusion (bhrama) resting on an illegitimate 
transference {adhyasa), in virtue of which we transfer the 
reality, which alone belongs to the subject, to the world of 
the object, and, conversely, the characteristics of the objective 
world, e.g,y corporeality, to the subject, the Self, the SouL 

Concerning this, let us hear Qaiikara himself. 

2. Analysis of Qankara's Introduction (p. 6-23). 

** Object (tdshaya) and Subject {vi8hayinf\ he says at the 
beginning of his work, "having as their province the presen- 
^tation of the 'Thou' [the not I] and the 'I,'^^ are of a nature 
*^as opposed as darkness and light. If it is certain that the 
^ being of the one is incompatible with the being of the other, 
*^it follows 80 much the more that the qualities of the one 
''also do not exist in the other. Hence it follows that the 
^transfer {aähy&sa) of the object, which has as its province 
*^the idea of the 'Thou,' and its qualities, to the pure spiri- 
**tiial subject, which has as its province the idea of the 'I,' 
**and conversely, that the transfer of the subject and its 
Equalities to the object, is logically false.— Tet in mankind 
''this procedure resting on false knowledge {mithyä-jüäna- 
'^nimUa) of pairing together the true and untrue [that is, 
''subjective and objective] is inborn {naisargika\ so that they 

28 Ytuhmad'Osmatpratyaya-gocara ; B a n e r j e a translates : " indicated by 
the second and first penancU pronounSt^^ and so p. 16, 2 asmat-pratyaya* 
riskayaMt: "because it (the soul) is the object of the first personal pro- 
nomm," which, however, gives ns no clear meaning, for only presentations, 
not prononns, have ohjects,— The son! is therefore subject {vishayin\ 
yet not (empiric) subject of knowledge as which the ahatnpratyayin 
\thmi is, the manas, to distinguish from the ahatnkartar) figures, to which 
the aonl again stands opposed as object (vishaya) ; cf, the passages in notes 
89 and 30, and further in the course of the work (Chap. XXVII, 3). 


54 Introdaciion. 

"transfer the being and qualities of the one to the other, not 
''separating object and subject, although they are absolutely 
''different (atyanta-vivikta) and so saying, for example: 'This 
"am I,* *That is mine.'" 29 

However this transference be defined, (p. 12, 1—14, 3) in 
any case it comes to this, that qualities of one thing appear 
in another, as when mother-of-pearl is taken for silver, or when 
two moons are seen instead of one (p. 14, 3— *6). This erroneous 
transference of the things and relations of the objective world 
to the inner Soul, the Self in the strictest sense of the word, 
is possible because the soul also is, in a certain sense, object, 
namely, object of presentation to the "I," and, as our aathor 
here affirms, in no sense something transcendent, lying beyond 
the province of perception (paroksham).^^ 

>* By this the objective, e. ff., the body, is sometimes treated as subject, 
sometimes as a quality of it. As explanation the foUowing passage may 
serve, p. 20, 8: '^ As one is accustomed, when it goes iU or well with kit 
^'ion or wife and the like, to say, 'it goes ill or well with me,* and thus 
" transfers the qualities of outer things to the Self (soul, dtman) [cf. p. 689. 
^'Sff.], in just the same way he transfers the qualities of the body, w^hen 
^he says: *I am fat, I am thin, I am white, 1 stand, I go, I leap,' aad 
''similarly the qualities of the sense organs when he says: *I am dumb, 
''impotent, deaf, one-eyed, blind,* and similarly the qualities of the inner 
" organ [antafikaranam «» tnanfu^ cf. 2, 3, 32], desire, wish, doubt, resolation 
'-and the like; — thus also he transfers the subject presenting the *I' 
^ {aham-pratyayin) to the inner soul, present solely as witness ($äkskin) 
" of the personal tendencies, and conversely the witness of all, the inner 
" soul, to the inner organ and the rest " [that is, to the sense organs, the 
body and the objects of the outer world]. 

*9 P. 14, 5: "Question: but how is it possible to transfer to the inner 
"soul, which is no object, the qualities of objects? For everyone tranafen 
"[only] to one object standing before him another object: and of the 
"inner soul thou maintainest that it is cut off from the idea of 'Thou' 
"[not- 1] and is no object [I read with Govinda: avisKapatvam]? — Answer: 
"Not in every sense is it non-object; for it is the object of perception 
"of the 'I'** [aanuxt-pratyaya-viBhaya ; taken strictly and according to 
p. 78, 6, cf. 73, 5. 672, 1, not the sdkahin^ but only the Xrartor, that is, 
the individual soul already endowed with objective qualities, is oAosn- 
praiiyay<i'V%tihaya]'j "and the [whole] assumption of an inner soul resu 
" on this, that it is not transcendent {aparoktha). It is also not neceasarr 
"that the object, to which we transfer another object, should stand before 
"us; as, for instance, when' simple people transfer to space {äkäiQa\ 

IL Aim of the Yedänta: the destraotion of an innate error. 55 

"This transference, thus made, the wise term ionoeakce 
" (avidyä)^ and, in contradistinction to it, they call the accurate 
^determination of the own nature of things '' (vastu-svarüpam, 
of the being-in-itself of things, as we should say) ^knowledge 
**(mdyä). If this be so, it follows that that to which a [similar, 
"^ false] transfer is thus made, is not in the slightest degree 
^affected by any want or excess caused thereby" (p. 16, 

The object of knowledge, the Soul, thus remains, as 
made clear in these words, entirely unaltered, no matter 
whether we rightly understand it, or not. From this we 
must conclude that the ground of the erroneous empirical 
concept is to be sought for solely in the knowing subject; 
in this subject the avidya, as repeatedly (p. 10, 1. 21, 7. 
807, 12) asserted, is innate (naisargika); its cause is a wrong 
perception (it is mithya-jnana-nimitta, p. 9, 3); its being is a 
wrong conception (mithya-pratyaya-rupaf p. 21, 7); — all these 
expressions point to the fact that the final reason of the false 
empirical concept is to be sought — where, however, the 
Vedanta did not seek it — in the nature of our cognitive faculty. 
An analysis of this, as Kant undertook it, would in fact give 
the true scientific foundation of the Yedanta system; and it 
is to be hoped that the Indians, whose orthodox dogmatics, 
holding good still at the present day, we here set forth, will 
accept the teachings of the ^ Critique of Pure Reason,'' when 
it is brought to their knowledge, with grateful respect 'i 

"which is not an object of perception, the dark colour of the ground, 
"and the like. In just the same way is it possible to transfer to the 
'^ inner soul what is not soul." 

>i Also Kant^s axiom that the transcendental ideality of the world does 
not exclnde its empiric reality, finds its full analogy in the concepts 
of ^aflkara: cf. p. 448, 6: ''All empiric action is true, so long as the 
"knowledge of the soul is not reached, just as the actions in dream, 
" before awaking occurs. As long in fact as the knowledge of unity with 
** the tme Self is not reached, one has not a consciousness of the unreality 
"of the procedure connected with standards and objects of know- 
pledge and fruits of works, but every creature, under the designation of 
"*!' and 'mine,' takes mere transformations for the Self and for charac- 
*tenstics of the Self, and on the other hand leaves out of consideration 
"their original Brahman -Selfhood; therefore before the consciousness 

56 IntroductioiL 

On the soil of this natural Ignorance stands according to 
Qankara, all human knowledge, with the exception of the 
metaphysics of the Yedanta; thus, not only the empirical 
thought, that is, thought by means of the sense-organs, of 
common life, but also the whole ritual canon of the Veda, with 
its things commanded and forbidden under promise of reward 
and punishment in another world (p. 16, 4 — 17, 1). 

The immediate ground on which both worldly and Yedic 
actions must be referred to the sphere of Ignorance, lies in 
this, that both are not free from the delusion (abhimäna) of 
seeing the ^I" in the body; for neither knowledge nor action 
is possible unless one considers as belonging to the Self, '^ 
the sense-organs and the body bearing them, and the ritual 
part of the Yeda also cannot but transfer many circumstances 
of the outer world erroneously to the Soul.^' 

A further ground for the inadequacy of all empirical 
knowledge is, that it is only distinguished from that of ani- 
mals in degree through higher evolution (vyutpatti), but is in 
kind similar to it, so far as, like it, it is wholly subserrient 

^'of identity with Brahman awakes, all worldly and Vedio actions are 

" P. 17, 2: ''But how is it ppssible that the means of knowledge, 
^ perception and the rest, and the [ritual] books of doctrine are limited to 
''the province of Ignorance?— Answer: Because without the delusion that 
"'I' and 'mine' consist in the body, sense* organs, and the like, no 
*'knower can exist, and consequently a use of the means of knowledge 
''is not possible. For without calling in the aid of the sense-organs, 
"there can be no perception, but the action of the sense-organs is not 
"possible without a resting place [the body], and no action at all is 
"possible without transferring the being of the Self (the Soul, äkman) 
" to the body, and without all this taking place no knowledge is possible 
"for the soul, which is independent [reading asangasya] [of embodied 
"existence]. But without action of knowing, no knowing is possible. 
"Consequently, the means of knowledge, perception and the rest, as 
"as well as the books of doctrine [in question] belong to the prorince 
"of Ignorance." 

» P. 20, 5: "For when it is said, for example: *Let the Brahman 
" offer \ the like ordinances rest on the fact of transferring the castes, 
"A^rama's, ages of life and similar differences to the soul; this trans- 
" ference is, as we have said, the assumption that something is where it 
•• is not. '* 

n. Aim of the Yed&nt»: the destruction of an innate error. 57 

to egoism, which impels us to seek for what is desired and 
to avoid what is not desired; and it makes no difference here 
whether these egoistic aims, as in the case of worldly actions, 
reach their realisation already in this life, or, as in the case 
of the works ordained by the Vedas, only in a future existence, 
thus presupposing a knowledge of it. Quite otherwise the 
Vedänta, which, on the contrary, leaves the whole sphere of 
desire behind, turns its back on all differences of position in 
outer life (even if, as we shall see, not quite consistently), 
and raises itself to the knowledge that the Soul is in reality 
not the least involved in the circle of transmigration (sarnsära). '^ 

** The interesting passage which gives us an insight into the Indian 
idea of the difference between man and animals, reads in its entirety as 
follows, (p. 18, 4ff.): — *<For this reason also" [worldly and Vedic know- 
ledge belongs to the province of Ignorance], ** because [thereby] no 

* difference is made between man and animals. For just as the animals, 
** when, for instance, a sound strikes their ears, in case the perception of 

* the soond is disagreeable to them, move away from it, and in case it is 
"agree a ble, move towards it,— as, when they see a man with an upraised 
"stick before them, thinking: *He will strike me,' they try to escape, and 
"when they see one with a handful of fresh grass, approach him [one 
•eea that when the Indian speaks of an animal, he thinks of a cow, 
somewhat as we think of a dog] : so men also whose knowledge is more 
" developed (v^u^atma-cittc^), when they perceive strong men of terrible 
"aspect, with drawn swords in their hands, turn away from them, and 
"tarn towards the contrary.^Thus with reference to the means and 
"objeeta of knowledge, the process in men and animals is alike. Of 
"course in the case of animals perception, and the like, goes on without 
^previous (!) judgment (viveka)', but as can be seen by the resemblance, 
"even in the case of [spiritually] developed {vyutpatHmatäm) men, per- 
" ception and the like for the time [of false knowledge] is the same; and if 
■^aocofding to the spiritual canon the performance of works is permitted 
" only to one who has gained insight {buddhi)t and not to one who has not 
** recognised the connection of the soul with the other world, yet for this 
" permission it is not imperative that one [should have recognised] the truth 
" concerning the soul freed from the Samaara, to be taught by the Yedinta, 
"which leaves behind hunger and the other [desires], and turns away 
" from the difference between Brahmans, warriors and the rest. For this 
« tmth is not implied in the ixgunction [of the work of sacrifice], but is 
"rather in contradiction to it And while the canon of ordinances is 
*- TSÜd [only] for this degree of knowledge of the soul, it does not rise 
"above the province of Ignoranoe.'* 

58 Introduction. 

For all those laws of empirical knowledge and action are 
yalid for us only so long as we are influenced by the Ignorance, 
resting on a false transference, which nature imposes on us, 
of which it is said in conclusion (p. 21, 7): ^Thus it stands 
"with this beginningless, endless, innate transference, which 
^4n its essence is a false assumption, producing all the con- 
" ditions of doing and enjoying [or 8u£Pering] and forming the 
''[natural] standpoint of all men. To remove this, the root 
"of the evil, and to teach the knowledge of the unity of the 
''soul, — this is the aim of all the texts of the Yedänta."'^ 

This aim the Yedänta reaches by separating from the soul 
(the Self, attnan) everything that is not soul, not Self, and is 
only transferred thereto falsely, thus, in a word, all Upädhi\ 
or individualising determinations, clothed (upahitam 163, 9. 
690, 6. 739, 7) in which the Brahman appears as individual soul. 
Such üpädhi's are: 1) all things and relations of the outer 
world (cf. note 29), 2) the body, consisting of the gross ele- 
ments, 3) the Indriya% that is the five sense-organs and five 
organs of action of the body, represented as separate existences, 
4) Manas, also called the inner organ (antdhkaranamjt the 
central organ for the sense-organs as well as for the organs 
of action, in the first place closely approaching what we call 
understanding, and in the latter almost synonymous with, 
what we call conscious will, the unified principle of 
conscious life, as 5) the Mukhya pram with its five offshoots, 
is the unified principle of unconscious life, subserving nutrition. 
— All this, of which more in our psychological part, meta- 
physics cuts away, in order to retain the soul, that is, the 
real Self or "I," which is present as spectator (säkshin) of 
all individual actions, but itself only apparently individualised 
by the Upadhi's, is on the contrary in reality i^dentical with 
the highest godhead, and, like this, is pure spiritual nature, 
pure consciousness (caitanyam). 

*^ Cf. for the doctrine of the Avidya alto the following pasaages: 
p. 98, 8. 112, 3. 182, 12. 185, 12. 199, 5. 205, 10. 343, 4. 860, 2. 433, ]3w 
452, 2. 455, 4. 473, 17. 483, 6. 607, 1. 660, 10. 680, 12. 682, 3. 689, 1. 
690, 5. 692, 14. 787, 13. 804, 1. 807, 11. 837, 2. 860, 15. 1056, 1. 1132, la 
1133, 12. 1133, 15. 

IL Aim of the Yedanta: the destruotion of an innate error. 59 

And here we touch the fundamental want of the Yedänta 
system, which, among other things, causes the absence of its 
proper morality, however near this, in its purest form, lay to 
its principle.'^ Rightly the Yedänta recognises, as the sole 
source by which we may reach true knowledge, true 
apprehension of being-in-itself, our own ''I,'' but it wrongly halts 
at the form in which it directly appeals to our consciousness, 
as a knower, even after it has cut away the whole intellectual 
apparatus, and ascribed it to the ^not I," the world of 
phenomena, just as it has also, yery rightly, indicated as the 
dwelling of the highest soul, not, as Descartes did, the head 
(about which Brih. 2, 2 treats), but the heart 

Meanwhile, as we shall see, the spiritual (caitanyam) is, in 
our system, a potency which lies at the root of all motion 
and change in nature, which is therefore also ascribed, for 
example, to plants, and means thus rather the capacity of 
reaction to outer influences, a potency which, in its 
highest deyelopment, reveals itself as human intellect, as 

'* The command ** drfartrfiotii tov icXtjoCov oou cb« oeauxiv" ['Love thy 
oeighbonr as thyself*^] ii an immediate consequence of the fundamental 
concept of the Yedanta, as the following verses of the Bhagavadgitä 
(13, 27-28) may show:— 

"This highest Godhead hath his seat in every being, 
*'And liveth though they die; who seeth him, is seeing, 
"And he who everywhere this highest God hath found, 
"Will not wound self through self. . . .*' 

III. Who is called to the Study of the Vedanta? 

1. The indispensable Condition. 

The question, who is to be admitted to the saving teaching 
of the Vedanta, and who is to be excluded from it, is discussed 
in an episode of the first Adhyäya of the Brahmasütra's with 
great fulness (p. 280 — 323), and the result is, that there are 
called to knowledge, all those who are reborn (dvija) through 
the Sacrament of the Upanayanam (the initiation by a teacher 
with the solemn investiture with the sacred thread), therefore 
if they fulfil this condition, all Brahmaaa's, Kshatriya's and 
Yai^yas, and further also the gods and (departed) Rishis; that, 
on the contrary, the Qüdra's (belonging to the fourth, non- 
Aryan, caste) are excluded from it. 

Both the exclusion of the Qüdra's and the inclusion of 
the gods, give rise to long and interesting discussions. 

2. Exclusion of the Qüdra's. 

At first sight it may appear strange considering the principle 
of the Yedänta, that the Qüdra's are shut out from the path 
of salvation. Of course birth in a particular caste is not a 
matter of chance, but the necessary consequence of conduct 
and works in a former existence; but, as the Vedanta makes 
no difference between the three higher castes, it should hare 
been a logical consequence of its views (first however drawn 
by Buddhism), to admit the Qüdra too; for he also has a 
soul, he also is Brahman, and there is no conceivable reason 
why he also should not become conscious of this, and thus 
partake of the saving knowledge, especially as it is recog- 
nised that he is in need of it (p. 315, 11. 317, 3), and further 
the objector's argument of the Qüdra^s qualification for knov- 

III. Who it called to the study of the Yedanta? 61 

ledge (p. 316, 11) is not contested from a worldly point of 
Tiew (p. 317, 4), as also his right, admitted by the Smriti, to 
participate in the hearing of the Ilihäsd's and Purana^s (the 
epic and mythological poems) is not denied (p. 322, 14). 

But the same accommodation to national prejudices which 
determines the philosophers of the Yedanta to derive all their 
knowledge, even by the most tortuous procedure from the 
Veda, makes it also impossible for them to admit the Qüdra; 
for a condition precedent to the study of the Yedanta, is the 
study of the Yeda and a knowledge of its contents (p. 316, 
9), for this again, the Upanayanam (initiation by a teacher), 
to which the Qüdra cannot attain (p. 317, 2, 320, 6), as the 
law {smriti) further forbids the reading aloud of the Yeda, 
even in the presence of a Qüdra (p. 322, 2. 6). 

With this is connected the discussion of certain cases 
occurring in the Yeda itself, where a doctrine is apparently 
imparted to a Qüdra, or man of doubtful caste. 

The first is that of the Samvarga-vidycL^ a theory (remind- 
ing one of Anaximenes) of Vayu (wind) and Präna (breath) 
as ^samvargäh^ (absorbers), on the one hand, of the elements, 
on the other, of the life-organs, which ChäncL 4, 1 — 3 Baikva 
imparts to Jana^ruti, even after he has previously called 
him a Qüdra. >? 

37 The wording of this legend, which shows in very drastic fashion 
that the knower of Brahman, be he ever so wretched, stands higher than 
the richest and best who does not know it, is as follows (Chand. 4, 1-2): 
"Janagruti, the grandson [of Jana^ruta] was a dispenser, giving 
''mach, cooking much. He had houses of rest built on all sides, that 
*mea from all parts might eat with him. Once geese [or flamingoes] 
*flew past in the night. Then spoke one goose to the other: Ha there! 
** dim-eyed, dim-eyed [seest thou not] the splendour of J&nu^ruti the 

* grandson is extended like the heaven; approach it not, bum not thyself.'— 
*To her the other said: 'Who is he of whom thou speakest, as though 
**he were Raikva with the car!'— 'What is this— of Raikva with the 
"car?' — 'As [at dice] to him who has won with the kfita [the highest] 

* throw [or perhaps vijitäya from v(;, cf. J^gv* I« 92, 10 vijah] the lower 
"throws are also counted with it, so to him [Raikva] comes home all 
"the good the creatures do; and he who knows what he knows, for him 
"also is this true.* — This Jana^ruti the grandson over-heard. As soon 
*ae be rose, he spoke to his steward [who praised him in the way the 

62 IntroductioD. 

On the other side, Qankara reminds us firstly that a single 
case does not make a rule (p. 317, 9), and that what was 
right in the case of the SaqiYarga-Yidya need not therefore 
be transferred to all other things (p. 318, 1); but after this 
both Sütram and scholion (316, 6. 318, 10) affirm that 
^Qüdra" in the foregoing case is not to be taken in its tra- 

** Vaitälika's were afterwards wont to do]: *Thoa speakest [of me] W9 if 
**I were Raikya with the car.'— 'What is this— of Raikva with the car?* 
** — *As to him who has won with the krita throw, the lower throws an 
*'al80 counted, so to him comes home all the good the creatures do; and 
''he who knows what he knows, for him also is this true.' — ^Then weot 
''the steward forth to seek him. He came back and said 'I have not 
"found nim.' — He [Jäna^ruti] spoke to him: 'Go seek him where a 
** Brähmana [in the full sense, as Bpih. 3, 5, 1. 8, 8, 10] is to be aonght 
"[in solitude, in the forest, on a sandbank, in the river, in a remote 
" place,— as the scholiast explains].' — There sat one under his car, scratch- 
" ing his sores. To him he made obeisance saying : ' Art thou, Tenerable 
" one, Raikva with the car?'— 'I am verily he,' he answered.— The steward 
"returned and sAid: '1 have found him.'— Then took Jana^ruti the grand- 
"son six hundred cows, a golden necklace, and a waggon with male», 
"and went to him and said: 'Raikva! here are six hundred cows, here is t 
" golden necklace, here is a waggon with mules, teach me, venerable one, the 
"Godhead whom thou worshippest '— To him answered the other: 'Ha, hs! 
"for a trinket and a yoke, thou Qudra! keep them for thyself, with thy 
" cows.'— Then took Jana^ruti the grandson again a thousand cows, a goldeo 
" necklace, a waggon with mules and his daughter; he took them, and went to 
" him and said: 'Raikva ! here are a thousand cows, here is a golden necklace, 
" here is a waggon with mules, here is a wife, here also is the village in which 
"thou sittest;— teach me, venerable one!'— Then raised he her face [sunk 
"in shame] and said: 'He has brought these [cows]; through this face 
"alone, Qudra, thou wouldst have made me speak.' — Those are the 
" [villages] called Raikvaparna, in the country of the Mahavrisha's, where 
"he dwelt [at his invitation] and he spoke to him." 

Then follows, in the mouth of Raikva, the 8arnvar:gavidi/ät which has, 
however, not the slightest connection with the foregoing narrative, to 
that one could substitute for it, quite as suitably, ahnost any other 
extract from the Upanishad's. Also the systematising at the beginning, 
the legend of Kapeya and Abhipratarin in the middle, with its Trishtubb 
verses, and the promise ^ya' evam veda" at the conclusion, go to show 
that here, as so often in the Upanishad's, we have to do with two quite 
independent passages, originally placed side by side only perhaps because 
the krita throw occurs in both, carelessly united by a later editor, and in 
later times {e. g, by Qaükara, p. 1006, 7) expressly maintained to be 
connected with each other. 

ni. Who is called to the study of the VedänU? 63 

ditional sense (rüdhärtha), but in its etymological sense 
(avayavärtha); namely because Jana^ruti from sorrow (gti-cd) 
at the humiliating speech of the goose, had run (du-4rä'va) 
to Raikya, this Kishi, who, through supernatural knowledge, 
became aware of what happened, and wished to make this 
evident, called him ^ gtirdra^' (I). A subsequent (p. 319—320) 
direct proof that Jana^ruti was a Kshatriya, must be termed 
utterly inadequate, so far as it seeks by all kinds of quibbles 
to make it probable that the Abhipratarin mentioned in the 
SaipTargavidyä (Chand. 4, 3, 6) was a Kshatriya, — and there- 
fore also Jäna^ruti, because he is mentioned in the same 
yidyä(!). It is more arguable, as Qankara insists in this 
connection, that Jana^ruti must have been a Kshatriya because 
he had a steward (kshattar) (p. 320, 2); — however this may 
be, the whole zealously prosecuted investigation only proves 
for us that, for the time of Qankara and also for that of 
Bädaräyapa, it was by no means held to be self-evident that 
a man of princely wealth and pomp like Jana^ruti, could 
not have been a Qüdra, which is interesting from the point 
of Tiew of the history of culture. 

A further case is that of the boy Satyakama, to whom 
his mother Jabälä declares she cannot tell him from what 
family (gotram) he comes, because in her youth she had had 
to do with too many; with childlike naivete, Satyakama (whose 
name, as M. Müller fittingly observes, means OiXaXrjOY];) repeats 
this to the teacher who asks him concerning his family; the 
teacher finds that only a Brahman can be so sincere, and 
imparts the knowledge to him as such. '^ 

M Ckämdogya-Üponiuhad 4, 4: ''Satyakama, the ton of Jah&la, said 
**to his mother: 'Venerable one, I would enter as a Brahman student; 
.*t«U me of what üimily I am.' — She said to him: *This I know not, my 
''boy, of what family thoa art: in my yonth I went about much as a 
''maid; there I got thee; I myself know not of what family thou art; 
*my name is Jabala, and thy name is Satyakama; so call thyself [instead 
"-of after the father] Satyakama, son of Jabala. '— Then went he to Hari- 
**dnKmata the Gautama, and said: *I would enter with thee, venerable 
'one, as Brahmacarin, deign to accept me, venerable one!* He said to 
**him: *0f what family art thou, dear one?'— He said: *I know not, oh 
* master, of what family I am. I asked my mother, and she answered 

54 Introdaciion. 

^transfer the being and qualities of the one to the other, not 
''separating object and subject, although they are absolutely 
^^di£ferent (atyantorvivikta) and so saying, for example: 'This 
"am I,' 'That is mine.'" 29 

However this transference be defined, (p. 12, 1—14, 3) in 
any case it comes to this, that qualities of one thing appear 
in another, as when mother-of-pearl is taken for silver, or when 
two moons are seen instead of one (p. 14, 3— >6). This erroneous 
transference of the things and relations of the objective world 
to the inner Soul, the Self in the strictest sense of the word, 
is possible because the soul also is, in a certain sense, object, 
namely, object of presentation to the "I," and, as our author 
here affirms, in no sense something transcendent, lying beyond 
the province of perception (paroksham).^^ 

2« By this the objective, e. ^., the body, is sometimes treated as subject 
sometimes as a quality of it. As explanation the foUowing passage may 
serve, p. 20, 8: ''As one is accustomed, when it goes ill or well with hit 
''son or wife and the like, to say, 'it goes ill or well with me,* and thus 
^ transfers the qualities of outer things to the Self (soul, ätman) [cf. p. 689. 
** 3 ff.], in just the same way he transfers the qualities of the body, when 
''he says: 'I am fat, I am thin, I am white, 1 stand, I go, I leap,* and 
"similarly the qualities of the sense organs when he says: *I am dumb, 
" impotent, deaf, one-eyed« blind, * and similarly the qualities of the inner 
" organ [antafikaranam «» ffuinas, cf. 2, 3, 32], desire, wish, doubt, resolution 
^and the like; — thus also he transfers the subject presenting the *I* 
** {aham-pratyayin) to the inner soul, present solely as witness (takMn) 
^ of the personal tendencies, and conversely the witness of all, the inner 
"soul, to the inner organ and the rest" [that is, to the sense organs, the 
body and the objects of the outer world]. 

** P. 14, 5: "Question: but how is it possible to transfer to the inner 
"soul, which is no object, the qualities of objects? For everyone transfen 
"[only] to one object standing before him another object: and of the 
"inner soul thou maintainest that it is cut off from the idea of *Thou* 
"[not- 1] and is no object [I read vrith Govinda: avishayatvam]^ — Answer: 
"Not in every sense is it non* object; for it is the object of perception 
"of the *!'*' [asmat-pratyaya-viahaya; taken strictly and according to 
p. 78, 6, cf. 73, 5. 672, 1, not the sdlahiih but only the kartar^ that is, 
the individual soul already endowed with objective qualities, is ahoM- 
pr(ity€^a'V%ahaya]'j "and the [whole] assumption of an inner soul resu 
" on this, that it is not transcendent {aparok^ut). It is also not neoesaarr 
" that the object, to which we transfer another object, should stand before 
"us; as, for instance, when* simple people transfer to space {äkdfa-. 


XL Aim of the Yedanta: the dettraction of an innate error. 55 

^This transference, thus made, the wise term lONoaAi^cE 
** (auridya)^ and, in contradistinction to it, they call the accurate 
*^ determination of the own nature of things" (vastu-svarüpatih 
of the being-in-itself of things, as we should say) ^knowledge 
^ (vidya). If this be so, it follows that that to which a [similar, 
** false] transfer is thus made, is not in the slightest degree 
~ affected by any want or excess caused thereby" (p. 16, 

The object of knowledge, the Soul, thus remains, as 
made clear in these words, entirely unaltered, no matter 
whether we rightly understand it, or not From this we 
must conclude that the ground of the erroneous empirical 
concept is to be sought for solely in the knowing subject; 
in this subject the avidya, as repeatedly (p. 10, 1. 21, 7. 
807, 12) asserted, is innate (naisargika)] its cause is a wrong 
perception (it is mHJiya-jmna-nimitta, p. 9, 3); its being is a 
wrong conception (mithyä-prati/ayorrüpa, p. 21, 7); — all these 
expressions point to the fact that the final reason of the false 
empirical concept is to be sought — where, however, the 
Vedanta did not seek it — in the nature of our cognitive faculty. 
An analysis of this, as Kant undertook it, would in fact give 
the true scientific foundation of the Yedanta system; and it 
is to be hoped that the Indians, whose orthodox dogmatics, 
holding good still at the present day, we here set forth, will 
accept the teachings of the ''Critique of Pure Reason,'' when 
it is brought to their knowledge, with grateful respect 'i 

''which is not an object of perception, the dark colour of the ground, 
■'and the like. In jatt the same way is it posBible to transfer to the 
■^ inner soul what ia not soul." 

SI Also Kant's axiom that the transcendental ideality of the world does 
not exclude its empiric reality, finds its full analogy in the concepts 
of ^afikara: cf. p. 448, 6: ''All empiric action is true, so long as the 
** knowledge of the soul is not reached, just as the actions in dream, 
** before awaking occurs. As long in fact as the knowledge of unity with 
"the true Self is not reached, one has not a consciousness of the unreality 
"of the procedure connected with standards and objects of know- 
- ledge and fruits of works, but every creature, under the designation of 
**I' and 'mine,' takes mere transformations for the Self and for charac- 
''tenstics of the Self, and on the other hand leaves out of consideration 
** their original Brahman -Selfhood; therefore before the consciousness 

66 iQtrodaction. 

''The names of the Gods, like Äditya and so forth« even if 
^ they refer to light etc., compel us, according to the scriptures« 
''to assume spiritual beings corresponding [to the elements] 
"gifted with aigvaryam (ruling power); for they are thus 
*'used in the Mantra's and Brahraa^a's; and the Gods have, in 
** virtue of their aigvaryam, the power of remaining as the 
''Self (ätman) of light etc., or, according to their pleasure, of 
"taking this or that indiyiduality (vigraha); for the scriptures 
"say, in explaining the Subrahmanyä formula [Shadvingarbr. 
"1, 1]: '0 ram of Medhätithi^^that is as ram he [Indra, as 
" Qankara adds] once stole Medhätithi, the scion of Känva'^ and 
as the Smriti relates [Mahäbh. 1, 4397), Aditya, as a man 
"yisited Kunti; also the earth etc. have, according to the 
"scriptures, spiritual oyerseers, for it is said [Qatap. Br. 6, 1, 
"3, 2. 4] Hhe earth said^ — *(he waters said'; and, even if the 
"natural elements, as the light in the sun, and so on, are 
"without spirit, still they have, to judge by the part they play 
"in the Mantra's and Brahmapa's, God-like beings as their 
"spiritual overseers." 

As such "overseers" and ''disposers," the Gods act especially 
in the life-organs (p. 186, 6: devatä-ätmä indriyasya adhi- 
shpiätä, p. 728, 9: karanänäm niyantrishu devaUäsu), in which 
they entered according to Ait. 1, 2, 4, Agni as speech, Väyu 
as breath, Äditya as eye, and so on (p. 423, 14); for. though 
the organs in themselves are capable {gaJcta) of doing their 
own work, yet they do it only like a cart, which must be drawn 
by an ox (p. 727, 1); however, the Gods do not therefore take 
part in the enjoyment [and suffering] which in the body is the 
lot only of the individual soul (p. 727, 13;— the Gods are only 
bhoga-upäkarana-bhütat the soul alone is hhoktar, enjoyer. 
p. 379, 4), for the soul alone is stained by good and bad, 
affected by pleasure and pain (p. 728, 3), while the Gods are 
free from all evil (p. 728, 6); as also at death they do not 
wander forth with the life organs and the soul, but withdraw 
their assisting power (p. 746, 8), partly in order to hold inter* 
course on the moon with the (temporarily) blessed (p. 760, 5), 
partly, to show the way through the different heavenly regions, 
to the soul entering into the Brahman (p. 1117, 11). 


III. Who is called to the study of the Yed&nta? 67 

As for the rest, the Gods dwell in the highest region of 
sovereignity (parctsmin aigvarye pade p. 728, 4), but all their 
aicvaryam is dependent on the Faramegvara (p. 217, 7), the 
''highest lord,** that is the Brahman: this is the Atman (the 
(Self), as in everything else, so also in the Gods (Ätmä devän&m 
Ch&nd. 4, 3, 7); it is the Antaryämin (inner ruler), which, 
according to Brilu 3, 7, inwardly rules all beings, all organs, 
and 80 also all Gods without their being conscious of it them- 
selves, being for that reason, in this sense, different from their 
empirical self {devaiitman^ p. 196, 6). The Igvara (Lord), as 
the Brahman is called by preference in these exoteric dis- 
cussions, is further the power that creates Gods, men and 
beasts, being guided in doing so strictly by the merit and 
demerit of the soul in a previous existence (p. 492, 12), and 
in accordance with this, has destined animals to tmending 
suffering, men to a middle state, and the Gods to ''unending 
enjoyment'' (p. 491, 6). But this "unending enjoyment,'^ like 
everything except the Brahman, comes at last to an end; the 
immortality of the Gods is a relative one (äpekshikam p. 326, 4. 
241, 14) and means only longevity (p. 193, 12); they are also 
entangled in the Samsära (the circle of transmigration), are mere 
products (viMra p. 196, 13. 280, 3) doomed to transitoriness 
and want; for, as the scripture (Brih. 3, 4, 2) says: "what- 
ever is different from Him is subject to sorrow'' 
(p. 241, 16), and for this reason the Gods also are called 
to the saving knowledge, as we shall now consider more 

First it is to be noted that the Gods are nowhere in the 
scriptures excluded from the Brahmavidya (p. 281, 1). They have, 
it is true, no part in the Upanayanam (initiation by a teacher), 
but they do not require this; for the aim of this ceremony is 
merely admission to the study of the Veda, which is of itself 
revealed (svayam-pratibhata) to the gods (p. 281, 3). Moreover, 
there are even instances of gods and Rishis becoming Brahman 
pupils, like Indra of Prajapati (Chand. 8, 7 — 12) and Bhrigu 
of Vanu(ia (Taitt 3, 1). In the hearts of the Gods too (ac- 
cording to KätL 4, 12) dwells the JPuru$ha (Brahman) ^a 
thumb's breadth in height," for the purpose of knowledge, — 


68 Introduction. 

naturallj in the case of the gods, we are to understand the 
hreadth of a God's thumb (p. 282, 1). 

Moreover, the Gods are capable of liberation, because, ac- 
cording to the witness of the Mantra's, Brähmapa^ Itihäsa's, 
Puräpa's and popular belief, they possess individuality (vigraha- 
vattvam) (p. 280, 9), and need liberation, because their power 
(vtbhüti) belongs to the sphere of the changeable and is there- 
fore transitory (p. 280, 7). 

Now against these two assumptions very serious difficulties 
are raised. 

First objection: The asserted individuality of the gods, 
says the opponent, is neither real nor possible. It is not 
real, because, although the gods are present when sacrifices 
are offered to them, they are not perceived (p. 282, 7), and it is 
not possible, because individuality cannot be in several pUices 
at the same time; but the gods can so, since Indra for instance 
is often recipient of offerings in several places at the same 
time (p. 282, 8). 

To this it is to be rejoined: The gods are not seen at 
sacrifices, because they have the power to make themselres 
invisible (p. 284, 6), and they can be in several places at the 
same time, because they are able to divide their being (ätfman) 
into different forms (p. 284, 4); for if even the Togin, accord- 
ing to the Smriti (Mahäbhäratam 12, 11062), can multiply his 
body a thousand-fold, in order to enjoy the things of sease 
in one form, and to undergo frightful penances in another 
(p. 283, 9), how much more to the gods, who, according to one 
Vedic passage (Brih. 3, 9, 1), are first counted as 303 and 
3003, that is 3306, and then as only 33, with the explanation 
that the greater number indicates only their powers (moAt- 
fnänas% as the 33 are again reduced to one only, since the 
being of them all is Pränaf the Life (that is, here, the Brahman) 
(p. 283). 

Second objection: If the gods are, like ourselves, indivi- 
duals, they must also, like ourselves, be bom and die^'; now 

<> P. 285, 7 ; a quite correct dedactioQ, which is also not coniestid 
by Qaflkara, but is in another place expreesly stated by him (p. 696^ 11 

III. Who iB called to the Btudy of the Yedinta? 69 

the Yeda is eternal ( i n the o pirit o f the Or oator ; who '^ breathe d 
it ^i»>> >» *^^^ Y^^fiir^^o offinnn p 4«^ '^^^^^ Bfih,"8^-4r40), 
and the Yeda speaks of the gods. How is this possible if the 
gods are not also eternal ( p i fl06, 6)? 

This objection forces the composer of the commentary, and, 
perhaps, even the composer of the Sutra's (e t 1, 0, QO ),'to a 
rery remarkable theory, which comes yery close to Plato's 
doctrine of ideas; and, as we haye no ground at ail for 
supposing that either side has borrowed from the other, this 
bears witness to the fact, that there is something in the nature / 
of things, which tends towards Plato's teaching, to lead to [^ 
which the teaching of the Indian can be of use. 

It is true, he says, the indiyidual QoAb are transitory, and . 
the word of the Yeda, which speaks of them, is eternal; but 
the words of the Yeda, for instance the word ''cow" occurring 
in the Yeda, does not refer to indiriduals (to any separate 
cow), but to ''the object of the words: cow etc." (gabieHxrlha 
p » 886, C ), that is, to the species; and in just the same way 
the word ^'Indra" means, not an individual, but a certain 
position (sthdna-vigesha), something like the word '* General;" 
whoeTer occupies the position, bears the name (p. 887, 6). 

Therefore we must make a distinguish between the in- 
diTiduals (vyaktO]^ 9Q9;"^f and also p. 464,- ^, literally: 
** manifestation"), which are transitory, and the species (äkriti, 
that is "form," "shape," "sttoc,") vhich are eternal; p»-88^,-7^ 
""For though the individuals, as cows etc. originate, their 
^species do not thereby originate; for in substances, qualities 
''and activities originate the individual appearances (vyakti), 
^not the forms of the species (äkriti), and only with the species, 
''not with the individuals are the words [of the Yeda] connected, 
^ for with the latter, on account of the eternity [of the Yeda], 

padd A» loke iifattä-panechifmam tfostu ffkatoMit tad antavad drithtam) 
with a profoond feeling that what iB limited in Bpsce muBt be bo in 
time alto; of which the sole exception, perhspB iB matter (that is) if 
its qoantity in space iB limited, (which we do not know), which, however, 
M saeh, if an ahetraction without individnal eziBtence. — Among the 
Gredtt thie thought was exprOBsed by MelisBOs, ap. Simplic. in AriBtot 
Fkff9. fol. S8b: o^ ^ap del cTvai dvustiv, 5,Tt |ji-^ icav ion. 

70 Introdiicti«B. 

^o connection can be admitted. Therefore, though the indiii- 

^dnals originate, the species, in words like cow etc., are eternal; 

^erefore there is no contradiction; in just the same way there 

48 no contradiction in the case of names [of the gods] like 

^Vasa and the like, becanse the species of the gods are eternal, 

''eTen when an origin is admitted for the indiridnals." 

I These eternal species of things, as they are stored up in 

the Veda as the everlasting repository of all wisdom and 

knowledge, are, howeyer, for onr author not mere forms (äkritij 

felSoc), but the conception of them, exactly as in Plato 09^h. 

/p 84711 (t) approaches that of the efficient powers (gakÜ, 

I S6vo|iic), from which the oniyerse, after its disappearance, 

/ originates again and again; p. 30d, 1: '^This world in truth 

/ ^disappears, but in such fashion that the powers{jemain9 and 

I Hhese powers are the root from which it comes forth anew; 

I *'for otherwise we should have an effect without a cause. Now 

''it cannot be assumed that the powers [from which the world 

""comes forth anew] are different in kind [from those from which 

4t formerly came forth]. Therefore it must be granted that 

'4n spite of the constantly repeated intenuption [of the course 

''of the world], a necessary determination (niyatatvam) exists 

"in the beginningless Saqisara for the [newly] developing aeries 

"of worlds, as the earth etc., for the series of groups of living 

"beings, gods, animals and men, and for the different con- 

f "ditions of castes, Agrama's, duties and rewards, like the 

"necessary determination in the correlation of the [five] sense- 

"organs with the [five] elements: for in the case of these 

"also, we cannot admit as possible a difference for each new 

"creation, so that there might be a sixth sense-organ and 

"element^ ^ While therefore the process of the world in all 

"world-periods (kalpa) is similar and makes it possible [in a 

4< P. 803, 7: shashtha-indriya-vishaya; in the Bsme way, as aa 
example of impoiiibility p. 415, 1: Bkashthaaya iva indriya^artka^^ — Of 
other scholastic examples, to indicate impossibility, there occur in oar 
work: bandhyd-putra (the son of the barren) p. 570, 12 and ^pa-viMitHim 
(hare's horn) p. 564, 1. 4. S. 566, 7. Cf. 882, 8: «a prdfim apt difom 
proMthäpitah praticiin api di^m pratishtheta (for **for him all things 
possible"); the same image as Xenoph. Memarab. 4, 2, 21. 

ni. Who is eslled to the study of the Yedlnta? 71 

^ew creation] to be guided according to the process in the 
former world-period, therefore at eyery creation the differences 
''of the same names and forms are present in the mind of the 
''creators (ifvaräh « cf ■ a . 4 1 ), and in consequence of the likeness 
^of names and forms it happens that, eren if a return of the 
''world by means of a coUectiye CTolution and a coUectiye 
"disappearance is maintained, yet the autho rity and so forth 
"of the word of the Veda suffers no injury.'j^iJ 

Thus the word of the Veda, with its whole complex of 
ideas of the world and its relations, forms an eternal rule of 
guidance for the Creator, outlasting eyery disappearance of 
the world. The Creator ''remembers," while he shapes the 
world, the words of the Veda Qi 991, 10}, and thus the world 
originates with its constant forms {myata-c^qriti) as the gods 
and the rest, from the word of the Veda (p. 298, 2). Natur- 
ally this coming forth of the gods etc. from the Veda is not, 
like the OTolution from the Brahman, to be taken in the sense 
of a causa materialia (upädänorkäranam)^ but it means only 
'*a coming forth of the indiyiduals of things in conformity with 
the use of the words of the scriptures" ( sabdo ' vya v ah ära-yogga- 
art h a w f o kti nithpaHih^ p. B 07, 0) , which were there before the 
world, not only according to the witness of scripture and 
tradition (pr288), but also because they are the necessary ^ 
pre-8upposition of creation. For if one wishes to make any- / 
thing, one must first call to mind the word that indicates it / 
(p;-96^, d), and thus also before the creation the Vedic wordsf 
were present in the spirit of the Creator, and, according ti 
them, he shaped all things (p . 280, ■& ). \^^ 

But what are we to understand by "word'' in this woiltr- 
creating sense (p. 289, 9)?— Perhaps we might answer: the 
concepts corresponding to the words. But this answer 
the Indian cannot give, because he never reached a conscious 
separation of concept and perception. He answers in the first 
place: By word he understands^^ here the Sphota (the burst- 

«* Who? is not said. It is the opponent, but not Qaflkara, as Cowell 
a«iiiDM in Colebr. M. E.> p. 373 n. 1 ; what Cowell quotes is only the 
Ftirvapakshaf not the Siddhdnta, which Upavartha afterwards maintains; 
probably ^'a&kara took the whole discussion from his commentary (cf. n. 17). 

72 Introdaeiion. 

ing forth, the sudden coming to consciousness of the idea on 
hearing the letters of the word); and this conception leads to 
a discussion which is not without interest, and which, as a 
contribution to the Philosophy of Language, we here translate 
as accurately as possible in the form of an episode. 

4. Episode: on the yedäntic philosophy of language 

(translated from p. 289, 10—297, 7). 

[The Opponent, who defends the Sphota, says:] "An origination 
''of indiTidoals, such as gods etc, from the eternal words [of the Veda] 
" is not possible, on the assumption that the letters [of the word are thb 
** bearers of its meaning], for they as soon as they appear, pass awmy. 
''Not only so but the letters which pass away as soon as they have 
''appeared are continually apprehended differently according to their 
''pronunciation. Thus it is possible, for example, to recognise a man with 
"certainty, even without seeing him, when we hear him read aloud, by 
"his voice, and to say 'Devadatta is reading,' or 'Yignadatta is reading.' 
"And this diversity of apprehension of the [same] letters is, how- 
"ever, not based on error, because there is no apprehension which 
"conld refute it. — ^It cannot, therefore, be assumed at all that the 
"meaning of a word is recognised [merely] from the letters. For [ßrwify] 
"it cannot be assumed that each single letter in itself makes known the 
"sense, because they are different from each other; [geeandlp] [the aense 
"of the word] is also not [merely] a conception of the sense of the 
" letters, because they succeed each other [so that the earlier have already 
"passed away when the latter are pronounced]. It is perhaps {thirdijf] 
"that the last letter, assisted by the impression [samsJUIra], which the 
"perception of the preceding letters has produced, makes the sense known? 
"—This also is impossible. For [only] the word itself, presupposing 
^ the apprehension of the connection [of the letters], makes the meaning 
"known, as in the case of smoke [whose yanishing and continnaUy 
"reproduced particles alone are not able to give the conception of smoke]. 
"Further, an apprehension of the 'last letter, assisted by the impression, 
"which the perception of the preceding letters has produced,' is not 
"possible, because the impressions are not [any longer] perceptible. — Is 
" it then perhaps [fourthly] the last letter, assisted by the impressiona [of 
"the preceding] perceived in their after effect, which makes the sense 
"known?— Not this, either; for the recalling also, as it is the after efiect 
"of the impressions, is again a series [of presentations in time, — which 
"has already been discussed above, under the second head].— Therefore 
"it only remains possible that the word [as a whole, that is, its sense] is 
"a Sphota [an outburst] ng], which, after the percipient has received the 
"seed of the impression through the apprehension of the single letters. 

m. Who iB called to the itndy of the Yed&nU? 73 

*" mad has brought it to ripenesi by means of the appreheniion of the last 
^ letter, flashcB before him suddenly in its unity as a single conception. 
''And this single conception is no reminiscence, referring back to the 
** letters; for the letters are several, and cannot, therefore, be the object 
*- of the single conception. This [SphoUit the soul of the word, as ve might 
^-say,] is [only] recognised again, [not produced], on the occasion of its 
** pronunciation, and is therefore eternal [as well as a unity,] because the 
** conception of the manifold refers only to the letters. Thus the word, 
*- [that is, its sense] in the form of the Sphota is eternal, and from it, 
*- as that which names, goes forth as that which is to be named, the world, 
*^ consisting of deed, doer and fruits." 

"In reply, the venerable Upavarsha'* [an old MimäÄsa and Yedanta 
"- teaeher, cf. above. Note 17, and Golebrooke Misc. Ess.) 1, 882] ^'main- 
^ tains that only the letters are the word." 

[Opponent:] "But I have said, however, that the letters, as soon 
^'tliey appear, pass away." 

[Upavarsha:] ^This it not so, because they are again recognised 
'-as the same." 

[Opponent:] "That they are lecognised again, depends in their case 
^on the fact that they resemble [the former], somewhat as in the case 
•* of hairs (cf. on Brih. 748, 2)." 

[Upavarsha:] "O no! For that it is a recognition [of the same, 
** not merely of like], is not refuted by any other recognition." 

[Opponent:] "Becognition is grounded on species (äkriti)," [When 
I say a repeatedly, it is not the individual a, but the species a, which 
recvrs in different individuals.] 

[Upavarsha:] "Noj it is a recognition of individuals. Yes, if in 
*- speech other letters were continually apprehended, as in the case of 
*" other individuals, for example, cows, then recognition would be grounded 
" on speeiee; but this is not so; for only the individual letters are re- 
^cognised again in speaking, and [if the same word, for example, *cow,* 
^is repeated,] then it is assumed Uiat the word *cow' has been spoken, 
^twioe, not two words *cow' [once]. 

[Opponent:] "But the letters are still [as argued above] apprehended 
" as different, according to the difference of pronunciation ; for when the 
*- reading aloud of Devadatta and Yi^iiadatta can be recognised by the 
* tone, merely by hearing them, it results from the fact that a difference 
■* is apprehended." [Therefore the recognition of a letter must be that 
of the species, not of the individual differing according to pronunciation.] 

[Upavarsha:] "Without detriment to the exactness of the recognition 
*- in the case of the letters, letters msy be pronounced [more] joined or 
*>[more] separated; hence the different apprehension of the letters is 

74 Introduction. 

^ grounded on the difference of pronunciation, not in the nature of the 
^'letten. Further: he alio, who transfers the difference to the individiial 
^^ letters [instead of the manner of pronunciation], musty if a recognition 
"is to he possible, [first] settle species for the letters, and then assume, 
''that these [species] are differently apprehended owing to foreign in- 
''influences; and here it is preferable to assume, as simpler, that, in the 
" case of the individual letters, the apprehension of the difference is oon- 
" ditioned by foreign influences, while, on the other hand, their recognitioa 
" is conditioned by their own nature. For the assumption that there ii 
"a difference in the letters, is refuted precisely by the fact that a re- 
"cognition of them takes place." 

[Opponent:] "But how can it happen that the sound ga which ii 
" one, is at the same time different, when several pronounce it at the 
" same time, and [likewise] when it is pronounced with the acute, grave, 
"or circumflex accent, or without the nasal?" 

[üpavarsha:] "But this difference of apprehension is not caused 
"by the letters, but by the tone (({Avant)." 

[Opponent:] «What is tone?" 

[Upavarsha:] "That which reaches the ear, when one hears soundi 
"from a distance, and does not perceive the difference of the syUablei, 
" and which prompts one sitting near to attribute his own differences of 
"stupidity and sagacity to the letters [which he hears]. And from thif 
"[the tone] depend attached the differences of accentuation with the 
" acute etc., and not the nature of the letters. But the letters are re- 
"cognised just as they are pronounced [independently of the tone]. If 
"this be assumed, then the perceptions of accentuation have a basii, 
"otherwise not; for, as regards the letters, they are only recognised 
"again, and do not differ [in themselves]; therefore we should have to 
" assume that the differences of accentuation lie in their connection end 
" separation ; but connection and separation are not perceptible^ and «e 
"cannot take our stand on them, in order to arrive at an explanatios 
" of the difference of the letters ; consequently the perception of aoeen- 
" tuation etc. would have no basis [without the assumption of tone].— >We 
^ must not fall into that error either that, because the accentuation is 
"different« the letters to be recognised are also different. For because 
"one thing shews differences, another, which is not different does not 
"need to shew them also; as, for example, one does not condade thst 
"the species is different, because individuals differ among themsehei. 
"And as it is thus possible to recognise the sense from the letters, the 
'^ hypothesis of the Sphota is unnecessary." 

[Opponent:] "But the Sphota is no hypothesis, but an object of 
"perception. For in the understanding (buddhi), after it has received 
" [different] impressions through apprehension of the single letters, [tbe 
"sense of the word] flashes out suddenly." 

in. Who is called to the study of the Yedinta? 76 

[Upayarsha:] ''This is not so: for this understanding [of the sense 
'-of the word] also refers to the letters. For after the apprehension of 
''the separate letters [of the word 'cow,' for example,] has preceded in 
^ttniey there follows this single concept (buddhi) — *cow,' whose object is 
*^ the totality of the letters and nothing else." 

[Opponent:] "How do you prove this?'* 

[Upavarsha:] ''By the fact that with the concept which thus cornea 
^ into being [cow], the letters C etc., and not the letters Tetc., are connected ; 
"-for if the object of this concept were a Sphota, something different 
** from the letters C etc., then the letters C etc., would have just as little 
'^ to do with it as the letters T etc.; but this is not so; and therefore this 
** simple concept [of the idea] is [not a SphoUh but] otäy a reminiicenee 
'^camieeted with the kttenr 

[Opponent:] "But how is it possible, that the different letters are 
^the object of the simple concept?" 

[Upavarsha:] "To this we answer: a thing which is not simple can 
''alao be the object of a simple concept, as is seen in examples like: series, 
"- forest, army, ten, hundred, thousand, and the like. For the understand- 
** ing of the word 'cow' as a unity, since it is conditioned by the extract- 
** ing of one sense from many letters, is a metaphorical one (aupaedriki), 

* just as is the understanding of forest, army, and the like." 

[Opponent:] "But if the mere letters, by entering, in their totality, 
^ into the sphere of a simple concept, formed Üie word, then no difference 
** would be made between words like jd-rd (paramours) and rä-jä (king), 
^ka-pi (ape), and pp'ka [cuckoo), for the letters are the same, yet in a 
*^ different connection they give a different sense.'' 

[Upavarsha:] "To this we answer: even when all the letters are 
*-peroeiTed« just as ants can only form our idea of a row, when they are 
^ in a row, so the letters can only form the concept of a word, when they 
^ keep their sequence [this is only an evasion of the opponent's objection] 
''and there is no contradiction in the fact that, even when there is no 
■'difference in the letters, a difference in the words may be perceived in 
"oonaequence of a different order of letters. Therefore since certain 
■^letters perceived in their order etc. are, according to the traditional 
''luage of language, connected with a given meaning, apprehended 
** [through them], though they are perceived in their own proper function 
>* as single letters, our unifying understanding becomes conscious of them 
■* simply as this or that, and they thereby convey this nr that given sense. 

* — ^Therefore the assumption that the letters [are the bearers of the sense] 
*is the simpler, while the assumption of a Sphota leaves the sensible 
""and hypostatises the supersensible, by which it is sssnmed that these 
-given letters, perceived in order, reveal the Sphota and this Sphota 
"reveals the sense; which is certainly complicated enough. Admitting 

76 Introdaction. 

** therefore that the letters, according u they are pronounced, are different 
^ in each case, it most yet undeniably be assumed, that as that on which 
** recognition rests is an identity existing in the letters, and that in the 
" case of the letters the deliberate design of communicating the senie ii 
''transmitted in this identity." 

Author's note. The truth in this controversy probably lies between 
the two extremes. The Opponent is right, in so far as philosophy cunot 
dispense with the acceptance of ideas (for ideas are reasonably to be 
understood by the Sphota), and Upavarsha is right, in so far as ideu 
exist only so far as words exist (retained by memory). Moreover, the 
relation between idea and word is certainly no mere external, conyentional 
one, but originally inner and organic; but why just these sounds expren 
just this idea, is a problem which philosophy, comparative philology and 
physiology have hiüierto worked at in vaio, yet the solution of which 
can and will never be abandoned by science. 

IV. Qualifications of those called to the study 

of the Vedanta. 

1. The Study of the Veda. 

Ak indispensable condition of our science, the impossi- 
bility of folfilling which in the case of the Qüdra, as we saw, 
(p. 58£F.) excluded him from the saving doctrine, is the study of 
the Veda, and this requirement, or at least the appearance 
of it, seems to have been continually more exaggerated in 
course of time. Thus it is said in Saddnanda^s Vedäntasära^ 
a later compendium of the Vedänta, § 6: ''He who is called 
to the study must have regularly studied the Veda and the 
Ved&ngas (that is, the six subsidiary sciences of the Veda: 
phonetics, grammar, etymology, metre, ritual and astronomy, 
as they are already enumerated Mupd. 1, 1, 6) so, that he 
may be able to understand the full sense of the Veda ex tem^ 
pore (äpätatah)^^ — a requirement which, considering the extent 
of the Yeda^* and the great difficulty of many Vedic texts, 
in the strict sense of the word no one except Brahm&n can 
hare fulfilled, while men must have satisfied themselves, in the 
case of each hymn for instance, with imprinting accurately on 
their memories the metre, poet, deity and ritual purpose, and 
at the same time, perhaps, also understanding something of 
the sense. ^7 Of such exaggerations we find no trace in Qali- 

<* There is no qaet tion of a limitation to one's own fäkhd (cf. p. 979, 
4: ietmaeta'veda-atrtha'Viiflänavatah), and such a limitation would alto not 
inclnde all the Upaniehad texts preiapposed by the Vedanta. 

«^ Cf. Colebrooke, Misc. Sss. i p. 20, and in Qafikara's work (p. 801, 8) 
the qnotation from the Anheifa-brdhmanam p. 8 : ** For whoever employs 
a hymn for sacrifice or study without knowing the Rishi, Metre, God- 
head, and ritoal nse of it, knocks against the trunk of a tree, or falls 
into a pit'* 

78 IntrodttoÜon. 

kara: he contents himself with simply indicating the study 
of the Yeda and a knowledge of its contents as an indispens- 
able condition (p. 24, 4. 316, 9); what he actually presupposes, 
apart from the occasional quotations of other Vedic texts (c£ 
p. 32), is hardly more than an accurate knowledge of the 
eleven older, or, as we might almost say, of the genuine 
Upanishad^s (Aitareya and KatMhitaki\ Chändogya and Kena; 
Taittiriyaf Käihäka, Qvetägvatara and Bnhadaranyaka with 
Igä; Mundaka and Pragna), with quotations from which he 
everywhere deals yery liberally; generally quoting only the 
opening words with the ''etc." which is unfortunately so 
common in Indian texts, and which sometimes slips from him 
even where there is nothing more to follow (cL p. 269, 4), 
and greatly injures the precision of treatment As we cannot 
in general assume in our readers such an acquaintance with 
the Upanishad texts as the Indian could in his, we shall 
interweave in our presentation an anthology embracing a series 
of the most beautiful and important passages of the üpani* 
shad's, even if we do not select them according to a standard 
of our own, but in accordance with the texts of the scriptures 
employed by Bädaräyapa and Qankara.^^ 

48 The most important part of what has ahready been done for the 
Upanishad*8, excepting editiona of texts (by Roer, Weber, Cowell, Foley 
and others) is as follows: Anqnetil Duperron, OupneVhat, Argen- 
torati 1801-1802, a Latin translation of 50 Upanishad's from the Peraian 
into which Sultan Daraschakoh, 1656 A.D., had had them translated, 
contains: Vol. I, p. 15 Tschehandouk, 98 Brehdarang, 294 ijltfrt, 375 
Mandek, 395 Eischavaaieh, 400 Sarb; VoL II, p. 1 Narain, 5 Taditc, 
12 Athrbsar, 27 Eensnad. 35 Sarbsar, 68 KoVhenk, 94 Sataater, 128 Forsch, 
152 Dehian band, 157 Maha aupnel^hat, 162 Atma pru boudeh, 165 Kuml, 
171 Schai rtmdri, 197 Djog mxnJeha, 200 I^ogtat, 204 Schiw SoMkiap, 
207 Abrat (athrb) »aieha, 218 Atma, 217 Brahm badia, 221 Ambrot 
bandeh, 229 Tidj bandeh, 232 Karbheh, 241 Lijabal, 849 Maha narä§n. 
266 Mandouk, 271 Fankl, 274 Tschehourka, 279 JP^m hens, 286 AranL 
291 Kin, 299 Kiouni, 328 Anandbli, 338 Bharkbli, 346 Barl^heh aomkU 
351 I^'ounka, 355 Mrat lankoul, 358 Anbratnad, 366 Baschkl, 372 IMkhaMi, 
378 Tark, 380 Ark^hi, 387 IVanau, 403 Schavank, 412 Nersing'heh atma; 
for the corresponding Sanskrit names see below. A German translation 
of this translation of a translation has appeared Dresden 1888. — ^Ram 
Mohnn Roy, Translation of several principal books, passages and texts 
of the Yeds, ed. II, London 1832 (contains Mundaka, Kena, Käikaka^ 

IV. Qualifioations of those called to the study of the Vedanta. 79 

2. The four Requirements. 

As further conditions for the study of the Vedanta, Qan- 
kara mentions (p. 28, 3), in conformity with the Yedäntasära, 
the four requirements which we shall now consider more 

/^>.— Colebrooke, Misc. Ess. > I, p. 47-54. 02-71. 76-79. 83-88. 91-98. 
110>113.— F. W. Windischmann, Sancara, Bonnae 1833, p. 49-186.— 
The aame in his father's ** Philosophie im Fortgange der Weltgeschichte,*' 
Bonn, 1882-34, p. 1888-90. 1448-49. 1540. 1585-91. 1595-98. 1613-23. 
166&.e0. 167a>76. 1689-1719. 1737-40.— Poley, i[2tAaJka-0upanichat (with 
Mtmdaka) translated into French, Paris 1837.— Roe r, the TaitHriya, 
AUaresfa, ^^vetä^vatara, Kena^ Ifä^ Eatha, Fragna, Mundaka and Man- 
dükya üpanishads, translated, Bibl. Ind., CalcutU 1853.— The same, the 

Up. transl. Calc. 1856.— Raj end rala la Mitra, the 
fa-Up., transl. Calc. 1862.— Go well, the JTaKtAttoM-brahmana- 
npaDishad, ed. with an Engl. TransL, Gale. 1861.— The same, the Maitri 
up., Calc. 1870. — A. Weber, Analyse der in Anquetil Duperron's 
Übersetsang enthaltenen Upanishad, Ind. Stnd. I, p. 247-302. 
380-456. II, 1-111. 170-286 IX, 1-173, Berl. 1849. 1853. Leipz. 1865; the 
only thorongh treatment of the material existing up to the present (1888). 
An index (wanting in the Ind. Stud.) is added here for more conyenient 
reference: Vol. I: p. 254 Chdndogyc^ 273 BrihadBranyaka, 273 MaiMyant, 
279 Mwndaka^ 298 1q&, 301 Sarvopanithats&rn, 380 Näräyana, 381 Tadeva, 382 
Aikarva^iras, d8o Eansanäda, dSl Sarvasära (A.itMtey9L'Vp.i^92EaM8httaki, 
4:K) Qvet6fvatara^ 439 Prafna; Vol. II, p. 1 Dhyänavindu, 5 Mähä, 8 Ätma- 
prabiMa, 9 Eaivalyat 14 Qatarudriyami 47 Togagikshä, 49 Yogatattva^ 
51 Qiva$amkafpa, 53 Atharvafikhä, 56 Ätma, 57 Brahmavidyä, 59 Amrita- 
rtniM, 68 T^ovMu, 65 Oarbka, 71 Jäbäia, 78 Mahänäräyanaj 100 Mändükya, 
170 gSkafyaiJ), 170 Kslmrikä, 173 Paramahafisa, 176 Ärunika, 181 Kena, 
196 Eäthaka, 207 Anandavaut (— Taitt. 2), 230 Bhriffuvain (»Taitt. 3); 
VoL IX, p. 1 FtiruehaMcta, 10 Chülikä, 21 Mrityuiäügüla (?), 23 Amfi- 
tamäda, 38 VäMsala, 42 Chägaleya (?), 46 TärdkOy 48 Ärsheya (?)> ^^ iVa- 
navOt 52 Qamutka (?), 53 Nrinnha. — ^The same. Die Vqjra9(UA des A^Taghosha, 
B«rL I860.— The same, Die Bämatäpantya Up., Berl. 1864.— The same, 
Ind. Lii.>, p. 54-57. 77-81. 103. 106-109. 139-154. 170-190.- A. E. Gough, 
The Philosophy of the üpanishads, CalcutU Review, CXXXI, 1878-1880. 
— P. Regnaud, Mat6riaux poor serrir k la Thistoire de la philosophie 
de l*Indc, Paris 1876-78; cf. Weber's Cntiqae of the first part, Jenaer 
Ltier.-Z. 1878 Nr. 6, p. 81 ff.— F. Max Müller, The üpanishads, trans- 
lated, part I, Oxford 1879 (Sacred Books of the East, Vol. 1); the first 
▼oliime indades the Introduction and Chändoyya, Kena, Aiiareya^ 
EmmMfaki, lf&; the second (VoL XV, 1884) contains Käthaka, Mundaka, 
TaiUkiya, Brihadäranyaka^ Qvetägvatara, Pracna, MaitrS^/am. For 

80 Introduction. 

1) The first is ^discerning between eternal and non- 
, eternal substance'' {nitya-^nitya-vastiirviveka) ; by eternal 
i substance Brahman is meant, and by non-eternal^ eyery thing 

else. As this discernment in the full sense of the word is 
really the last result of our scienc^ we are to understand by 
it here, where it appears ^as condition precedent, only the 
general metaphysical disposition in virtue of which one has a 
consciousness of an unchanging being, in contrast with the 
changeableness of all worldly things and relations; in this 
sense the said condition of the Vedanta agrees exactly with 
the question with which Plato begins his exposition of meta- 
physics, and which also pre-supposes the consciousness of the 
same difference: ^xi xi ov iai, y^v^oiv th oäx S^ov, xal xl xi 
^tfv^iisvov (liv del, Bv hk oi&iicoxs" (Tim. p. 27 D). 

2) The requirement which Qankara, and (better, because 
without ar(ha) Sadänanda, mention in the second place, gives 
us a high conception of the earnestness of Indian thought: it 
is ^Renunciation of the enjoyment of reward here 
and in the other world" (iha'amuira'[artha']phala'bhcfa' 
viräga). Only as far as we pursue philosophy without the 
consciousness of following material aims at the same time, do 
we pursue it worthily and rightly, — and he only can hope to 
find an explanation of the highest questions of being who has 
learned to raise himself above all hopes and longings of the 
heart to pure objectivity of spirit. 

3) There is more misgiving about the third requirement, as 
which Qankara gives ^the attainment of the [six] means, 
peace, restraint, etc." (Qama'dama'ädi-sädhana'Sampady 
This is based on a passage in the Brih. Up., where, at the 
end of a wonderful description of the Akämayamäna, that is, 
the man who already in this life, through the power of know- 
ledge, has reached freedom from all desires, it is said in 
conclusion (Brih. 4, 4, 23): ''Therefore he who knows this is 
** peaceful, restrained, resigned, patient and collected; only in 
*^ the Self he sees the Self, he beholds all as the Self (the Sool, 

farther refi. cf. now my ** Sechzig Up. dei Veds übersetzt mit Einleitaiigen 
und Anmerkungen, Leipzig 1897." 

IV. Qaalifieations of those called to the itudy of the Yedaot«. 81 

**ätman); otü yanquishes him not, he yanquishes evil; eyil bums 
*^him not, he bums eyil; free from passion and free from 
^ doubt, he becomes a Brähmapa, he whose world is the 
''Brahman." Fitting as all this is, when said of the saint 
who has OTercome tiie world, it is strange when the Yedän- 
lists, relying on the passage, enumerate the possession of the 
following six means as conditions precedent to knowledge: — 

1. Qama Tranquillity, 

2. Dama Restraint, < 

3. Uparati B.enunciatioD, / 

4. UtikAä Resignation, \ 
6. Samadhi Concentration, 

6. Qraddha Belief. 

The explanation of these conceptions by Qankara (on Brih. 
loc cit), Gk>yindänanda and Sadänanda, with numerous diver- 
gencies in detail, amounts to this, that, under No. 4, they all 
understand an apathy towards contraries like heat, cold, and 
the rest, in the sense of the Stoics; under Nos. 1, 2, 3, 6, on 
the other hand, an inner concentration along with a fulli 
withdrawal of the senses from the objects of the outer worid,/ 
Neither of these will fit the picture that we form of the true 
philosopher to>day. In contrast to the Stoic sages (whose 
model was certainly not Heraclitus, the real father of the 
Stoic doctrine), we imagine the philosophic genius rather as 
a profoundly excitable, nay, even passionate nature; and, in 
spite of all concentration and meditation, we demand from 
him, as from the empiric inyestigator, a full interest in the 
risible world and its wonderful phenomena, only that he must 
see them with other eyes than the empiric, in a word, to 
use an expression of Plato's (Scholia in Ar. ed. Brand., 
p. 66 B 48), not only with the eye which sees the ticicoc, but 
also with that which sees the iicicitT^c. And just as little will 
the requirement demanded from the pupil under No. 6 com- 
mend itself to us, since we have learnt from Descartes, that 
the beginning of wisdom consists in this, de omnibuB du* 

4) As fourth and last requirement for the study of the 

Vedftata, Qankara and Sadänanda name Mumulahutvam, ^ the 


82 Introduction« 

• longing for liberatioiL" And rightly so. For he who enjoys 
the day of life with childlike, Hellenic, cheerfulness, howoTer 
high a flight his genius may take in other respects, will only 
touch in passing the last and highest problems of being, as did 
the Greeks; to seize them fully and clearly requires a deep 
feeling of the yanity and nothingness of all this life, and a cor* 
responding longing to pass ^from the non-existent to the existent, 
*^fram darkness to light, from death to immortality" (Brih* 1, 3, 
28), a longing by which, as the passage quoted leads us to 
believe, the Indians were inspired eyen in ancient times, and 
which remained the true motive principle of their philosophy; 
so that, exceptions apart, the question of liberation forms the 
comer-stone of all the philosophic systems of India. 

3. Relation of the System to that of Justification by 


The already enumerated requirements in the elect are, 
according to Qankara, the only ones which are indispensable« 
As soon as (anantaram) they are fulfilled, the ^investigation of 
the Brahman" can begin (p. 29, 4); and it is not necessary 
that the ^investigation of duty," that is, the study of the 
Mimansa of Jaimini (c£ above p. 20), should precede it (p. 28^ 
4); on the contrary it may just as well follow as go before 
(p. 25, 1), since the contents and aim of the two systems are 
independent; the investigation of duty demands observance, as 
Qankara (p. 27) remarks; and refers to a future, dependent 
on the action of men, and has, as its fruit, abhyudaya (going 
upward, happiness, both transitory in heaven, and also earthly 
in a future birth), but the investigation of the Brahman, on 
the contrary, has as its fruit nihgreyasam (literally: quo nihil 
melius, summum bonum), that is, liberation; it refers to a 
something which has always existed, not dependent on the 
action of men; it does not command, like the other, but only 
teaches, ^ as if, in teaching concerning any thing, it is brought 
before the eyes" (p. 28, 1, cf. 818, 7); therefore all imperatives^ 
even if they are taken from the scriptures, are, when directed 
to the knowledge of Brahman, as blunt as a knife with which 
one would cut a stone (p. 76, 3); therefore also all the 

rV. Quftlificationi of those called to the itndy of the Yedanta. 83 

commands of the scripture, that we should inrestigate the 
Brahman, have only the meaning that they turn the thoughts 
from their natural tendency towards outward things (p. 76, 6) 
and the egoistic aims bound up with them (p. 76, 7), through 
which the eternal goal of mankind is not reached (p. 76, 8), 
and give them a direction towards the inner soul, in order 
then to teach them about the existence of the soul (p. 77); 
as also further, for him who knows the Brahman, all commands 
and prohibitions cease to be in force: ^for this is our ornament 
and pride (älainkära\ that after the knowledge of the soul as 
the Brahman all obligation of action ceases, and all past 
actions are annihilated" (p. 77, 7). 

flowerer freely, as is visible in these quotations, our science 
raises itself above the whole legal system with which the 
Brahmans had succeeded in fettering the spirit of the Indian 
peoples, yet it hardly ventures at all to carry this into practice. 
Only for him who has won the knowledge of the Brahman, 
as we shall see further on more in detail, do all laws cease ^'; 
but, as long as this point is not reached, the four Ägramas, 
or stages of practice in which, according to Brahmanical law, 
the lite of each twice-born has to traverse the steps of 
Brahman pupil, householder, hermit and beggar (above 
p. 15£L), along with the works prescribed in them, remain in 
force (p. 1008, 5): "For [only] full-grown knowledge requires 
^nothing else for the perfecting of its fruit [liberation]; yet it 
^certainly requires other things, in order that it may first 
''grow. Why? Because of the passage of scripture which 
^ speaks of sacrifice and so forth. For thus says the scripture 
*(6rih. 4, 4, 22): ^The Brahmans seek to know this [the 
"- 'highest spirit], by reading the Veda, by sacrifice, by gifts, 
*^ *by penances, by fasts'; and this passage shows that sacrifice 
*-<&:c are a means of knowledge; and, as it is therein said, 
*^'they seek to know,' therefore this limits them to being a 

«»p. 1007, 1 : ** For knowledge [alone] is the cause through which the 
goal of man is reached; therefore, after this goal has been gained through 
knowledge, the works of the ApramaSf such as kindling the fires &C., are 
not [farther] to be observed." 


84 Introduction. 

''means for the growth [of knowledge]." In the same way* 
by the passages Chänd. 8, 5, 1, Käth. 2, 15 and others it is 
"shown that the works of the Äframas are a means of know- 
ledge" (p. 1009, 4). Their difference from the means, 
tranquillity &c.| enumerated above, consists only in this, that 
the latter continue even for those who have gained knowledge, 
and thereby form the more immediate (pratt/asanna) means, 
while sacrifice &c. are to be considered as the external (pähya) 
means, since they exist only for those who are striving after 
knowledge (p. 1012, 4). These external means, sacrifices, 
gifts, penances, fastings, are to be followed by every one with 
the exception of those who have reached knowledge, whether 
desiring liberation or not (p. 1017, 9); in the latter case the 
obligation to fulfil them lasts the whole life, in the former, 
for a time only (p. 1019, 2), since they are only helpful in 
gaining knowledge, but, this once gained, become superfluous. 
For thus teaches scripture (p. 1008, 9. 1019, 4), it also shows, 
how he who possesses the means of Brahma-scholarship &c^ 
will not be overcome by affections (frfe(a), such as love [and 
hate] (p. 1021, 3). In what their collaboration towards know- 
ledge further consists, is not more definitely determined; 
according to p. 1044, 4, they are to collaborate towards the 
knowledge which arises from the hearing of the scriptores, 
by destroying the hindrances which may exist; these hindrances 
consist in this, that other works of a former birth may come 
to ripeness, whose fruit may be a hindrance to knowledge; 
if the power of the stated means be the stronger, it overcomes 
the other fruits of works, and knowledge is gained (p. 1043, 
4); but if, on the other hand, the hindrances are stronger, 
the pious practices, in virtue of the metaphysical power 
(aiindriyä Qoktih) which dwells in them, as in all woiks 
(p. 1044, 1), bring forth knowledge in the next birth, in which, 
as was the case, for instance, with Vdmadeva (Ait up. 2, 5. 
Brih. 1, 4, 10), it may occasionally exist even from the mothers 
womb (p, 1044, 10). 

But how stands it with those who, on account of wretched 
circumstances, lack of means and the like, cannot fulfil the 
religious duties of the Ägram<i$t and thus stand, as it were, 


IT. Qutlificationi of thoM called to ilie ttady of the Vedinta. 85 

in the middle,*^ between the twice -bom and the Qüdras 
(p* 1021, 8)? They also, thus declares the answer, as is seen, 
for instance, in the case of Raihva (c£ n. 37), are called to 
knowledge (p. 1022, 1), although it is better to live in the 
AframoB (p. 1024, 2). For those whose condition is wretched, 
we must admit that, either on the ground of ordinary human 
actions, such as repetition of prayers, fasts, worship of the 
gods (p. 1023, 1), or also in consequence of the works of the 
Agranuts performed by them in a former birth, the grace 
{anugraha) of knowledge is bestowed on them (p. 1023, 6). 
And here we touch a very remarkable conception, concerning 
which we shall try further on to reach perfect clearness, but 
the material for which we shall introduce here, in order to 
direct the reader's whole attention to it« 

4» Liberation through ''the Grace" of Knowledge. 

How is the knowledge that leads to liberation, that is, the 
recognition of the Brahman, produced in men? To begin with , 

we must rero <^"ll^ftl' t^flt i^ ''" ^^^ " gn^ofi'/^n nf poining onipo, 

thin g which we did not posse ss ; to gain it is impo s sible, sin ce 
the - Brahman is actually notbipg else than our own self 
(p. 71, 7). But wh at have we .tQ jl2,..iii_örd£t-lQ— hfipome 
conscioua-D^ this r^ This is briefly answered by the passage, 
p. 69, 7: ''The knowledge of the Brahman is not dependent 
''on the action of man, but on the contrary, just like the 
"^knowledge of a thing which is an object of perception and 
** other means of knowledge this also depends only on the 
** object [that is, on the Brahman]." One must also not think 
that the recognition of the Brahman is an effect of the action 
of inTestigating (p. 69, 10), or of worshipping (p. 70, 3); and 
even the scriptures are its source only so far as they destroy 
Ignorance concerning the Brahman (p. 70, 7), just as they 
have no further significance for the state of awakening (pro- 
bodha) (p. 1060, 11); nay (p. 70, 10), all investigation and 

^ Antard 3, 4, 36, explained by ^a&kara ai antaräle; if we ondentand 
tlie expreenon rightly, it meant, what we were before (n. 13) not able 
to condode with certainty from Manu, that the Agramai were obligatory 
OB all three Dv^fa caetei. 

86 Introduction. 

knowledge, so far as subject and object are thereby separated, 
is a direct hindrance to the recognition of the Brahman, as 
says the scripture (Eena-Up. 2, 11, recalling the Gospel 
according to Matthew, XI, 26): 

''Who doth not know, he knoweth it 
''And he who knoweth it, doth not; 
''Unknown it is to him who knoweth 
"And known to him who doth not know.'' 

under these circumstances, according to the mode of ex- 
pression of the exoteric, theological teaching, in which the 
philosophy of our system is framed,*^ the birth of knowledge 
and the liberation connected with it, appears as a grace of 
God (literally: of the Lord tgvara), as becomes clear from 
the two passages which we here quote: 

P. 682, 3: ^For the individual soul, which is impotent, is 
»the condition of Ignorance, to distinguish [from the soul] 
^the aggregate of the organs of activity [appearing as the 
^body], and is blind through the darkness of Ignorance, from 
''the highest soul, the overseer of the work^ the onlooker 
^dwelling in all being, the Lord who is the cause of spirit, 
''from him, by his permission, comes theSaipsara, consisting 
''in the states of doing and enjoying (suffering^ and through 
"his grace, is caused knowledge, and, through this, 

P. 786, 7: "Granted, that the soul and God are related 
"as the part and the whole, yet it is evident that the soul 
"and God are of different character. How stands it, then, 
"with the identity of God and the soul? Does it exist, or 
" does it not? — In truth it exists, but it is hidden; for Ignorance 
"hides it. But, although it is hidden, yet, when a creatore 

*i That in the conception of grace (as in general in the whole appre- 
hension of Brahman as lovara) we have to do only with an exoteric 
personification, which is not to be taken strictly, becomes also clear from 
the fact that p. 1023, 9 the Samskäräh (moral purifications) are likewiM 
spoken of personified, as anugrahttaro vidyäyäh. Cf.on the teaching of grace, 
besides the two above quoted chief passages, also p. 662, 1, where tbe 
para ähnan is spoken of as cakBhur-ädi-anavagähya and jnana-praioda' 
anagamya', to the teaching of creation refers the parame^vara'anMgrQka 
p. 300, 3. 301, 2. There are no further passages as far as we know, in 
which the conception of grace occurs. 

IV. QoAlificationfl of thoie called to the ttady of the Ved&nta. 87 

^thinks on and strives towards the highest God, just as the 
'^ faculty of sight in one who has become blind, after the 
'^darkness is shaken off by the power of remedies, in him, in 
^whom the grace of God perfects it, does it become mani- 
''festv but not naturally in any being whatsoever. Why? 
^Because through him, through God as cause, the binding 
'^and loosing of the soul are accomplished, binding when it 
''does not recognise the essence of God, and loosing, when it 
^does. For thus says the scripture (Qvet. 1, 11): 

<* When God if known, all fetten fall away, 
"All tormenta ceaie; birth is no more nor death; 
*'And he who knows him, when his body dies, 
"Has for his lot bleat freedom and release." 

V. Source of the Vedanta. 

1. General Remarks on the Indian Fram&^&s 
or Canons of Knowledge. 

What are the sources from which we draw our knowledge? 
This question, of which every philosophy has to give an ac- 
count, meets us in the Indian systems largely in the form of 
a consideration of the IVamänas^ literally, ''measures" or 
''canons," of our knowledge; in which, therefore, not the con* 
cept of a source from which we draw is the basis, but on the 
contrary that of a means of control, by which we are to 
measure the knowledge already existing in us, and test its 
correctness, a concept which is explained by the fact that 
Indian philosophy did not start, as far the most part the 
Grecian did, from an inyestigation, free of assumptions, into 
''the existent," but rather, like modem philosophy, from the 
critical analysis and testing of a complex of knowledge handed 
down (through the Yeda)*^, As such Pramanas, or canons of 
knowledge, the systems, as a rule, enumerate: 1) Dratyakshaw^ also 
called drishtamj the sensuously perceptible, as it is known 
to us by direct perception; 2) Anumänam "the measuring after 
something," inference, by which that part of "the existent" 
which does not fall within direct perception,*' becomes accee- 

*> An enential difference coniiatt in modem philoeophy in ita fan- 
damental character, even np to to-day, being a toilsome ttniggle aod 
gradoal shaking off of the fetters of medisBTal scholasticism, — ^whik ths 
Indian philosophy throngh all time has been the better, the more dose ly 
it has adhered to the basis laid down in the Yedic Upanishads. Bat ia 
truth this basis is also of an eminently philosophical character. 

u By this is explained the fundamental proposition of the theory of 
knowledge, that where I^afyaksham exists, there is no Änumäncam p. 667, 9: 
prafyaktkatväd anutndna^provritteh. 

Y. Source of the Yed&nta. 89 

rible; we know of it only because the perceptible points to 
something else, not perceptible, with which it is connected. 
This connection can be threefold, according as the element to 
be inferred is either the cause [of the element perceived, or its 
effect, or as, thirdly, the two stand in a relation which does 
not fall under the conception of causality, for example, in that 
of analogy. 

These two spheres of knowledge, the perceived and the 
inferred, embrace naturally the whole complex of *'the existent" 
The position of the Carvakas (materialists) who will only 
allow validity to the first is crude but correspondingly little ob- 
jection can be raised, when the Yai^eshikas and Bauddhas 
(Buddhists) will not go further than these two pramänaa. For 
it is very strange that the Sänkhyas and others add to these 
also 3) Aptavacanamj that is '^ right communication," which 
then, again, according as it is understood, means secular or 
religious tradition. For the former goes back again to Praty- 
aksham and Änumänam and the latter is, in philosophy, no 
legal component, and is one of the means by which the San- 
khyas and others, with all their heresy, were yet able to keep 
up an appearance of orthodoxy. Through further splitting up 
of Änumänam^ not to the advantage of clearness, the adherents 
of the Nyäya reached lour, the Mimansakas of the school of 
Jaimini six, and others even nine Pramä^as (et Colebr. Misc. 
E$$A p. 240, 266, 303-304, 330, 403). 

2. Insufficiency of the secular Canons of Knowledge. 

Like the Pürva-mimäm&f the Vcdänta also accepts six 
canons of knowledge, according to Colebrooke {loc cit, p. 330), 
who appeals for support to the (modern) Vedäntaparibhäshä. 
As far as our Yedänta-sütras are concerned, there is, neither 
in the text nor in the Commentary, any discussion of the Pra- 
m&pas at all; on the contrary they are everywhere presupposed 
as well known, and set aside as inadmissible for the meta- 
physics of the Vedänta,*^ — and in reality a fundamental ac- 

M p. 40, 2: *'Only from the canon of scrip tare ai mesna of knowledge 
"is the Brahman known as the canie of the coming into being and 
"[eztttenoe and paning away] of the world;*' p. 488, 1: "only through 

90 Introdaotion. 

count of the fact that metaphysics attains its contents onlj 
through a right use of the natural means of knowledge, is yerr 
difficult, and presupposes a greater ripeness of thought than 
we find in the Vedanta, which helps itself out of the difficulty 
by the short cut of substituting a theological for the philo- 
sophical means of knowledge, as we shall now further show. 
As for Bädaräya^a, he expresses his rejection of the secular 
means of knowledge, Pratyaksham and Anumänam with the 
drastic brevity which characterises him, in this, as we have 
already remarked (aboye p. 23), that he uses the two words to 
indicate something altogether different, namely the Qruti and 
Smriti] thus in the Sutras 1, 3, 28. 3, 2, 24. 4, 4, 20 (supposing, 
naturally, that Qankara has explained them correctly). The 
^ruti^ therefore, the holy scriptures, in the narrower sense the 
Brahmaxias and Upanishads, but also the Mantras presupposed 
by them, that is, hymns and formulas, ^^ are for Bädaräya^a 
the Pratyaksham] the revealed is for him self-evident, needing 
no further authority. It is otherwise with the Srnriti,^^ under 
which name Qankara Quotes testimonies from the Sankhya and 
Yoga systems, from the law-book of Manu, from the Mahä- 
bhäratam and Puränas, as also from the Vedic Sutra literature. 
For while the Veda, like the sun, which has its own light, 
possesses unconditional authority (nirapeJcsham prätnänyam 
p. 414, 6), the Smriti is called Anumänam because, as Qan- 
kara, p. 287, 11, explains, for its support another basis of 
authority (prämänyam) is necessary. As, namely, the secular 

^'the scripture can one plange into this deepest, highest Brahman; one 
" cannot plunge into Him by reflection." Of passages where the Pramanas 
are mentioned, we have noted, betides these the following: the pramananij 
pratyaksha'ddtni are avidyävad-visliayäni (p. 17, 13); they are frail (p.448, 1); 
are common to us and animals (p. 19, 6): praiyakaham is rüpa-ädi, anumä'- 
nam &c. is linga-ädi (p. 426, 8. 438, 1) ; of different character is anubhava, 
permissible, according to 42, 4, in the investigation of Brahman, cf. 419, 2 
anubhava-avaaanam brahma-vijnänatn'f the monstrosity of an absolute 
perception (subject without object) occurs on p. 671, 2; cf. 96, 5. 

&& Thus, for example, passages of the Rigveda-Samhita are quoted as 
Qruti p. 208, 13. 212, 1. 804, 4; on the contrary the mantra is opposed to 
the grutij p. 308, 4. 

•• As also with the Äcära (above p. 24); cf. p. 990, 1: smnti-doSrn- 
bhy&mf na gruteh. 

y. Sonioe of the VedanU. 91 

Anumdnam rests on the Pratyaksham, and only has the force 
x)f proof 80 long as it is rightly inferred therefrom, the Smriti 
also is only so far yalid as an authority, as it confirms the 
Qmu by its testimony, and completes it by right inference. 
Therefore it is frequently quoted in confirmation, but not 
seldom also rejected; as for instance 4, 2, 21, in reference 
to the departure of the soul, the ideas of the Smriii (Bhaga- 
Tadgita 8, 23) are only so far rejected as they are in con- 
tradiction to the ^ruti (p. 1109, 5). For the rest Bädaräyapa 
declares himself, 2, 1, 11, as opposed in principle to any 
possibility of basing the metaphysical yerities on reflection 
{tarka)^ which is commented on by Qankara as follows (p. 435, 
11): — "And, therefore, mere reflection {kevalas tarkah) must 
not be quoted in opposition in a matter which is to be known 
by [sacred] tradition (ägamä); for reflections which, without 
[sacred] tradition, rest only on the speculation (utprekshä) of 
men, are untenable, since this speculation is unbridled. For 
instance the reflections thought out by some experts after 
great trouble are recognized by others, still more expert, as 
[merely] apparent, and those of the latter in the same way by 
others. Therefore one cannot rely on it, that reflections haye 
stability, because the opinions of men yary« But [it may be 
objected], when there is a man of recognised greatness, a 
Kapäa or another, who has made a reflection, one could at 
least rely on it as well-founded. Eyen here a sound foun- 
dation is lacking, since even the recognised pioneers (ttHAa- 
kara) such as KapUa, Kanada and the like, openly contradict 
each other." To this the opponent objects: "Yet one can, 
perhaps, come to a well-founded reflection, in reflecting in a 
different way, for that there can be no well-founded reflection 
at all is in itself a law based on reflection alone (p. 436, 7); 
and because one reflection is false, the other need not also be 
false; the opinion that all reflection is unreliable, would make 
an end of all worldly action resting thereon (p. 436, 10).^' 
Reflection, he says, might haye in yiew the consideration of 
the words of scripture, in order to reach in this way the full 
truth (p. 437, 1); eyen Manu (12, 105) recommends, besides 
the tradition of scripture, perception and inference; and the 

'92 Introdnction. 

excellence of reflection is precisely this, that, unboand by 
previous reflections, in case they are untenable, other reflec* 
tions may be made (p. 437, 7). To this Qalükara replies 
(p. 437, 10): ^'Even though it appear that in many province 
reflection is well-founded, yet, in the proTince here spoken of, 
reflection cannot be freed from the reproach of baselessness; 
for it is impossible to know at all this extremely profound 
essence of being (bhävaryäthätmyam)^ without the [sacred] 
tradition, connected with liberation; for this subject does not 
fall within the province of perception (pratt/aksham)^ because 
it is without form and the like, and therefore also not within 
the province of inference (anumänam) and the other [Prama^as]. 
because it has no characteristics [Ungarn] and the like." Here, 
as our author further develops the question, where the fall 
truth and the liberation which results from it— as all admit— 
are being considered, the subject of knowledge must be iden- 
tical, and the knowledge of it uncontradictable. But reflections 
do not fulfil these conditions, because they contradict each 
other, and what the one maintains, another overthrows, and 
what the latter puts in its place, yet another overthrows 
(p. 438, 9). Besides, the Sankhya system is not in any way 
recognised by everyone as the highest, and in any case it is 
impossible to bring together all the thinkers of all lands and 
times, to establish firmly the final truth of reflection among 
them. But, on the other hand, the Yeda, as a source of 
knowledge, is eternal; its subject stands fast; the full know- 
ledge of it formed therefrom cannot be turned aside by all 
the reflectors of the past, present and future (p. 439, 6). By 
this the full validity of the Upanishad teaching is proved, and 
by this it is established, "in virtue of the [sacred] tradition 
and the reflection which follows it" that (which was to be 
proved) the spiritual Brahman is at once the cawa efßciens 
and the caiisa materialis of the world (p. 439, 7). 

Qankara expresses himself even more strongly in discussing 
the same point in another place. To the objection that the 
Brahman can only be causa efficiens and not also maierialis, 
because experience (Jioka) shows that only a cavxa effidens^ as 
for instance, the potter, can be endowed with knowledge, he 

y. Soaree of the Yedanta. 93 

answers (p. 403, 7): ^It is not necessary that it should be 
here the same as in experience; for this subject [Brahman] 
is not known by inference {anumänam), but only by reve- 
lation (gabda)j and it is therefore [only] necessary here that 
[which is to be proved] it should be in accordance with reve- 
lation, and this shows that the knowing tgvara (Lord) is the 
causa materialis [of the world]" (cf. p, 1144,13). 

In these circumstances it is possible occasionally to make 
such statements about the Brahman as would be, according to 
worldly standards, absolutely contradictory; for example, that 
the Brahman does not wholly enter into the phenomenal world, 
and yet is without parts: (p. 481, 13) ''in the scripture the 
Brahman is rooted ; in the scripture it has its ground of know- 
ledge, not in sense-perception and the like; therefore it must 
be taken as scripture gives it; and scripture teaches of the 
Brahman both that it is not wholly [used up in forming the 
world of appearances], and that it is yet without parts. Nay, 
even in the case of worldly things, such as amulets, spells. 
drugs and the like, it happens that, in virtue of difference of 
place, time, and cause, they manifest powers with various con- 
tradictory effects, and even these cannot be known by mere 
reflection without instruction, nor can it be determined, what 
powers, with what accompaniments, referring to what, for what 
available, a given thing may have, — how can it then be possible 
to know the nature of the Brahman, with its unthinkable per- 
fections of might, without the scripture?'' 

This advantage, however, of being allowed occasionally to 
ignore experience, holds good only in the case of the Yedanta 
teacher, but not of his opponent (p. 695, 8): ''The follower of 
the Brahman investigates the being of the cause [of the world] 
and the like, relying on the [sacred] tradition, and it is not 
onconditionally necessary for him to accept every thing in ac- 
cordance with perception {na avagyam tasya yatixä-druiitam eva 
$arvam abhyupagantavyam)] but the opponent, who investigates 
the being of the cause [of the world] and the like, relying on 
the examples of experience (drishtänta), must accept everything 
according to experience, — ^that is the difference." 

94 Introdaotiom 

3. The Reyelation of the Veda. 

To mitigate the seyerity of these declarations, we must call 
to mind the details given in Chap. U, 2 (reading especially 
the passage in n. 32, above p. 56), according to which all 
empirical means of knowledge, and all the world produced 
by them, belong to the realm of Ävidyä, as also, on the other 
hand, that in the Yeda, especially in the XJpanishads, there 
are philosophic conceptions which have their like neither in 
India, nor, perhaps, anywhere else in the world. Therefore 
we can well understand our author's view that the Yeda is of 
superhuman origin (apauriisheya p. 170, 2); that it is infallible 
(p. 618, 1); that, as we saw above p. 69 ff., the Gods are created. 
but the Veda, on the contrary, is ever-present in the spirit of 
the creator of the world, as the timeless rule of being; that 
it was "out-breathed" by him*^ concerning which the two 
chief passages are (p. 47, 2): "The great canon of scripture 
beginning with the Kigveda, which, enforced by many branches 
of knowledge, lights all things like a lamp, and in a certain 
measure is omniscient, has the Brahman as its origin and 
cause. For such a canon as the Kigveda and the rest, which 
is endowed with the quality of omniscience, can come from 
none but an omniscient source.^' And further (p. 48, 4): "The 
great being which, according to the scripture [Brih. 2, 4, 10] 
brought forth unwearying in sport, like the outbreathing of a 
man, the Eigveda and the rest, as a mine of all knowledge, 
which is the basis of the division into Gods, animals, men, 
castes, Agramas and the like, this being must possess an 
unsurpassable omniscience and omnipotence." 

As the Brahman itself is free from all differences, so also 
is the knowledge of the Brahman, as we gain it from the 

>7 We have thus in India, as analogy of our Inspiration, an Ex- 
piration, through which the Yedic texts were revealed to their composers, 
who are therefore called i^isAis; the Mantras and Brahmanas "appear" 
(pratibhänti) to them, are ''seen" (drishta) hy them; of. p. 801, 6: ^'Qannaka 
and the other [composers of Pratigakyas] teach, that the Decades [of the 
Rigveda] were seen by Madhucehandas [the composer of the opening hymns 
of the Rigveda] and the other JKisAw." In the same way, according to p. 314, 13, 
the Brahmanas were also seen by the Riakisirishtnäm mantra-brähmana-dar' 
^nSm] cf. p. 119, 3: mantra-brahmanayog ea ekarthatvam ynktam, avirodhat 

y. Sooree of the YedänU. 95 

Upanishads, uniform throughout and without contradiction 
(p. 834, 4): ''Has it not been established that the Brahman, 
the object of knowledge, is free from all differences, as before, 
behind, and the like, uniform, and, like the lump of salt [Brih. 
4, 5, 13], of one taste? How, then, can the thought arise of 
a difference or non-difference of knowledge? For that, like the 
variety of [pious] works, a variety with reference to the Brahman 
could be taught by the Yedanta, can by no means be affirmed, 
since the Brahman is one and uniform. And if the Brahman is 
uniform, then the knowledge of the Brahman cannot be mani- 
fold; for the assumption that the subject can be one thing and 
the knowledge of it another, is necessarily erroneous. And if, 
on the other hand, there were to be taught different doctrines of 
the one Brahman in the Yedänta, of which some were true and 
others false, we should have the case of disbelief in the Yedanta 
[that is, the Upanishads] [cf. p. 104, 1],— therefore one cannot as- 
sume that there are in the Yedänta differences in the knowledge 
of Brahman." In conformity with this principle, the numerous 
contradictions in the Upanishads are explained away (1, 1, 27 
may serve as an example), or hidden under the broad mantle of 
exoteric doctrine, of which we shall speak in the next Chapter. 
However, occasionally minor contradictions in the parallel texts 
of the Upanishads are admitted with the remark, that they are 
not important ^s Where the sense of the scripture is doubtful, 
the rule of experience (laukiko nyäydh) decides, p. 1064, 5: 
^But still it is unseemly to check the view of the scriptures 
--by a rule of experience? To this we answer: this is so, where 
--the sense of the scripture is certain; but where it is doubt- 
^ful, it is permissible to have recourse to a rule of experience, 
-for the sake of clearing up the question;"— as generally the 
the worldly means of knowledge are helpful to the investigation 
of the sense of the scriptures (p. 40, 6): ''The knowledge of 
**the Brahman is gained by the sense of the word of the Yeda 

»■ For example p. 222, 2. 849, 11. 865, %: na hi etävatä vifeahena 
ridyä-tkatvam apagacchatu-^AlSj 12 (rutinätn paraapara-virodhe iati, eka- 
racena Hard niyanU. Thia especially holds good in the case of contra- 
dictions in things where the aim of man {purutka-artha) does not come 
into qaeetion, p. 874, 7. 

96 Introdaetioii. 

''being considered and determined; it is not gained by other 
''means of knowledge, such as inference (anumänam) &c. Bat 
"although it is the Vedänta texts which inform us of the 
"cause of the world's coming into existence &c, yet, to make 
"sure that we have grasped their sense [correctly], an inference 
"which does not contradict the words of the Vedanta is not 
"excluded as a means of knowledge. For by the scriptore 
"itself [Brih. 2, 4, 5. Chand. 6, 14, 2] reflection is called in as 
"a help/'— (p. 42, 3): "For in the investigation of the Brahman, 
'^the scripture is not, as in the investigation of duty [the Fd^rvO' 
^^mimänsä], the exclusive authority, but the authorities here 
"are, according to circumstances, the scripture and the [inner] 
"perception (anubhava) and the like. For the knowledge of 
"the Brahman reaches its final point in perception, as far as 
"it refers to a really existing subject — (p. 44, 6): "But does 
"not the Brahman, so far as it is something really existing. 
"alone belong to the province of other means of knowledge, 
"and is not the consideration of the words of the Vedanta 
"consequently aimless? By no means the Brahman, for, as 
"it is not an object of sense, the [causal] connection with 
"the world would not be grasped [with certainty]. That is to 
"say, the senses, according to their nature, have as their object 
" external things, and not the Brahman. If the Brahman were 
"an object of sense, then the world might be grasped as an 
"effect connected with Brahman. Now, we only perceive the 
"effect, so that [without revelation], it cannot be decided whether 
"the world is connected with Brahman [as cause], or with 
"something else [for the same effect can have different caufies}*' 
Of the possibility here suggested, of bringing in reflection 
as an aid, our author makes a far more extensive use than 
might appear from these expressions. Since this side of Qan« 
kara's work has for us the chief interest, we vriU, as far as 
possible, pass over his endless quotations fi*om the Veda, bat 
on the other hand, bend our whole attention to the philosophic 
reflection. The perfection of the latter, as it meets us in ^an* 
kara's Commentary, may itself speak for the fact that we hare 
to do here with a monument of Indian antiquity not merely 
theological, but also in the highest degree philosophicaL 

VL Exoteric and Esoteric Vedanta Doctrine. 

1. Justification of Exoteric Metaphysics. 

All metaphysics has to battle with the great difficulty, 
unique in the whole province of science, that it must think 
in conceptions and express in words what is properly contrary 
to their nature, since all words and conceptions at last spring 
from that Tery base of empiric reality which metaphysics under- 
takes to transcend, in order to lay hold on the ^ SelP (ätman) 
of the world, the ''Svtai; Sv" the ^'thing in itself^" which finds 
its expression and manifestation in all empiric reality, yet 
without being identical with it. 

So far, then, as metaphysics adapts itself to the form, of 
empirical knowledge, in order thereby to express its own 
content, it necessarily lassumes an allegorical, more or less 
mythical character; and, as this is the only form in which it 
can be grasped by the people, standing in need of it (ixstvoic 
U TOic Igfl» iv «apaßoXatc xa «dvta fivstai, St. Mark, IV, 11), is 
called exoteric metaphysics. So far as, on the other hand, 
it adheres to the path of exact science, in order to attain to 
a Whole, thoroughly demonstrable in all its parts, and equal 
to any opposition, metaphysics must often choose difficult by- 
paths, turning conceptions through many shades of meaning, 
with all kinds of reserrations, and in many cases entirely 
renounce, results that can be clearly represented. — ^And all 
this demands a great power and habit of abstraction, attain- 
able only by few; therefore for this form of our science the 
name of esoteric metaphysics is to be taken. 

98 Introdvotion. 

2. Exoteric and Esoteric form of the Vedänta. 

a) General Sorvey. 

In accordance with what has been said, the metaphysics 
of the Vedantaalso has two forms, a theological, exoteric, 
and a philosophical, esoteric form; both are present in 
the work which we haye to analyse, running parallel, and 
being present in all the five proTinces of the Yed&nta teach- 
ing, namely, the theology, cosmcdogy, psy-du^logy, the doc- 
trine of transmigration, and that of liberation; they stand 
in a con&nuoüs" contradiction which is^ necessitated by the 
nature of the matter. But the great difficulty for the philo- 
sophic understanding of the Brahmasütras lies in the fact» 
that neither in the text nor in the commentary are the two 
conceptions clearly separated from each other, but rather meet 
us everywhere interwoven with each other, in such sort that the 
fundamental texture of the whole consists of a representation 
of the exoteric, or, as we may also call it (with an extension 
of the conception, whose justification will be given in what 
follows) the lower doctrine (aparä vidyä), which, howeyer, 
is penetrated in every province by the esoteric or higher 
doctrine (para vidyä), standing in contradiction to it, a 
relation which compels us to justify our general view here at 
the outset 

As is shown by the analysis of contents at the conclusion 
of our first chapter, the doctrine of the Yedänta consists 
properly in a richly coloured picture of the world on a mjtho* 
logical ground. The first part contains, in Adhyäya I, the 
theology, which on the basis of seven times four passages 
of the Upanishads, discusses the essence of the Brahman, its 
relation to the world as creator, ruler and destroyer, its re- 
lation to the soul, and its various names and attributes. This 
is followed, in Adhyäya II, by the cosmology which is con- 
cerned with the relation of the world to the Brahman as 
cause, its gradual evolution from and re-absorption in it, and, 
from II, 3, 16 on, tibe psychology, in which are thoroughly 
discussed the nature of the soul and its organs, its relation 
to Ood, to the body, and to its own deeds. In Adhyäya HL 


VI. Exoteric and Etoteric Vedänta Doctrine. d9 

comes first the doctrine of transmigration, then a sup- [ 
plement to the psychology (III, 2, 1 — 10), another to the theology 
(III, 2, 11—41); the rest of the Adhyäya contains a mis- 
cellaneous assemblage of discussions, for the most part exegetic 
in character, as the chief content of which we can, in any 
case, with Qankara (p. 1049, 3), consider the teaching of the 
means (sddhana) to attain the higher and lower doctrine, that 
is the knowledge and worship of the Brahman. For the most 
part these discussions deal with the strange question whether 
certain passages of the Veda are to be comprehended in one 
"Yidya," or to be separated, a question which has a meaning 
only for the lower doctrine, with its aim of worship. Finally, 
the conclusion of the work, Adhyäya IV, contains the eschato^ 
logy; it sketches in detail the departure of the soul after 
death, and how some souls follow the way of the Fathers 
(piirijfäna) to a new incarnation, while, on the contrary, others, 
the worshippers of the Brahman, are led along the way of the 
gods (devaydna) higher and higher upwards to the Brahman, 
** whence there is no return" — according to the Upanishads, 
but not without further conditions, according to the reasoning 
of our system: for this Brahman is only the ''lower" Brahman, 
that is, as considered as possessing attributes (guna)^ it is the 
object of worship, and not of ''perfect knowledge" (samytMgdar" 
(anam); only after this latter, that is, the esoteric doctrine, 
is imparted to the pious in the world of Brahman, is he also 
liberated; until then, although he is in the world of Brahman, 
and a partaker of Lordship (aigvaryam)^ "his darkness is not 
yet driTen away" (p. 1154, 9), "his ignorance not yet destroy- 
ed" (p. 1133, 15), that is, he possesses only the lower doctrine 
(apard vidyä)^ whose content consists of all that has hitherto 
been mentioned, not the opposed higher doctrine, the para 
vidyä or samyagdarganam, that is, the pure philosophic, esoteric 
doctrine, which, in every part of this picture of the world with 
its empiric colouring, crops up in contradiction with it, and 
whose results, according to the metaphysical standpoint which 
we occupy, we may find strange, or admirable. In the depart- 
ment of Theology it teaches that the Brahman is not thus 
or thus, but altogether without attributes (guna)^ distinctions 


100 Introduotion. 

(pigesha) and limitations (upadhi), and therefore in no way 
capable of being defined or conceiyed. And this Brahman, 
doToid of all limitation^ is the only being, ontside which nothing 
is; therefore, in the department of Cosmology, there can be 
as little question of the origin of the world as of its existence, 
bat only of there being neither anything different (nana) from 
the Brahman, nor any plurality of things (jpropanoa), and that 
the world extended in names and forms is non-existent (avastu), 
is only a glamour (ntäyä) which Brahman, as master-magician 
{mäyavin), projects (prasärayaU)^ as the dreamer projects 
dream forms (p. 432,8). In the same way all further Psycho- 
logy falls away, after the saying *^tat tvam asi^ (that thoa 
art), is comprehended according to which the soul of each 
human being is not an emanation, not a part of the Brahman, 
but fully and completely the Brahman. For him who knows 
this, there is no more migration of the soul, nor eren 
liberation; for he is already liberated; the continued existence 
of the world and of his own body appears to him only as an 
illusion, the appearance of which he cannot remore, but which 
cannot further deceive him, till the time when, after the decease 
of the body, he wanders not forth, as the others, but renudns 
where he is and what he is and eternally was,— the first prin- 
ciple of all things, ''the originally eternal, pure, free Brahman." 
This is the Samyagdarcanam^ the Vidyä in the stricter 
sense of the word, distinguished on the one side from empiric 
cosmology, and psychology, Atndyä, and on the other from the 
doctrine of the aparanh sagunam brahma, of its worship and 
the entering into it by the way of devayäna; this is the opona 
vidyät sagunä vidyä, whose possessor can, howerer, alao on 
occasion be called vidvän (p. 1095, 11. 1134, 11). Strictly 
▼iewed, this apara vidyä is nothing but metaphysics in an 
empiric dress, that is Vidyä as it appears, considered from 
the standpoint o( Ävidyä (the realism innate in us). This de- 
finition is not, however, found in Qankara, as in general the 
distinction of the esoteric and exoteric doctrine and the inner 
connection of the latter, as well as of the former, does not 
attain the clearness with which we express it and must ex- 
press it here, unless we have to renounce a full comprehension 

YL Exot«ric and Esoteric Vedanta Doctrine. 101 

of the system. What preyented our author from connecting 
together — as he did in the case of the para vidyä — the apard 
vidifä also, with his doctrine of the creation of the world and 
Saqisära, in the unity of an exoteric system, was firstly the 
excessiTO attention which, in Indian fashion, he paid to theolo- 
gical and eschatological questions, and, on the other hand, 
the apprehension of injuring the letter of the Veda, in which 
esoteric and exoteric teaching are interworen, hy a recognition 
of the contradictions between them. For this reason, for in- 
stance, he takes endless pains to maintain the teaching of the 
creation of the world through the Brahman, and to unify it 
with his better insight into the identity of the two, by trying 
to show that cause and effect are identical, and then constantly 
(e.^., p. 374,12. 391,10. 484,2. 491,1) asserting that the doc- 
trine of creation had only the aim of teaching this identity of 
the world with the Brahman, a yiew which cannot be brought 
into harmony with the ample and realistic treatment which 
be himself bestowed on it. 

Naturally we shall do no yiolence to our author, and 
where, in the organism of his system, we note a false con- 
nection, we shall only indicate it, and not remedy it; but, on 
the other side, we have the right to exercise philosophic criti- 
cism and this will be the better, the more it is done entirely 
from within, that is, from the principles of the system itself 
For in erery philosophical system lies something more than 
its originator put into it; the genius reaches further than the 
indiTidual, and it is the task of the historian to indicate 
where the thinker has lagged behind the full scope of his 

To this end we must be allowed here, at the outset of our 
exposition of the system, to bring together the passages which 
justify our general Tiew of it; tiiey will form the beacons to 
which we haye to look for guidance on our laborious and 
dangerous journey, and from them we shall take the standard 
to test where our author has fallen short of the greatness of 
his own point of riew. 

102 Introdaetioii. 

b) Exoteric and Btoieric Theology. 

Quite clearly and conscioasly, if not everywhere carried 
tmt in detail« do we find the contrast made between exoteric 
and esoteric doctrine in the proYince of Theology, under the 
names of the lower, attribute-possessing (oparfi, sagunä)^ 
and the higher, attributeless doctrines (para, nirgunt 
vidffä); the former is the doctrine of the lower, attribute- 
possessing Brahman, the latter of the higher, attribute- 
free Brahman (aparam, sagunam, savi^eAam, also Mrtfomt 
amukhyam brahman and param, nirgunamj nirvifeahanij also 
avOcritamj mttkhyam, ^ddham brähma) ; the former is the object 
of worship, the latter of knowledge; in the case of the former 
doctrine the fulfilment of duties is commanded; but not in 
the latter (p. 1077,7); the former has many different rewards, 
the only fruit of the latter is deliTcrance. 

The most important passages are as follows*. 

(p. 111,3:) ^The Brahman is known in two forms, [1.] at 
''qualified by limitations (upädhi) which are deriTed from the 
** multitude of his metamorphoses in respect of names and forms, 
^and [2.] on the contrary as free from all limitations." 

(p. 803, 3:) ^^ There are passages of twofold character (lingam) 
^ referring to* the Brahman; the one, as e. jr. 'all-working, all-wish- 
^ 'ing, all-smelling, all-tasting,' etc. [Chänd.3, 14, 2, et p. 50 aboTe] 
''indicate that it is affected by difference (vi(esiha)\ the others, 
"e.^., 'not coarse, not fine, not short, not long,' etc. (Brib. 
" 3, 8, 8), indicate its freedom from all differences • . . Bat 
"it is not admissible to assume from the passages of twofold 
"character that the highest (param) Brahman has itself 
^(svatas) this double nature; for one and same thing cannot 
"in itself he affected by differences such as form, etc., and 
" not be affected by them, for this is a contradiction . • • And 
"by being connected with limitations (upädJii) a thing of a 
"one kind cannot assume another nature; for when rock crystal 
" is transparent, it does not become opaque by being connected 
" with limitations such as red colour and the like; on the con- 
"trary it is only an illusion (bhrama) that opaqueness per- 
"meates it; what adds the limitations to it is ignorance 
^(avidyd). Therefore, whichever character is assumed, the 

YL Ezotarie and Etoterie Yedi&to Doctrine. 103 

"Brabman moat be conceiTod as unchangeably free from all 
^differencee, and not the reverse. For ererywhere in the 
^scriptores where it is a question of teaching the proper 
'^nature of the Brahman^ it is taught by such passages as 
^'not to be heard, not to be felt, without form, eternal' 
^(Käth. 3, 16), that the Brahman is completely abore all 
'^ change. &> 

(p. 133,7:) '^For where in teaching the nature (rüpam) of 
''the highest Lord all differences are excluded, the scriptures 
'use such expressions as: 'not to be heard, not to be felt, 
'^^ without form, eternal' (K&th.3, 15). Because the highest 
Tiord, howerer, is the cause of all, He is exhibited to us as 
« distinguished by certain qualifications of the changeable world 
''[of creation, which is a transformation of Him], when we 
"read 'all-working, all-wishing, aU-smelling, all-tasting' (Ch&nd. 
'^3, 14, 8); and the case is the same when He is termed 'the 
" *[man in the sun] with the golden beard' (Ch&nd. 1, 6, 6), etc" 

(p. 1191,1:) "As the lower (aparam) Brahman is closely 
"connected with the higher (param) Brahman, it is no con- 
"tradiction to apply the word Brahman to the former also« 
"For the fact of the matter is this: the higher Brahman it- 
" self is the lower Brahman, so far as it [the former] is now 
"and again for the purpose of worship described as possess- 
"ing certain qualities of the changeable world, such as 'Manas 
"'is what it is formed of (Ch&nd. 3, 14, 2) etc, qualities which 
"depend on the ascription to it of pure limitations (vifuddhch 

(p. 867, 19:) "These qualifications too [firom Taitt 2, 6: 
" 'LoTC is his head' etc.] are only assumed in the highest 
"Brahman as a means of turning the thoughts to it (eitto- 
"ooatdra-fipdya-md^atvena), not with a view to knowledge • . • 
"and this rule [that such qualifications hare only local not 
"general ralidity] is applied elsewhere, when it is a question 

•• Of. p. 806,9: *■ Therefore the Brahman matt in these pattages ao- 
* cording to tho Scriptoree be regarded as quite without form (fnrdkäram); 
«■biit the other passages which rafer to the Brahman as possessing form 
'(äkäravat) are not concerned with it but with the enjoining of wor- 
«ship {ntpämmäy 

104 Introdaoiioii. 

" of certain qualities of the Brahman which are inculcated for 
"the purpose of worship ••• For a 'More' and ^Less' of 
"attributes in which continues the [empirical] action of the 
"manifold (sati bheda-vyavahäre) exists in the attribute-possess- 
"ing (sagunam) Brahman, not in the attribute-less (nirgunam) 
"highest Brahman." 

(p. 112, 2:) "In a thousand passages the scripture teaches 
"the double nature of the Brahman, distinguishing between 
"it when it is the object of knowledge and ignorance (vidyä- 
^ avidyd-vishaya). From the standpoint of ignorance (avidya- 
^avasthäyäm) all occupation with Brahman has the distinguish* 
"ing mark that it, as object of worship, and its worshipper 
"are distinguished; and in this case certain ways of worship- 
"ping the Brahman haye as their end an exaltation {abhyiul' 
^aya); the end of others is gradual delirerance (Icramamukti); 
"others again have as their aim the success of the work of 
" sacrifice; <o and they vary according to the attributes (guna), 
"differences (vigesha) and limitation (upddhi). Now though 
"the God to be honoured, the highest Atman, distinguished 
"by this or that attribute and difference, is one, still the 
"rewards [of worship] are different according to the attributes 
" worshipped/' 

(p. 148, 2:) " For where the highest Brahman {param brahma), 
" free from all connection with differences, is indicated as soul, 
"there is, as is to be seen [from the scripture], only one single 
" fruit, namely liberation; where, on the contrary, the Brahman is 
"taught in its connection with different attributes (guna-vi^e^a), 
"or in its connection with different symbols [praiika-vigeAa, 
"on which 4,1,4. 4,3,15—16], there are produced high and 
"low rewards only limited to Samsara (samsära^ocaräni evay*^ 

•• Cf. p. 815, 5: "«The fruit of the time [the worship of the 
''hrahmd] yarying with the inttmction, it sometimet annihilation of tio, 
''fometimef attainment of [heavenly] lordship {aifvaryam)^ tometiiBfit 
** gradual deliverance; so it is to be understood. It is thas correct to 
"aasnme that the words of the scripture about worship and the wordi 
"about the Brahman [as object of knowledge] have not a tingle bat 
"different purposes.** 

•< Cf. p. 1047, 7: *< Where no difference of teaching exists, there cannot 

YI. Exoteric and Eeoterie YedanU Doctrine. 105 

c) Exoteric and Esoteric Eschatology. 
As already made clear by the passages quoted, this two- 
fold nature of the lower Brahman, as the object of worship, 
and of the higher, as the object of knowledge, corresponds 
exactly to the two-fold eschatological theory of our system. 
The names parA and apari vidyä comprehend, for Qankara, 
not only the philosophical and theological theories of the 
Brahman, but also the doctrine of the destiny of those who 
adhere to the one or the other; the para vidyä teaches how 
he who knows the param hrahma, by this very knowledge, 
becomes identical with it, and accordingly stands in need of 
no departure of the soul and further adrance towards it, in 
order to reach it; on the other hand the aparä vidyä com- 
prehends the theory of the Brahman as object of worship, 
and at the same time the theory of the rewards which fall to 
the lot of the worshipper; these are, as we saw, partly tem- 
poral, partly celestial, partly eten the gradual liberation of 
the Devayana, but always limited to the Samsära (p. 148, 5), 
from which it follows that, like the I^triyäna, the Devayäna 
also belongs to the Saipsara, namely, as its termination. Ac- 
cording to this, as we are expressively assured, the whole 
teaching of the Devayäna (the ascent of the pious to the 
Brahman) belongs to the aparä vidyä (p. 1087, 3); to the 
attribute-possessing worship (sagunä upäsanä) of the Brahman, 
not to the Samyagdarganam (p. 909, 8. 10) ; heaven and the 
like, with its lordship (aigvaryam) is the ripened fruit of the 
soffunä vidyäh (p. 1149, 13); for him who, on the contrary, 
knows the param brahma^ as is developed in the episode 

*^ be, aa in the case of fruit of worki, a difference of fruit either. For in 
'■the eaae of that doctrine [the nirgund vidyd]^ which is the means of 
"liberation, there is no difference aa in the case of'workf. On the con- 
*trary, in the caae of attribute-pouefsiDg doctrines {saffundsu vidi^ä8u\ 
" aa, for example, * Manas is his materia], Prana his body* (Chand. S, 14, 2), 
" asd eo on, there exists a difference, in consequence of Uie admixture or 
* separation of attributes, and accordingly, as in the case of the fruit of 
'works, a difference of fruit according to the given peculiarity. And a 
'token of this is the scripture, when it is said: * whatever he adores him 
^ 'as, that he becomes ;' but it is not so in the case of the attributeless 
'doctrine {mrgunäyäm vidyäyäm\ because [in it] no attributes exist ^' 


cmiceming the pari vidyä 4, 2, 12—16 (präsanffOd paravidyä- 
gatä citUä p. 1103, 12), there is no more departure from the 
body, nor any entering into the Brahman (p. 1102, 1). 

d) Exoteric and Eioteric Coemology and Piychology. 

At first sight, the matter stands somewhat differently in 
the prorince of Cosmology and Psychology. The qaestion is 
here no longer the contrast between aparä and para vidya, 
bat another, the contrast between two standpoints, which, 
p. 466, 1, are distinguished as the standpoint of worldlj 
action (vt/avakära-avasthä) and the standpoint of the 
highest reality (paramärtha^vasthä). The former is that 
of the Ävidyä (p. 455, 6), the latter that of the Vidyä. The 
former teaches a creation of the world by the Brahman who 
is endowed with a plurality of powers (gakti), and the existence 
of a plurality of individual souls, for whose actirities and enjoy- 
ments it is the stage from the latter standpoint, the possibility 
of a creation and a transmigration ceases along with plurality, 
and in place of both comes the doctrine of the identity of 
Brahman with nature and with the soul. 

(p. 491, 1 :) ** This scripture-doctrine of the creation does 
^ not belong to the highest reality (paramartha), for it lies in 
^ the proyince of worldly action (vyavahara) in name and form 
^admitted by Ävidyäj and has, as its highest aim, to teach 
^that the Brahman is the soul; this must not be forgotten!'' 

(p. 478,18:) ^When, through declarations of identity like 
^'tat tvam asi' (that thou art), identity has become known, 
^then the soul's existence as wanderer, and Brahman's 
^existence as creator have tanished away. 

That the paramärtha-avcisOiä of Cosmology and Psychology 
forms a whole wi^ the para vidyä of Theology and Eschato- 
logy, may be concluded from the explanations of Qankara 
himself, in the single passage in which he lays down the 
esoteric teaching connectedly, and which is translated at the 
end of this chapter. Here we will prove only, what Qankara 
was not so clearly conscious of, that, quite analogoosly, the 
vyavahära^vasthä of the doctrines of creation and trans- 
migration are to be connected with the ag^arä vidyä of an 


VL Exoteric and Eaoterie YedanU Doctrine. 107 

attribute-possessing, that is, to speak in our language, of a 
personal God and a soul which departs to him after death, 
in the unity of an exoteric metaphysics, which treats 
of the Beyond from the standpoint of innate realism 
(avidyä)f since the apara vidyä cannot exist without the vya- 
vahära^vasthä, nor the vyavahärcHivasthä without the apara 

1) The apara vidyä cannot exist without the vyavahära- 
avasOiä; for the devayäna of the apara vidyä demands, as its 
complement, the pUfiyäna; but this is the path of Samsära^ 
and Qankara himself has told us (above p. 106), that the 
reality of Samsära and the reality of the creation stand and 
fall together; therefore the apara vidyä demands, as its com- 
plement, the realism of the doctrine of creation; as also, con- 
Tersely, the devayäna, and, along with it, the apara vidyä, 
disappear only for him who has recognised the unity of his 
Ätman with Brahman, and therewith the illusion of the mani- 
fold world and the wandering soul. 

2) In exactly the same way the vyavahära'ovasthä of the 
teaching of creation cannot exist without the apara vidyä of 
uiffunam brdhtna; for, in order to create, Brahman requires a 
plurality of gaktis, or powers (p. 342, 6. 486, 10); but these 
stand in contradiction (p. 1126, 2) to a nirvigesliam brahma, 
from which it follows that only a sagunam, savigesham, not a 
ynrgunam, nirvigesham brahma can be a Creator. 

The inner necessary connection between the vyavahära- 
avasOiä and the apara vidyä, here demonstrated, often enough 
comes more or less clearly to Qankara's consciousness: thus, 
when he describes the sagunam brahma as avidyä^vishaga 
(p. 112. 2), for which the bheda-vyavahära exists (p. 868, 7)* 
when he yiews the upädJiis attributed to it as resting on 
avidyä (p. 804, 1); when he explains the fruit of its worship 
as safnsära-gocaram (p. 148, 6), the aifvaryam of the apara- 
brahmavid as samsära-gocaram (p. 1133, 14) and those who 
have entered into the lower Brahman as still subject to Avidyä 
(p. 1154,9. 1133,16), that is, with the same word with which 
he ererywhere else describes the realism of the doctrine of 
creation and transmigration. And on occasion he expresses 

openly, that the cosmological distinction of i^vüra and pro- 
^ca belongB to the aagunä upäsanä (p. 456, 10), and, con- 
-eely, that the teaching of sagunam brahma presupposes the 
ipaUca (p. 8S0,12). 

From these facts we justify the wearing together of the 
iching of the soffunam brahma, of a world thereby created 
d of AD indiyidual soul which moves in this world, and 
ally enters into that brahma, into a whole of exoteric meta> 
ysics. And Qaükara also, if we were to ask him— "Is, then, 
tiat toffumm brahma and the devayäna leading thither real. 
Ithongh from the standpoint of the highest truth neither 
lists?" He wonld certainly answer: "They are precisely as 
eal as this world; and only in the sense that the prapafica 
od samsära are unreal, are the sagunam brahma and the 
evayäna unreal; both are the apard vidy&, that is Vidya 
a it appears from the standpoint of Avidyft" (avidyd-ara- 
äyäm p. 112,3. 680,12. 682,3).6* 

But it must still be home in mind that Qankara did not 
tch full clearness as to the necessary connection of the 
oteric doctrines, and this will often become clear euoagh 
>m his discussions, which we shall reproduce faithfully and 
altered; but, as regards the esoteric doctrine, on the cod- 
iry, there is found at the end of his work a passage from 
lich his coDScioosness of its inner necessary connection come« 
t as clearly as possible, and which, as a compendium tn mue 
Qankara's Metaphysics, and, at the same time, as aa example 
the style and character of thought of the work with which 

are occupied, we here translate word for word. 


' *^ The thought thtt the eioteric doctrine time at sccommodatiBiE the 
th to the eomprehention of the maties, cen eleo be poiotsd out is 
akare ; thus the ipatikl conception of the Brehmkn is formed MpalaldJu- 
liam, p. 183,8. 199,4; the incBinremeDt of Brahman ii Imddlti-tTtka. 
Uana-arthah, 836,4; na At avUtare 'nanfe brahmani larvaiÄ ptmbliik 
■yd huddhih »thäpaj/itum. matida-madhi/a-^uttaina-tmddXiMtpmMmt. th. 
•,6. The propsdeatic character of the exoteric doctrine ia Ttij 
u\j laid down in the CommenUry to Chänd. 8, 1, p. 6S8, and tbii 
wage (which we iball tranelaU in Chapter XI, t,d) it before all te 
conaidered, when tbe rightocH of our conipreheniion of the Tedimta 
tcm cornea in qnettion. 

\L Exoteric and Esoteric VedanU DoctriDe. 109 

3. Appendix: Qankara's Esoteric Philosophy, 
translated from 4, 3, 14 (p. 1124, 10—1134, 3). 

a) Do the liberated go to the Brahman? 

''Some maintain that the passages of scripture as to going [to the 
** Brahman] refer to the higher [not to the lower, attribate-posseesing 

* Brahman]. This cannot be, because a going to the Brahman is im- "^ 
''poasible. For to the all-present highest Brahman, inmost of aU, who 

* is the soul that is within all, of whom it is said: *like the ether [p. 1125] 

* *omni-present, eternal* (cf. abo?e p. 32, L 9) — *the perceptible, not super- 
*' sensible Brahman, that as Self is the innermost being of all' (Bjih. 
'^d.lfU— «Self only is this universe* (Gh&nd. 7, 25, 2),— «The Brahman 
*'*onlj is this universe, the most excellent* (Mund. 2, 2, 11),— to this 
*" Brahman whose character is determined by passages of scripture like 
*-thaee, there cannot now or ever be a going in. For we cannot go to 
"^a place where we already are; but on the contrary, according to oom- 
*^mon acceptation, only to another place. It is true experience shews, 
*thmi we can also go to that, in which we are already, so far as we dis- 
«•tinguish different places in it. Thus a man is on the earth, and yet 
*goes to it, in so ftf as he goes to another place. So also the child is 
^identical with itself, and yet reaches puberty, which is its own self, 
^ eeparated by time. In the same way, one might think, there may be a 
** way of going to the Brahman, so far as it is endowed with all kinds 

* of powers (fokti). But this is not so; on account of the negation of all 
**differenees (vtfetAa) in Brahman: «Without parts, without action, rest- 
** «ful, faultless, stainless' (Qvet. 6, 19),— «Nor gross nor fine, nor short nor 
*" *long' (Brih. 8, 8, 8),— «For he, the unborn, is without and within' (Mo^d. 
**2,1, 2),— 'Verily this great unborn soul (ätman)^ that neither grows old 
^ 'nor fades nor dies, that is without fear, is the Brahman' (Bfih. 4, 4, 25^ 
** — 'He is not thus, not thus' (Brih. 3, 9, 26);— according to these rules of 
** acriptiire and tradition no connection of the highest soul with spatial, 
"temporal or other differenees can be assumed, so that one could go to 

* it as to a part of the earth or to an age of life; but a spatially and 
"iemporaOy [p. 1126] determined going to the earth and to the age is 
"poenUe*' because they are differentiated by locality and circumstances." 

M It is in the highest degree attractive and instructive, to observe, 
bow here and elsewhere the spirit of man in antiquity toils and strugglea 
to reach the eternal fundamental truth of aU metaphysics, which it was 
reserved for the genius of Kant to set forth in perfect clearness and to 
prove beyond contradiction: the truth that Being-in-itself must be space- 
less and timeless, because space and time are nothing else but subjective 
fame of our intellect— As here ipaee and time are denied for the 
Brakmao, so in the sequel will causality of creation be interpreted as 

b) EaoUrie Gotmologf. 
"It yon MMrt, that Um Brmbmui mut IwTe manifold powen{f«Ui. 
'bacanae, aceordiag to the icriptiirr, it ii tha canae of tba crcatioD, fib- 
'aiatmca and extinction of the world, we lay no! for the paaaage* of 
'acriptnre which deny diffenoc«! to it can have no other aenae [bnt Iba 
'litaral one]. Bnt the patt^e* of •criptnre about the creation and n on 
'can likewtM have no other aenae?— This it not to; for their aim ii 
' [*>o't] ^ teach the identity [of the world with Brahman]. For «bn 
'the «eriptore, by the eiamplei of tnmpi of clay and the like,** teadui 
'that 'the Exiateut", the Brahman, alone it tnir, bot that [ili] traii- 
' formation [into the world] i* nntrne, it cannot hare the aim of teacb- 
'ing a creation and the like.— Bat why ihoold the paaaagea of acriptan 
'aboot the creation and tiie like be tabordinated to those abont tbt 
'negation of all difference«, and not conTCiaely the latter be «obordinalrd 
'to the former?— To thii we antwer: became the paiiage« of acriptan 
'abODt the negation of all difference« hare a meaning which leaTea notkisi: 
'more to be withed for. For after the unity, eternity, parity, and thi 
'like, of the aonl are recogoited, nothing more remaint to be deaind, 
'becante thereby the knowledge, which i« tha aim of man, haa been ci>- 
'tained: 'wbera can error or lorrow be, for htm «ho beholda aaitj?' 
'(1^ 7)— ' Fearletanna, Terily, o Janaka, haat thou attained* {Brih.4.i 
•4),— "The wita hat no fear of any one at all' (Taitt. 3, 9),— 'Him Tenh 
"the qnettion trouble« not, what good be hat not done [p. 1187], whii 
"BTil be bat done' (ibid.),— that teacbe« the •criptnre. And whde in 
'thi* way it «hew« that the wite are eontcioat of aatitfaction, it alao for- 
'bid* the nntrne aaaertion of a tran «formation [creation], tine« it mti 
"From death to death be it ensnared who difference tee«' (Kith. 4, K'. 
'Conteqaently it cannot be aatnmed that the pinage« of «criptnre wkicb 
'deny difference are to be «nbordinated to the other«. Not eo ia it witL 
'the pataage« of «criptnre abont crtation and the like. For theaa an 
'not able to teach a «enie which leafei nothing more to b« wiahed fer. 
'On the contrary, it it efident, that thne have another aim [than tbtL 
' immediaUly pnt forward, of teaching a creation]. For after it it Gift 
'taid (Chind. 6, 8, 8): 'Of thi« growth which baa «pring np, dear ov, 
' 'learn that it cannot be without a root,'— the «eriptore in the teqad 
tcacbet, bow the one thing, which it to be known, it 'the Exittent', u 
the root of the world. And thus it it alao laid: 'That, whence ttitw 
■beingt come forth, whereby they, coming forth, live, wherein tbv. 
■departing hence, enter ^:ain, thataeek, for that i« the Brahman' (Tii't 
3, 1). Tbnt the paiaagea of acriptnre abont the creation ftc, have the 
aim of teaching the nnity of the Atman, to that no connection of ibe 

•* Cb&nd. 6, 1, 4: " Jntt as, dear one, by a lamp of day eTCrythint 
that contiita of clay, ia known; retting on wordt it tha trantfbmatioD. 
a mere name, in tmth it it only clay," etc. 

VL Exoteric and Esoteric Yedanta Doctrine. 


"Brahman with manifold powert [it to be attumed], and oontequentlj a 
"going to it it impottible. And alto the pattages *Hit rital tpirit with- 
*- * draws not. Brahman it he, and into Brahman he it resolved' (Brih. 4, 
"4, 6), forbidt nt to think of an end to the higher Brahman {param 
^brakma). Thit we explained in ditcotting [Sütram 4, 2, 18] 'clearly 
"^according to tome' [passages, it it the body, not the indiyidaal tool, 
**oat of which he who hat reached liberation withdrawt].** 

c) Etoteric Ptychology. 

** Further, when a going to the Brahman it attnmed, the Jira (the 
indiTidnal tool) which goet it either [1.] a part of the Brahman, or [8.] 
a modification, or [8.] different from the Brahman. For in the case of 
abeolate identity with him, a going it impottible. If thit be to, which 
of them it right?— We antwer: if [according to 1.] that [Jira] it a pari 
[Uterally: a teparate place] [in the Brahman], then he hat already reached 
that [Brahman] contitting of the parts, and consequently even in this 
case a going to the Brahman is impossible, [p. 1128] But the assumption 
of parts and of that which is composed of them has no application te 
the Brahman, because, as everybody knows, the Brahman is without 
members. It is much the same if [according to 2.] we assume a modi- 
fication. For the modification is alto already in that from which it ia 
modified. For a vessel of clay cannot exist, if it ceatet to be clay; if 
thit h^pened, it would cease to exist. If we could understand [the 
ioul] as a modification or member [of the Brahman], the soul must 
remain inherent [in the Brahman], and a going of the wandering soul 
[reading $am$ärigamanam] to the Brahman is absurd. But perhapa 
[according to 3.] the Jiva is different from the Brahman? Then it 
must be either [a.] the size of an atom, or [b.] all-pervading, or [c.] of 
middle sice. If it is [according to b.] all-pervading, no going can be 
possible. If it is [according to c] of middle size, it cannot [cf. above 
p. 68, note 48] be eternal [which was, however, proved 8, 8,54]; if it ia 
[according to a.] the size of an atom, then it is inexplicable that sen- 
sation exists tluoughout the whole body. We have moreover proved 
above [2, 8, 19—29] fuUy, that it can neither be of the size of an atom 
nor of middle size. But that the Jiva is different from the Highest ia 
altogether contrary to the canonical words: 'tat ivam ost* (*That thou 
art,' Chand. 6, 8, 7). The same error occurs, if we assume that it [the 
Jiva] is a modification or a part of it [the Brahman]. If you assert, 
that the error does not occur, because a modification or a part is not 
Mparate from that of which they are [modification or part], we contest 
this, because the unity in the main point would be wanting. And in 
the case of all these assumptions, you cannot get over it that either no 
cessation of transmigration is possible, or that in case it ceases, the soul,, 
onksa its Brahman-selfhood be aisumed, mast perish." 




I »I 






d) EBoterie Morality. 

''But there are some who come and say: * Suppose someone practised 

** *the regular and occasional [good] works, in order to escape the fall 

''*[into transmigration], and avoided at the same time those springing 

** *from the desire [for reward], as also the forbidden [works] in order 

" 'to go neither to heaven nor hell, and exhausted the works [of his 

** * former existence] which are to be expiated in the present body [p. 1129] 

" ' by the expiation itself, there would thus, after the dissolution of the 

*^ * present body, exist no further cause for incurring a new body; and 

** * thus the liberation of such a one, being only a continuation in his 

** 'own essence, would be reached even without identification with Brah- 

** 'man.* — ^But this is not so; for there is no proof of it. Becanse by no 

«canonical scripture is it taught^ that he who seeks liberation abonld 

''proceed in this wise. On the contrary, they have evolved it oot froa 

"their own intellects, thinking thus: because Samsara is caused by the 

" works [of an earlier existence], therefore it cannot exist, where there ii 

"no cause. But the calculation faUs to the ground, becanse the bod- 

"existence of the cause cannot well be known [cf. the detailed statemenu 

"p. 678,9 ff.]. For of each single creature it must be admitted, that it 

"has accumulated many works in an earlier existence, which ripen to 

"desirable and undesirable truits. As these bring contrary froits, thcj 

" cannot both be expiated at the same time ; therefore some of them [tbe 

" works] seize the opportunity and build up the present existence, othen, 

"on the contrary, sit idle and wait until space, time and cause come for 

"them. As these which remain over cannot be exhausted by the present 

"expiation, it cannot therefore be determined with certainty, that, for 

"one who leads his life in the prescribed way, after the dissolation of 

"his present body, no further cause should exist for another body; oa 

" the contrary the existence of a residuum of works is proved by paesagsi 

"of the Qniti and the Smriti like (Chand. 5, 10, 7): 'Those whoee condnet 

^ 'here is fair,' and as it is further said ['for them there is the proepect 

" ' that they enter a fair womb, a Brahman womb, or Slshatriya wooib. 

** 'or YaiQya womb; — bat those whose conduct here is foal, for them is 

" 'the prospect of entering a foul womb, a dog's, or pig's, or Qand&la% 

^ 'womb'].— But if this be so, still [p. 1130] those [residual fmita of works] 

"can be got rid of [lahepakäni; perhaps here and in the seqaal kak^^ 

"leditt, kihapyot etc. 'exhausted' would be better; cf. p. 909, IS] by regokr 

"and occasional good works? — ^That cannot be; because no oontnst 

" [between them] exists. For if they were contraries, then the one might 

"be wiped out by the others; but between the good works heaped np ia 

"an earlier existence and the regular and occasional [ceremoniea] thsrs 

^ is no contrast, because the one and the other are of morally meritorioss 

^nature. In the case of evil works, since they are of immoxml aatare. 

"tbe contrast exists indeed, and accordingly a wiping oat might very 

^well take place; but still it will not result in there being no oanae for 

YL Exoteric and EsoUric Yedftnta Doctrine. 113 

-a new body. For in case of the good works, it still happens that they 
•" remain as cause, and for the evil works, it cannot be ascertained that 
"they have been completely paid for [by pious ceremonies]. It can also 
-not be proved that by performing the constant and occasional [cere- 
-* monies] only avoidance of the descent [into transmigration] and no 
-other fruits besides are obtained; for it is quite possible, that yet other 
"fruits result therefrom, in addition. At least Äpoitawiba [dharma-iiUra 
"1,7, 90, 8] teaches: *For, as in the case of the mango-tree, which is 
** 'planted for the sake of the fruit, also shadow and sweet scent result as 
" *weU, so also, when duties are performed, other beneficial ends also spring 
*" * therefrom.' Moreover no man, who has not 8ami^darga$uim (perfect 
-'knowledge), can be sure that, with his whole self, from birth to death, 
"he has avoided all forbidden practices and those aiming at enjoyment 
-for, even in the most perfect, smaU lapses can be perceived. But even 
"if we could be in doubt about this, in any case it cannot be known 
" that no cause [for a new birth] exists. And without the Brahman-hood 
" of the soul having been brought to consciousness, by the way of know- 
" ledge, the soul, whose nature it is to act and e^joy, cannot reach liber- 
"ation, for it cannot renounce its own nature, any more than fire can 
" [cease to be] hot — [p. 1131] This may be, it may be objected, but the 
** evil lies only in the acting and eiigoying as effect, not in its potentiality 
"[in the deeds, not in the will, from which they proceed], so that, even 
" while the iK>tentiality remains in existence, liberation is possible through 
" avoiding the effect But this also cannot be the case. For if the poten- 
-tiality remains in existence [reading: QokH-Modbhave], it cannot possibly 
"be prevented from producing its effect— But it might still be, that the 
"potentiality, without any further causal moment, [the will without an 
"efficient motive] may not produce any effect; hence [the potentiality] 
-by itself, even when it remains in existence, commits no transgression. 
-—This also cannot be; for the causal moments are always connected 
- [with the potentiality] by a connection referred to the potentiality .•> 
" So long, therefore, as the soul possesses the natural tendency to act 
"and enjoy, and so long as the Brahman-hood of the soul, which is to 
" be gained by knowledge, is not attained, there is not the faintest prospect 
"of liberation. And the scripture also, when it says: * There is no other 

** fokü-lakihanena iambandhena nitya»afnbaddha\ whether the sense 
of these rather obscure words has been caught above, or not, in any case 
It is clear that our author misses the main point of the matter, so far 
•s he does not see that the real guilt lies only in the quality of the 
poHi (that is, the will), it being all the same, whether the will, instigated 
by the chance occurrence of nimitta (motive), unfolds its being in deeds, 
or whether this unfolding remains latent. — ^To have recog^nised this clearly 
and expressed it, is the service which Jesus has rendered to philosophy; 
compare Matthew v, 21 ff., xii, 38 ff. 


iinn*]*Af!. — Bat, ttitm the brs r^at tfa» Ji*B » id^si^ «hb tkt 
lAMRA, flri.l IMC «Q woddlj • 
>«1«>1|^*, hit*. p«re«p'.M>n etc:, c 
♦f»r7. it r*« ** J"«* •• "«fl ■ 

«».'/T« ^. k6, iMT«9t{. Aad tbe cawm ako. whn ä m^: 'For when 
irn 'm t dn»)!*;, m it were, ooe ■ee* tbe other' aad ao on{Bfik.i,i- 
Ktf-iii-Mi with theet «ordi tbe mction c< pwteptitm. knd tb« liit. 

thfl nnM>tli«n«d, m Ttlid, bat on th« oÜ>^ bud dedra it u no: 
•1 f'yr th« awklWBed) for it ii Mid fortker: 'But wbeo for anjont 
bM btcviDM M hii own lelf, bow ihonld he tLen ne uij otte''' 
I M Of). Thartfnre bec»DM for bim wbo knowi tbc higbert BiafaM»- 

i'luA of K'ling and tbe like ba« ceaeed entiraly, any goinf [W tkt 
iliiriati aftftf itnathl ii quit« impoanble for bim." 

•) Biot«ric Eicbatology. 
' lliil. «h*<r« do the patiagei of acriptore belong which apok of > 
iig [111 tha llraliman]?— [p. 1182] Aniwer: they belong to the npac 
ilia ailriliitl.R>ji»iaaaiiDg doctrioH (lagunä vidf/äh). According!; ■ 
M|C li it'iikan of partly in the doctrine of the five firea (ChiDd..\ 
III. tlj'lli. (I. V}. ]>artly in tba doctrine of the thnine (Eanah. 1), |wnl> 
li# liovlt-iiiaol ihaAll-iouKOhfcnd. 5, 11-24). But where in refemK* 
111« llralimaii a doing ia apoken of, for example, in the paM^n 
IB Uialximii I» Ufa, tba Brahman ii joy, tbe Brabnan i« ampliudt 
lAixl. 4, 10, n^ iraiialalad Ül<ap. XI, 9, below p. 164) and 'Here in thu 
\y III III» Uralimaii (the body] ia a booae, ■ amall btsa blowus 
..iKil, n. I, 1 i traiiaUlml Chap. XI, Id, below p. 160)— thare abo. n 
i>i<i)ii*ii<>« »r 111« altril'Uia 'bringing lo*e' and ao on (Cb£iid.4, l&l 
1 liailiiit li'iir witbca' and ao on(Ch&nd. 8, 1,5) it ia only a qnarti"» 
«»i«lii|')«ii)| Dip atinkute po aa taaing [Bnbman], and tbeieforc a t<^ 
!■ lu )')»'*. but it«wh»T« ia a going taaght with ntmae^ U ^ 
l>.4t 1ti«lti»an . fttrM-WAoMi». Aa tbaitfore in tbe paaaage: 'Hu 
,„\ ■I'liiu woti.tra« nor ,lfrih. 4. 4, 6^ tnnahted Ckäp. XU, 4. > 
»d i> tli-KiAi. M *!>>> in tW v«*v <>f the aroida: 'Tba knowtf of ^ 
I«!..«.« .«.U^ iW H^^^r ,T»m. a. 1; for e*en if the «on 
it.V**' tm|v M a icvv.:.t. ;»< ii l&d-.^«;ea b«f«. wbne. aa abr*n. i 
v^i"t ■'>' *H,\i>4>T ya.'v oaaT^.-« t># «Bianbod. oaly tke entecin; i9'^ 
iV ,•«« ►w-t-.i, •■,ik T*{»i\ä IV- ;3» axT-Juiaa«a «i tke cxteaaioe ;' 

■•>«»■ » >hA «r,- J» 1,- )Jw V;ral.viu w i>e r w aJawd' iBHb. 4. 4. * 
• *v .'.t « ft« >* iv^; -.» «ft L. TtniMv -.1 -a» f^^t a»d iahi™f* 
il* )it),«i r-:>al.T-a. . ii i V T*ufii\ miömr f*t läm frnfot^ 
••.■I ■.( « V: wft/. ».■/.). N/« M. st^zwiM« uawtif fc tke mm- ■■ 

O; (■/..„( , 

VI. Exoteric and Etotario Yedftnta Doctrine. 


"-anTeiled original selfhood comes to conscioasness; and a meditation on 
"-the going also has not the slightest reference to the knowledge which 
^is conscious of an etemaUy perfected bliss, leaving no further goal to 
"be reached. Consequently the going refers to the lower [Brahman]; 
** and only so far as the difference between the higher and lower Brahman 
*" is not kept steadily in view, will the passages of scripture concerning a 
''going referring to the lower Brahman be falsely made to refer to the 
- higher." 

f) Esoteric Theology. 

''Are there then two Brahmans, a higher and a lower?— There are 
''certainly two; as is seen from the words: 'In truth, o Satyakama, this 
*" 'sound Om is the higher and the lower Brahman' (Pra^na 6, 2). — What 
""then is the higher Brahman, and what the lower?— To this we answer: 
"^ Where, by discarding the differences of name, form and the like, ascribed 
"* by Ignorance, Brahman is indicated by the [purely negative] expressions 
** *nor gross [nor fine, nor short, nor long]' and so on (Bfih. 3, 8, 8) it is 
"the higher. But where, on the contrary, exactly the same [reality], for 
" the purpose of worship, is described as distinguished by some difference 
""or other, for example, in words like: * Spirit is his material, life his 
** * body, light his form ' (Ghand. 3, 14, 2), it is the lower.— But does that 
"not contradict the word of the scripture, that it is 'without a second' 
"(Chand. 6, 2, 1)?— Not at all! [The contradiction] disappears, because 
"ascribed limitations like name and form spring from Ignorance. But 
"the fruit of the worship of this lower Brahman is, according to the 
** context *If he desires the world of the fathers* and so on (Chand. 8, 
"2, 1) a world-lordship (Jagad-aifvaryam) belonging to Samsara, since 
"Ignorance is not [yet] destroyed. Now this [fruit] [p. 1134] is connected 
"with a given place; therefore a going, in order to gain it, is no con- 
" tradiction. It is true the soul is all-present ; but as space [ether] enters 
" into the vessel and the like, it also enters into connection with ascribed 
"limitation (upädhi) like Buddhi and the rest, and so far a going is 
** assumed for it, concerning which we have spoken, with reference to the 
''Sutra: 'because it [the soul in the condition of Samsara] is the nucleus 
«'*of its [Buddhi's] quaUties [love, hate, desire, sorrow, etc.]' (2,3,29)." 







♦ » 


• t, 




it openly, that the cosmological distinction of tgvara and pra- 
panca belongs to the sagunä upäsanä (p. 456, 10), and, con- 
versely, that the teaching of sagunam brahma presupposes the 
prapaUca (p. 820, 12). 

From these facts we justify the wearing together of the 
teaching of the sagunam brahma^ of a world thereby created 
and of an individual soul which moves in this world, and 
finally enters into that brahmaj into a whole of exoteric meta- 
physics. And Qankara also, if we were to ask him — "Is, then, 
"that sagunam brahma and the devayäna leading thither real, 
"although from the standpoint of the highest truth neither 
" exists ?** He would certainly answer: "They are precisely as 
"real as this world; and only in the sense that the prapauca 
"and samsära are unreal, are the sagunam brahma and the 
^devayäna unreal; both are the aparä vidyä, that is Vidya 
"as it appears from the standpoint of Avidya" (avidyä-ai-a- 
sthäyäm p. 112, 3. 680, 12. 682, 3).62 

But it must still be borne in mind that Qankara did not 
reach full clearness as to the necessary connection of the 
exoteric doctrines, and this will often become clear enough 
from his discussions, which we shall reproduce faithfully and 
unaltered; but, as regards the esoteric doctrine, on the con- 
trary, there is found at the end of his work a passage from 
which his consciousness of its inner necessary connection comes 
out as clearly as possible, and which, as a compendium in nuce 
of Qankara's Metaphysics, and, at the same time, as an example 
of the style and character of thought of the work with which 
we are occupied, we here translate word for word. 

— n : 

^ The thought that the exoteric doctrine aims at accommodating the 
truth to the comprehension of the masses, can also be pointed oat in 
Qafikara ; thus the spatial conception of the Brahman is formed upalabdki- 
arthamy p. 182,8. 193,4; the measurement of Brahman is buddki-itrtha*. 
upäsana-arthah, 835,4; na hi avikäre ^nante brahmani sarvaih puffibhik 
fokyd buddhih Mthäpayitum, manda-madhya^ttama'buddhitvätpufMm, th. 
836,6. The propaedeutic character of the exoteric doctrine is very 
clearly laid down in the Commentary to Chand. 8, 1, p. 528, and this 
passage (which we shall translate in Chapter XI, l,d) is before all to 
be considered, when the rightness of our comprehension of the Yedinta 
system comes in question. 

VI. Exoteric »od EMteric TedinU Dootrio«. 109 

3. Appendix: Qaökara's Esoteric Fhiloaophjr, 

translated from 4,3,14 (p. 1124, 10— 1134,3). 

») Do the libetsted go to the Brahmui? 

"Some nuioUin that the pMugei of »criptnre h to going [to the 

•Brahmui) refer to the higher [not to the lower, attribote-poeMeung 

'BrfthsBKo]. Thi* cannot be, became a going to the Brahman it im- ' 

*paauble. For to the all-pretent highett Brahman, inmoit of all, who 

■it the tool that it within all, of whom it ii uid: 'like the ether [p. 112B] 

* 'onuii-pretent, eternal' (cf. above p. 8S, L 9) — 'the perceptible, not taper- 
"eensible Brahman, that a« Self it the innermoit being of all' (Bph. 
"■a,!,!),— 'Self only it thii univerte' (Chind. 7, 85, S^— 'The Brahman 
"'only ii thit uairerte, the inott excellent' (Mund. 3, S, 11),— to thii 
''Brahman wfaoaa character it determined by paitage* of tcriptnre like 
"thaee, there cannot now or erer be a going in. For we cannot go to 
"a pUc« where we already are; bnt on the contrary, according to com- 
'mon acceptation, only to another place. It it tme experience «hewt, 
'that we can alto go to that, in which we are already, «o far at we die- 
■-tingiüeh different placei in it. That a man it on the earth, and yet 
"goea to it, in ao far aa he goee to another place. So alto the child ia 
*" identical with ibalf, and yet reacfaee puberty, which it itt own aelf, 
"•aparated by time. In the tame way, one might think, there may be a 
"way of going to the Brahman, to far aa it i* endowed with all kinda 
-of powera (foUi). Bat thit it not eo; on acconnt of the negation of all 
"differeneea (rtfoAa) in Brahman: 'Without parti^ without action, reet- 
" 'fal, fanltleat, atainleea' (Qret 6, 19J,— 'Nor grati nor fine, nor thort nor 
'' ■ long ' (Bph. 8, 8, 8), — ' For he, the unborn, ii without and within ' (Mn^^- 
'S,!, S),-''Vmly thit great nnbom tool {ätman), that neither grow« old 
*- 'nor fadaa nor diet, that ia without fear, ia the Brahman' [Bnh.4,4,SS), 
■■ — 'Be ia not thus, not thai' (Brih. 3,9,96);— according totbeee mlaa of 
"•cnptare and tradition no connection of the higheit tool with apatial, 
"tsBporal or other di&eiencea can be «Momed, to that one ooold go to 
*it aa to a part of the earth or to an age of life; but a ipatially and 
"(«aporaUj [p. 11S8| determined going to the earth and to the aga ia 

* piNnble *> becanae they ere differentiated by locality and drcnmitaneat." 

•* It i« in the bigheit degree attraotive and initmetive, to obterre, 
how hare and eliewhere the tpirit of man in antiquity tout and itrngglea 
to reaeh the eternal fundamental truth of all metaphyiici, which it wat 
leaarrtd for the geniot of Kant to aet forth in perfect deameat and to 
pittra beyond contradiction: the truth that Being-in>itMlf mart be ■pace- 
lea* and ''"■■'if I becante ipace and time are nothing elae but lubjectiTe 
feme of our intellect.— Aa here ifoet and time are denied for the 
Br«hmaa, ao in the lequel will cantality of creation be interpreted aa 


120 First Part: Theology or the Doctrine of Brahman. 

(euxeoftai) or wording {prare^ precari) or demanding (bidjan) 
or softening (MOAUtnbCH) or offering incense (^]{), but as the 
will of man striying upwards towards the holy, the dirine; io 
accordance with this, the designation of God as Brahman 
would arise from a concept which finds and grasps the Dime 
where it is preeminently to be sought and found. The other 
designation of Grod as Ätmarij that is, ''the Self,'' or *the 
Soul" also points us to our inner life (cfl p. 100, 18: ätm& }ii 
näma svarüpam); but when this is distinguished from ''the 
living Self," the individual soul (Jivätman, Jiva) as ''the 
highest Self {Param&tman^ MuVhyätman^ Aupanishadätman). 
these expressions admonish us to distinguish two sides in oar 
own selves, of which this whole empirical form of existence is 
only one, while the other, lying behind it, rests in the bosom 
of the deity, is even identical with it 

This is not the place to follow up further the designations 
of God as Brahman^ Ätman, PurtishOj Igvara and the profound 
views which they open up; to this end the first steps of onr 
knowledge must first be exhibited from the Veda more clearly 
than has hitherto been done. Here we must restrict ourselves 
to developing the Theology of Bädaräya9a and Qankara, look- 
ing at the XTpanishads only with their eyes; but even in this 
scholastic form, the ideas of the Godhead show a loftiness the 
like of which cannot easily be found elsewhere. 

2. Arrangement of the Theology. 

Apart from casual phrases scattered through the whole 
work, the doctrine of the Brahman is dealt with in two parts 
of the Brahmasütras; that is, in the first Adhyäya, which hjs 
down the Theology on the basis of a series of scripture texts, 
in a general way, and without developing the difference between 
Saguxia and Nirgupd. Vidyä,^^ and in an appendix to this, in 

*7 Such a difference teems to be kept in view, judging from the 
introductory discutsions p. Ill — 114; but in the development of the 
question whether sagunam or nirgunam brahma is to be understood, 
another question is generally substituted, that is, whether the text eited 
refers to the highest self or to the individual self. The threefold 
antithesis of param brahma^ 1) to the forms as which it is presentsd 

Til. Prefatory fiamkrki and Amugement. ISI 

Adhy&ya III, 2, II — II, vhich contains the esoteric theology. We 
shall follow this twofold division; but within the first Adhy&ja, 
in order to gain a clear idea of the matter, we cannot adhere to 
the order maintained in the S&tras, since they bring together 
the most heterof^eneous material in the strangest manner, and, 
on the other hand, widely separate passages naturally helonging 
to each other. To justify our transpositions it may be useful to 
explain as far as possible the principle of arrangement which 
governs the first Adhyäya of the Brahmasfttras. 

To begin with, the first Adbyäya is divided as we have it 
(c£ table of contents at the end of the first chapter, above 
p. 39), into forty, that is, ten times foar Adhikarapas (Chap* 
ters). Four of these chapters separate themselves naturally 
from the rest: the two last 1, 4, 23—27 and 1, 4, 28 which 
belong to the following cosmological section, and 1, 3, 26—33. 
1, 3, 34 — 38, which contain an episode already treated in 
chap. IIL Of the remainiog AdhikaraQas, the four first form 
theIntroduction,/oHrother8(l, 1, 5— 11. 1,4,1—7. 1,4,8—10. 
1,4, 11 — 13) combat the Sänkhya doctrine. After deducting 
these, we have seven times /our Adhikarapas, which consist 
of an ezegetical and dogmatic discussion of the same number 
of passages from the Upanishads. Of these, /our are taken 
from BrihadÜinuiyaka-IJpT Jour from K&thaka-Üp., four from 
Atbarran Upanishads (three from Mnod&ka, one from Pra(na)> 
four, that is two each, from Taittiiiya and Eaushitaki, and 
the remaining three times four from Chindogya-Upanishad. 
The following scheme shews their order: 

1} 1,1,1»-19 Taitt.a,6 

2) — ,90-ai Chind.1,6,6. 

3> — . 8S Chlnd. 1, 9. 1. 

♦) — ,Sa Chlod.1,11,6. 

8)— ,84— S7 Oh4nd.S,lS,7. 

€) -, 38-81 Kktuh. 8, S 

7) 1, 3. 1—8 Chiod. 3, U, 1. 

8> — , 9-10 .... Katb. 9, 8D 

9) .,11—13 .... Eäth.3,1 

{»agititam frgitotg), 9) to the fonoi in wfaieb it ii manifeated, that i», the 
vorid, ^ to tha individnal fOol, ii not abarplr diitingniahed and proaerved 
by Caaksra; we ahall recor to thii in Chapter ZIV, 1. 

122 First Fart: Theolocry or the Doctrine of Brahman. 


18—17 Cbänd,4»lM 

11) — , 18—20 Brih.8,7,a 

12) -,21-28 Mund.1,1,6 

13) — ,24—82 CbandL 6, 11— 84 

14)1,8,1-7 Mun4.2,2,6 

16)— ,8— 9 Chand.7,23 

16)— .10— 12 Brih.8,8,8 

17)— ,18 Fra5na6,B 

18) — , 14—18 Ohind. 8, 1, 1 

19)— ,19— 21 Ch&nd.8,12,a 

20) —,22— 23 Mun4.2,2,10 

21) -,24-25. . . . K&th.4,12 
22) —,89 .... K4th.6,l 

28)— ,40 Chftnd.6,12,3 

24) -,41 Ch&nd.8,14 

25)— ,42-43 Brih.4,8,7 

26) l,4,14-15Taitt.2,6 

27)— ,16— 18 Kaash.4,19 

28)— ,19-22 Brih.4,5,6 

As this surrey shews, the order of the passages, as they 
occur in the different üpanishads, is rigidly preserred. Bnt 
apart from this, these passages are interwoven in a way for 
which we only here and there seem to recognise a reason. 
Possibly this enigmatic relation points to preparatory exegetical 
works within the different Qäkhäs, which were then graduallj 
united in a single whole. 

However this may be, this much is clear, that this principle 
of arrangement is in fact an external one. Therefore, in oar 
statement of the doctrine, we ignore it altogether, in order, 
after producing certain proofs of the existence of God (Chap. 
YIII), to treat of the Brahman on the basis of the material 
in question, first in itself (Chap. IX), then as a cosmic principle 
(Chap. X), again as a cosmic and at the same time psychic 
principle (Chap. XI), lastly as the soul (Chap. XII), and as 
the highest end (Chap. XIII). The investigation of the esoteric 
(nirgunam) Brahman will form the conclusion of the Theology 
(Chap. XIV). 

VIII. Proofs of the Existence of God. 

1. Prefatory Bemark. 
Ih the course of the work, with which we are concerned, 
we sereral times come acrosa discussions, which have a certain 
likeness to the proofe of the existence of God that figure in 
the modem pre-Kantian philosophy. We give them here 
under the names in use among us, as a comparison of the 
arguments on both sides is not without historical interest. 
There can be no question of mutual dependence, since proofs 
like the cosnological and physico-theological lie in the 
nature of man's processes of thought; as it appears, the In- 
dians were never ensnared into an ontological proof; on the 
other hand, we find a new proofs which we may call the 
psychological, and in which the concept of God blends 
with the concept of the souL We begin with a short and 
provisional definition of the Brahman, and then introduce the 
passages which occur under the titles mentioned, without 
meaoing to maintain that their entire contents are suited to 
these titles chosen for the sake of comparison. 

2. Definition of the Brahman. 

(p. 38, 2:) "The cause, from which [proceeds] the origin or 
■subsistence, and dissolution of this world which is extended 
'in names and forms, which includes many agents and enjoyers, 
'which contains the fruit of works specially determined accord- 
*ing to space, time and cause, a world which is formed after 
* an arrangement inconceivable even for the spirit, this omniscient 
'and omnipotent cause is the Brahman." 

(p. 90, 3:) " Brahman is the omniscient and omnipotent cause 
*of tbe origin, persistence and passing away of the world." 

124 Firtt Part: Theology or the Doctrine of Brahman. 

3. Cosmological Proo£ 

under this title we translate Sütram 2, 3, 9 with Qankara's 
explanation (p. 627—628). 

Sütram: *^But [there is] no origin of Hhe Existent,^ on 

'^account of the impossibility.^^ Explanation: "After anyone 

"has been taught from the scripture, that also ether [or: 

''space] and air have originated, although we cannot conceire 

"their coming into being, he might come to think that the 

"Brahman also originated from something, for when he per- 

"ceiyes how from the ether and the like, which are still only 

"modifications, yet other modifications arise, he might conclode 

"that the ether also sprang into being from the Brahman, as 

"if from a mere modification. The present Sütram "But [there 

"is] no-origin^ etc., serves to remove this doubt; its meaning 

"is: but one must not think that the Brahman, whose essence 

"is Being (sad-ätmäka), could have originated from anything 

"else; why? ^owing to impossibilityJ For Brahman is pure 

"Being. As such it can [firstly] not have sprung from pure 

"Being, because [between the two] there is no superiority, so 

"that they cannot be related [to each other] as original and 

"modified; — but also [secondly] not from differentiated Being, 

"because experience contradicts this; for we see that from 

"homogeneity differences arise, for example, vessels from clay, 

"but not that homogeneity arises from differences; — further 

*^ [thirdly] also not from non-Being,^^ for this is essenceless 

'^ (nirätmaka); and because the scripture overthrows it, when 

""it says (Chänd. 6, 2, 2): 'How should the Existent come from 

"the non-Existent?' and because it does not admit a producer 

"of the Brahman, when it is said (Qvet 6, 9): 

''Cause it He, Matter of the Sense's Lord, 
^He has no Lord, and no Progenitor.*' 

"For ether and wind on the contrary an origin is shewn, 
"but there is none such for the Brahman, that is the difference. 
"And because it is seen how, from modifications, other modi* 
"fications arise, there is no necessity for the Brahman also 

** The similarity of this demonstration with that in the Farmenides 
T. 62ff., is conspicnons; Zeller, Philosophie der GMechan I*, p. 471. 

Vm. Proof! oT the Exutenoe of God. 135 

- to be a modification. For were this bo, then we should come 
-to DO primordial oatnre (mülaprakriti) but should have a 
Tejrrewu« tn irffinitum (anavaaOiä). What is assumed as the 
"primordial nature, — ^jost that is our Brahman; there is thus 
"perfect agreement"" 

4 Fhysico-tbeological Proof, 
(p. 500, 3;) "When the matter is considered with the help 
"of examples only, it is seen that in the world no non-intelligent 
"object without being guided by an intelligence brings forth 
"from itself the products which serve to further given aims 
"of man. For, e. g^ houses, palaces, beds, seats, pleasure- 
"gardens and the like are [only] contrived in life by intelligent 

- artist« in due time for the purpose of obtaiuiug pleasure and 
"avertiug pain. Exactly the same it is with this whole world. 
"For when one sees, how, for example, the earth serves the end 
"of the enjoyment of the fruit of the manifold works, and how, 
"again, the body within and without by possessing a given 
-arrangement of parts saitable to the different species and 

- determined in detail that it may form the place of the en- 
-joyment of the fruit of the manifold works, — so that even 
-highly skilled artists full of insight are unable to comprehend 
-it tlmugh their understanding,— how should this arrangement 
"proceed from the non-intelligent original-matter [of the S&ü- 
"kbyas}? For lumps of earth, stones and the like are in 
-po wise capable of this? Clay also, for example, is formed, 
-as experience teaches, to different shapes [only] so long as 
"it is guided by the potter, and exactly in the same way must 
"matter be guided by another intelligent power. He, there- 
"fore, who relies on the material cause only as clay, etc., 
"cannot rightly maintain, that he possesses the primordial 
-caase; but no objection meets him who, besides it [the clay], 
"relies on the potter etc. as well For when this is assumed 

M In tbo lut pbrue, the relationibip between the Xndi»n uid Uta 
w w tem eoamologicftl proof, M weU m the inkdeqaftcjr of botb, codmi 
oat v«7 clearty; lino« con>id«red empirickliy Dothing lUadj in the wa; 
of K rr y a i M from the effect to the caum, from thii ^ain to iti c«nM, 

126 First Fart: Theology or the Doctrine of Brahman. 

" there is no contradiction, and at the same time the scriptura 
^ which teaches an intelligent power as cause, is thereby re- 
"spected. So that, as the arrangement [of the Kosmos] would 
^become impossible, we may not have recourse to a non- 
" intelligent power as the cause of the world." 

B. Psychological Proof. 

(p. 32, 4:) '^Is the Brahman which is to be investigated 
^ known or unknown? If it is known, we do not need to in- 
^vestigate it; if it is unknown, we cannot investigate it! — 
"Answer: That Being which of its own nature is eternal, 
^^pure, wise, free, all-knowing, almighty is Brahman. For from 
^the etymology of the word Brahman the meanings ^eternal 
"pure' etc. are reached, according to the meaning of the root 
^barh ['to separate;' see above, p. 119]. But the existence of 
"the Brahman is demonstrated by the fact that it is the Self 
"(Soul, atrnan) of alL For everyone assumes the existence of 
"himself, for he cannot say: "I am not" For if the existence 
"of Self were not demonstrated, then all the world could say 
"'I am not' And the Self is the Brahman. — But if the 
"Brahman is universally demonstrated because it is the Seit 
"then it is known, and the objection that it need not be in- 
"vestigated, recurs? — Not so! For with reference to its 
"characteristics there is contradiction. For the common people 
"and the materialists [Lokäyatika: 'those who follow the world *] 
"assert: 'the Self is only the body invested with intelligence;' 
"—others again; "the Self is only the [naturally] intellectual 
"organs of sense;' — others: 'it is the understanding (mona^);* 
" — ^yet others: 'it is only the perishable intellect;' — others: 
"'the Void;' — others again: 'it is the [individual soul] extend- 
"ing beyond the body, wandering, acting, and suffering;'— some: 
"'it is only the sufferer, not the agent;' — some: 'it is the 
"all-knowing, almighty Lord, who extends beyond this [world];' 
" — still others: 'it is the Self of him who suffers [or: enjoys] 
"there.'— Thus many oppose each other, and rely on arguments 
"and passages [of Scripture] or their appearance. He, there* 
"fore, who inconsiderately assumes the one or the other, may 
"compromise his salvation and come to destruction. Therefore, 

Tin. Froofi of the EsUUnoe of Qod. 127 

"becaase they set forth the ioTestigation of the Brahman, the 
"consideratioD of the Vedaota [Upanishad] texts, supported 
"bj Don-contradictory reflexion, is recommended as a means 
"of salTatioD." 

(p. 78, 6:) "For the etonial Spirit (purusha) different from 
"the agent [the individual soul], which is the object of the 
"presentation of I, dwelling as witness {gäk$kin) in all being, 
"uniform, one, the highest, is not apprehended by anyone from 
•' the Section of Works [of the Veda] or from any book based 
"on reflexion; he, who is the soul of all. And therefore none 
-can deny him, or make bim ao element of the Section of 
"Works; for he is even the Self (sonl) of him who denies 
"bim; and because he is the Self of all, it is therefore im- 
"possible either to flee from him or to seek him. For every- 
" thing that passes away, came into existence and passes away 
"through modification, because it finds its end in the spirit; 
-but the spirit is imperishable, because there is no cause of 
" perisbableness in it, and because there is no cause of change 
-in it, therefore is it raised [above change], and eternal, and 
" for this very reason in its own nature eternal, pure and free 
"[or: freed]." 

Mow in so far as God is the (metaphysical) I of man him- 
self, his existence cannot be proved at all, but also it does 
Dot need to be proved, because he is that which is alone 
known directly, and thereby the basis of all certainty, as is 
developed in the following most remarkable passage. 

6. Cogito, ergo ium. 
(p. 619, 8:) "For if the Self [that is, Brahman] also [like 
"ether, wind, fire, water, earth] were a modification, Üien, 
"since the Scripture teaches nothing higher above it, every 
"effect from ether downwards would be without Self (nirät- 
-maka, soulless, essenceless), since the Self [also] would be 
"[only] an effect; and thus we should arrive at Nihilism 
~ igünya-väda). Just because it is the Self, it is not possible 
-to doubt the Self. For one cannot establish the Self [by 
"proof] in the case of anyone, because in itself it is already 
"known. For the Self is not demonstrated by proof of itselfl 

128 First Fart: Theology or the Doctrine of Brahmui. 

^For it is that which brings into use all means of proo^ such 
^as perception and the like, in order to prove a thing which 
^is not known. For the objects of the expressions ether etc. 
** require a proof, because they are not assumed as known of 
^^ themselves. But the Self is the basis (ägrayä) of the action 
^of proving, and consequently it is evident before the action 
''of proving. And since it is of this character, it is therefore 
''impossible to deny it For we can call in question some- 
''thing, which comes to us (äganttika) [from outside], but not 
''that which is our own being. For it is even the own being 
"of him who calls it in question [cf. p. 79, 1. 823, 2]; fire cannot 
"call its own heat in question. And further, when it is said: 
"'It is I, who now know what at present exists, it is I, who 
"knew the past, and what was before the past, it is I, who shaD 
"know the future and what is after the future,' it is implied 
"in these words that even when the object of knowledge alten, 
"the knower does not alter, because he is in the past, fotore. 
"and present; for his essence is eternally present (Mf- 
^vadä^artamäna-svobhävatväd); therefore, even when the body 
"turns to ashes, there is no passing away of the Self, for its 
"essence is the present, yea, it is not even for a moment 
"thinkable, that its essence should be anything else than this/' 

IX. The Brahman in itself. 

1. Br&hmao aa the non-Ezigtent 
Sütrain 1,4,14-16. 
It i§ asserted, Qankara says (loe. cit.), that the Yedänta 
texts referring to the deri?atiou of the world from Brahman, 
as well as those referring to the nature of Brahman itself, 
are frequentlj contradictory; in the former case, sometimes 
the ether, sometimes fire, sometimes breath is named as the 
first created, while in the latter, Brahman is in some passages 
described as the " non- Existent," in others as the "Existent." 
With regard to the first point, he says, it will be discosaed 
fortber OD (cf. Chap. XVII, 1); here we have only to do with 
the latter. It is true that it is said (Taitt 2, 7): 

■ Non-Eziit«Dt waa thii in the be^nning, thence the ExiiteDt kroee" 
while on the other hand it ia said (Chänd. 6, 2, 1): "Existent 
"only, dear one, was this in the beginning, alone and without 
-a second. Some, verily, say: non- Existent was this in the 
-beginning, alone and without a second; from this non-£kistent 
-arose the Existent But how could this be, dear one? How 
"could the Existent arise from the non-Existent." 

Here, in the one passage, as in the other, the all-knowing, 
almighty, all-animating Being without a second is indicated as 
the cause of the world (p. 372, 7); and if the Taitt Up. speaks 
of a non-Exiatent it is not an essenceless Don-Existent that is 
to be understood, as the preceding verse (Taitt 2, 6) proves: 

■He i« bnt DOD-Exiitent"' who know* Brftbnwn ■■ nou -Existent; 

"He «ho knowi BnhmkD u Exiitent become« hinuolf by thit Exuteot" 
The word "Existent" is commonly used to indicate the/ 

I* QkDfcan klwayi resdi: omimn eva $a bhavaii, p. 375, 13. 124, 9. 
188.*7. 888,4. 

130 Eint Fart: Theology or the Doctrine of Brahman. 

world extended in names and forms; now in order to suggestf 
that this development did not exist before the creation, it is 
metaphorically said of Brahman which alone is: it was, as it 
were, a non-£xistent (p. 376, 7). 

2. Brahman as the primordial Light 

Sutram 1,3,22—23. 

Mu^A 2, 2, 10 (= Käth. 5, 15 = Qvet 6, 14) says: 
"There shines not sun nor moon nor stars, nor shine these 
"lightnings, far less earthly fire: after Him the shining One, 
"all shines, from His light is lighted this whole world.^ 

In this passage, as Qankara explains, it is not some kind 
of light-element that is to be understood, but the highest At- 
man, of which Chänd. 3, 14, 2 says: "Light is his form, truth 
his resolve" (p. 272, 9), and which is spoken of (p. 274:, 2) in 
what goes before (Mu9d. 2, 2, 6. 9). A Light-element is not 
to be thought of, because from such an element the sun etc 
[hence the moon also!] cannot borrow their lights since they 
are themselves just as much light-elements (p. 272, 11); but 
they can all very well borrow their light from the Brahman, 
for a borrowing can also take place in the case of things of 
di£ferent kinds, as a glowing ball of iron bums after the fire, 
and as the dust blows after the wind (p. 273, 2); moreover, 
besides the light-elements named, the sun etc., no other exists 
(p. 274, 8). — From the shining of the Ätman "all 'this" would 
borrow light, that is, either: the sun, etc., in the sense in 
which Brih. 4, 4, 16 says: "Him the Oods honour as immortal 
Life, as the light of lights," or it means: this whole world- 
development, as it has arisen in names and forms as ''the 
reward of works to the doer" (Jcriya-kdraka-phalaj p. 973, 12; 
the same formula p. 291, 6. 447, 3. 987, 6), has as cause the 
light-nature of the Brahman, just as the revelation of all forms 
has as its cause the light-nature of the sun (p. 273, IZjT All 
that is perceived, is perceived through the Brahman aalight 
but the Brahman is perceived through no other light, because 
its own being is to be Self-shining, so that the sun etc shine 
in him (tasmin). For the Brahman reveals the other, but the 
Brahman is not revealed by the othen (p. 276, 1). 

IX The Brmhmui in iUelf. 131 

3. Brahman as the last, unknoTable origin of the 


>) Sfitnm I, S, S1-2S. 

In the Introduction of the Muoija^TJpanishad two doc- 
trines are distinguished (in another sense than aboTe, p. 98£}, 
a lower, which, as Qankara remarks, has as its fruit ascent 
(abhyudaya, ct p. 82), and a higher, which has as its fruit sal- 
vation (p. 203, 6). Under the lower the four Tedas besides 
the six VedäDgas (Phonetics, Grammar, Etymolog;, Metre, 
Ritual and Astronomy) are enumerated, and then it is said 
farther, Muq4- It It 6: 

"But the higher is that through which that Imperishable ^ 
"is known: the invisible, intangible, nnoriginated, colourless, 
''without ejes and ears, without hands and feet, the eternal, 
" all-perrading, all'present, ver; subtle, this is the Uucbanging 
"which the wise know as the womb of beings. As the spider 
"puts forth [the threads] and draws them back again, as herbs 
"grow up upon the earth, as from a living man the hair c 
*'head and body, so from this Imperishable arises all the / 
" world." 

Here, as Qafikara develops it, the highest God is to be 
understood, not primordial matter or the indi vidual s oul. For 
though the examples brought forwi^d^ t&e spider's body 
and the man's body, are only directed by an intelligent power, 
but are themselves non-intelhgent (p. 200, 12), yet these are 
only comparisonB, which must not be pressed too far (p. 304, 
14); that an intelligent «riginal Being is to be understood, is 
proved by what immediately follows, and is therefore to be 
applied here, "he who understands all, who knows all" (Mun<j-' 
1, 1, 9). which cannot be applied to a non-intelligent primordial 
matter (p. 201, 3). — One might also think of the individual 
soul, because it certainly according to its moral nature (p. 301, 
9) conditions what arises as being, but what follows further 
oo, shews clearly that only the highest Brahman can be meant. 
For it ia said further, Mupt}. 2, 1, 1: 

"This is the truth: — As, from a well lit fire, sparks, of 
"like nature to it, arise thousandfold, so, dear one, from the 

132 Fint Part: Theology or the Doctrine of Brahman. 

'^ Imperishable go forth manifold beings, and return into it 
''again. For divine is the spirit (purusha), the formless, who 
"is within and without, unborn, breathless, wishless, pure, jet 
"higher than the highest Imperishable. From him arises 
*^ breath, the understanding with all the senses, from him arise 
''ether, wind, and fire, the water, and earth the support of 
^ all. His head is fire, his eyes the moon and sun, the cardinal- 
^ points are his ears, his Yoice is the revelation of the Veda. 
^ Wind is his breath, his heart the world, from his feet the 
''earth; — he is the inner Self in all beings.'^ 

From this passage, says Qankara, it is clear, that neither 
the individual soul, to which such majesty of body does not 
belong, nor primordial matter is to be thought ot because it 
is not the inner Self in all beings (sarvorbhütarantarätman). 
(p. 207, 12). If at the same time an individualised form is 
attributed to the invisible womb of beings, this is not in order 
to ascribe to it a real individuality, but only to make it clear 
that it is the Self of the universe (sarva-atman) (p. 208, 1).— 
A difficulty is caused by the fact that the Atman, which 
(above p. 131) is called "the Imperishable," is here spoken of 
as "higher than the highest Imperishable." The way in which 
Qankara tries to solve this difficulty, by here understanding the 
" Imperishable as the undeveloped subtle body [Chap. ICICXI^ 3], 
''forming the seed-power for names and forms, which serves as 
" the ground- work for the Lord, and is only a limitation (upadhi) 
" ascribed to himself" (p. 206, 1), as well as the opinion ot 
some, considered by Qankara (p. 208), that in the conduding 
words of the text Prajapati (a cosmogonic personification ol 
Brahman) is to be understood, we may very well pass by. 

b) Sutram 1, 8, 10—12. 

In the Brihadaranyaka-Upanishad (3, 8) Grärgi, the daughter 
of Yacaknu (not the wife of Yajnavalkya, as Colebrooke, M.£.^ 
p. 343 erroneously supposes) asks Yajnavalkya in what is woven 
and interwoven that which exists above heaven, beneath the 
earth, and between heaven and earth, in what the past, 
the present, and the future, and receives as answer: in the 
ether (space) all this is woven and interwoven. — "But in what** 

DL The Brahman in iUelf. 133 

she asks further, ^is ether (space) then woyen and intenroTen?'' 
— To this YajnaYalkya: 

"^It is that, o Gärgt, which the Brahmans call the Im- 
^ perishable (aksharam)^ it is neither gross nor fine, nor short 
'^nor long, nor red [like fire] nor adhering [like water], not 
^ shady nor dark, not wind nor ether, not sticky [like gum], 
^without taste, without smell, without eye or ear, without 
^ Toice, without understanding, without Tital*force, and without 
^ breath, without mouth and without measure, without inner or 
^ outer; nothing whatsoerer does it consume, nor is it consumed 
^ by any. At the bidding of this Imperishable, o Gärgi, sun 
^and moon are kept asunder from each other; at the bidding 
^'of this Imperishable, o O&rgi, heayen and earth are kept 
^asunder from each other; at the bidding of this Imperishable, 
'^o Gargi, the minutes and the hours, the days and nights, 
^ the half-months, months, the seasons, and the years are kept 
^asunder. At the bidding of this Imperishable, o Gargi, the 
"streams run downward from the snowy mountains some to 
''the east, some to the west, and whithersoerer each one goes; 
''at the bidding of this Imperishable, o Gärgi, men praise 
''the generous man, gods strive for the sacrificer, the fathers 
''for the o£ferings for the dead. Verily, o Gargi, he who 
"knows not this Imperishable, though in this world he offers 
"and has offerings made, though he suffers penance many a 
"thousand years, gains an unenduring [reward]; but he who 
" knows not that Imperishable, o Gargi, and departs from this 
"world, he, indeed, is miserable; but he who, o Gargi, know- 
"ing this Imperishable, departs from this world, he, indeed, 
"is a Brähmapa. Verily, o Gargi, this Imperishable is see- 
"ing, not seen, hearing, not heard, understanding, not under- 
" stood, knowing, not known. For outside him there is no 
"seer, outside him there is no hearer, outside him there is 
"none with understanding, outside him there is none with 
"knowledge. In this Imperishable, yerily, o Gargi, is the ether 
"woren and interwoyen." 

In this passage, as Qafikara explains, the Imperishable 
(aksharam) means not "the syllable," as usually is the case, 
generally the sacred syllable ^am^^^ of which it is said (Chand. 

134 First Fart: Theology or the Doctrine of Brahman. 

2, 23, 4) ^the sound om is all this," bat the highest divinity 
(p. 242, 10) ; for of it only is it true that in it Üie ether and 
thereby the universe is woven (p. 242, 14), as even in the 
passage mentioned (Chänd. 2, 23, 4) the sound ^om" signifies 
Brahman (p. 243, 3), whose properties of eternity and all-per- 
meation are signified etymologically by aksharam (na Jaharatu 
agnute cOj p. 243, 4). Primordial matter can also not be 
understood as the Imperishable, for it is said: ^at the bidding 
of this Imperishable," and "this is seeing not seen" etc., which 
must refer to an intelligent power (p. 243, 12. 244, 8); but it 
cannot refer to the individual soul, because in the words: 
"without eye and without ear" etc., all limitations {upädhi) 
are excluded, and without these the individual soul cannot 
exist (p. 244, 13). 

All the properties of the Brahman, which we have dealt 
with hitherto, were (so far as they are not to be taken figurat- 
ively) purely negative; now we turn to the two positive de- 
terminations of the being of the Godhead, which show it u 
1) pure intelligence, 2) pure bliss. 

4. Brahman as pure Intelligence, 
Sütram 1, 1, 6—11. 

Prefatory Remark. When we consider the weakness 
and frailty of man^s intellect, we can only wonder at the 
unanimity with which, in Indian, Greek and modem philo- 
sophy, Intelligence is ascribed as an essential attribute to "the 
Thing-in-itself." It is well worth while to follow out the 
motives which have led the thinkers of ancient and modem 
times to declare so feeble a faculty, which works only inter- 
mittently, is bound up with organic life and perishes with it 
to be the essence of the being of Beings. These motives sre 
especially clearly seen in the deeply founded structure of the 
Yedanta philosophy. Metaphysics must above all seek a firm 
and immovable point of certainty, in order to attack the sub- 
ject, and this can only be found in the consciousness of the 
philosophising subject; hence the Cartesian: cogitOt ergo imsi, 
and the corresponding statement of our work, which we have 

IX. The BnhmMt in itieir. 136 

given sbore p. 137ff. Hera, within oar ovn Self, we gais ao 
infallible gaide to the absolute Being which we are seeking: 
that which cannot be laid aside mnat also be the imperishable, 
the unchangeable must also be that which lies at the basis 
of ererj thing changeable, a conriction, which is most clearl; 
expressed hj calling the Principle of all Being the Ätman, 
that is, the Sel£ We reach it as, in the manner described 
aboTe p. 68, and in note 29, we gradually separate from our 
"I" eTerything which is "not-I," hence not only the outer 
world, the body and its organs, but also the whole apparatus 
of Buddhi or intellect (the indriyaa and the manat). What 
remains, should consequently be spoken of only as uncoascious; 
but they conld not go so &r, without remoring the whole 
phenomenon from the region of perceptibility. Conscionsness, 
therefore, in which all this process of elimioatiou proceeds, 
was left as the terminus, so that not only was the necessity 
avoided of abandoning, along with the organs of perception, 
their function also, — perception, — but also the reiy noteworthy 
objections of the adversaTy, which we shall presently detail, 
were set at defiance. 

Many times, as Qankara says in the passage, with which 
we are concerned, intellect is ascribed to the Principle of 
world-creation in the Teda. So when it is said: "Be designed 
(aik^uttä): I will become many, I will procreate" (Chänd. 6, 
S, 3); — "He designed: I will create worlds" (Ait 1, 1, 1); — 
"He formed the design, then he created Breath" (Prafna 6, 
3. 4); — "fie who knows all, nnderetands all" etc. (Muq4- X> 
1, 9). — From this it follows that we must ascribe to the Brah- 
man omniscience, absolute, unlimited knowledge, that, as a 
later passage (3, 3, 16) explains. Brahman is pure spirituality 
(eaitanyam) and this alone. — Against Üiese arguments the 
Sänkhyas raise the following objections: 

First Objection: An eternal cognition in Brahman would 
take away the freedom of Brahman with reference to the 
action of cognition (p. 93, 1). — To this Qankara replies: to 
begin with, it is to be held that ooly an eternal actual, and 
not a potential, cognition (such as the Sünkhyas ascribe to 
the ttUtva-guna of their primordial matter) satisfies the demands 

136 Fint Part: Theology or the Doetrine of Brahman. 

ol onmiscience.'^ A cognition of this kind does not take away 
the freedom of Brahman; for in the case of the son also, 
although it continually gives forth heat and light, we saj *it 
warms," ''it shines" and thereby indicate that it does this of 
itself^ of its own accord [p. 95, 16; that is to say: the follow- 
ing oat of the law of its own nature does not take away the 
freedom of a being]. 

Second Objection: a cognition is only possible, if there 
is also an object of perception (karmanj literally ''a product,^ 
in contrast to karanamj organ), which was not Üie case before 
the creation (p. 96, 1). — Answer: as the sun also shines, when 
there is nothing for it to shine on, so Brahman might know 
without having an object of cognition (ct p. 649, 10). Yet one 
existed, even before the creation. What is this pre-cosmic ob- 
ject? — It is (p. 96, 6) ^ the Names and Forms which are neither 
''to be defined as beiogs nor as the opposite, which are not 
" evolved, but striving towards evolution (avyakrite, vyacUdrshite), 
"the Names and Forms" of the world [which as the words 
of the Veda, as we saw above p. 71, hovered before the spirit 
of the Creator before the creation]. 

Third Objection: Cognition cannot proceed without 
organs of perception, body, senses, etc. (p. 93, 4 96, 11). — 
Answer: because cognition inheres in Brahman, as shining in 
the sun, as an eternal law of its nature, it requires no organs 
to this end, like the individual soul (p. 97, 1 ), which, as is 
provisionally set forth on p. 98, is nothing but the Brahman 
itself, limited by the Upädhis like the body etc., and there* 
fore only separate from the Brahman from the standpoint of 
Ignorance (cf. above p. 68 ff.). The individual soul (p. 100 — 101) 
is the Self of Brahman, and the Brahman is the Self of the 
individual soul; for of Brahman it is said: (Chand. 6, 3, S) "this 
"divinity designed: good! I will enter into these three divinities 
"[Fire, Water, Earth] with this living self!" and again it is 
said (Chand. 6, 8, 7): "whose being is this universe, that is the 

71 p. 95, 10. The passage seems corrapt; it would be a help if ve 
might read: katham nitya-jnana'akriycUve atarvqfnatva'hämrt by which 
what follows becomes consistent. 

IX. The Brmhman in iuelf. 137 

"RAal, that is the soul (the Self), that art tbon, o Qveta- 
"keta!"— That Self means the own nature; a spiritnal pover, 
like the indindaal soul, cannot hare an nnspiritual as its 
own nature (p. 100, IB. 104, 9).—0a this groond, which for oar 
authors is unassailable, they take their stand further on, when, 
to prore the spirituality of the Existent or the G-odhead, they 
refer to two phenomena, that of liberatioa, and that of 
dreamless sleep. Liberation is a return into Brahman 
(p. 102, 8); and from another point of riew it is only a com- 
ing to conscioasneas of one's own Self (p. 103, 7), it follows, 
therefore, that Brahman is simply this Self, aod therefore 
spiritoaL As Liberation is an eternal union with the Existent, 
that is, with Brahman, the cause of the world, so deep, dream- 
less sleep according to the scripture (Chänd. 6, 6, 1) is a tem- 
porary union with the Existent (p. 109, 3); the word "he 
sleeps" (avapüi) means, howerer, "he has entered into himself" 
(n>am apita); a spiritual power, like the individual soul, can- 
not enter into an nnspiritual as into its own self (p. 108, 10). 

5. Brahman as Bliss. 
Sfttnm 1, 1, 13-19; cf. 3, 8, 11-13. 

Brahman is the inmost essence of man. — This thought is 
exhibited in the second part of the Taittiriya Upanishad by 
the theory (which plays a targe part in the later Vedäntasära, 
but not yet in Bädaräyapa and Qankara) of the different 
corerings ifcofa), by which our Self is sorrounded, and through 
which we must break, in order to reach the inmost essence 
of our nature, and thereby the Brahman. 

After Taitt 2, 1 has briefly explained, bow from the Ätman 
the ether proceeded, from this the wind, from this the fire, 
from this the waters, from these the earth, from this plants, 
from these food, from this seed, from this man, and further 
it is said: this man consists of food (annaroBamaya), in this 
self of food indwells, another, filling it, the Self of breath 
I pränamaya), in this again the self of understanding (matio- 
maya), in this the self of intellect (vijaäitamaya), in this 
lastly, as inmost, the self of bliss {änandamaya). For each 
of these fire sheath-like selfea, indwelling one in the other, 

138 Fint Part: Theology or the Doctrine of Brmhmaa. 

are distinguished and specified (perhaps while the form of a 
bird is present to the thought) the head, the right and left 
sides (irings), the body, and ^the support (literally: the tail), 
the base." In the case of the self of food, these parts are 
formed by the parts of the body, in the case of the self of 
breath, by the yital spirits with the ether (in the heart) and 
the earth, for the self of understanding by the four Vedas 
and the Upanishads (ßdega)^ for the self of intellect by faith, 
truth, right, piety (yoga) and lordship; for the self of bliss it 
is said finally: <*LoTe [literallj: what is dear] is his head, joy 
^ his right side, rejoicing his left side, bliss his bodj, Brahman 
^his support, his base" (Taitt 2, 5). 

In this passage, according to Bädarä7a9a's Sutras and the 
accompanying interpretation, by the ''self of bliss" we are to 
understand Brahman; as is prored p. 116 from the connection 
of the passage, and from the frequent description of Brahman 
as bliss in the Taitt up. and elsewhere (Brih. 3, 9, S8), and 
finally, because it is spoken of as the innermost of alL The 
word ''of bliss" do not here mean "made of bliss,'' but in- 
dicate only the fulness of the bliss of Brahman (1, 1, 13 p. 117> 
which is the source of all bliss (1, 1, 14 p. 118). Neither the 
individual soul (1, 1, 16—17 p. 119—120) nor the primordial 
matter of the Sankhyas (1, 1, 18 p. 121) can be understood 
here, from the connection of the whole; moreover the union 
of the individual soul with the being "of bliss" is required 
(1, 1, 19, p. 121—122) in the words of Taitt up. 2, 7: «For 
"when one finds his resting-place and peace in this invisible. 
"bodiless, ineffable, unfathomable [literally: baseless], then he 
"has entered into peace; but if on the contrary, he assumes 
"a hollow in this [as in the four others] — [Commentary: if he 
"makes a difference between himself and this], then has he 
"unrest; it is the unrest of him, who thinks himself wise." 

But in direct contradiction to this interpretation, (which 
is to be applied when the subject is resumed 3, 3, 11 — 13) 
another explanation of the Upanishad passage is introduced 
at the end of our extract by the words: "Here, however, tlie 
following is to be noted," (p. 122, 9) explaining that the inter- 
pretation of -maya as "consisting of" and then as "having 


IX The Bnhtnui in ilMlf. 139 

the fnloess," is as mconseqnent as if one bad only half-digested 
his food,'^ and then, entering into the discussion, declares that 
it is not by the "self of bliss" that Brahman is to be under- 
stood, but only by that which is indicated as "its support, its 
basis;" the self of bliss is not yet the kernel, but only the 
inmost shell, of which, therefore, ire should hare counted not 
four but five (p. 123, 10 : annamaya^aya' änandamaya'paryatt- 
läh paüca kogäh kalpyante). In conclusion, the representative 
of this opinion gives an explanation — extremely forced — of the 
s&tras in his sense. 

As both interpretations agree in recognising Bliss (änanda) 
as the being of Brahman, this difTerence is of no particular 
consequence for our purpose. But it is interesting for the 
literary character of our work, as well as for the history of 
the Yedfijita, that here in Qankara's commentary two opinions 
stand side by side, of which, as it seems to us, the former 
alone corresponds to the text of the Upanisbads and Bäda- 
rüyaoa's Sdtras, while on the side of the latter are ranged 
the Commentary to the Taittiriya-Upanishad, which goes under 
gankara's name, as well #s the Vedäntasära, which likewise 
interprets the self of bliss as only a shell (Yedäntaaära, § 66, 
ed. BoahtL) and thus cooots fire shells on which, in com- 
bination with the three Gnuas of the Sänkhya Philosophy, 
the whole of its psychology is built up. 

Either tha latter interpretation is due to a later inter- 
polator, not to Qankara, in which case the Commentary to 
the Taittiriya-Upanishad also must not be attributed to him 
Cef. in it p. 36, 14 mshumnä, and above note 8); — or it is 
Qankara's: in the latter case, we may suppose that he copied 
the first interpretation given to the separate Sutras from an 
earlier commentator (a possibility, which would be of great 
importance for the character of his whole work, cf. notes 17. 46), 
or we can also suppose, that Qankara disagrees with Bäda- 

'1 p. 133, 13: arddha-jaratXya-ny&yma; limilwl; p. 176, U: na tatra 
arddMa-jaratij/atti (with thU retding) loMyam. DiflerenUy bdiI very 
i^Airel; Govind« eipUins the Utter pu»ge: arddham, ntvkhamitram, 
joratyA «riddUi/ili kämaifate, na afig&ni, tti, m 'yam arddkajaratiya- 

140 First Fart: Theology or the Doctrine of Brahman. 

r&jEQa here, that he therefore interprets the Sutras first in 
Bädaräyaxia's sense, and then rejects this interpretation, in 
order to give another in its place in the sense of which he 
finally interprets the Sutras as the standard authoritj of the 
school, consciously changing their original meaning. 

6. Brahman as Free from all Etü. 

Sütram 1, 1, 20—21. 

As is well known, the hymns of the Samaveda, with but 
few exceptions (above p. 5) rest on those of the Rigveda. 
The composer of the Chändogya-Upanishad (which belongs to 
the Samaveda) takes advantage of this circumstance, to show 
how, in the provinces of cosmology and psychology, certain 
phenomena rest on others, while on the contrary Brahman« 
which is symbolically represented as the man in the sun and 
the man in the eye, is raised above everything else, and free 
from all evil. 

As the Säman rests on the Bic (so is explained Ghand. 
1, 6), so fire rests on earth, wind on atmosphere, the moon 
on the stars, on the clear light of the sun rests the black, 
very dark in it (which, according to the scholiast, is seen by 
looking very intently at the sun; possibly: the sun-spots are 
to be understood?). <*But the golden man (pumsha) who is 
'^seen in the interior of the sun with golden beard and golden 
''hair, to the tips of his nails all golden, — his eyes are like 
''the flowers of the Kapyasa-lotus, his name is '^high" (ud). 
"for high above all evil is he; he raises himself high above 
"all evil, who thus knows;— his songs (? geshnau) are Ric and 
"Saman, therefore [it is said] the high-song (udrgiiha)^ there- 
"fore also the high-singer (ud-^ätar\ for he is his singer; the 
"worlds, which lie upwards from the [sun], — over these he 
"rules, and over the wishes of the gods." 

What is here set forth in the province of cosmology 
{adhidaivatam), is then developed in that of psychology ((tdhyat- 
mam). As the Säman rests on the Bic, so rests breath on 
speech, the image (cUman) on the eye, understanding on the 
ear, the black, very dark on the bright appearance in the 
eye. "But the man who is seen in the interior of the eye. 

IX. The Bnlimui in itMlf. 141 

" be is this Ric, this Säman, this praise, this sacnficiat sentence, 
" ibis prater (brahnum). The fonn which the former has, this 
"also has the latter, the songs of the former are his songs, 
"the name of the former is his name; the worlds which lie 
"beoeath him, — OTer these he rules, and orer the wishes of 
"men. Therefore those who sing here to the lute, sing him, 
"therefore good is their lot" 

Here, explains Qankara, we most by no means anderstand 
by the man in the sun and in the eye, an individnal soul 
raised throagh knowledge and works (p. 130, 3), but Brahman; 
for when form and position are attributed to him (p. 130, 6. 9), 
and the boundaries of bis might are spoken of (p. 130, 13), all 
this happens only for the sake of worship (p. 133, 10. 13. 16), 
since «e are dealing here with the attribute-possessing Brah- 
man, not with the attribute-&ee (p. 133, 7), Of Brahman alone 
it can be said that he is "high above all eril" (p, 131, 10), 
and that he, the alUanimating, is indicated as the snbject of 
spiritoat as well as of secular songs (p. 132, 1. 8). For of him 
it is said in the Bhagavadgitä (10, 41): 

■All that haa might and beaut;, vital force, 
'Know thon that of m; power 'tie a part" 
We most distinguish between this sun>puruaba and the in- 
dividual soul embodied in the sun (p. 134, 2; cf. above p. 66); i 
for thus says the scripture: (Brih. 3, 7, 9) "He who, dwelling ' 
■'in the snn, is different from the sun, whom the sun knows 
" DOt, whose body is the sun, who rules the sun within, — he is 
" thy soul, thine inner ruler, the immortal" 

7. Brahman as Free from Causality and Affliction. 

Sütram 8, 3, 35—36. 

Jost as Kant declares theoretical speculation insufficient, 
and turns the human soul with its demands away from specn- 
lation back to the practical way, so already did Tdjiiawdkya, in 
a highly remarkable passage in the Bfibadäranyaka Upanishad 
3. 4 — 6, the consideration of which we shall transfer from 
3, 3, 35 — 36 into the present connection. 

(Brib. 3, 4:) "Then asked him Ushasta, the descendant of 
»Calcra. 'Y^naval^a,' said he, 'the immanent, non-transcen- 

142 First Part: Theology or the Doetrine of Brahman. 

^ «dent Brahman, which as soul is innermost of all, that shall 
" «thoa declare to me.' — 'It is thy soul, which is innermost of 
" 'alL'—* Which, o Yäjnavalkya, is innermost of all?'— 'That 
"'which inbreathes by inbreath that is thj soul, the inner- 
'"most of all, that which outbreathes bj outbreath that is 
" 'thy soul, the innermost of all, that which interbreathes by 
" 'interbreath that is thy soul, the innermost of all, that which 
"'upbreathes by upbreath that is thy soul, the innermost of 
"'all,— this is thy soul, which is innermost of alL' — Then said 
"Ushasta, the descendant of Cakra: 'It is only indicated by 
"'this, as when one says: that is a cow, that is a horse; but 
" 'the immanent, non-transcendent Brahman, the soul, which is 
"'innermost of all, that shalt thou declare to me!' — 'It is thy 
"'soul which is innermost of all.' — 'Which, o YajnaTalkya, is 
"'innermost of all?'— 'Thou canst not see the seer of seeing. 
" 'nor canst thou hear the hearer of hearing, nor canst thon 
"'understand the understander of understanding, nor canst 
" 'thou know the knower of knowing. He is thy soul, which 
*" 'is innermost of all. — What is different from him is afi&icted.* 
" — Then Ushasta, the descendant of Cakra, was silent." 

(Brih. 3, 5:) "Then asked him Eahola, the descendant of 
"Eushitaka. 'Yajnavalkya,' said he, 'even that immanent 
"'non-transcendent Brahman, which as soul is innermost of 
"'all, that shalt thou declare to me.' — 'It is thy soul which 
"'is innermost of all.'— 'Which, o Yajnavalkya, is innermost 
"'of all' — 'That which oyercomes hunger and thirst, affliction 
" 'and madness, age and death.— Truly, after they have foxmd 
"'[Qank.: recognised] this soul, the Brahmans cease from long- 
" 'ing after children, and longing after possession, and longing 
" 'after the world, and wander about as beggars. For the 
"'longing after children is a longing after possessions, and 
" 'the longing after possessions is a longing after the world: 
"'for both are mere longings. — Therefore after the Brahman 
"'has put off his erudition, let him abide in childlike sim- 
"'plicity; and after he has put off both his learned and his 
"'childlike estate, then he becomes a silent one (Muniy^ after 
" 'he has put off keeping silence and not keeping silence, then 
"'he becomes a Brähma9a. — By what does this Br&hmaoa 

IX. The Brahmui in itMlf. 143 

"■lire? — By whaterer it may be, by that he lires. — WhatäTer 
" 'is different from him is afflicted.'— Then Kahola, the descen- 
" dant of Eashitaka, was silent" 

Qankara's remarks on this passage are limited to showing 
that both extracts belong to the unity of the same Vidja 
(cf. above p. 99), which appears from the beginnings and 
eodingB containing the same words (p. 933, 14), from the use 
of the particle eva "even" (p. 923, 16) as introductory con- 
junction of the second piece, as also from the fact that in 
both cases the inner soul is treated of (p. 922, 7), as there 
are not two inner souls, but one (p. 922, 9). The repetition 
is due to the difference of the instruction (p. 923, 7): the first 
time the Ätman is depicted as lying beyond cause and effect 
ikarya-kStrana-vyatirikta), the second time as overcoming 
hunger and the other qualities of Saipsära (ofanät/ä-ädi-satn- 
sära-dharma-atUa) (p. 924, 2. 3). 

That the two extracts make up a harmonious whole is 
evident from their parallel construction; moreover a com- 
parison of them may teach ns whether, with our recollections 
of Kant, «e have rightly hit the central thought The Brah- 
man, BO teaches the first extract ^ theoretically unknow- 
able: for because, in all knowing, it is the knovnng subject, 
it can never be an object of knowledge for us. To the mind 
«hieb, not resting content with thü, puts forward the same 
questioD anew, it is, in the second extract, pointed out that 
Brahman is to be grasped practically. This happens as 
one raises oneself step by step from the estate of erudition 
(pdndityam) to that of childlike simplicity (bäiyam, c£ Matth. 
18, 3). from this to the state of the Muni, from this to that 
of the Bräkmana [in its emphatic meaning, as Brih. 3, 8, 10. 
Chand. 4, 1, 7], who renounces family, possessions and worldly 
pleasure, because these are different from the Brahman, and 
therefore subject to afBiction. 

Touching the nature of the steps mentioned, and especially 
the meaning of B&lyam one may compare the investigations 
in 3, 4, 47—60 (p. 1034—1041), from which we take only the 
foUovring beantiM passage of Smriti (p. 1041, 8): 

i 44 First Fart : Theology or the Doctrine of Brahman. 

**Whom no one knows as high nor lowly bom, 

''No one as erudite nor yet not erudite, 

*'No one as of good deeds nor evil deeds, 

^'He is a Brahmans, in very truth! 

**GiYen up to hidden duties well fulfilled, 

"In secrecy let all his life be spent; 

''As he were blind and deaf, of sense bereft, 

"Thus let the truly wise pass through the world«'* 

X. The Brahman as Cosmic Principle. 

1. The Brahman as Creator of the World. 

Ths creative actiTity of the Brahman is one of the fun- 
damental ideas concerning it, which recurs in most of the 
V'edic texts to he considered. We here discuss only a few 
passages, which cannot conveniently be introduced elsewhere 
and refer for further informatioD to the texts as well as to 
our cosmological section (chaps. XYI, XVII). The passages 
in question teach us to know the Brahman from two sides: 
(a) as that which conditions the spatial extension of heings \ 
(Brahman as Äkä^, that is, "Ether" or "Space" of which/ 
later), — (h) as that which fills and animates the spatially ex- 
tended (Brahman aa Präna, that is, "Breath" or "Life"), 
(m) Tbe Brfthman m lUfa. SCttram I, 1, 29 ind 1, 3, 41. 

1. In the Ch&ndogja-Up. 1, 8—9- there is a dialogue between 
tbre« men, in which is iuTestigated tbe point of departure 
(gati), of the Säman (song). The Säman, so it is said in the 
course of the dialogue, goes back to the Tone, the Tone to 
Breath, Breath to Food, Food to Water, Water to tbe celestial 
world, which has, however, as its hasis the terrestrial world. 
Bot the terrestrial world also is finite, and goes hack to the 
Ether (or space). 

"Kow it is the Ether from which all these beings arise, 
"and into which they return; the Ether is older than them 
"all, the Ether is Uie highest goal. This most excellent of 
"all is the üdgttha [song of the Säman], it is tbe endless." 

Even though, QaSkara remarks on 1, 1, 22, it would be 

most natural in the case of the word Ether to think of the 

so-called element, yet what is said here of tbe Ether cannot 

apply to the element, but only to the Brahman (p. 136, 6). 

-. 10 

146 Fint Part: Theology or the Doetrine of BrakmaiL 

For even if the other beings (elements) have arisen directly 
and immediately from the ether-element, yet it is said here 
that ''all beings/' therefore the ether also, arose from, and 
return to that which is here, as frequently in the scripture, 
symbolically called the Ether, that is the Brahman (p. 136, 9). 
Moreover this only could be meant by the oldest (p. 136, 11). 
according to the Scripture (Chänd. 3, 14, 3) which calls it 
''older (greater) than the earth, older than the atmosphere, 
''older than heaven, older than all these worlds;" and only 
the Brahman can be the highest goal (p. 136, 14), according 
to the words (Brih. 3, 9, 28, where Qankara, with the Madhyan* 
dinas, reads räter): 

"Brahman ii bliss and knowledge, the highest aim of the sacrifioer 

''And of him who desists and knows.** 

2. Towards the end of the Chändogya-Üp. (8, 14) there is 
found a remarkable saying (perhaps a blessing for the depart* 
ing pupil), which runs thus: "The Ether it is, which extends 
''Kames and Forms; that in which these two are [or: that 
"which is in these two], that is the Brahman, that is the im- 
" mortal, that is the souL I go forth to the hall of the lord 
"of creation, to his house [I enter the world]; I am the gloiy 
"of Brahmans, the glory of warriors, the glory of cultiyators; 
"to glory following after have I come; let me the glory of 
"glories not enter into the grey, the toothless, the toothless, 
"the gray, the slimy [into the womb for a re-birth; or: into 
"grey old age?]." 

In this passage also, according to Qankara on 1, 3, 41« by 
the Ether is to be understood the Brahman, chiefly because 
it is distinguished from Names and Forms,'' which embrace 
everything created, everjrthing that is not Brahman itself 
(p. 329, 7). 

(h) The Brahman as Frdna. Sütram 1, 1, 28. 

Between the two great Upanishads, Brihadarapyaka, which 
serves as text-book for the students of the (white) Yajurreda. 

7S p. 329, 5 antard ** different," as at p. 454, 12, where it is explained 
by anjfat while the Commentator on Ghand. and according to all appear* 
anoes also Bädarayana 1, 3, 41 understand it as ''inside." 

X The finhmaa m Gonaie Principle. 147 

and diändogra, which serres for the students of the Säma- 
Teda, are to be obeerred many, often verbal agreements, but, 
side by side with these, certain traces of a thorough-going 
polemic, which is shown, among other things, by the fact that 
teachers, who appear in the one Upanisbad as the highest 
aathorities, occupy only a subordinate position in the other. 
Thus, for example, Ushasta, the descendant of Cakra, whose 
doctrine in Brih. 3, 4 is subordinate to that of Yajnavalkya 
(c£. above p. 141), while, in Chand. 1, 10 — 11, under the name of 
Uahasti ^* it is true, he plays the leading role. In the legend, 
which is here recounted of him, he appears as completely 
deatitate, and yet, notwithstanding his poverty, proud, since 
he begs food from a rich man, but refuses the drink offered 
with it, because he can get water to drink without begging. 
It is further related of bim how he betakes himself to a 
sacrifice, and embarrasses the priests who have been engaged 
for it by bis questions. The king, who is offering the sacrifice, 
notices him, and, after hearing his name, transfers to him the 
functions of the other priests. Now it is their turn to 
examine üshasti, and the first question in this colloquy runs 
thos: "Which is the Godhead to which the Prastäva (the 
"introduction to the song of the Säman) refers?" — To this 
Ushasti answers (Cbänd. 1, 11, 5): 

"It is the Life (or the Breath, prona); for all these beings 
"enter into Life, and to Life (prdnam, probably better: prdndd, 
"from Life) do they arise." 

Here, according to Qankara, we must not, by Life, ander- 
stand the rital force, into which, according to Qatap. 10, 3, 3, 6, 
the organs enter in sleep, and from which, on awaking, they 
are bom again, but Brahman, because according to the words 
of the text not only the organs, but all beings arise from it 
and return to it again (p. 140, 10); and if it be objected that 
I'shaati's other two answers, as which "the Sun" and "Food** 
foUow, cannot apply to Brahman (p. 139, 13), it may be answered 
that this is not at all necessary (p. 141, S). 

'* (aOkan calls him Vahaiti alto in quoting Brih. 3, 4 (p. 9Sa, 3). 

148 First Part: Theology or the Doctrine of Brahman. 

2. The Brahman as World-ruler. 

(a) Sütram 1, 3, 39. 
In the Käthaka-XJpanishad (6, 1) the world is likened to 
an inverted A(vattha (ficus religiosa) whose one root is abore 
(Brahman), and whose manifold branches are below (the be- 
ings of the world). Thus Brahman is indicated as the Essence 
of the üniverse, on which all worlds rest, and which pene- 
trates and rules them as the Breath of Life (präna): 

^'The root above, the branch below, 
"This fig-tree stands from ancient days:— 
**This is the pure, the firahman this, 
''And this is the Immortal called. 
"This is the resting-place of worlds, 
"By none can this be e'er surpassed. 
««This [world] is truly that [the Brahman]! 

''This is the Life in which the world, 
** Which sprung from it, moves tremblingly, 
''Fearful is this, a threatening flash, 
"Who knows this, his is immortality. 

"From fear of this bums the Fire, from fear of this the Sun, 

" From fear of this run Indra and Vayu, and Death the fifth of tham.*^ 

In this passage, says Qankara, by Life (or Breath, präna) 
we are to understand, not the fivefold Vital-breath (Cfau^ 
XXYII, 4) or the wind, but Brahman, as is clear from the 
context (p. 324, 7). To this alone can apply the passage about 
the trembling of the whole world (p. 326, 2) as also what is 
said of the lightning-flash; ^for just as a man thinks: *the 
"* 'threatening lightning-flash could strike my head if I did not 
^'fulfil his [Indra's?] bidding;' and impelled by this [and 
^similar] fear performs the command of a king etc., so the 
"whole world, fire, wind, sun etc., from fear?* of Brahman« 
''necessarily perform the duties which are assigned to them'' 
(p. 325, 11). Moreover, proceeds Qankara, it is only the know* 
ledge of Brahman, through which immortality is ours (p. 326, 2\ 
for thus says the Scripture (Qvet. 3, 8 — ^ Y&j. S. 31, 18; ctlTaitt. 
Ar. 3, 13, 1): 

7» Cf. Psalm 104, 7 and Heraclitus': 'iJ>aoc 06^ 6icspßi^otTat |A><Tp«, t( 
li {JL^, '£ptv6tc (Aiv MxTfi iic(xoupoi i^supi^oouetv. 

X The Bnhnian u OoiiDic Principle. 149 

"Tbo knowflth him, lutUi triiuDph«d over dekth, 
"And he who leeki thii goti, thii pkth muit tntd." 
As the last words show, hj immortalitr (amrttatvam), in 
the case of the Indians, we are not so much to imderstaad 
the western idea of on indestructibility by death, but rather 
a liberation &om the necessity of dying again and again. 

(b) Sütrun 1,3, 18^30. 

In the Brihadära^yaka-tIpaniBhad T^fiavalkya is asked 
by UddäWca the sod of Amna (the father and teacher of 
Qvetaketu in Cbänd. VI, cf. Chap. XX, 2) concerning "the 
"inner rnler (antarydmin), which inwardly rules this world, 
" and the other world, and all beings," and thereupon answers 
(Brih. 3, 7, 3): 

*'He who, dwelling in the earth, is difierent from the earth, 
"whom the earth knows not, whose body is the earth, who 
"inwardly roles the earth, this is thy soul, thine inner ruler, 
"the immortal." 

What is said here of the earth, is further, by a stereo- 
typed repetition of the same formula, transferred to water, 
fire, the atmosphere, the wind, sk^, the sun, the cardinal points, 
moon and stars, the ether, darkness, light; then to all beings; 
then to breath, speech, the eye, the ear, the mind, the skin, 
knowledge [accor^g to the Känvo; "the self" according to 
the Määhyandina-BAceTiaioa] and seed. — In conclusion it is 
said (3, 7, S3): 

"He is seeing, not seen, hearing, not heard, understanding, 
" not understood, knowing, not known; outside him there is none 
'that sees, that hears, that understands, that knows; he is thy 
'soul, thy inner ruler, thy immortal; — what is different &om 
■him, is afBicted." 

Here, as Qankara shows, by the "inner ruler" the highest 
Atman is to be understood; for it is his quality to rule all 
Üiat exists from within; he has the power to do this, because 
he is, the cause of all that exists (p. 195, 13); and in this he 
makes nse of the organs of the beings in question (p, 196, 7). 
That he is different from beings, is evident from the fact 
that these beings do not know him; for the said beings know 

150 First Fart: Theology or the Doctrine of Brahmaa. 

themselves, as, for example the deity earth knows: ^'I am the 
earth" (p. 196, 4). — We must not think of the primordial matter 
of the Sankhyas, because although it is true of this, that it is 
said to be ^not seen" eta, it is not true that it is ''seeing^ 
etc. (p. 197, 5). — Just as little can the individual soul be meant, 
because this is enumerated among the things ruled by it, in 
the passage, where the Känvas read ^knowledge," and the 
Madhyandinas ^'the self." Both mean the individual soul 
(p. 198, 7). Besides the difference between the Brahman and 
the individual soul is not, in the highest sense, real, bat only 
the work of Avidyä, which perceives the highest soul by means 
of the ascribed limitation (upddhi) as individual soul (p. 199, 5), 
and on which the separation of subject and object, the em- 
pirical means of knowledge, Saipsära and the Yedic Canon 
rest (p. 199, 9). In truth there is only one inner soul, and 
not two (p. 199, 7). 

3. Brahman as Destroyer of the World. 

Sütram 1, 2, 9—10. 

In the Kathaka-Upanishad it is said (2, 24—25): 

"Not he who ceases not from deeds of yiolence, 
"Nor he who has a restless, wandering mind, 
"Nor he who has not peace within his heart, 
"By knowledge can that highest Spirit gain. 
"To whom the priest and warrior are bread 
".Which he besprinkles with the sauce of death— 
"Who that hath done these deeds can find him out" 

Of the three objects, says Qankara, of ^hich the Käthaka- 
üpanishad treats, fire, the individual and the highest souL 
only the last can be understood here under that which con- 
sumes food. It is true that fire also consumes; it is also 
true that it is said of the individual soul (Mupc}* 3, 1, 1): 
''The one eats the sweet berry," and the following words 
''the other looks on, not eating," refer to the highest soul 
(cl on this below p. 171); but this is to be understood of 
the enjoyment of the fruit of works, which comes only to the 
individual, not to the highest soul (p. 178, 13). In our passage* 

Z. Tb« Bnhmko u Gosmie Principle. 161 

on the contrarj, it is a qaeation of the deTouring of all 
things movable [men and beasts] and immoTable [plants], for 
which priest and warrior, as the noblest, are quoted as ex- 
amples (p. 178, 11). This devoviring of all that lives, after it 
has been sprinkled with the condiment of death, belongs only 
to the Brahman in its character of Destroyer of the World 
(p. 178, 7). 

XL The Brahman as Cosmic and at the 
same time Psychic Principle. 

The Brahman is identical with the soul;— the power which 
creates and supports all the worlds, the eternal principle of 
all Being lives whole and undivided in each one of us. This 
doctrine of the Yedänta, great and worthy of admiration as 
it is (cf. St John 14, 20. GraL 4, 19. 3, 20), is expressed in a 
further series of Yedic texts cited by B&daräya^a, which we 
bring together in this chapter. 

1. Brahman as the very Small and very Great 

(a) Sütram ] , 2, 1—8. 

The section Chänd. 3, 14 (cf. Qatap. Br. 10, 6, 3) contains 
the much quoted "Doctrine of Qa^dilya" (Qändüya-Vidyä). 
which runs as follows: 

''Verily this universe is Brahman; as TajjalAn [in it be- 
" coming, ceasing, breathing] it is to be worshipped in silence." 

''Truly of Will (kratu) is man formed; according as his 
" will is in this world, after its likeness is bom the man, when 
"he has departed hence; therefore should a man strive after 
«[good] WüL"76 

"Spirit is its material, life is its body, light its form; 
"its resolye is truth, its self is endlessness [literally: the ether]; 

76 Eratu p. 168, 1 it explained by samkalpih dhyänam^ in the Com- 
mentary to Ghand. 3, 14, 1 by mfcaya^ adhyatHuäifa^ ameaia praJtyoffO, to 
Brih. 4, 4, 6 by adkyavaadya^ ntQcayo yad-anantarä kriyä pr av art ai e; cf. 
Bfih. 4, 4, 6: "Man it altogether formed of detire {k6ma)i according ai 
*'hit detire it, to it bis will (kratu), according at hit will it, to he doet 
"the work (ka$man\ according at he doet the work« to does it befall 

XL The BnHmui «i Coamic tnd »t the tune time Paychie Principle. 163 

" aU-worlÖDg is he, all-wishing, aU-smelliDg, all-tasticg, com- 
" preh ending the All, silent, ungrieTed: — this is m; soul (ätman) 
"in the innermoBt heart, smaller than a grain of rice, or of 
" barley, or of mustard-seed, or of millet, or a grain of millet's 
" kernel; — this is my soul in the innermost heart, greater than 
"the earth, greater than the atmosphere, greater than the 
"beaTen, greater than these worlds. — The all-worloDg, all-wish- 
"ing, all-smellisg, all -tasting, embracing the all, silent, un- 
" grieved, this is mj soul in the innermost heart, this is Brah- 
"man, into Him shall I enter on departing hence. — He who 
"has gained this, he, Teiilj, doubts do more." 
" Thus spoke Q&u^ilja. Qäp4il7a-'' 

In this passage, as Qankara at great length explains, the 
highest Atman is spoken of, as whose being the ether is men- 
tioned, because, like the ether. He is omnipreBent (p. 170, 12). 
Because He is the being of all, for this reason the qualities 
belonging to the individual soul, Spirit (manas), Life, etc. are 
ascribed to him (p. 171, 2), just as the Scripture says (Qvet 
4,3 — A. V. 10,8, 27): 

"The woman tbon trt, and the man, 

"The mftiden end the bof, 

"And born thoD groweit erer^where, 

"At old man on a ■taff." 

which refers to Brahman (p. 171, 3). For, so far as He is 
represented as possessing attributes (sagumm), such indiridual 
properties as wish, breath and the like can be ascribed to 
Him. while of the attributelesa Brahman it is said (in the 
passage quoted above p. 132) "the breathless, wisbless, pure" 
(p. 171, 7). Although in our passage it is said of Brahman 
that He is »3.B0 in the body, yet the individual soul is not 
therefore to be understood, for it is distinguished from Brah- 
man b; being only in the body (p. 172, 6). A distinction is 
pointed out between them in our passage by the words: "Into 
"Him shall I enter" (p, 172, 12), as also in the parallel passage 
Qatap. Br. 10, 6, 3, S, where in the words "thus lives this golden 
spirit in the ii|ner sonl " the highest soul stands in the nomi- 
native, the individual in the locative (p. 173, 6); as also in the 
Smriti passage Bhag. Q. 18, 61. Of course only the highest 

154 First Part: Theology or the Doctrine of Brahman. 

soul really exists, and only the ignorant conceive it as limited 
by Upadhis: body, senses, Manas, and Buddhi, that is, as the 
individual soul, just as space, in the vessels, limited through 
the Upadhis [of the sides of the vessels] is apparently different 
from cosmic space. Yet the illusion only endures until iden- 
tity with the highest soul is known by the sentence ^tat tvam 
asU^^ whereby the whole standpoint of practical life vnth bon- 
dage and liberation [destroying bondage] comes to an end 
(p. 173, 16). — The objection that the human heart is too narrow 
a dwelling for the highest soul, is not valid; what is in one 
particular place cannot be everywhere, but what is everywhere 
can also be in one particular place (cf. p. 1060, 2: the soul is 
God, but Grod is not the soul); he who is lord of the whole 
earth, is lord also of the city of Ayodhya (p. 174, 12). There- 
fore, as space is also in the eye of a needle, so is Brahman 
also in the heart (p* 175, 2), and is specially there pointed 
out, in order to concentrate attention upon Him; as Visluiia 
is in a Qälagräma stone (p. 174, 16; the same comparison also 
p. 188, 12. 253, 12; cf. 860, 10. 1058, 13. 1065, 12. 1059, 6). If 
anyone should here object, that Brahman, if He dwells in the 
different hearts, as parrots in different cages, must Himself 
be either manifold or divided, he may be reminded that the 
relations here spoken of have no reality in the highest sense 
(p. 175, 5). In this also lies the answer to the objection, that 
the Brahman, if He dwells in the heart, must also take part 
in pleasure and pain: this is precisely the difference between 
the individual and the highest soul, that the former is the 
doer of right and wrong, the enjoyer of pleasure and pain, 
(p. 176, 2), while the latter, on the contrary, is free from all 
evil, and although present when one suffers, has as little share 
in the suffering as space has in the burning, when bodies 
filling it burn (p. 176, 5). Certainly the scripture teaches the 
identity of the individual soul with Brahman, but for him who 
has perfectly, and not only half, understood this teaching, with 
the entrance into full knowledge, the enjoyments and suffer- 
ings of the individual soul also cease (p. 176, 12), since both 
rest only on a vain illusion (p. 177, 3). 

XI. Th« BnlnDan u Connie kod at the nioe time Piyehic Priociple. 165 

(b) Sütr»inl,3,24— 35. 
Id the Kätbaka-Üpanishad (4,12—13) it is eaid: 
* And in the niidit, a tbomb-breadth bigb, 
"The Spint (piirtuAa) in tbe body dtrelU, 
"Lord of the pMt, and what aball be, 
'Therefore no fear approacbet him, 
■Verily, thii ii that." 

"The Spirit (fmnuha), bot a thumb-breadth high, 
"la u a Qame de*oid of smoke, 
"Lord of the paat and what (ball be, 
"To-morrow even a* to-day. 
'Verily, thii ii that." 
Here, says Qaokara, where a certain measure is gireo, it 
voald certainly be simplest to think of the indindaal soul, of 
which the Smriti, (Mahäbh. 3, 16763) relates, that Yama (the 
god of death) "tore it forth, of the length of a thumh, by 
force from the body" of Satyavant (p. 276, 8); however, not 
it but Brahman is to be anderstood here, because it is said 
"the lord of all that was, and is to be," and also because of 
tlie words etad vai tad "verily, this is that" [occurring as a 
refrain, and with the same meaning as the recurring tat tvam 
asi in Ch&nd. YI], that is, this [the world, the soul] is that 
Brahman, of which thou hast asked me, in the words (Rath. 
2, 14): 

■Fhim good and evil free, free from «ffect and eaote, 
"IVom pait and future free, — that tell me, what it it." 
The Faramätman seems here limited, just as limitless space 
is, when anyone says: "the space in this tube is an etl long" 
(p. 277, 8); and this, because it is necessary to direct people's 
attention to it (p. 278, 1). It is true that the Spirit thumb- 
breadth high is first of all the indiTidnal soul, but it is pre- 
cisely the aim of the Yedänta to teach this, — on the one side, 
the being of Brahman, and, on the other, its identity with the 
indiridoal soul (p. 279, 2). The latter doctrine occurs in the 
Kätbaka-Upanishad, as is to be seen from its concluding words 
(6. 17): 

■A thomb-breadtb high, in tTWj cre«tnre'i heart, 
'The Spirit ever dwell« aa inner loal; 
"ThMi fimm tb« body draw it forth with care. 

156 EixBt Fart: Theology or the Doctrine of Brahmao. 

''As from the reed bank one draws forth a reed^ 
"This know thoa as the immortal, as the pnre/* 

(c) Sütram 1,2,24-82. 

To the attempt to transform the names and cult of the 
old Yedic nature-gods into the religion of Brahman, belongs 
the Doctrine of Ätman vaigvänara in Chändogya-Üp. 6, 11 — 24 
— Vaigvaimra '^who dwells in all men" is originally an epithet 
of Agni^ but here becomes a name of the all-animating Brah- 
man, and, in conformity with this, in the place of the fire- 
sacrifice {cLgnirhotram) offered to Agni and through him to the 
gods, stands a sacramental feeding of one's own body, in which 
Brahman dwells. 

Six rich and learned Brahmans are engaged on the question: 
^What is our soul, what is Brahman?" and go with it 
to king Afvapati, who, when he rises in the morning, can saj: 

''In all my kingdom not one thief, 

"None coyetoos, no drunkard dwells, 

''Not one who sacrifice or knowledge shnns, 

"And none who breaks the holy marriage tow." 

He begins to teach his guests, who ask him to impart to 
them the doctrine of Ätman vaifvänarüf by asking what thej 
imagine Ätman to be. The answers in order are, that Atwian 
is heaven, the sun, the wind, the ether, the water, the earth 
After the king has pointed out the insufficiency of these ideas 
of Ätman, since heaven is only its head, the sun its eye, the 
wind its breath, the ether its body, the water its beUy, the 
earth its feet, he says to all his six pupils : ** As individual as 
"it were (pfithag iva), ye all know the Ätman vai^vänara. 
"and eat your food; but he who knows this Atman thus,— ss 
"a span long, — and adores it as immeasurably great, "^ he eats 
"food in all worlds, in all beings, in all bodies." Then after 

77 Abhivimdna', as the different attempts at explanation p. 22^ 8 she«, 
the scholiasts themselves no longer knew what this word meant. The aboft 
explanation, suggested by the Petersburg Dictionary in accordance witi 
the etymology, is acceptable from the habit of the üpanishads to em- 
phasize the greatness side by side with the smallness of Brahman. Per> 
haps, as Weber suggests, we should read atwimäna. For a differsnt 
opinion cf. our Upanishads, p. 145 ff. 

XI. Tb« Bnbmui u Ooimio and kt th« ums time Piychio Prinaiple. 157 

the abore named diTisions of nature hare further been men- 
tiooed u parts of the Atman nnder myatica) names, as also 
the sacrificial bed, the sacnficial grass, and the three -sacrificial 
fires, there follows an interpretation which substitutes, for the 
cult of the fire-sacrifice, the feeding of the body as a sacrifice 
for the Atman; this feeding is divided into five oSTeringa, hj 
which the fire vital spirits, and through them the five organs 
of sense (the fifth is omitted), fire pairs of natnre-gods and 
natore-elenents, with all that lies under their sovereignty, and 
lastly the person of the offerer, are satiated. "He who, not 
" knowing this, ofiers the fire-sacrifice, with him is it as though 
"he had raked the coals away, and sacrificed in the ashes ■ 
"hot be who knowing this thus offers the fire-sacrifice [that 
"is, the snbstitnte mentioned], he has sacrificed in all worlds, 
"in all beings, in all bodies. As the pith of a rush, thrown 
'into the fire, bums away, go burn away all the sins of him, 
"who, knowing this, consommates the fire-sacrifice. And should 
"he who knows this give what remains over even to a Ca^däla, 
'he [asya, by the Commentator less suitably joined to ätmani 
' t-aipvdnarel would thereby have offered it in the Atman vaif- 
"rdnaro. This is said by the verse: 

"Ai hungry eliildrea roond their mother lit, 

*AU beings lit around the aacriGce." 
It is true, says Qankara, that the words ätman and vaif- 
vänara have many meanings. Vai^nara can mean fire, as 
in Rigv. X, 88, IS, or, as in Rigv. I, 98, 1, the Ood of fire, or, 
as in Brih. 6, 9, 1, the fire of digestion in the body; in the 
same way by Atman can be understood as well the individual 
as the highest soul (p. 211—212). Here only the latter is to 
be onderstood by Atman vai^änara, for the reason that to 
it only can apply the saying that heaven is its head, etc., and 
at the same time that it is the inner soul (p. 313, 1), and that 
the sins of him who knows it are bamt away (p. 213, 6); also 
it only is the subject of the question raised at the beginning 
fp. 813, 7). The fire-element cannot be thought of, because 
its being is limited to burning and lighting (p. 217, 4); nor 
the god of fire, because his power depends on that of the 
highest God (p. 317, 7). The fire of digestion also, as snch. 

158 First Fart: Theology or the Doctrine of Brahmui. 

cannot be meant, on account of the indication that heaven is 
its head (p. 216, 2), and because in the parallel passage Qatap. 
Br. 10, 6, 1, 11 the AUnan vaifvanara is termed ''the Purush: 
(spirit) in the inward part of the Puruaha (man),'' (p. 216, 6).— 
Therefore the highest Atman is to be understood here, whether 
in the quality or under the symbol of the fire of digestion 
(p. 215, 13. 217, 10), or, with Jaiminiy directly and without 
symbols. It is called Yaigv&nara, which means the same as 
Vigvänara^ like Rakshasa and Rakshas, Vayasa and Vayi^ 
(p. 219, 3), because He is common to all men, or all men are 
common to Him (p. 219, 1), in that He animates alL The 
Yedänta teachers are not at one as to why it is said to be 
''a span long;" Ägmarathya believes it is to indicate the heart 
as the place of the perception (p. 219, 11), Bddari^ because it 
is an object of memory for Manas, which dwells in the heart 
a span large (p. 220, 2); Jaimini, because it is true of it, that 
it is a span large, in that Qatap. Br. 10, 6, 1, 10—11 from the 
point of view of psychology (adhyättnam) compares its parts 
with those of the face, allegorically (p. 221, 1), as, lastly, the 
Jäbälas (Jäbäla-Up. 2, p. 438 ff., ed. Bibl. Ind.) give, as the 
dwelling place where it is enthroned, the point of union between 
the nose and eyebrows (p. 223, 1). 

(d) Sutram 1, 3, 14— 18. 

After the esoteric teaching has been put forward in the 
sixth and seventh parts of Chändogya-Üp., there follows, at 
the beginning of the eighth part, a kind of direction for the 
teacher, as to how he is to help pupils who hold the exoteric 
standpoint This is introduced by Qankara in his Commentary 
on Chändogya-Üp. with the following words: 

^'Even though Brahman has been recognised as free bom 
''spatial, temporal and other distinctions, in the sixth and 
^seventh lectures,, by the words: 'Being is it, One only and 
« 'without a Second,' (Chänd. 6, 2, 1)— *Soul only is all this 
« 'world* (Chand. 7, 25, 2), yet the intellect (huddhi) of the 
''slow spirits is such that it perceives Being as affected with 
^ differences of space etc., and cannot be brought immediatelf 
'^ to an intuition of the highest reality. Now as withoat knov* 

XL The Bnhinui ms Coimic uid it tha aame Urn« Faychio Principle. 159 

** ledge of Brahman the goal of man cannot be reached, there- 
** fore Brahman, in order to be known, must be Bpatiall; 
" pointed out in the lotus of the heart For even if the eeeence 
"of Ätman consists of Being, as it alone is object of the 
''perfect kuowtedge and without attributes, yet, because the 
** slow spirits demand that it shall be possessed of attributes, 
"it is to be taught with the attributes 'wishing truth' etc. 
" Further, eyen if the knowera of Brahman of themselves ab- 
" stain from objects of sensual enjoyment, as women etc., jet 
" the thirst (trishnä) caused by being addicted to sensuality in 
" different births cannot at once be converted, and therefore 
"the different means, such as life as Brahman pupils [in a 
'^ condition of chastity] etc., are to be applied. Further: if 
"even for those who know the unity of the Ätman, no goer, 
"or going, or object to which one goes, exists [cf. above p. 109], 
"and on the other hand, after the cause for the persistance 
" of a residuum of Ignorance etc. [in them] has been removed, 
" liberation is only an entering into one's own Self, like light- 
" ning in atmosphere, or the wind which has risen [cf. Chänd. 
"8, 12, 3, translated above p. 61], or the fire, when the wood 
"is burnt out, yet for those whose understanding is saturated 
"with ideas of goer, going etc., and who adore Brahman as 
"spatial in the heart, and possessed of attributes, a going to 
" Brahman through the carotid artery (mürdkanyä nädi) is to 
"be tanght To this end serves this eighth part For a 
"Brahman that is free from space, attributes, going, rewards, 
"and differences, in the highest sense Being and without a 
"second, seems to the slow spirits no more than non- Being. 
" Therefore the scripture thinks: let them first find themselves 
"on the path of 'the Existent,' then I shall gradually bring 
"tbem also to an understanding of 'the Existent' in the 
"highest sense." 

With these words, in which perhaps more clearly than any- 
where else, the motive of the exoteric teaching is disclosed, 
Qankara goes on to consider the following passage (Chan- 
dogya-Up. 8, 1): 

160 First Part: Theology or the Doctrine of Brahman. 

The Master speaks: 

^Here in this city of Brahman [the body] is a house, a 
^ small lotus-flower [the heart]; therein is a small space; what 
''is in this must be inyestigated, this, verily, should one seek 
'*to know." 

The Pupil speaks: 

^Here in this city of Brahman is a house, a small lotos* 
"flower; therein is a small space; what is then in this, that 
"must be investigated, that one should seek to know?** 

The Master speaks: 
"Verily, as great as the Universe, so great is this space 
"inwardly in the heart; in it both heaven and earth are in- 
"eluded; both fire' and wind, both sun and moon, the lightning 
"and the stars, and what is in the world, and what is not in 
"the world [past and future], all that is included therein.** 

The Papil speaks: 

" If all this is included in the city of Brahman, and all 
"beings and all wishes, — if now old age overtakes it, or cor- 
"ruption, what then remains over from it?" 

The Teacher speaks: 

"This in us ages not with old age; nor is it reached bj 
"weapons; it is the true city of Brahman, in it are the wishes 
"included; that is the Self (the soul), the sinless, free from 
"age, free from death, free from suffering, without hunger and 
"without thirst; its wish is true, true is its resolve.** 

"For just as mankind here below, as though by command. 
"aim at the goal, that each one strives after, whether it be 
"a kingdom or a field, and only live for that — [thus in striT- 
"ing after heavenly reward, are they also the slaves of their 
"wishes;] and just as here below the enjoyment, which has 
"been won by work, vanishes away, thus also in the Beyond 
"vanishes away the reward that is won by good works." 

"Therefore he who departs hence, without having knovn 
"the soul and those true wishes, in all worlds his part is a 
"life of unfreedom; but he who departs hence, after he 

XI. Tbe Brtbnum m Comic and »X the iftme tine Piychic I'rinoiple. 161 

"known the soul snd those true wishes, in all worlds his part 
"is a life of freedom." 

As the context of this passage shews, the Ignorant is called 
uofree, because he is dependent on his wishes. In contrast 
to this heteronom; stands the autonomy of him «ho knows. 
He is free, because he knows in himself the Ätman, which 
embraces the world, and with it the totality of all desires. 
Therefore, as is stated more folly in the sequel (Chänd. 8, S) 
the sage possesses and enjoys within himself the fulfilment of 
every wish. Should he long for intercourse with the departed, 
with fathers, mothers, brothers, sisters, friends, if his senses 
demand sweet savours and garlands, food and drink, song, 
niasic or women, — "whatsoever goal he longs for, whatever he 
"may wish, that arises for him at his wish, and becomes his 
''share, in which he rejoices." 

In contrast with the nothingness of all satisfactions brought 
to men from without, the wishes of him who has become con> 
scions of his "I" as the totality of all Being, are called "true" 
or "real" (satya). In reality this is true of all men, only that, 
with the exception of those who know, they are not conscioos 
of it, since their true wishes are "covered up" by untruth, 
that is, by the outer world and the pursuit of it, as is pro- 
foundly developed in the sequel. 

"These tme wishes are covered up by untruth, [in the 
"Ignorant]. They are there, in truth, but untruth covers 
"them over; and when one of his friends departs hence, the 
"man sees him no more. But [it is so in truth, that] all bis 
"friends, who are alive here, and those who have departed, 
"and whatever else he longs for and reaches not,— all this 
"he finds when he enters here [into his own heart]; for here 
"his true wishes are, which nntruth covered up. — But just as 
" he who knows not the place, finds not a hidden treasure of 
"gold, even though he should walk over it many times, so all 
"these creatures find not this world of Brahman, although 
"they daily enter it [in dreamless sleep]; for by untruth are 
"they forced away. — Truly this Ätman b in the heart! And 
"this is the interpretation of it: hridi ayam (in the heart is 
"he) therefore it is called Ufidayam (the heart). Verily, he 

162 Fint Part: Theology or the Doctrine of Brahmaa. 

''who knows this, daily enters into the heafenly world.— 
^ And what this perfect peace is (samprasäda), that rises from 
''this body, ascends to the highest light, and appears in own 
''form; that is the soul, — thus the Master spoke, — that is the 
* immortal, the fearless, that is Brahman." 

In what follows, Brahman is explained with reference to 
the name Satyam (the Heal) in its etymological meaning, as 
that which binds the mortal and immortal together; then again 
as the bridge (the boundary, setu) which keeps asunder the 
two: "The Atman is the bridge (the boundary), which keeps 
"these worlds asunder that they may not blend. This bridge 
"day and night trayerse not, nor old age, nor death, nor 
" sorrow, nor good work, nor evil work, all sins turn back from 
"it, for sinless is that world of Brahman. Therefore, rerily, 
" he who being blind has crossed over this bridge, regains his 
"sight, he who is maimed, becomes whole again, he who is 
"sick, becomes welL Therefore, verily, nighty when it passes 
"this bridge, changes into day, for, once and for all, this 
"world of Brahman is light" 

After this the different obligations of the Brahmans (sacri- 
fice, offerings, the great Soma festival, silence, fasts, life in a 
hermitage) receive a new etymological interpretation in the 
sense of the Brahmavidya which leads to Brahmaloka and 
the renunciation {hrahmacäryam * 8tri'Vi8liaya^trüiinä4yäga) 
connected with it, there follows at the end of the section the 
doctrine, indicated by Qankara in the introduction to the 
section as wholly propaedeutic, of the entering of the soul of 
him who dies as Saguna-vid (knowing exoterically) into Brah- 
man through the carotid artery and the sun, which are united 
by a sunbeam, as two cities by a road. Of this further in 
our last part (Chap. XXXLX, 2). 

It might be thought, so Qankara says in the Commentaiy 
to the Brahmasütras on this passage, that by the ^amall 
"space in the lotus of the heart," space properly so called is 
to be understood (p. 249, 12), or perhaps the indiridnal soul* 
because to it belongs the " city of Brahman," that is the body, 
since it has acquired this body through its works (in an eariier 
existence), (p. 260, 6), because the heart is commonly held to 

XI. Th« BrftbiDM) u Connio uid kt the tBme time Pijoliic Frincipl«. 163 

be the seat of Manat, which is a limitation of it (p. 260, 9), 
becaose it is called Qret 6, 8 "large as the point of an awl" 
(p. 860, 10), or because, what is in it is still distinguished 
from the space, that is, the highest soul is stiti different from 
the individual soul (p. S&O, 13). — But the natural space is not 
to be thought of here, because making the space in the heart 
eqairalent to cosmic space would not agree with this {p. 351, 
10), and just as little would it suit the indiTidual soul limited 
by Upädhis (p. 263, 8). On the contrary everythiog points to 
the fsLct that, by the small space in the heart, the highest 
soul, and nothing else, should be understood. The description 
of God as space (ether) is also found elsewhere (p. 868, 11), 
while it never occurs in the case of the tadividual soul (p. 268, 
13). It is true that God is also called "greater thau space" 
((^atap. Br. 10, 6, 3, 2), (p. 852, 4), hut here it was only intended 
to accentuate His greatness in the universe in contrast with 
His smallness in the heart (p. 26S, 6). Of Him alone can it 
rightly be said that he is sinless, without age, death, etc. 
(p. 262, 9), and the city of Brahman, the body, is, indeed, the 
dwelling in which he can be perceived (p. 353, 9), in which 
sense he is called (Pra<;na 5, 5. Brih. 3, 5, 18) the purusha 
puri^ya (p. 253, 10); with Him only, also, can truly be con- 
nected the promises, which, in our passage, are connected with 
a knowledge of Him (p. 264, 6). But concerning the subtle 
expression of the Opponent, that it is not the small space, 
but what is in it, that is enquired about, it is to be remarked 
that in it are in fact heaven and earth, hut that it is not 
about these, but precisely about the small space that the 
question is raised (p. 254, 14). To Brahman we are also 
potDted by the expression, that all beings enter day by day 
the world of Bridiman, to wit, in deep sleep; of whoever is in 
this condition it is said, even popularly: "he is with Brahman," 
is brakn^bhtHa, brahmatäm gata (p. 366, 6). The " world of 
Brahman" is not the world of Brahman the popular^ god 
{Ramaiäsana), hut "Brahman as the world," for only of the 
latter can it be said that it is entered day by day (p. 266, 
11). Also the term the bridge, which keeps asunder the world 
and its content, such as castes, Agramas, etc, that they may 

164 First Part: Theology or the Doctrioe of Brahman. 

not blend, suits Brahman only (p. 268, 1). (Oji the other hand, 
Perfect Peace (samprasMa) in our passage means, not the 
condition of deep sleep, but the individual soul when in that 
condition, and, thus, entering into the highest Brahman as 
into its own proper nature (p. 269, 6); but the indiridual 
soul, as already remarked, is not to be understood by space 
(p. 260, 1). 

2. Brahman as Joy (kam) and as Amplitude (kham), 

Sutra« 1, 2, 13-17. 

Not gloomy asceticism characterises the knower of Brah- 
man, but the joyous hopeful consciousness of unity with God. 
— This appears to be the fundamental thought of the Upako- 
sälavidyä in Ohand. 4, 10 — 16, which runs as follows: 

^ITpakosala, the son of Kamala, lived as pupil (brahma- 
^cärin) with Satyakama, the son of Jab&lä [cf. note 38]. 
^Twelye years had he tended for him the sacrificial fires; 
^then he dismissed the other pupils, but him he would not 
^dismiss. Then his wife said to him: *The pupil grieves; be 
^'has tended the fires well; look to it, that the fires do not 
^* speak to him instead of thee [Comm.: speak evil of thee], 
^ 'teach him the doctrine.' — But he would not teach it to him, 
** but set out on a journey. Then the pupil fell ill, and would 
^'not eat Then the teacher's wife said to him: 'Eat, pupil; 
^'why eatest thou not?' — But he said: 'Alas! In men there 
*"are so many desires! I am quite full of disease; I care 
^'not to eat'— Then the fires said among themselves: 'The 
*"pupil grieves, yet he has tended us well Come then! let 
'^'us teach him the doctrine!' — And they said to him: 'Brah- 
'"man is Life, Brahman is Joy, Brahman is Amplitude.' — 
"But he said: 'I know that Brahman is Life; but the Joy 
"'and the Amplitude know I not' — But they said: ^Yerilj, 
" 'the Amplitude is the Joy, and the Joy is the Amplitude.' 
"And they explained to him how Brahman was the Life and 
"wide space. 

"Then the fire, that is called Oärhapaiya, taught him: 
" ' The earth, fire, food, and the sun [are my forms]. Bat the 

XI. Th« Brkhmui u CoBmic und tt tbe Mine time Fijchie Priociple. 163 

" 'man who is seen in the sun, I am he, and he is V iChoms 
" of the Fires:] 'He who, knowing this, worships this [Fire], 
" * he pats sway eril deeds, he hecomes world-possessing, he 
" 'comes to fnll age, he lives long, his race fails not, him help 
*"we in this world and in the other world, who, knowing this 
" ' fire worshipB it,' 

*'Then the second fire, which is called Anvähäryapacana, 
"taught him: 'The water, the regions of tbe world, the stars 
" 'and the moon [are mj forms]. But the man who is seen 
" in the moon, I am he, and he is L' [Chorus of the Fires:] 
" 'He who, knowing this fire worships it,' etc., as before. 

"Then the third fire, which is called Ahavaniya, taught 
"him: 'Breath, the ether, lieaven, the lightning (&re my forms]. 
" ' Bat the man who is seen in the lightning, I am he, and he 
"'ig V [Choms of the Fires:] 'He who, knowing this fire 
"'worships it' etc^ as before. 

**And they said to him: 'Now knowest thou, üpakosala, 
" 'dear one, the doctrine about us, and the doctrine about the 
" 'Ätman. But the way to Him will the teacher point out 
"'to thee.' 

"Mow, his teacher when he returned, spoke thus to him: 
"'Upakosala!' — And he answered and said: 'Master!' — Bathe 
"said: 'Thy face shines, dear one, as the face of one who 
" 'knows Brahman. Who, then, has taught thee?' — And be 
"answered evasiTely: 'Who should teach me? Of a truth 
"'these here look as they do, and also differently;' thus he 
"spoke, pointing to the fires. — 'What have they said to thee, 
" 'dear one?' — And be answered him: 'Thus and thus.' — Then 
"the teacher said: 'They have only told thee its dwelling- 
" 'places; bat I will tell thee its own self; as the water clings 
"'not to the lotus-petal, so no evil deed clings to him who 
" 'knows this.' — And he said; 'Let the master teach it to me!' 
"And he said to him: 'The man who is seen in the eye, he 
"'is tbe Atman, said he, he is the immortal, the fearless, he 
" ' is Brahman. Therefore also, when grease or water comes 
■"into tbe eye, it flows off to the edges. Him they call lore's 
"'bvasuTfl, for he is a treasure of what is dear. He is a 
" ' treasore of what is dear, who knows this. He is also called 

166 Fint Fart: Theology or the Doctrine of Brahman. 

" *the prince of loye [literally: the herald of loTe], for all that 
"48 dear, he leads; he leads all that is dear, who knows this. 
** *He is also called the prince of radiance, for he is radiant 
'"in all worlds; in all worlds is he radiant, who knows this. 
"'Therefore [when such as these die], whether fimeral rites 
" 'are performed or not, they enter into a flame [of the funeral 
" <fire], from the flame into the day, from the day into the 
" * light half of the month, from the light half of the month 
"'into the half-year in which the sun goes northwards, from 
"'that half-year into the year, from the year into the snn, 
" 'from the sun into the moon, from the moon into the light- 
"'ning; — there is a man who is not as a human being; he 
"'leads them in to Brahman. That is the way of the Oods, 
" 'the way of Brahman. They who go that way, for them 
"'thus is no returning to the earth, no returning.'" 

In this narrative, so explains Qankara, by "the man who 
is seen in the eye," neither a form mirrored in the eye, nor 
the individual soul, nor the god of light, but the highest Brah- 
man is to be understood, for this only is, in a true sense, 
"the Atman," only this is "the immortal; the fearless," who is 
spoken of here (p. 187, 8). To Brahman only can refer the 
unstained purity, which is expressed by the grease and water 
flowing to the edges (p. 187, 10), as also the names "love's 
treasure," "love's herald," "prince of radiance" (p. 187, 12 £> 
We should not stumble at the fact that a place of Brahman 
is spoken of; this could only be objected to, if Brahman were 
said to be in this place only, and not, by other passages <rf 
scripture, in many other places as well (p. 188, 3). But as a 
matter of fact, to the end of the worship of the attribute- 
possessing Brahman, manifold places, names, and forms are 
ascribed to it, although it is in reality without attributes or 
any of these (p. 188, 10). This happens, in order to make it 
perceptible, like YishQU in a Q&lagräma stone (p. 188, 18). 
Also only in Brahman can be found the union of joy and 
amplitude. In the case of amplitude alone, it is traOi ws 
might think of space, as the symbol of Brahman (p. 189, 6), in 
the case of joy alone, of sensual pleasure (p. 189, 9), but in 
conjunction the two ideas mutually particularise each other 

XL The Brabmu m Coimie and tt the ttme time FejrohM Pritieiple. 167 

(Uara-itara^^hitau) and mean that Brahman irhich in its 
own natnre consists of pleasure (Miikham), (p. 189, 12). Also 
the fact that the fires sa; that they have not only explained 
the teaching about themselTeB, but also that about Ätman 
(p. 190, 6), BO that no sin attaches to him who knows this, as 
no water clings to the lotus>petal (p. 191, 1), can only apply 
to Brahman, the entering into whicl^ for him who has heard 
the Upanishad, by the way of the gods, is set forth at the 
conclusion (p. 191, 6). In our passage, the form mirrored in 
the eye cannot be understood, because it is not always in it 
(p. 193, I3X and precisely at the time of worship, is not there 
(p. 193, 16), and because according to Chänd. 8, 9, 3 it passeB 
away with the body (p. 193, 18); nor the individttal soal, either 
because it has its dwelling, not in the eye only, but in the 
whole body (p. 193, 3), because not it but the highest soul is 
"immortal and fearlesB," in that ignorance of it imposes mor- 
tali^ and fear (p. 193, 7), and because it does not possess 
lordship (aigvaryam), so that the names "lore's treasure," 
"lore's herald," "prince of radiance" cannot apply to it (p. 193, 
8); lastly it is aUo not the deity of the sun either although 
according to Brih. 6, 5, 3 it rests in the eye by means of the 
rays (p. 193, 9), because it is not the Ätman, bat an outer 
form (p. 193, 10), and because it is not immortal, for the im- 
mortally of the gods means only existence for a long time 
(p. 193, 13), just as their aigvari/am is not self-dependent, bat 
dcfiends on the Ifvara, through fear of whom they perform 
thair duties (p. 193, 14). 

3. Brahman as the Light beyond HeaTen and in the 


8&tru 1, 1, S4-S7. 

With strange allegorical embroidery the theme of the 

present chapter is treated in the section Oh&nd. 3, 18— 13, 

i^ch compares the world, the macrocosm, to the body as 

microcosm, and this again to the heart, on the basis of the 

harmony ruling in all three, as which Brahman is regarded 

in all three, and that by means of the symbol of the Oüyatri, 

168 Fint Part: Theology or the Doctrine of Brahman. 

—a Yedic metre, consisting of three feet, to irhich, as we 
shall see, yet a fourth, imaginary foot is added. In order to 
grasp this glorification of Brahman as Oayatrij we must 
remember the eternity and original dignity of the Word of 
the Veda (discussed above p. 71). As this is, as it were, 
borne and controlled by the metre, as representative of which 
the Oäyatri appears here, so Brahman, as the earth, hears 
and controls all beings, as the organs of sense {präna) the 
body, as vital spirits (prdna, unless there is a mistake in 
the repetition of the same word) the heart (the principle 
of life). 

Thus we are to understand, when, in the text, on the basis 
of the common bearing and controlling of beings, sense-organs, 
and vital spirits, it is said: "What the earth is, the body is, 
''what the body is, the heart is." For this reason also the 
G&yatri is called sixfold^ because it symbolically represents 
the three things named and their respective contents (cf 
p. 149, 8 bhüta'prithivt'Carira-'hridaya'Väk'präna and on Chan- 
dogya-Up. p. 184, 10: väff'hhüta-prithitA'farira'hfidaya'pränay 
But further it has four feet^ that is, the three actual and a 
fourth, imagined, which is also mentioned Brih. 6, 14.^® For 
the rest, the Brihadara^yakam loc. cit. follows its own coarse; 
how, in our passage, the four feet are to be understood, must 
be deduced from the verse (ßigv. X, 90, 3) quoted on this 

"However great is Nature's majesty, 
''The Spirit is yet higher raised by far, 
"Of it, but one foot do all beings make, 
"Three feet are immortality in heaven.*' 

It would be simple to conclude that, for the author of oar 
Chandogya-passage, the three immortal feet or quarters of 
Purusha are represented by the three real feet of the Oäyatr% 

7s As in this passage the right of each of the three first feet to the 
necessary eight syllables is vindicated, we mast not with the *cparß^ 
(Brahmuütra p. 150, 10) and Max Müüer (üpanishads I, p. 45) divide tbs 
24 syllables of the Gayatri into four times six, in order to «xpkiB the 
eahuhpadd $hadvidhä gäyatri. 

XI. The Brahmu ■• Coimic and at the »ama lima Fiychic Principle. 169 

the beingless pbeBomenal world, on the contrary, by its imagin- 
ary foot With this agrees what immediately follows: 

"Therefore, rerily, that which is called Brahman, that is 
"certaialy that which this space outside the man is; but the 
"space which is outside the man is certainly that which thia 
"space inside the man is; but this space inside the man is 
"certainly that which this space inside the heart is: this is 
"that Perfect, Unchangeable [a definition, which Brih. S, 1, 5 
"is found to be inadequate]; perfect, unchangeable happiness 
"lie gains, who knows this." 

Further on, the five gates of the gods in the heart, or, as 
they later appear personified, "the five warriors of Brahman 
and doorkeepers of the heaTen-world" are described, as which, 
corresponding to the triplicity running through the whole 
passage, appear five vital spirits, fire sense-organs, and fire 
nature-gods, of which one vital spirit, sense organ and nature- 
god are always put as identical.'* Then it is said further: 

"Now, however, the light that gleams there beyond the 
"hearena, at the back of all, at the back of each, in the 
"highest world, the highest of all, that is certainly this light 
"inward here in man; its perception is, that when anyone 
"here in the body feels it, he perceives a warmness; its audition 
" is, that when anyone thus [note 12] closes his ears, he hears, 
"as it were, a humming, as though it were the noise of a 
"bnming fire. This is to be honoured as its perception 
" and audition. He will be perceived and heard, who knows 

Against the objections of the Opponent, who wishes to 
understand by "the light beyond the heavens" the natural 
light (p. 143, 11), by "the light inwardly in man" the light of 
the belly (that is, probably, the fire of digestion), (p. 144, 7) 
Qafikara proves that the one and the other can only mean 
Brahman, on account of the feet, which cannot be attributed 
to any natural light (p. 146, 6), but, in harmony vrith the 
verse quoted from the Rigveda, can be attributed to Brahman 

'* Ib the latt Trial SJiäfa ihoold ba omitted and befora vd$v an 
orgkn, probabtj (mu, iBMrted. 

170 First Part: Theology or the Doctrine of Brahmui. 

(p. 146, 1), who is likened to light, because, in virtue of His 
spirituality, He lightens the whole world (p. 147, 2); that a 
place beyond the heavens is ascribed to Him, is done for the 
purpose of worship (p. 147, 6), just as Brahman is elsewhere 
indicated locally in the sun, in the eye, in the heart, although 
He is spaceless (nishpradefa), (p. 147, 8); and He also is to be 
understood by the symbol of the light of the belly (p. 147, 14). 
That the fruits of this worship mentioned at the end are only 
slight, is no obstacle to its referring to Brahman; only the 
knowledge of the attributeless Brahman has, as its one fruit, 
liberation (p. 148, 4), while the fruit of worship by means of 
attributes or symbols is manifold, although limited to Saips&ra 
(p. 148, 6). That Brahman is indicated as the Oäyatri happens 
(so Qankara says, departing from the interpretation which we 
have set forth above), in order to fix the thoughts on Him 
(p. 149, 16); the metre itself, as a mere grouping of syllables 
(p. 160, 1) is not to be thought of here, because it is said: 
''this world is the OäyatrV^ and because beings etc are in- 
dicated as its feetjSo and also because our passage expressly 
names Brahman and the warriors of Brahman (p. 162, 4). 
That it is first said paro divas (beyond heaven) and then again 
divi (in heaven) is no contradiction: just as one can say of a 
falcon, which is sitting upon a tree, he is sitting ''on the top 
of the tree," and he is sitting ^ on the tree" (p. 163, 4). 

4. Brahman and the Soul dwelling together in the 


. Sutras 1, fi, 11—12. 

The transition to the Chapter which is to teach nt to 
know Brahman as the Soul itself, may be formed by an isolated 
passage, in which the highest and the individual soul appear 
as united together in the heart; it is found in the Ktt^i^ka- 
Up. 3,1: 

•• The Sütram 1, 1, 26 has bkütaddipddOt that is, beinge and tW 
three hearenly feet, while Qafikara (evidently falsely and not u eoft- 
tonnity with p. 149, 8) underttande: heingi, earth, hody and heart (p. 161, Si 

XL The Brkhman m Oonnic And ai the tkine time Pijohic Priociple. 171 

■ Drinkiag fulfilment of their deedi in life, 
"The two have gone into the teeret eare, 

■In the higbeit, that one half ia of the highett {that ia in the heart); 
" He call« thete Light and Shade who Brahman knom." 
For the theme of the Käthaka^üp. Qankara firstly infers 
that by "the two" here either the organs of knowledge with 
Bnddbi at their head and the indinduat soul, or the indiridual 
and the highest soul are to be understood (p. 179 — 181), then, 
that only the latter is permissible; for that which drinks ful- 
filment for its prerions deeds, is undoubtedly the individual 
Boal; and side by side with it only a kindred nature, therefore 
the highest soul, could be mentioned (p. 18S, 3); that this 
dwells in the heart, is so often said in other places (p. 182, 5); 
that of it also it is said, it drinlcs, must not be taken literally, 
jtut as if it were said: "the people are carrying a parasol," 
when only one of them is carrying it (p. 180, 12. 182, 9, and 
3, 3, 34, p. 921, 7, where the subject is once more explained); 
they are called shadow and light, becaase the one is subject 
to SaqiB&ra, the other being free from it, Saipsära itself exist- 
ing only through Ignorance (p. 182, 11). The same contrast 
is fonnd again not only in other passages of the E&^ka-Up., 
bot also in the verse [taken with changed meaning from fiigr. 
1, 164, 20] of the MuQ4aka<Up. 3, 1, 1 (— gvet 4, 6. 7): 
"Enow thon two friends fair-feathered, 
■Tied to a nngle tree; 
"On« «ata at the aweet beiry, 
"Not eating, one looke on." 
Here, by the one that eats, the indiTidual soul is to be 
anderstood, by the one that looks on, the highest soul {p. 183, 
19), as also in the verse that follows: 

■To lach a tree innk down, the tpirit- 
" It perplexed and aorrowfol, without a lord; 
"Bnt when the lord ia tonght and fonnd by him 
"In m^ett;, then aorrow fieea away." 
In eonclosion Qankara mentions a view of the BnAgi- 
raJuui/a^irähmanam (also quoted p. 8B9, 10, and, as fyiäffi- 
UpattiAad, p. 232, 12) according to which by the two are to 
be anderstood the aattvam (that is, the anta^karamm) and 
the individual soul, the latter, however, so far as it is raised 
above Saqtsira and ha« gained unity with Brahman (p. 184—186). 

XII. The Brahman as Soul. 

1. Brahman as the Self (ätman). 

Sutras 1, 4, 19—22. 

No man, whatever he may do, can get out of his own Self: 
everything in the world can only arouse our interest, nay, onlj 
exists for us, in so far as, affecting us, it enters the sphere of 
our ** I," and so, as it were, becomes a part of us. Therefore 
our own Self with its content is the first, and in a certain 
sense the only object of philosophical inyestigation« 

This thought may prepare us for the consideration of one 
of the most remarkable passages in the Upanishads, the con- 
versation between Täjnavälkya and his spouse MoUireyif which 
exists in two recensions, Brih. 2, 4 and Brih. 4, 6, and in both 
according to the reading of the KänvcLS, as well as (in Qatap. 
Br.) according to that of the Mddhyandinas] in all, therefore» 
in four forms. Qankara quotes, if we leave out of the question 
passages which are identical, sometimes the recension in Brih. 
2, 4 (for example p. 386, 10. 392, 8), sometimes that in BpL 
4, 6; and the latter as well in the Känva form (p. 199, 1. 11. 
399, 4. 613, 2. 648, 6. 674, 9. 930, 6. 974, 7. 1142, 6) as in the 
Mädhyandina form (p. 186, 16. 386, 7. 387, 3. 392, 10. 794, 14. 
983, 4). Also the quotation 646, 9 - 647, 1 is according to the 
AlädhyandinaSj borrowing imam, however, instead of idam from 
the Känva$\ the quotation p. 388, 9 is divergent from both, 
and the same again in another form p. 391, 8;— this seems to 
shew, that Qankara is wont to quote the upanishads chieflj 
from memory, which might serve him here, where four recensioas 
interfere with one another, less faithfully than usual In iriiat 
follows, we analyse the passage according to BfÜL S, 4 and 

XII. The BrahmKu a* Sonl. 173 

ictrodnce Uie divergencies in Bj-ih. i, 5 only so far as seems 

(Addition in Brib. 4, 5: " YajnaTalkya had two wives, Mai- 
"treyi and Eätyäyan!; of these Maitrey! was conTersant with 
" Brahman, Kätyäyan! on the contrary knev only what women 
"know [cf. St Luke X, 38— 43]. Now Yajnavalkya wished to 
"pass to the other condition of life [from the condition of 
"householder to that of hermit)). Then said Yajaavalkya: 
"'Maitreyi! I will now give up this condition [of householder]. 
"'Therefore will I make partition hetween thee and Kätyä- 
"yant' — Then spoke Maitreyh 'If indeed to me. Master, this 
"'whole earth with all ita riches helonged, should I thereby 
"'be immortal?' — 'By no meansl' said Yäjnaralkya, 'but as 
"-the life of those who prosper, so would thy life be; bat 
"'there is no hope of immortality through riches.' — Maitreyi 
"spoke: 'What shall I do with that, whereby I become not 
"-immortal? Share with me rather, Master, the knowledge 
"■which thou possessest.' — yajnavallg^a spoke: 'Dear to ub, 
" 'rerily, art thou, and dear is what thou sayest. Come, seat 
"'thyseli^ I vill explain it to thee, but do thou mark well 
"'what I tell thee.'" — 

The teaching which now follows begins with the sentence: 
" Verily, not for the sake of the husband is the husband dear, 
' but for the sake of the Self is the husband dear." What is 
here said of the husband, is further, with continual repetition 
of the same formula, declared of the wife, children, power, 
Brahmanhood, warriorship, worlds, gods, beings, and finally of 
all that exist«; — all this is not dear for its own sake, but for 
the sake of the Self. — Apparently nothing more can be found 
than the thought expressed by us in introducing this chapter; 
(^'afikara, on the other hand, on Bpih. p. 448, 7 explains that 
here renunciation (vairägyam) is taught as tbe means to im- 
mortality. And indeed, when everything only serves tbe pur- 
pose of gratifying the Self, it is further the question, what 
then is our true and real Self? And here the Indian coa- 
icioasuess is led quite of itself by the word Atman (Self, Soul, 
God) to find in God our own real "I," and in a withdrawal 
to him tbe satisfaction which we seek in all relations of life. 

174 Firtt Fart: Theology or the Dootri&e of Brahmao. 

Therefore the real nervus probandi lies here in the use of the 
word Atman which arises from deeper philosophical insight: 
— ^what we long for, is everywhere and always only the satis- 
faction of our own Self; but our Self is identical with the 
highest Godhead and only apparently different from Him; he 
who sees the illusory nature of this appearance, who has be- 
come conscious of God as his own Self, has and possesses the 
perfect satisfaction, which he has sought in Tain in striying 
after the outward. In this sense it is further said: *^The Self, 
''verily, o Maitreyi, is to be seen, heard, meditated on and 
''investigated; he who sees, hears, meditates on and investigates 
"the Self, has understood this whole world.** — He who has 
understood this, knows himself as one with all Being; he who 
has not understood it, for him all beings are foreign and 
hostile; this is expressed by the sequel, in which it is ex- 
plained that Brahmans and warriors, worlds, gods, and beings, 
all abandon or exclude (parädät) him who regards all these 
things as different from himself. — Not in its void appear- 
ances can the Self be grasped, but in that which produces 
these appearances; he who has understood this, has understood 
appearances along with it; this thought is contained in the 
following images: when a drum is beaten, a shell blown^ a 
lute played, the tones going out from them cannot be grasped; 
but if the instrument or the player are grasped, then the tones 
are grasped at the same time. — As from damp wood, when it 
bums, clouds of smoke go forth, so from this great Being aD 
Yedas and (as Brih. 4, 6 adds) all worlds and creatures are 
breathed forth. — The Atman is the point of union (ehäifonam^ 
for all beings, as the ocean for all waters, the skin for all 
sensations of touch, the tongue for all tastes, the nose for all 
smells, the eye for all forms, the ear for all tones, etc. — ^Bnt 
why do we not see the Atman, who alone really is, but only 
its void appearances? To this replies the following image 
guaranteed as genuine by Chänd. 6, 13, but on account of its 
being dogmatically exceptionable, already quite altered is 
the late recension Brih. 4, 6: "'As a lump of salt» thrown into 
"'water, dissolves in the water, so that it cannot be taken 
" 'out, but wherever it is tasted, it is everywhere salt, — tikUM, 

Xn. Tlie Brabmtn u Son!. 176 

"'rerily, alao this great, endless, shoreleBS Being which is 
"'knowledge tbrongh and through: from these creatures it 
"'rises [as knowing spirit] and with them it perishes again; 
"'after death there is no consciousness I thus verily I tell theel' 
"Thua spoke Täjnavalkya. Then Maitreyi spoke: 'B7 this, 
" 'Master, hast thou perplexed me, that thou sayest, there is 
"-DO consciousness after death.' But YäjnaTalkya spoke: 
" 'Nothing bewildering truly speak I; what I said, suffices for 
"'the understanding, for where there is a duality, as it were, 
" 'there the one sees the other, there the one smells, hears, 
" 'speaks to, thinks of, knows the other; hot where, for s man, 
"'all has become his own Self, how should he there see aoy- 
"'one, how should he there smell, hear, speak to, think of, 
"'know anyone? That through which he knows all this, how 
"'shoold he know that, how should be know the Knower?'" — 
(Addition in Brih. 4, 6: "'Now knowest thou the doctrine, O 
"'Maitreyi; this truly suMces for immortality.' Thus spoke 
"YajnaTalkya and departed.") 

The remarks of Bädar&yana and Qankara on this passage 
are of special interest, in that they allow us to penetrate into 
certain differences of principle within the Vedänta school, in 
which Ägmarathya and Audulomi, each in bis own way, re- 
present the rationalistic, exoteric understanding, while Kä^a- 
krittna represents the mystical and esoteric. — Äs is usaal, the 
question is raised, whether in the passage the individual or 
the highest soul is to be understood by the "Self" (p. 385, 13); 
vhat diBtinguishes the two, is only the limitations (upädlii), 
that is, the body, organs of sense and action, Manas and 
Buddhi, clothed in which the highest soul appears as the 
indiTidoal soul; on them it depends, that it is enjoyer (or 
sufferer, bhoktar) and actor (/carter), from both of which con- 
ditions the highest soul, that is. Brahman, is free. Now in 
oar passage there are certain unmistakable features, which 
only suit the indmdoal soul; thus the introduction, in which, 
the soul's loTe of things is spoken of, which can only be under- 
stood of the enjoyer (p. 366, 5); thus too the doctrine that the 
soul rises out of these creatures and again perishes with them 
(p. 366, 9); thus finally, the expression " Knower," which indicates 

176 First Part: Theology or the Doctrine of Brahman. 

an actor (p. 386, 11). On the other hand, the whole context 
(p. 386, 16), compels us to think of the highest soul: a know- 
ledge of it only, secures the immortality which Maitreyi strore 
after (p. 387, 4); only of it is it true, that, when it is known, 
all is known (p. 387, 6); so also the proposition, that all things 
exclude him, who believes them to be outsid« the soul, can 
only be understood of the highest soul which includes ali 
(p. 387, 13); this is especially true of the similes of the drum 
and the rest (p. 387, 14) and of the passage, where the soul 
is indicated as the cause of the Veda etc. (p. 388, 1) and as 
the point of union of all that is (p. 388, 4). If consequent!} 
only the highest soul is to be understood, then we must a>k. 
how are we to deal with the above mentioned features which 
only suit the individual soul? Agmarathya sees in them a 
guarantee of the promise, that with the Atman all is knowi^ 
if he grasp all, he grasps the individual soul also (p. 388. 8f. 
390, 10. 391, 12). As this view, not quite clear in spite of 
repetitions, amounts to understanding the soul as a part • :' 
Brahman, and therefore the relation between them as spatial 
so Andtilomi sets up a temporal relation: because the soul i> 
temporarily (in deep sleep) one with Brahman, therefore ir. 
the passage in question it appears as found in unity with 
Brahman (p. 389. 390, 12. 392, 1). In opposition to both. 
Kägakritsiuiy whose view Qankara adheres to, as being in con- 
formity with scripture (p. 390, 14. 393, 11), establishes thf 
doctrine of Identity, in virtue of which the highest soul 
exists whole and undivided in the form of the individual soul 
(p. 390, 2. 392, 3); the annihilation of knowledge after deati 
means only that of individual knowledge (vigesha^vijnäPiaMK 
(p. 392, 7) and the description of God as the '^Knower^ iii- 
dicates no actorship, but only a consisting of the pure sub- 
stance of consciousness (p. 393, 9), as also the reality of libe- 
ration consists in the irrefragable certainty of the knowledge 
that God and the soul are one, and the absolute satisfaction 
therefrom resulting (p. 396, 3). — 

Similar considerations of the fact that the difference between 
God and the soul is a mere appearance, while liberation i$ 
a seeing through this appearance, will be met with many 

XIL The Brahman as Soul. 177 

times in the sequel; but all altempts of this kind to grasp / 
liberation as a new form of knowledge, do not give, and cannot ' 
give, any satisfactory conclusion as to its nature (as it appeared ' 
to the Indian in examples and appears to us), so long as it is 
not supplemented by the idea of the moral transformation, 
which is so strongly accentuated by Christianity, but remained 
foreign to Indian thought This seems to have been felt in « 
the Ved&nta schools also;— against those who could acquiesce / 
in the solution of the question sought in the region of intellecy 
only, the words of Qankara at the end of our extract seem 
to be directed: ''But those who are stubborn, and force the 
" sense of the scripture, therewith force also the perfect know- 
^ledge which leads to salvation, hold liberation to be some- 
"* thing made and [therefore] transitory, and do not follow 
"" after what is lawful" (p. 396, 3). 

2. Brahman as Präna (Breath, Life). 

(a) Sutras 1, 1, 28—81. 

Brahman as the principle of life is the subject of the third 
Adhyäya of the Kaushitaki-Upanishad, which in Cowell's edition 
exists in two recensions p. 73 — 102 and p. 129 — 134,^^ and the 
actual contents of which are as follows: 

1. IVatardana comes to the abode of Indra, who allows 
him to choose a boon. Pratardana begs the god to choose 
for him what he deems to be the best thing for mankind. 
After some hesitation Indra speaks: ''Then know me; for this 
^I deem to be the best thing for a man, that he should 
*^know me ... . Who knows me, his place [in heaven] is not 
** diminished by any deed, neither by theft nor by slaying the 

» Qankara appears, as we found above (p. 31) to follow a third 
reoention whose readings in general agree with those of CowelPs first; 
yet he reads 3^ 2 p. 78, 4 with the second prajnätniä tarn (p. 154, 8) ; 
3, 5 p. 89, 8 he has contrary both recensions, adüduhat (p. 164, 2) ; at 3, 3 
p. 83, 1 he remarks that some read itnam gariram (p. 161, 6), which would 
be an instance of fatira as masculine, as Qankara's construction itnatn 
(jloam), parigrihya ^Hram^ utthapayati is hardly possible. Qankara has 
a Tery noteworthy reading 3, 2 p. 82, 2, where he reads (utitve ca instead 
of atH iv etfa (p. 158, 71 


178 Fint Part: Theology or the Doctrine of Brahmtn. 

'^ fruit of the body, nor by matricide nor by parricide; and 
''eTcn if he has committed (cakruAo) evil [previoasly, before 
^the knowledge of Brahman], yet the colour fades not from 
"his face [no fear makes him pale]." 

2. ''I am the breath (präna), I am the Self of knowledge 
^ (prajüätman); as this, as immortal life worship me. Life is 
** breath and breath is life ; for as long as the breath remains 
"in this body, so long remains the life; only through breath 
" is immortality [continuance of life] gained in this world, and 
"through Imowledge, true wishes [wishes that are directed to 
"the Eternal, cf. above p. 161]. He who worships me as im- 
" mortal life, comes to fuU life in this world, he gains im- 
" mortality, imperishability in the hearenly world.** — ^Further 
it is developed that all the life-organs (speech, ear, eye, etc) 
go back to a unity (ekcLbhuyam gacchanti), through the power 
of which each organ performs its function, so that, in each 
special manifestation of life, all organs [in virtue of their cen- 
tralisation in life] work together. "Thus it is," adds Indra, 
confirming the theory quoted, "and the well-being of the life- 
" organs lies in what they are [astitvej that is, in Brahman, 
"not in what they do]." 

3. "The organs are not essential to life; for the dumb, 
"blind, deaf, imbecile (bcUa) and crippled live; but verily the 
"life only, the Self of knowledge, surrounds the body and 
"supports it (uUhäpayaHy literally: raises it up), therefore it 
"is to be worshipped as the support (ukthamj literally: hymn). 
"This is the penetration of aU [organs] in the life. Verily, 
" life is knowledge, and knowledge is life." — ^According to this 
identification, carried out all through, of life (präna) and 
knowledge (prajnä)), which is based on the fact that Brahman, 
as the principle of life, as shewn above (p. 134ff.), must also 
be pure intelligence, are depicted the nature of deep sleep 
and death. In both, the life-organs (speech, eye, ear, etc.', 
along with the things and relations of the outer world de* 
pendent on them (name, form, tone, etc.), enter into the life; 
on awaking, as sparks arise from the fire, so the organs arise 
from the life, from them the gods (that is, the powers of 
nature), and from the gods the worlds, go forth again; in 


XIL The Brahman as Soul. 179 

death, on the contrary, life, with the organs merged in it, 
wanders forth from the body. 

4. It is further shewn how all external relations are poured 
(dbhivurijyante) into the life, by means of the life-organs (as 
speech, eye, ear, etc.). 

6. The life-organs, as separate members or parts, are drawn 
out of the life [udülham; or with Qankara adüdvhat^ the organs 
each milk a part out of the life]; but the things of the outer 
world are only the element of being of the organs projected 
outwards (parcutät prativihitä bhütamäträ). 

6. By means of intellect [pro/fid, which was identified 
above with Ufe] the man mounts the organs [like a car] and 
so reaches outer things. 

7. For in themselyes and without intellect (prajnd) the 
organs cannot know and notify outer things. (In this passage 
prajHd takes the place of mancUf which elsewhere appears 
as the central organ of the life-organs, but is here ranged 
along with them.) 

& Not objects, but the subject, should be investigated, not 

speech, smell, form, tone, etc., but that which speaks, smells, 

sees, hears, etc. — ''The ten elements of being are related to 

^Cognition, and the ten elements of Cognition to being; for 

''if the elements of being were not, then the elements of 

^(Tognition also would not be, and if the elements of Cognition 

"were not, then the elements of being would not be either. 

"For through the one [without the other] no appearance 

"(Hfpam) comes into existence; yet this is not a plurality [of 

"outer things and organs], but as, in the case of a car, the 

"felloes are fastened to the spokes, and the spokes to the 

"nave, so these elements of being are fastened to the elements v^ 

"of Cognition, and the elements of Cognition to the Pram 

"(Life). This Pram alone is the self of Cognition (prajüä- 

'^tman)f and bliss, it does not grow old and dies not He 

"becomes not higher through good works, or lower through 

"evil [abstains from all works], for He alone causes him to 

"do good works, whom He will raise above these worlds, and 

"He alone causes him to do evil works, whom He will lead 

"downwards; He is the guardian of the worlds, the ruler of 


180 First Ftrt: Theology or the Doctrine of Brahman. 

''the worlds, — He is my soul, this is to be known, He is my 
''soul, this is to be known!" 

In this section of the Eaushitaki-Upanishad, as Qank&ra 
deyelops it, by Präna neither breath, nor the god Indra, nor 
the indiridual soul are to be understood, although there are 
characteristics which point to all three of them, but on the 
contrary the highest Brahman (p. 165, 2 read: param brahtna), 
for of it only can it be said, that a knowledge of it is the 
highest good for man (p. 156, 2), and that he who has known 
it is stained by no sins, in that, after knowledge of Brahman, 
all works Tanish away (p. 156, 7); only to Brahman applies the 
description as Self of Cognition,^^ as bliss, as also that it does 
not grow old and dies not, performs no works and predestines 
the deeds of beings (p. 156, 8 — 17). — The god Indra, in whose 
mouth the whole dissertation is placed, is not to be thought 
of, because in this passage occur a mass of relations, those 
mentioned and many others, which compel us to understand 
the highest soul (p. 158, 2), with which Indra is here identified, 

^ just as Yämadeva is with Manu and Süir^ (EiigJ* 4, 26, 1; 
cf. Brih. 1, 4, 10), in virtue of a gift of seership extending to 
the life before birth, occurring in the canon of scripture; ^^ 
therefore also the heroic deeds of Indra are only mentioned 
to the end of glorifying the knowledge of Brahman, connected 

^ with them, because he who possesses this knowledge, remains 
unscathed like Indra in all his battles (p. 160, 5). — No more 
than Indra can the individual soul or the Mukliya präna (the 

*s At Eaush. 8, 2 so in Qankara'i work also prqjMiman means onij 
the highest (p. 156, 8. 157, 12. 158, 6; on the other hand» jfoa p. 161. 8 
in the Pürvapaksha), and v^jfiänätman means only the individual tool 
(p. 184, 7. 181, 12. 182, 13. 16. 183, 2. 12; 120, 15. 388, 14. 393. 11). Is the 
same way, präjna^ for Badarayana (1, 4, 5. 2, 3, 29) and Qankara (p. 273. 

7. 8. 275, 4. 331, 5. 9. 347, 4. 5. 14. 350, 10. 14. 351, 11. 12. 3&2, 1. 9. 353, 
5. 13. 354, 2. 475, 1. 662, 12. 780, 5. 6. 10. 785, 1. a 793, 11. 828, 13. 82<'. 

8. 8) and ^AtopräjTia ätman (p. 271, 12. 272, 7. 9) always means the highest 
soul. — This is the more to be accentuated, as in the Vedlntasara 
§ 53 ff., präjiia has become a term for the individual souL 

** ärshena darganena yaihägästram^ as Qankara p. 159, 9 cxplaizii 
the ^tradrishH of the Sütram; cf. however drishH in the Sütram 1, 2. 8i> 
with Qafikara^s interpretation p. 215, 11. 

XIL The Brahman as Soal. 181 

central organ of unconscious life) be understood, although to 
the former would apply the distinction between subject and 
object (p. 160, 13), to the latter, the support of the body 
(p. 161, 3), while the indication as Self of knowledge and the 
separation between pram and pro/nd would lend itself to this 
interpretation (p. 16], 8. 11). (^The most essential reason why 
not these but Brahman are 'to be understood, lies in the 
words of the Sütram 1, 1, 31: upasQiraividhyädy äfrüatväd, iha 
tad-yogäly which either mean: ''because, if J%va and Mukhya 
^präna as well as Brahman were to be understood, a triplicity 
''of worship would of necessity arise (p. 161, 16); because 
''elsewhere also the word Präna refers to Brahman (p. 162, 7); 
"and because here it is connected with marks of Brahman 
'*(p. 162, 8),*^ — or, according to another explanation of the 
Sütram: "Brahman is to be understood, because a triplicity 
"of worship of Brahman, namely as präna, as prajna, and as 
'^brahman is taught here (p. 164), because elsewhere also a 
"worship of Brahman is taught by means of limiting qualities 
" (upädhi-dharma) (p. 166, 6), and this is taking place here also 
•*(p. 166,6)." 

(b) Sütrasl,4, 16— 18. 

As a variation of the theme just treated of, we may con- 
sider the conversation between OärgyOy the son of Bdläka^ 
and AjätafatrUj which forms the fourUi Adhyaya of the Kau- 
shltaki-Upanishad, and, with important divergencies in detail» 
recurs in Bfih. 2, 1. Qankara adheres to the Kaushitaki 
recension,^^ according to which the main contents are as 

Oärgya, a renowned authority on the Veda, comes to king 
Ajätafotru and offers to explain Brahman to him. After he 
has determined Brahman in a series of sixteen definitions, as 
the spirit (purusha) in the sun, in the moon, in lightning, etc, 
and these explanations have one after the other been rejected 

** Here alio ^^afikara*t readings diverge in many ways from both 
formt in which the text it printed by Cowell; thui he reads (p. 380, 7) 
Momvadishihäh instead of iamtfädi^/ishthäh and samavddat/iihth^ Kansh. 
4, 19, p. li?, 3 and 188, 20. 

182 First Part: Theology or the Doctrine of Brahman. 

by Äjätagatru as inadequate, Qärgya becomes silenti and the 
king speaks to him: ^In vain therefore hast tbou challengad 
''me to a disputation, in order to explain Brahman to me; 
''for, verily, he who has made those spirits [named by thee]. 
'^ and whose work this [world] is, he, verily, is to be investigated.'' 
— Now Äjätagatru undertakes to teach O&rgya. He leads 
him to one in deep sleep, who does not wake when they speak 
to him, but only after they have pushed him with a sticL 
Äjätagatru asks Qäryya : " Where lay this spirit, where was 
"he, whence did he come?" — ^As Oärgya does not know it, 
the king explains to him how, in deep sleep, all organs, to- 
gether with the corresponding things of the outer world, enter 
into the life {präna) and dwell with it in the arteries that 
go out from the heart and surround the pericardium; on 
awaking, as sparks rise from the fire, so from the Mfifian the 
organs go forth, from them go forth the gods (who rule them), 
and from them the worlds. "This Präna^ the IVajnatman, 
"has entered into the body as into its Sel^ even to the hair, 
"even to the nails. As a knife pushed into the sheath, or 
"fire into a fire-vessel, so has the Prajüätman entered into 
"the body as into its own Self^ even to the hair, even to the 
"nails. On this Self depend those selves [the organs] as a 
"people on their chiel As the chief nourishes himself (bfttcnftfe). 
"through his people, as the people nourish (bhui\janti) the 
"chief, so does this Self of Cognition nourish itself through 
" those selves, so do those selves nourish this Self of Cognition . . . 
"All evil he puts away, chieftainship over all beings, indepen* 
"dence, sovereignty does he gain, who knows thus." 

In this passage, as Qankara explains, not the MuJAya 
präna or the individual soul, but Brahman is to be under- 
stood, since at the very beginning it is said: "I will explain 
"Brahman to thee" (p. 380, 6); in harmony with this, in the 
case of the words "whose work this is," we are not to think 
of the nutrition of the body, which is the work of the MulAya 
präna (p. 378, 6), or of good and bad works, as they are per- 
formed by the individual soul (p. 379, 2), but of this world 
which was made by Brahman (p. 381, 6). To the objection 
that marks of the Mukhya pram and Jiva (the individnal 

HL The Bnhmia m SooL 183 

soul) are also met with, a reply is to be made in the words 
of the Sütram 1, 1, 31 : upäsätraividhyät etc. (explained by us 
in the preceding section, above p. 181) (p. 382, 8). For that 
only Brahman can be meant, appears from the concluding 
words, and from the unsurpassable fruit promised in them 
(p. 38S, 13). — To this is added, as Jaimini remarks, that in 
the passage concerning deep sleep, in both question and answer, 
the individual soul is distinguished from Brahman, into which 
it enters, and from which it comes forth again (p. 383, 10), 
and in the V&jasaneyi recension (Brih. 2, 1, 16) on this occasion 
it is expressly indicated as the vijfiänainayäh puru8hä(i (p. 384, 
9); from this it is clear, that that from which it goes forth, 
most be something different from itself^ namely the highest 
Brahman (p. 385, 4). 

3. Brahman as the Soul in deep Sleep. 

Sütrts 1, 3, 19-21 and 1, 8, 40. 

The rpassage which we considered Chap. XI, 1, d (above 
p. 168 £) follows in Chänd. 8, 7—12, the teaching of Indra 
by Prajäpati (a mythological personification of the creative 
force, which here stands for Brahman) concerning the nature 
of the Self 

''Praj&pati said: The Self^ the sinless, free from old age, 
^free from death, and free from sorrow, without hunger and 
** without thirst, whose wishes are true, whose resolve is true, 
*^ this Self is to be investigated, this you should seek to know. 
''He wins all worlds and all wishes, who has found this Self 
''and knows itl" — In order to gain knowledge of the Self, the 
gods send Indra, the Asuras (Demons), Virocana, to Prajapati. 
— The three successive answers, which Prajapati gives to the 
question, what the Self is, represent three stages of knowledge, 
in virtue of which the Self is seen either in the body, or in 
the individual soul, or in the highest souL The first answer 
to the question: "What is the Self?" runs thus: «The Self in 
"the body (literally, the person, purusha), as it is represented 
"in the reflection in the eye, in water, in a mirror." — Who- 
ever, like Virocana and the Asuras, is satisfied with this view, 

184 Fint Part: Theology or the Doctrine of Bmhmmn. 

will see in sensual enjoyment and in the care of the body the 
highest goal of being, and even after death will deck the 
corpse with all kinds of trumpery adornments (hhikshä)^ with 
garments and decorations, — in order to gain by this means a 
life in the Beyond.^^— Virocana is satisfied with this answer. 
But Indra, knowing that, if the Self be the body, then the 
Self must be equally affected by the injury and destruction of 
the body, returns to Prajäpati, who gives him the second 
answer: ''The Self is the soul as it enjoys itself in dream." 
But this answer is also unsatisfying. The dream-soul is, it is 
true, free from the injury of the body, yet it is as though it 
were slain or persecuted, and is therefore not free from suffer- 
ing. With this doubt Indra returns a second time to Praja- 
pati and now receives the third explanation: ''When one has 
'^ fallen asleep, and entered altogether wholly and completely 
"into rest, so that he beholds no dream image, — that is the 
"Self, that is the immortal, the fearless. Brahman." — To the 
objection of Indra, that in this condition consciousness of one's 
self, and of other things also, ceases, so that it is, as it were, 
an entering into nothingness, Prajäpati finally answers: "Mortal, 
"verily, mighty one is this body, possessed of death; it is 
"the dwelling-place of that immortal, bodiless Sel£ The em- 
" bodied is possessed by desire and pain; for because he is 
"embodied, no turning away from desire and pain is possible. 
" But the body less are not moved by desire and pain. — Body- 
"less is the wind; the clouds, the lightning, the thunder are 
"bodyless. Therefore as these rise out of the universe [in 
"which they are bound, as the soul is, in the body], and enter 
"into the highest light, and thereby stand forth in their own 
"form, so also this perfect peace [that is, the soul in deep 
"sleep] rises out of this body, and enters into the highest 
"light, and thereby stands forth in its own form: that is the 
"highest spirit, which wanders there, sporting and playing and 
"delighting himself, whether with women or with chariots or 

>* He who holds the body to be the Self, cannot beliere in tny Mh 
after death. Probably the passage, as also what goes before (Amhi^Mm 
hi ethä iQKznisAad) is to be understood ironically.— Qa&kara*s Tiev, of 
which below, we cannot agree with. 

Xn. The Brahman as Soal. 186 

"^with friends [cfl above p. 161], and thinks no longer of this 
^serrile body, to which the ]Pra9a is yoked as a beast of 
** draught to the car. — When the eye is directed to the nni- 
** verse, this [the Prä^a] is the spirit in the eye, the eye [it- 
*self] is [only] the means; and he who wishes to smell, is the 
^Ätman, the nose is only the means; and he who wishes to 
** speak, is the Atman, the voice is only the means; and he 
''who wishes to hear, is the Atman, the ear is only the means; 
''and he who wishes to understand, is the Atman, the under- 
<* standing is his godlike eye [embracing past and future]; with 
^ this godlike eye, the understanding, he beholds those delights 
««and enjoys them. Those gods [who were taught like Indra] 
''in the world of Brahman worship him as the Self; therefore 
■«possess they all worlds and all wishes. He gains all worlds 
** and all wishes, who has found this Self and knows it. Thus 
''spoke Prajapati." 

In contrast with our view of this passage, which would 
recognise in the three chief answers of Prajapati (at least, as 
they are understood by the questioners) the expression of 
three philosophical standpoints, the materialistic, for which the 
Self is the body, the realistic, for which it is the individual 
soul, and the idealistic, denying all plurality, for which it is the 
highest soul, — in contrast to this, the only view as it appears 
to us, which fits the whole context, Qankara adheres to the 
view that, already in the first answer, the beholding, individual 
self which dwells in the eye is to be understood (p. 261, 2), 
so that ''the man (or spirit), who is seen in the eye," becomes 
a man "who sees in the eye." He expressly rejects the view, 
that the picture mirrored in the eye is meant, because other- 
wise Prajapati would not have told the truth (p. 266, 13); but 
it is not necessary to assume with him, " that Prajapati, if in 
" each answer we were to understand something di£ferent, would 
" be an imposter" (p. 268, 8) ; for the formula with which he 
each time introduces his explanation: "this will I further ex- 
"plain to thee," suits well a view of the Self which grows 
deeper step by step. — In the third answer also, as Qankara 
develops it, the individual soul is to be understood, yet as it 
passes over to another condition (p. 261, 6), namely, as, rising 

186 Fint Part: Theology or the Doetrine of Brmhmaa. 


out of the body, it becomes the highest spirit (p. S62, 3), so 
its true nature is revealed (p. 262, 6), according to which it is 
not individual, but the highest Brahman itself (p. 263, 8 . 
"This in fact is, according to passages of scripture like *that 
^thou art' (Chänd. 6, 8, 7), the real nature {f&ramäHhScam 
^svarüpam) of the individual soul, not the other, which is 
"formed through limitations {upädhi). So long, therefore, as 
''one does not put aside the Ignorance which affirms plurality, 
''which is like taking the trunk of a tree for a man [p. 263, 
"6; the same image p. 44, 2. 86, 12. 448, 2: c£ Platon, Phileb^ 
"p. 38 D], so long as one has not reached the highest, eternal 
"Self, appearing according to its o?m nature, by the know- 
"ledge that 'I am Brahman' (Brih. 1,4, 10), so long the in- 
" dividual soul is individual But if a man rises above the 
"aggregate of body, senses, Manas and Buddhi and has been 
"taught, by the scripture, that man is not an aggregate of 
"body, senses, Manas and Buddhi, not a wandering soul, but 
"on the contrary that of which it is said (Chänd. 6, 8, 7), 
"'that is the real, that is the soul' — consisting of pure is- 
"telligence, 'that thou art,' then he knows the highest eternal 
"Self which appears according to its own nature; as by this 
"means he raises himself above the illusion of this [reading 
^asmät] body etc., he goes to that very highest, eternal Self 
"which appears according to its own nature; for thus sajs 
" the scripture (Mui;i4* 3, 2, 9) : ' Verily, he who knows this 
"'highest Brahman, himself becomes Brahman'" (p. 263,4 to 
264, 3). As such the soul stands forth "in its own form," as 
gold, when by corroding materials it is freed from the ad- 
dition of other substances (p. 264, 6), or as the stars, when 
the day which overpowered them is gone, stand forth by night 
in their own form (p. 264, 8). However the eternal, spiritual 
light is never overpowered by anything; on the contrary, like 
space, it does not come in contact with the sensual world« 
and stands in contradiction to it (p. 264, 10). The individual 
soul, so long as it has not been raised above the body [which 
is what happens in deep sleep], is seeing, hearing, thinking, 
knowing. Were it so also, after being lifted above the bodyf 
then the contradiction [just stated] would not exist [p. 266, 3; 

XII. The Brahman as Soul. 187 

I read avirudhyeta^ optative with a privativum]. Therefore 
the position of things is such that we must distinguish between 
the condition of the soul hejore its separation from the limi- 
tations, body, senses, Manas, Buddhi, sensibility to pain and 
object, and its condition after separation from them. Before 
the separation it is apparently affected by the Upadhis, as 
the crystal is by the colour outside it; after the separation, 
it stands forth in its own nature, as the crystal, after the 
colour is put away (p. 266). Thus the embodiment or bodi- 
lessness of the soul only depends on whether one does or does 
not distinguish it from the üpädhis (p. 266, 2), and the dis- 
tinction of the individual and the highest soul rests only on 
false knowledge, not on an action of things, which is not poss- 
ible, because the soul, like space, does not adhere to them 
(p. S66, 8). Only the knowledge of these, only the (individual) 
knowledge of differences {vi^dm-vijfianam) is removed in deep 
sleep, not knowledge in its entirety (p. 267, 7); for the scrip- 
ture says (Brih. 4, 3, 30) : ^ For the knower there is no inter- 
'^ruption of knowing." — Some try to evade this identification 
of the individual with the highest soul, against the context of 
the passage; but rather is it the case that after the removal 
of Ignorance, as the imagined serpent becomes a rope, so also 
the not truly real individual soul, which is stained by doing 
and suffering, love and hate and other imperfections, and is 
subject to much that is evil, is transferred through wisdom 
to the sinless essence of the highest God, opposed to all these 
imperfections (p« 268, 10). — ^Yet others, and some of our 
Vedantins among them, (realistically) take the individual 
nature of the soul to be absolutely real; against these the 
Qäfirakam (Bädar&ya9a's Sutras) is directed, in order to shew, 
that '^tbe alone, supreme, eternal, highest God, whose being 
''is knowledge, through the glamour (mäyä) of Ignorance, like 
*'a magician, appears manifold, and that there is no other 
*" element of knowledge outside him" (p. 969, 1). Therefore it 
is true that God is different from the individual soul [so long 
as such a soul is spoken of], but the individual soul is not \ 
different from God [cL p. 816, 7: the prapaüca is brahman^ 
but brahman is not tiie prapaüca\ and p. 1060, 2: the samsärin 

188 First Part: Theology or the Doctrine of Brahman. 

is igvara, but igvara is not the samsärin], except from the 
standpoint of Ignorance (p. 269, 10). In waking, the sool is 
the onlooker in the cage of the body and organs, in dream 
it lingers in the arteries and looks at the dream-pictures built 
up of the ideas of the waking state; in deep sleep it enters 
into the highest light, that is, into Brahman (p. 270, 7). For 
that Brahman is the highest light, follows from the context 
(p. 327, 8) and from the above mentioned incorporeality, which 
belongs to Brahman alone (p. 328, 3), as also from the words 
««that is the highest spirit" (p. 328, 4). 

4 Brahman as the Soul in the State of Liberation. 

Sutras 1, 23, 42-43. 

The section Brih. 4, 3—4 (p. 705—919), whose main theme, 
according to Qankara, is the above, unfolds a picture of the 
condition of the soul before and after death, which for rich- 
ness and warmth, is unique in the literature of India, and 
perhaps in the literature of the world. We translate the 
passage with some abbreviations and omissions, which will 
justify themselves, remarking, however, that much, especially 
in the first part, remains problematic. 

(a) Introduction (4, 3, 1—9). 

To Janaka, king of the Videhas, comes TäjnaväUcyOj in 
order to discourse with h]m.8B The king raises the question: 
"What serves the man [purusha] as light?"— The first answer 

^ Sam enena vad%8hya\ it%\ this is not "an ingenious cof^'eeture" of 
Eegnaud in "Aw excellent work <m the Upaniahada" (as may appear 
from Max Müller, Upanishads I, p. LXXIlIff.X but a variant, which 
Dvivedagafiga had already mentioned in his commentary (p. 1141, 13,. 
ed. Weber); Weber adopted it in his edition of the Qatapathabr. (14, 7, 
1, 1), and again recalled the fact in his critique of Regnaud's work 
(Jenaer Literature. 1878, 9. Feb., No. 6), to which Regnand also refers mt 
the beginning of the Errata. — What Max Müller obseryes as against this 
reading, can be explained quite as well in the opposite sense: precisely 
because Yajnavalkya intends to discourse with the king, the nmrrator 
finds it necessary to give a new motive for the fact that not he, but the* 
king, speaks first. [For another view compare my Sixty Upanishads- 
p. 463.] 

XII. The Brahman as Soal. 189 

runs thus: ^The sun serves him as a light; for in the light 
*^ of the sun he sits and moves about, carries on his work and 
** returns home." — ^But what serves him as light when the 
^sun is set?" — "The moon." — "And when sun and moon are 
"set?" — "Fire." — "And when sun and moon are set, and the 
**fire has gone out?" — "Voice; therefore, when a man cannot 
"distinguish his own hand, and a voice is raised [reading 
**uccarati] somewhere, he goes towards it" — "But when sun 
"and moon are set, and the fire is gone out, and the voice 
"is dumb, what then serves the man as a light?" — "Then his 
"own self (ätman) serves him as a light." — "What is, then, 
"this Self?" — "It is that among the life-organs which con- 
" sists of knowledge, as the spirit shining inwardly in the heart. 
" This remaining the same, wanders through both worlds [this 
"world in waking and in dream, the other in deep sleep and 
"death]; it is as though he meditated, as though he wavering 
"moved [in reality Brahman is without individual knowledge 
"and motion]; for when he has become sleep (svapno bhütva), 
"then [in deep sleep] he transcends this world, the forms of 
"death [all that is transitory, evil]. For, when this spirit is 
"bom, when he enters into the body, he is flooded with evil; 
"but when he departs, when he dies, he leaves evil behind. 
"Two conditions are there of this spirit: the present and that 
"in the other world; a middle condition, as third, is that of 
"sleep. While it lingers in this middle condition, it beholds 
" both those conditions, the present [in dream] and that in the 
"other world [in deep sleep]. And according as he has access 
" to the condition in the other world, he proceeds and beholds 
"both, evil [this world, in dream] and bUss [the other world, 
"in deep sleep]." 

(b) Dreamsleep (4,3,9—14. 16-18]. 

"But when he sinks to sleep, then he takes from this all- 
" embracing world the wood (indträm, materiem)^ fells it him- 
^self and himself builds it, in virtue of his own radiance, 
"his own light; — when he so sleeps, then this spirit serves 
"as its own light There are no chariots, nor teams, nor 
"roads there, but he forms for himself chariots, and teams, 

190 First Part: Theology or the Doctrine of Brmhman. 

^and roads; there is neither bliss, joy, nor pleasure, bat he 
^creates for himself bliss, joy, and pleasure; there are no 
"springs, and ponds, and rivers, and but he forms for himself 
''springs, and ponds, and rivers, — for he is the Creator. On 
''this subject are these verses: 

"Patting Mide in sleep the bodily (fätiram) 
'^ Sleepless the sleeping organs he beholds; 
"Then borrowing their light goes back again 
''The golden Spirit, only wandering bird. 
''He leaves the Life to guard the lower nest 
''And soars immortal from the nest himself, 
"Immortal, moving wheresoever he wills, 
''The golden Spirit, only wandering bird. 
"In dream, the Spirit upward, downward moves, 
"And, as a God, creates Him many forms, 
"Now with fair women sporting joyously, 
"And now beholding sights that make him fear, 
"flis playground canst thou see, but not himself,"— 

''therefore it is said: 'let him not be wakened suddenly,' for 
" hard is one to heal, back to whom the Spirit does not find 
"its way. Therefore it is said also: 'for him it [sleep] is 
" 'only a state of waking/ for what he sees in waking, the 
'^same also he sees in sleep. Thus therefore this man sen« 
" as a light to itself . . . Thereon, after he has enjoyed him- 
"self and wandered forth in dream, and beheld good and efiL 
"he hastens back, according to his entrance, according to his 
"place, to the condition of waking; and by all that he beholds 
"in this he is not touched, for to this Spirit nothing adheres; 
" — ^and again, after he has taken delight and wandered forth 
"in the waking state, and after he has beheld good and evil 
"he hastens back, according to his entrance, according to his 
"place, to the condition of dream. And like as a great fish 
"glides along both banks, on this side and on that, so glides 
"the Spirit along both conditions, that of dream and that of 
"waking [without being touched there]." 

(c) Deep Sleep (4, 3, 19. 21-33). 

"But like as in yon space a falcon or an eagle» after he 
"has hovered, wearily folds his pinions, and sinks to rest, thns 
"also hastens the Spirit to that condition in which, souk to 

X£L The Brahman as Soul. 191 

*^ sleep, he feels no more desire, nor beholds any more dreams. 
^That is his form of being, wherein he is raised above long- 
^ing, free from evil and from fear. For, like as one whom 
''a beloved woman embraces, has no consciousness of what is 
^without or what is within, so also the Spirit, embraced by 
''the Self of knowledge [the Brahman], has no consciousness 
''of what is without or what is within. That is his form of 
''being, wherein his longing is stilled, himself is his longing, 
*he is without longing, and freed from grief. Then the father 
'^is not father, nor the mother, mother, nor the worlds, worlds, 
''nor the gods, gods, nor the Vedas, Yedas; then is the thief 
"no thiel^ the murderer no murderer, the Cä^däla no Cä94äla, 
"the Paulkasa no Paulkasa, the ascetic no ascetic, the penitent 
"no penitent; then he is unmoved by good, unmoved by evil, 
"then he has vanquished all the torments of the heart" 

"If then he sees not, yet he is seeing though he does not 
"see; since, there is no interruption of seeing for the seeing 
"one, because he is imperishable; but there is then outside 
"him no second, no other different from him whom he could 
"see. So too if then he smells not, nor tastes, nor speaks, 
"nor hears, nor thinks, nor feels, nor knows, yet is he a 
"knower, even though he does not know; since, for the knower 
"there is no interruption of knowing, because he is imperish- 
"able; but there is then no second outside him, no other 
"different from him, whom he could understand. For only 
"where, as it were, another is, can one see, smell, taste, address, 
"hear, think of, feel and know another." 

"He stands in the tumultuous ocean [cf. Qvet. 6, 16] as 
" beholder, alone and without a second, he whose world is the 
"Brahman. This is his highest goal, this is his highest joy, 
"this is his highest world, this is his highest bliss; through 
"a little part only of this bliss, other creatures have their 

"When among men one is fortunate and rich, king over 
''the others and loaded with all human enjoyments, that is 
"the highest joy for man. But a hundred of these human 
"joys are but one joy of the feithers, who have conquered 
"heaven, and a hundred joys of the fathers who have con- 

192 First Fart: Theology or the Doctrine of BrahmaiL 

'^quered heaven, are but one joy m the world of the Gan- 
'^dharvas, and a hundred joys in the world of the Gandharvas 
"are but one joy of the Gods through works, who by their 
"works have attained to godhead, and a hundred joys of the 
"Gods through works are but one joy of the Gods by birth, 
"and of one learned in the scripture and without falseness 
"and free from desire; and a hundred joys of the Gods by 
" birth are but one joy of Prajapati's world and of one learned 
"in the scripture and without falseness and free from desire; 
"and a hundred joys of Praj&pati's world are but one joy of 
" the Brahman-world, and of one learned in the scripture and 
"without falseness and free from desire. And this is the 
"highest joy, this is Brahman- world." 

(d) Death (4, 8, 85-4, 4, 2). 

" As a cart, when it is heavily laden, creaks as it goes, so 
"also this bodily Self, burdened by the Self of knowledge, 
"goes croaking [rattling], when one is lying at death's door. 
"And when he falls into weakness, whether it be through old- 
"age or sickness that he falls into weakness, then, as a mango- 
"fruit, a fig, a berry, lets go its stalk, so the Spirit lets go 
"the limbs and hastens backward, according to his entrance, 
" according to his place, back into the Life . . . And like as 
"to a king, when he will forth, the chiefs, and officers, and 
"charioteers, and rulers of villages gather together, so also, 
"at the time of his end, to the soul all life-organs come to- 
"gether, when one is lying at death's door. When, therefore, 
"the soul falls into swoon, and is as if it had lost all sense, 
"even then these life-organs gather themselves together to the 
"soul; and it takes up these force-elements into itself and 
"withdraweth to the heart; but the Spirit, which dwells in 
"the eye, returns outwards [to the sun, whence it descends, 
"cf. above p. 66]; then recognises he no more forms. Because 
"he has come to unity, therefore he sees not, thus it is said, 
"because he has come to unity, therefore he smells not, tastes 
"not, speaks not, hears not, thinks not, feels not, knows not 
"Then the point of the heart becomes luminous; from it, after 
"it has become luminous, the Soul departs, whether it be 

XII. The Brahman ai Soul. 193 

«through the eye, or through the skull, or through any other 
*^part of the body. As it departs, the Life also departs; as 
''the Life departs, all the life-organs depart with it It is of 
«the nature of knowledge, and what is of the nature of know- 
'^ ledge, departs after it" 

(e) The nnliberated Soal after Death (4, 4, 9—6). 

''Then knowledge and works take it [the soul] by the hand 
«and their newly gained experience" [if we may read apürva- 

«As a caterpillar, after it has reached the end of the leaf, 
«lays hold of another beginning and draws itself over to it, 
«so also the soul, after it has shaken off the body and let 
«Ignorance go, lays hold of another beginning, and draws 
«* itself over to it" 

«As a goldsmith takes the material of one piece of work, 
« and out of it hammers another, newer, more beautiful form,^^ 
«80 this soul also, after it has shaken off the body and let 
«Ignorance go, shapes itself another, newer, more beautiful 
«form, whether of the Fathers or the Gandharvas or the 
«Gods or Prajäpati or the Brahman or other beings." 

^Verily, this Self is the Brahman, consisting of Intelligence, 
«of Manas, of Life, of eye, of ear, consisting of earth, of 
«water, of wind, of ether, consisting of fire and not of fire, 
«of pleasure and not of pleasure, of anger and not of anger, 
«of righteousness and not of righteousness, consisting of all. 
« And according as anyone consists of this or of that, accord- 
«ing to his deeds and conduct, according to that is he bom; 
* he who does good will be bom as a good man, he who does 
«otU will be bom as an evil man, holy he becomes through 
«holy work, evil through evil. For verily it is said: 'Man is 
««altogether formed of desire (käma); and according as his 
«* desire is, so is his will (kratu), and according as his will 

9^ Compare Pythagoras in Grid. Met. XV, 169icq.: 
Utque novis faeilii iignatur cera figurUy 
Nee manet ut fuerat, nee forma» »ervat eoBdem, 
8ed tarnen ipea eadem est, animam »ie semper eandem 
Eeeet ted m wtria» doeeo migrare figuras, 


194 First Part: Theology or the Doetrine of BrahmAii. 

^ 'is, so performs he the work (Jcarman)^ according as he per- 
^ 'forms the work, so it befalls him«' — Thereon is this Terse: 

"Thftt he purtnes, and strides by deedi to reach« 
"Toward which his character and longing is, — 

** After he has received reward 
''For all that he has here performed, 
''He comes back from that other world 
" Into this world of deeds below." 

^Thus is it with him who desires (kämayamäna).^ 

(f) Liberation (4, 4, 6—1 

"Now as to him who desires not (akämayamäna)^: 
"He who is without desire, free from desire, whose desire 
"is stilled, who is himself his desire, his vital spirits do not 
"depart; but Brahman is he and into Brahman he resolves 
"himself. On this is this verse: 

"When every passion utterly is gone, 

"That larks and nestles in the heart of man, 

"Then finds this mortal immortality, 

"Then has he reached ihe Brahman, the Sapreme.'* 

"As the slough of a snake lies dead and cast away on an 
"ant-heap, so lies this body then; but the bodiless, the im- 
" mortal, the Life is Brahman only, is light only." — 

"On this are these verses: 

"A narrow path and old it is, which I have found and trod; 
"The sage, released, upon his way to heaven taked this road. 
"Whatever name you give to it, white, black, brown, red, or greea, 
"This is the only path for those who have the Brahman seen; 
"On this he goes, who Brahman knows, 
"And does the right, in form of light 

"The man who lives in Ignorance moves on to blindest gk>om; 
"To blinder still goes he who would by works escape his doom. 
"Yea joyless is this world for man and hidden in black night: 
"And to it after death he goes who hath not learned the right 

" But he whose mind the inner Self in Thought hath learned to grss^ 
"Why should he longer seek to bear the body's pain and woe? 
"For when a man in spite of all the stains of mortal sin, 
"The great awakening to the Self hath won, and learned to see, 
"Him as creator of the worlds, almighty ahalt thou know, 
" His is the universe, because the universe is he. 

XIL The Bffthman as Soul. 196 

*'Aiid while we yet are here below, may we this knowledge gain, 
**!£ not, illation cleaves to us, brings rain in its train. 
''For they who have the knowledge are immortal though they die, 
*'But they who have not gained it must return to misery. 

^'He who God's very self in his own bosom sees — 
''Lord of what was and is to come— no more he flees. 

*neath whose feet the mighty tide of days and years rolls past, 
^ In whom the fivefold host of things and space itself stands fast, 
" Whom gods as light of lights adore, as immortality, 
■'The Brahman know I as my deathless Self, for I am he. 

''Breath of the breath and very mind of mind, 
** Ear of the ear, and apple of the eye, 
" Who knoweth him as this hath truly seen 
^Old Brahman, who is from eternity. 

"Muting in spirit shall ye see: 
''That here is no plurality, 
"Their never ending death they weave, 
" Who here a manifold perceive. 

"The Atman is unchangeable, immense, a unity, 

" High above space and stain of sin, unchanging, great is he. 

"Muse upon him if thou wouldst wisdom find, 
"Use but few words. — They're weariness of mind." 

'^ Truly this great, unborn Self is that among the life- 
Morgans which consists of knowledge [as the spirit shining 
M inwardly]! Here, inwardly in the heart is a space, therein 
'^he lies, the lord of the universe, the ruler of the universe, 
«'the prince of the universe; he grows not higher through 
**good works, nor less through evil works; he is the lord of 
«the universe, the ruler of beings, the guardian of beings; he 
*^iB the bridge, which holds these worlds asunder, that they 
*" blend not [cf. above p. 162]." 

''Him the Brahmans seek to know through Yedic studies, 
M through offerings, alms, penances, and fasts; who knows him, 
* becomes a Muni To him the pilgrims go in pilgrimage, 
''when they long for home (lokay 

"This knew those of old, when they longed not for descen- 

"dants, and said: *Why should we wish indeed for descendants, 


196 First Part: Theology or the Doctrine of Brahman. 

'^'we whose self is this uniTorse?' And they ceased from the 
''longing after children, from the longing after possessions, 
''from the longing after the world and wandered forth as 
"beggars. For longing for children is longing for possessions, 
"and longing for possessions is longing for the world; for one 
"like the other is merely longing." 

" But He, the Atman, is not thus nor thus. He is incomprehen- 
"sible, for He is not comprehended, indestructible, for He is 
"not destroyed, unafifected, for nothing affects Him; He is 
"unfettered, He trembles not, He suffers no hurt" 

"[He who knows thus,] is overcome by neither, whether 
"he has therefore [because he was in the body] done evil or 
"whether he has done good; but he overcomes both; he is not 
"burned by what he has done or not done. This also says 
"the verse: 

''This is the eternal majesty of Brahman*s friend, 
"He doth not rise by works, nor yet doth he descend. 
*'Then follow after this; who after this hath toiled, 
"Will by his evil deed no more be stained and soiled.** 

"Therefore he who knows thus, is calm, subdued, resigned, 
"patient and collected; in his own Self only he beholds the 
"Self, he beholds all as the Self: evil doth not overcome 
" him, he overcomes all evil, evil doth not bum him, he burns 
"all evil; free from evil, free from passion, and free from 
"doubt, he becomes a Brähmana, he whose world is the Brah* 

"Thus spoke Yäjnavalkya. Then said the king: '0 holy 
"'man, I give thee my people in servitude and myself also.'" 

It might be thought, Qankara remarks on this section, 
that in it the individual soul is treated of, because towards 
the beginning and towards the end (under a and /) "that 
"among the life-organs which consists of knowledge" is spoken 
of (p. 330, 9); but we are rather to think of the highest soul 
all through, since in the passage concerning deep sleep and 
death it is distinguished from the individual soul, in the case 
of deep sleep, where it is said that the spirit is "embraced 
"by the Self of knowledge" (p. 331, 2), in the moment of death, 
where a burdening of the bodily self, that is, the individual 

XII. The Brfthman m Soul. 197 

soul, by the Self of knowledge, is spoken of (p. 331, 7). For 
that which is ^of the nature of knowledge" (präjfia) is [in 
direct contrast with the terminology of the Yedäntas&ra, of. 
note 82, p. 180] none other than the highest God, who is so 
called because he is eternally inseparable from omniscience 
(p. 331, 6). But with regard to the passage mentioned, at the 
beginning and the end, it is said there (under a): ''it is as 
'^though it meditated, it is as though it wavering moved," and 
(under/): ''truly this great, unborn Self is that among the 
'^ life-organs which consists of knowledge," clearly proving 
that the individual soul is mentioned here solely in order to 
teach its identity with the highest soul (p. 332, 1 — 6). Also 
the conditions of waking and sleep are mentioned only in 
order to shew the soul's freedom from them; for it is said 
(under b and c), that the Spirit is not troubled by the images 
in waking and dreaming, and again, that it is not troubled 
by good and evil (p. 332, 12), as also the king repeatedly 
breaks out into the exclamation [omitted by us]: "say what 
"higher than this, makes for liberation" (p. 332, 11). Lastly» 
the passages (under f) "the Lord of the Universe" etc., and 
"he grows not higher through good works" etc., shew that we 
are to think, not of the individual, but of the highest soul 
(p. 333). 

Xm. The Brahman as the highest Goal. 

1. Brahman as Object of Meditation. 

Satra8 1, 8, 18. 

Thb Meditation on the Brahman can be more or less 
perfect and accordingly, as is known from the passages ad« 
duced in Chap. VI (above p. 102 ff.), brings different fruit, 
namely, in part, earthly happiness, in part, heavenly though 
transitory felicity, in part, eternal union with Brahman. This 
thought is illustrated in the fifth section of the PraffM-Upa- 
nishad (p. 219 ff.) by the doctrine that, in the word ^om^" the 
symbolical bearer of the meditation on the Brahman, the three 
metrical moments (mäträ), of which it is supposed to consist 
(arUrin\ are distinguished. The meditation is more perfect 
in proportion as it extends to one, two, or to all three elements 
of the word "om,^^ The passage runs as follows: 

** Verily, o Satyakama, the sound *om' is the higher and the 
** lower Brahman. Therefore the wise, when he relies on it 
^ gains the one or the other." 

'^If he meditates on one element, enlightened by it, he 
^ comes [after death] quickly to the state of the living. The 
'^ ]^ig-hjmas lead him to the world of men; there he comes 
^to asceticism, pious life and faith and enjoys exaltation.'* 

"When in his thought he attains two elements, then 
"[after death] he is borne by the FajW-sentences upward into 
"the air to the Soma- world [to the moon]. After he has en* 
"joyed lordship in the Soma-world, he comes back again.** 

"But if, through all three elements of the sound 'om,* 
"he meditates on the highest spirit, then, after he has entered 
^into the light, into the sun, as a serpent is freed from its 

Xm. The Brahmftn M the highest Goal. 199 

** slough, BO he is freed from evil; hj the /SSman-songs he is 
^led upwards to the Brahman-world; then beholds he Him 
"who is higher than the highest complex of life, the spirit 
**who dwells in the city [the body] (puri-gayam purusham).^ 
It is a question, remarks Qankara, which of the two 
Brahmans, mentioned in the opening passage, is to be under- 
stood in the last paragraph, the higher or the lower? The 
spatial reference, which lies in the leading upward to the 
world of Brahman, speaks for the latter, and does not suit 
the higher Brahman (p. 245, 7; above p. 109). Nevertheless 
we must think of the higher Brahman because it is said ''he 
beholds," which can only refer to a reality, to the highest 
Brahman, as it is the object of perfect knowledge {samyag^ 
darganam) (p. 246, 6), while by the ''highest complex of life" 
Brahman in the form of the individual soul^^ must be imder- 
stood (p. 247, 1). In conformity with this also, in what has 
gone before, by the highest spirit, which is to be meditated 
on, the highest Brahman is to be understood (p. 247, 10), for 
meditation on it only brings the further mentioned deliverance 
from evil (p. 248, 4). But as to the reference to place, which 
lies in the leading upwards to the Brahman-world, it must be 
assumed that gradual liberation (kramamukti) is here taught, 
and that perfect knowledge is only communicated after the 
introduction into the Brahman-world (p. 248, 8), — ^though this 
last view is not quite in accordance with the doctrine of the 
system; as here the highest Brahman is to be understood, 
while on the contrary as we shall see later (Chap. XXXIX, 
4), gradual liberation applies only to the worshipper of the 
lower Brahman. 

M Somebody whose opinion ii introdaced very sbraptly p. 947, 8 
wiihas to refer the "highest complex of life" to the Brahman-world, a 
TMW which is neither approved of nor opposed in what follows, and has 
probably been interpolated into the text, so that the tatmät p. 847, 7 

originally connected immediately with 247, 9 (cf. above p. 29). 

200 Fir8t Part: Theology or the Doctrine of Brahman. 

2. Brahman as the Place of the Liberated. 

Sutras 1, 3, 1-7. 

In the Mu^daka-Upanishad 2, 2, 6 it is said: 

"The place in which the heavens, and earth, and mind, 
''The sky with ail the senses are entwined, 
^That place as nought but Atman shall ye know, 
"All other turns of speech shall ye forego >* 
" He is the bridge of immortality." 

Here, says Qankara, we might think of something other 
than Brahman, perhaps primordial matter, or the wind, or the 
individual soul, which in a certain sense could be called the 
place of things (p. 226), for the bridge mentioned seems to 
presuppose another shore (something outside it), which is not 
true of Brahman (p. 224, 8). But the place, in which the 
whole world is woven, can only be Brahman (p. 226, 10), as 
is shewn by the word Atman, which in its full sense is only 
valid for Brahman (p. 226, 1). The world is, of course, not 
related to it as the roots, trunk and branches to the tree 
(p. 226, 7), but is only a product of Ignorance (p. 226, 11); 
for the scripture warns us against accepting unreal plurality 
(p. 227, 3), when it is said (Käth. 4, 10. Brih. 4, 4, 19): 

"Their never ending death they weave, 
^'Who here a manifold perceive." 

What is said of the bridge, only means that Brahman keeps 
things asunder (cf. above p. 133. 162), not that He has another 
shore (p. 227, 10). But that Brahman alone can be the place, 
follows from the fact that He is afterwards indicated as the 
place to which the liberated go. For just this illusion that 
the I consists in the bodily nature, is Ignorance; the esteem 
of this body is Passion (räga), the despising of it is Hate, 
thoughts of injury to it are Fear, and so on according to 
the names of the host of the unreal (p. 228, 10). Liberation 
from all these defects is a going to the place which is hers 
spoken of; it is further said concerning it (Mui^4- S* St 8)- 

>* In the text the indicative stands: jdnatha, vimuficatha. 

Xni. The Brahman as the highest Goal. 201 

''He who this highest, deepest views, 
"For him the heart's knots are untied, 
"For him his doubts are all resolved, 
"His works all pass to nothingrness ; *' 

and again (Mupd. 3, 2, 8): 

"As rivers run, and in the deep, 
"Lose name and form, are lost to sight, 
"The sage released, from name and form, 
"Enters the highest spirit of light" 

Here neither primordial matter nor the wind can be spoken 
of (p. 230), nor yet the individual soul (p. 231, 1), which, by 
the words: ''This place alone you know the Atman is," is 
distinguished as subject from the highest soul as object 
(p. 231, 8). 

3. Brahman as Attainment of absolute Unity. 

Sutras 1, 3, 8-9. 

All knowledge, which is different from its object, is limited 
and not free; that knowledge only is unlimited and free, which 
knows itself as identical with the known. — This is the fun- 
damental thought of the Bhümorvidyä, the seventh section of 
the ChändogyarUpanishad (p. 473 — 527), whose chief contents 
are as follows. 

Närada prays Sanatkumdra to teach him; and, in answer 
to the question: what he already knows, enumerates the four 
Vedas and a long series of other sciences. In the conscious- 
ness of their insufficiency, he adds: '^I know, venerable one, 
*the Mantras [here the whole practical theology], not the 
*^Ätman [metaphysics]; for I have heard from those who are 
*^like thee, that be who knows the Atman is above sorrow; 
*but I, O Master, am sorrowful; lead thou me away from 

SanaOcumdrOy in bis teaching, takes the following course. 
All, he says, that thou hast learnt, is name, greater (bhüyai) 
than name is speech, than speech, understanding, than this, 
resolve, than this, thought, than this, knowledge, than this, 
force, than this, food, than this, water, than Üds, fire, than 
this, space, than this, memory, than this, hope, than this the 

302 First Fart: Theolog^T or the Doctrine of Brahman. 

life (or the breath, pram). ^As the spokes are fastened in 
''the nave, so all this is fastened in the life. The life prospers 
"through the life (breath), the life (breath) gives life, gives it 
''to life. The life is father and mother, the life is brother 
"and sister, the life is teacher and Brahman. Therefore, 
"when anyone roughly uses a father or mother or brother or 
"sister or teacher or Brahman, it is said: Fie on thee! thoa 
"art a parricide, matricide, fratricide, slayer of thy sister, 
"slayer of thy teacher, slayer of a Brahman [cf. I John JH 
"15 icSc i |iiod>v x&v iSeXcp&v aixou &v9p<DKOxx6yo( iotiv]; bat iC 
"after the life has fled, he pokes the same persons with the 
"pike [on the funeral pile] and bums them up, it is not said: 
"thou art a parricide, matricide, fratricide, slayer of thy sister, 
"slayer of thy teacher, slayer of a Brahman: for the life onlj 
"is this all. — Verily, he who thus sees and thinks and knows, 
"he is a conqueror in speech (ativädin); and if anyone should 
"say to him: thou art a conqueror in speech! he shall avow, 
"and not deny it." 

By life (pram) in this passage is to be understood, not as 
elsewhere frequently and also in the Ch&ndogya-Upanish&d 
itself (cf. above p. 147. 164. 177. 182) the highest Brah- 
man, but (perhaps in intentional polemic against this view) 
empirically "the life-principle (pram) shaped to the complex 
"of the subtle body, the PrajMtman [Brahman^ note 82] as 
"the central principle of the body, in which the highest gol- 
"head [Brahman] enters to the end of evolution in name and 
"form as the living self (as the individual soul, ^'»m ätman\ 
"like the image in the mirror." 'o — The result up to this is 
therefore only the highest point of the empirical view of the 
world, from which Sanatkumära seeks to lift his pupil to the 
metaphysical view, proceeding as follows: 

But he only is the true conqueror in speech, who conquers 
through the trutL The truth, therefore, must be investigated. 

*• Qaflk. on Ohand. p. 505, 15. Here ahonld be distingauhed 1. that 
which ii imaged {brahman, ätman), 9. the image of the mirror (/fattV 
8. the mirror {präna\ which however are all three at bottom om n 
Brahman. However the sense of the above scholion is in part obscir* 
and the translation unoertain. 

XUL The Brahman as the highest Ooal. 203 

Now the trath is based on knowledge, knowledge on thought, 
thought on faith, faith on certainty, certainty on action, action 
on pleasure [the inclination to do something, as determining 
the will]. 

Now pleasure, [thus the speaker continues, the idea of a 
single satisfaction, such as is felt after an action, leading him 
on to that of an absolute, final satisfaction] consists only in 
iUimitation (bhüman)^ not in the limited (dlpam). Now what 
is iUimitation? 

''When one sees no other [outside himself], hears no other, 
''knows DO other, that is iUimitation; when he sees, hears, 
"knows another, that is the limited. IUimitation is the im- 
"mortal, the limited is mortal." — "But on what is it based 
''then. Master?'' — "It is based on its own greatness, or, if you 
"will, not on greatness. For by greatness in this world one 
"understands many cows and horses, elephants and gold, 
"slaves and women, fields and lands. But this I mean not, 
"for here one is always based on the other." 

"But it [the iUimitation] is below and above, in the west 
"and in the east, the south and the north; it is this whole 

"Hence foUows for the consciousness of "I" (ahanJcara): 
"I (aham) am below and above, in the west and the east, the 
"south and the north; I am this whole world." 

"Hence foUows for the soul (ättnan): the soul is below and 
"above, in the west and the east, the north and the south, the 
"soul is this whole world." 

" He who sees and thinks and knows thus, rejoicing in the 
"soul, playing with it, uniting and delighting with it, he is 
"autonomous (8varäj)f and freedom (kämacära) is his in all 
"worlds; but they who regard it otherwise than thus, they are 
"heteronomous {anyaräjan)^ of transitory felicity, and unfree- 
"dom (akämacära) is theirs in aU worlds." — 

"Thus,'' it is said in conclusion, "he shewed him, whose 
"darkness was worn away, the shore beyond the darkness, he, 
"the holy Sanatkumäray 

Qa&kara's efforts, in connection with this passage, are 
directed to proving that, by iUimitation Brahman is to be 

204 Fint Part: Theology or the Doctrine of Brakmaa. 

nndentood, and not the preTionsly mentioned life. For al- 
though nothing higher follows after life in the series (p. 235, 41 
and who knows it is called a conqueror in speech (p. 236, S . 
although the description, also, that one ^sees no other outside 
himself" suits the life in the condition of deep sleep (p. 235. 
14), as also the terms as pleasure, immortal, Atman, could be 
understood of the life (p. 236), yet it is not the life; but odIj 
the highest Brahman which is to be understood by illimitation; 
for it is termed higher than deep sleep, that is, than the life 
in deep sleep (p. 237, 1) by the fsLCi that from him who knows 
the life, we are directed to him ''who through the truth con- 
quers in speech'' (p. 238, 10), while the first mentioned con- 
quest is unjustified (p. 239, 8). And as the truth spears 
further illimitation, that is, the highest soul different from the 
life (p. 240, 3); for to Him alone can apply the passage con- 
cerning the destruction of sorrow (p. 240, 6), as also the phrase 
''the shore beyond the darkness,'' that is, Ignorance (p.24J\ 
10), and the immense greatness, which lies in the idea of 
illimitation, and is only applicable to the highest God as the 
cause of all (p. 240, 14). To it applies also the unity of sub- 
ject and object, since the unity which arises in deep deep is 
also to be reduced to it (p. 241, 6). Lastly, to it refers also 
the term pleasure, since by it no pleasure enduring for a tine 
only (sämaya) is to be understood (p. 241, 12); as also the 
expressions such as immortality, truth, being based on its ovn 
greatness, omnipresent, and all-animating (p. 241, 16). 

XIV. Esoteric Theology. 

Sutras 8, 2, 11—37. 

1. Preliminary Kemark. 

HowEYEB sublime are the ideas of the Brahman, which up 
to this we haye gained from the Upanishads in pursuance of 
the selection made (not always quite happily) by Bädaräyai^a 
and Qankara, yet, in their figurative character, they fall short 
of satisfactorily fathoming to the full the being of the God- 
head. Because this was felt, to the theological part of the 
Brahmasütras is added a supplement, which has as its subject 
the esoteric Brahman, and, along with two other (psychological) 
supplements, is found in the sec ond Pada of the third Adhyaya, 
that is, after the Cosmology, Psychology and doctrine of trans« 
migration. Even if here and there a greater intelligibility is 
thereby gained, yet this gain is more than counterbalanced 
by the disadvantages inseparable from the treatment of the 
same subject in two widely severed passages; for this reason, 
ve here, as frequently, in our arrangement depart from that 
of the original work. 

The fundamental thought of the esoteric theology (cf. above \ 
p. 10S£ 115) is this, that Brahman strictly taken is without \ 
all differences (vifesha)^ attributes {guna)^ limitations" "[t<pqd>it) I 
andlor ms (amra) . — Tms "undiflefenirated Hfahman, as \\ 
we may briefly call it, has, however, two contraries: first / 
the forms of the phenomenal worlds as which Brahman, con- / 
ditioned by Upadhis, appears; then the imperfect figurative I 
ideas, which we form of the Godhead, in order to briu it / 
nearer to our understanding and our worship (upäsanä)^ It | 
is strange that between these two contraries of the undifferen- I 




206 First Part: Theology or the Doctrine of Brahman. 

tiated Brahman, however wide apart they naturally are, Qas- 
kara draws no sharp distinction, and even if according to one 
passage (p. 807, 6) it seems as if he saw in the phenomenal 
forms the basis (älanibanam) of the presentation-formSj yet fron 
the continual intermingling of the two, not only in the passage 
under consideration, but also in many other passages in the 
work 9 1 it follows that our author never became clearly conscious 
of the difference between themT^ Perhaps this was done morp 
by other Commentators, who, of the one Adhikara^am 3, 8, 
11 — 21, make two, of which the first (3, 2, 11 — 14) seems to 
have been directed against the manifoldness of phenomeDsI 
forms, and the second (3, 2, 15—21) against the plurality of 
the characteristics of Brahman, which Qankara (p. 818) dis- 
cards as aimless (vyartha), without our having been able 
completely to gather the opinion of the Opponent firom his 

Here, therefore, we are limited to reproducing Qankara's 
view, and the shortcoming indicated compels us to consider 
only from a certain distance the two contraries of the un- 
differentiated Brahman, which he confuses; this makes a clear 
insight into all details impossible. In other respects our coarse 
is such that we do not unnecessarily depart from the line of 
thought as arranged by our author. 

2. The differentiated and undifferentiated Brahman. 

Sutras 3, % 11—21. 

Concemiug Brahman there are, so Qankara expresses him- 
self, passages of scripture of two kinds; the passages of one 
kind teach Brahman as ' possessing differences, for example, 
when it is said: "All-working is he, all-wishing, all-smelling, 
all-tasting" (above p. 153), the others as devoid of differences, 
as in the passage: "That is not coarse nor fine, nor short 
nor long" (above p. 133). Now the highest Brahman in itself 

91 Thai the same confusion is ahready found in the 
which introduce the theological part (p. 110 — 114), and again very elcarlj 
p. 245, where in antithesis to the spaceless param brakma (p. 945» 7) 
appears as the aparam brahma the präna which rulee the body (p. 94&» lov 

XIV. EsoUric Theology. 207 

cannot be both, for it is not possible that one and the same 
thing in itself should be formed and formless (p. 803, 10). It 
is true that we might think that Brahman in itself is un- 
differentiated and becomes differentiated by Up&dhis (under 
which is to be understood eyerything which brings Brahman 
1. to phenomenal existence, 2. to presentation in the mind). 
But one thing cannot become another, by the fact that it 
appears to be connected with limitations: the crystal remains 
clear, even when it is painted with red colour (p. 803, 14); as 
it is only an error if it is taken to be red in itself, so in the 
case of Brahman also the limitation rests only on Ignorance 
(p. 804, 1). Therefore it is to be firmly held, that Brahman 
is free from all differences and perfectly unchangeable and 
not the contrary (p. 804, 3). 

How does it happen then, that, in many passages of scrip- 
ture, manifold forms are attributed to Brahman, since He is 
called sometimes four-footed, sometimes of sixteen parts, some- 
times dwarflike, sometimes having as body the three worlds, etc.? 
[p. 804, 9. Here and in what follows, the continual oscillation 
between phenomenal forms and forms of presentation should 
be noted.] Should we not perhaps admit that by the limitation 
a difference of form is actually brought about? For otherwise 
what is the purpose of the passages of scripture, which at» 
tribute differentiation to Brahman? — To this it is to be replied 
first, that every time that limitations appear, it is further 
said that Brahman is not affected by them [p. 805, 1 : for this 
an isolated example is adduced; in reality it is most frequently 
not the case]; and that in many passages (Kä(h. 4, 11. Brih. 
i, 4, 19. Qvet 1, 12) it is expressly asserled that there is no 
plurality, and that he who is predestined, what is predestined, 
and he who predestines are one in Brahman (p. 806, 13). At 
the same time it is to be noted that only the passages con- 
cerning the undifferentiated Brahman have as their aim, to teach 
the Being of God (p. 806, 7), while the passages concerning 
Brahman possessed of forms have another aim, namely worship 
^p. 806, 10). 

A few similes may elucidate the relation of Brahman to 
His phenomenal forms. As the light of the sun or the moon. 

208 Fint FatI: Theology or the Doctiina of Brshman. 

when it falls on the finger, shares in the finger's limitations, 
and in conformity with this, seems crooked when it is crooked, 
straight when it is straight» without in itself being crooked or 
straight, so also Brahman, when it is united with the limitatioi 
of the world of appearances, for example, of the earth, assumes 
its form, and on this is based (p. 807, 6) the apprehensioA 
of Brahman under different forms, as it is taught for the pur- 
pose of worship. It is therefore by no means purposeless; for 
all the words of the Upanishads haye a purpose and are 
authoritative (p. 807, 8). But this does not prevent this view 
from resting on Ignorance all the same; for on inborn Ignorance 
depends worldly action as well as that prescribed by the Yedas 
(p. 807, 12). 

Another simile is found in the Moksha-gastras: 

''Like SB thii san, whose being ia the light, 
*'Appean as manifold, in many streams, 
*'By limitation multiplied in space, 
"£*en so it is with the unborn Atman." 

And the following: 

"One soul of beings dwells in eyery being, 
*^ One and yet many, like the moon in wavee.*^ 

It is true, that the sun and the moon are formed and 
separated in space from their mirrored images, the Atman, 
on the contrary, is not formed (read mürto p. 810, 7) and not 
spatially separated from the limitations, but omnipresent aod 
identical with all (p. 810, 8), but no simile can be applied any 
longer, if we abandon the tertium camparatioms (vivaJakiiam 
ahgam); for if it were identical with the thing compared, then; 
would be no more comparison (p. 810, 13). It only affinns 
that Brahman, which is in the true sense unchanging and s 
unity, when it enters into limitation like the body and the 
rest, takes part, as it were, in the qualities of these limitations 
(p. 811, 6). 

But if Brahman in itself is so perfectly devoid of differences. 
how are we to explain the passages of scripture concemii^ 
Brahman as possessing differences (p. 813, 19)? — Some think 
they also teach the undifferentiated Brahman, since the reqnired 
annihilation of the phenomenal world must also be applied to 

XIV. Etoterie Theology. 20^ 

the forms of Brahman taught by them (p. 814, 3). Yet this 
procedure is only permissible when they appear in a passage 
which treats of the esoteric teaching (paravidyä)^ (p. 814, 4), 
but not where precepts of worship are spoken of (p. 814, 8). 
The passages which teach the nature of Brahman and those 
which prescribe worship of Brahman, must be kept separate 
thronghout (p. 815, 6). The former aim at liberation, the latter 
have as their fruit, according to the object, purification from 
Bins, attainment of lordship, or gradual liberation (p. 815, 5). 
And while the latter passages belong to the canon of precept, 
the former exclude all imperative elements, and aim only at 
the knowledge of the subject (p. 815, 10). 

What should the precept prescribe in the case of know- 
ledge of Brahman? Perhaps, to annihilate plurality, as one 
is ordered, by illuminating an object, to drive away the dark- 
ness (p. 816, 6)? — Then it must be asked: how is this an- 
nihilation of plurality to be thought of? Is it a real process, 
something like annihilating the hardness of butter, by putting 
it on the fire (p. 816, 10)? — But such an actual annihilation 
cannot be brought about by a mere man, and therefore cannot 
be ordered (p. 816, 15). Moreover in this case the whole 
pioraiity of earth etc would have been annihilated by the first 
man who reached liberation, and the Universe would stand 
empty (p. 817, 2). 

It must therefore be assumed, that the purpose is only to 
annihilate Ignorance which attributes to the one Brahman the 
ploraUty of appearances. But Ignorance is got rid of through 
teaching alone and without command (p. 817, 6), while a hundred 
commands without the teaching cannot remove it (p. 817, 9). 
Therefore, neither for the knowledge of Brahman nor for the an- 
iiihilation of plurality are commands of any use; on the con- 
trary both are accomplished by teaching alone (p. 817, 12). 

And for whom should the command to annihilate plurality 
hold good? For the individual soul? But it is annihilated 
along with it! Or the highest soul? But it cannot be com- 
aanded (p. 818, 1—4). 

It is true that it is said in the higher knowledge also: 
''this is to be seen!" (above p. 174). But the command here 



210 First Part: Theology or the Doctrine of Brahman. 

only means that it is to be brought before the eyes, and made 
the object of attention, not that it is to be known (p. 818, 7), 
Whether the latter happens or not, does not depend on a 
command, but on the quality of the object and the capacity 
for knowledge (p. 818, 12). If this were not so, if knowledge 
depended on will, it would be inexplicable that any one should 
go astray (p. 819, 1); but it depends not on the man, but oo 
the object, and can, therefore, not be commanded (p. 819, 4). 
If the scripture only commanded, then all in it that is not 
command, would have no meaning; it would, therefore, not 
explain (avyäcakshUa, optative with a privaUvum, p. 819, 8), 
that the knowledge of Brahman as soul cannot be commanded, 
but would command it to the man: but by this not only would 
one canon of commandments follow two opposite aims (works 
and teaching) and therefore be in contradiction with itself [it 
is difficult to see exactly why], but also liberation would be 
assigned to the sphere of meritorious works (adrishta) and 
therefore to something transitory (p. 820, 1). Finally, if the 
whole. contents of the Veda were included under the idea of 
commandment, this commandment would be in contradiction 
with itself, since on the one hand it would enjoin annihilation 
of plurality, and on the other a partial maintenance of it 
Therefore the imperative passages concerning differentiated 
Brahman and the non-imperative concerning undifferentiated 
Brahman must be kept separate from each other (p. 820>. 

3. Characteristics of the esoteric Brahman. 

Sutras 8, 2, 16. 17. 22. 

When Väshkali besought Bdhva to teach Brahman to him, 
the sage was silent. A second and third time this request 
was repeated. At last B&hva said: '^I am teaching it to thee, 
"but thou understandest it not; this Atman is silent" 

This narrative which Qankara p. 808, 11 gives as Qmti, 
though its origin is unknown to us (cf. note 24, aboTe p. 37:. 
finds its elucidation in different passages of scripture quoted 
along with it (p. 808) ; thus when it is said (Taitt 8, 4) : 

^'From him all word« turn back 
^And thoughts, not finding him," — 

XIV. Esoteric Theology. 211 

and in another passage (Eena 1, 3): 

'^ Other is it than all we know, 

^'And higher than the unknown, too;*' 

as also when the Smriii (Bhag. G. 13, 12, echoing Bigv. 10, 
129, 1) indicates Brahman as "neither the Existent, nor the 
non-Ezistent." But the full unknowableness of the original 
basis of things is most sharply expressed by the formula: 
""Neti, netir — "it is not thus, it is not thus",»^ which occurs 
in the Brihadarapyaka-Upanishad no less than fiye times 
(2, 3, 6. 3, 9, 26. 4, 2, 4. 4, 6, 16 and in a slightly different 
application 3, 2, 11). In the first of these passages it follows 
a statement of the two phenomenal forms {rüpe) of Brah- 
man, of which one is called "formed, mortal, at rest, being," 
the other "formless, immortal, in motion, belonging to the 
Beyond." The latter comprises the wind and the atmosphere, 
breath and the space within the body, the former everything 
else in nature and man. Both, according to Qankara (who 
subjects this passage to a lengthened consideration at 3, 2, 22 
p. 821^826), are denied of Brahman by the formula ^neti^ 
ntii"*'^ the knowledge of its true form consists in this, that all 
forms are denied to it (p. 824, 12), whether we refer the re- 
peated na iti to the two already adduced phenomenal forms 
(p. 825, 9) or to the phenomenal forms and the presentational 
fonns (p. 825, 10) or in general to everything that can be 
perceived (p. 825, 11). Therefore all objective existence is 
negatived of Brahman and only its non-objective existence as 
the inner Soul remains (p. 825, 14). TUs negation of all 
distinctions in Brahman means, however, [as Brahman alone 
is true being] a negation of the whole phenomenal world false- 
ly imposed on Brahman (p. 825, 15); therefore the formula 
«rfj, neti in Brih. 2, 3, 6 is explained by the words: "for out- 
^-side him — therefore it is said 'it is not so' — there is no other 
"beyond;'' but he himself is not not (p. 826, 6). 

Accordingly Existence remains as the sole characteristic 
of Brahman, and an Existence which is opposed to all empir- 

es für idam-arike'. "idam na, idam na'' (Govindai.anda p. 76, 21). 


912 First Part: Theology or the Doctrine of Brahman. 

ical Existence, so that, in comparison with this, it can jast 
as well be indicated as Non-existent (c£ above p. 129). 

But what are the positive characteristics of this esoteric 
Brahman which presupposes the negation of all differences? 
The later Yedanta names three of them, which form the 
famous name of * Brahman: Sac-cid-änandaf that is ^Ebdatence. 
Intelligence, and Bliss;" this compound which, as far as I know, 
occurs first in the Nrisinha-täpaniya-upanishad (Ind. St. IX 
60. 84. 143. 147. 148. 154) is nowhere found in Qankara's 
Commentary, and appears to be as yet unknown to our author. 
It is true that he repeatedly explains that, where Brahman 
is spoken of as Bliss, this limitation refers to the esoteric 
attributeless Brahman (p. 127, 16. 868, 11), but here, in the 
strictly esoteric part, this is not spoken of, perhaps, because 
Qankara counts it among the negative limitations as freedom 
from suffering; thus besides Existence, as the only positive 
Quality of the esoteric Brahman, remains intelligence; p. 808, 2: 
r^The scripture explains, that the undifferentiated Brahman is 
^^pure intelligence and free from all that is different from it. 
^for it says (Brih. 4, 6, 13): 'as a block of salt has no [dis- 
^ 'tinguishable] inside nor outside, but through and through 
"'consists only of salt taste, so also this Atman has no [dis- 
'^ Hinguishable] inside and outside but consists throughout 
^ 'altogether of intelligen ce.' p Chat is: this Atman is through* 
''out nothing but intelligence; intelligence is its exclosive 
" (nirantara) nature, as the salt taste is, of the lump of salt* 
What relation have the only two remaining characteristics 
of Brahman, Existence and Intelligence (bodha), to eac:. 
other?— The treatment of this question, expounded by other 
Commentators of the Brahmasütras, Qankara dismisses as 
purposeless (p. 812, 10) and on this point remarks as follows; 
(1) Brahman cannot be Existence without Intelligence, because 
this contradicts the passage of scripture (just quoted), aad 
because otherwise he would not be the self of the individoil 
soul, which is by nature intelligent; (2) not Intelligence with» 
out Existence either, because this is impossible; (3) and just 
as little Existence and Intelligence in their separate characten« 
because this would give rise to a plurality, which cannot exist 

XIV. Eioterio Theology. 213 

in the case of Brahman; it therefore only remains that (4) 
Existence is the same as Intelligence, and Intelligence the 
same as Existence (sattä eva bodho, bodha' eva ca sattäf p. 813, 
7), so that between the two there is no mutual exclusion. 
*^ Thus one might say," adds Qankara, passing oyer, as secondary, 
this question which is so interesting for us. 

We may, however, point out in connection with this, that 
both ideas in the End are resolvable into that of Force. All 
existence, in its essence, is nothing but a manifestation of 
Force and all Knowledge may be considered as a reaction 
against the crowd of impressions, and therefore as an activity 
of Force. That the Indian caitanyam comes very close to 
this idea, we have already remarked above (p. 69), and we 
shall encounter the proofs of it again in the course of the 

4. On the Possibility of Knowin'g the esoteric 


Sütrat 8, 2, 28—30.; 

However much we may agree with the Yedänta, when it^ 
holds that a fathoming of Being-in-itself is only possible in 7 
our own ''I", and, in its metaphysics, pushes aside everything / 
objective, and relies on the Subject only, we can as little ' 
agree with it when, disregarding the objections of the opponent, 
which we became acquainted with above p. 135 fif. it finds the 
last basis of Being in the Subject of Knowledge. The 
consequence is, that the Vedänta denies itself an immediatel 
insight into the essence of things; for the subject of knowledge I 
can never become the object for us, precisely because in| 
every cognition it must take the place of subject — We shall 
see now how, notwithstanding tbis, the Indian was able to find 
a way of perceiving the subject, the spirit. Brahman. 

At first our authors admit the objections thus raised as 
to the perceptibility of Brahman: Brahman is the ünmanifest 
{avyakiam)^ not perceptible, because in all perception it is, 
assomed as the witness (säkshin), that is, the knowing subject 
of knowledge (p. 827, 3). Yet there remains a possibility of 
knowing God: the Yogin^ that is, here, he who has become 

214 First Pari: Theology or the Doctrine of Brahman. 

one with God, sees him in the condition of Samrädhanam, 

literally: perfect satisfaction, which Qankara explains as a 

sinking oneself (prd-ni-dhänßm) in pious meditation (p. 827, 10). 

This condition the scripture (Käth. 4, 1) describes as follows: 

"The Self-existent pierced the openings 
^ Of senses outwards, therefore a man looks 
^On ontward things, not on the inner sool;— 
^A wise man saw, with backward-tamed eye, 
**The inner Self, longing for deathlessness.** 

But does not the division of subject and object exist here 
also, between him who sinks himself, and that in which he 
sinks himself (p. 828, 6)? — Our authors answer this question 
¥rith a negative, but, as the basis of their view, can only bring 
forward similes and passages of scripture. They begin by 
reminding us that this division only exists in virtue of the 
limitations (upddhi) (p. 828, 11), and that these rest on Ignorance, 
after the dissipation of which the individual soul is identical 
vnth the highest soul (p. 829, 3); they compare this identity 
with that of the serpent and its coils (p. 830, 1), the sun and 
its light (p. 830, 5), they insist that the liberation, which con- 
sists in thus becoming one, would be impossible, if we held 
the separation to be in the strictest sense real (p. 830, 13) 
and conclude from the scripture, that, with the annihilation 
of plurality, only the knower in us, and therefore the Atman, 
remains as the unit (p. 831, 7); — but an explanation of this 
unification of subject and object (as it actually takes place in 
the phenomena of aesthetic contemplation and religious devotionj 
cannot be obtained from their discussions. 

5. uncertain figurative Expressions used of Brahman. 

For sake of completeness, we may here briefly touch on 
the section 3, 2, 31 — 37, in which, in the form of an appendix, 
are discussed certain expressions, which apparently do violence 
to the negation of all Being outside Brahman, and to Brah- 
man's permeating all, and being omnipresent. 

1. Brahman is called ** the bridge which holds these worlds 
asunder," (above p. 162, cf. p. 133), and by a bridge is gene- 
rally understood an aggregate of wood and earth, for the 

XIY. Eioterie Theology. 916 

purpose of crossing a continuous mass of water (p. 833, 2); 
even a trayersing of this bridge is spoken of, and all this 
seems to presuppose something else outside Brahman (p. 832, 
4). — To this it is to be answered, that Brahman is only com- 
pared to a bridge, because He holds asunder (p. 834, 12) the 
world and its boundaries (or orders, such as castes, A^ramas, 
etc., p. 268, 1), as the bridge does the banks [according to the 
primitive idea just quoted, howeyer, it does not]; and the 
traversing of the bridge (above p. 162) means only the attain- 
ment of Brahman, as it is said: ''he has gone through the 
grammar," in order to express the fact that he has gained 
mastery of it (p. 834, 16). 

2. Further, Brahman has numbers and measures repeatedly 
applied to Him, such as " four-footed, eight-clawed, of sixteen 
parts," which seems to presuppose a limitation, for everything 
that can be measured is of limited size (p. 839, 9). — But this 
is only to bring it nearer to our [limited] understanding, as 
Bädar&yava says, our worship, as Qankara adds in explanation 
(p. 835, 1. 4); for it is not possible for man to seize the un- 
changing, the endless (p. 836, 7). 

3. A connection between the highest and the individual 
soul and again (in the passage discussed in Chap. IX, 6, above 
p. 140) a division (conditioned by it) within Brahman is re- 
peatedly spoken of, in virtue of which two parts of it are 
defined along side of each other like the kingdoms of Mägadha 
and Vaiddia (p. 832— 833).— But both exist only from the 
point of view of the UpddhiSy the relation of which to Brahman 
has already been discussed (p. 836, 7). The connection of the 
individual soul with Brahman is in reality an entering of the 
soul into its own Self (p. 836, 16), and the division within 
Brahman is no more real than that between cosmic space and 
the space within the body (p. 837, 6). Therefore it is proved 
that outside Brahman nothing is (p. 837, 10), that Brahman is 
in everything (p. 837, 16) and omnipresent (p. 838, 3). 





XV. Preliminary Remarks and Arrangement 

As before, our efforts will be directed, in the further course 
of our work, to the most faithful reproduction of the thoughts ' 
of Badar&yapa and Qankara; we shall therefore abstain from 
all liberties with these thoughts and shall indicate unmistake- 
ably as such our own incidental remarks. This fidelity ex- 
tends to the whole material content of the work which we have 
to analyse, but not to its form as well; we take the thoughts 
as we find them, but in their arrangement and systematic 
connection, we allow ourselves to be guided only by the inner 
necessity which lies in the coordination of thought itself; this 
frequently compels \is to deviate considerably from the arrange- 
ment of the original work. 

That the latter does not in fact correspond to the nature 
of the subject, is due to several causes. To begin with, the 
tendency of the Brahmasütras is chiefly polemical. The con- 
troversy with the opponents of the Yed&nta teaching, which 
we, in following out our present aim, only introduce when it 
sheds new light on the system itself, is put in the foreground 
by our authors; while the most essential dogmas not seldom 
receive a subordinate treatment, just because they are not 
new and strange to Indian thought, as they are to us, but are 
matters of common currency and to a certain extent self- 
evident. Moreover it is the chief endeavour of the philosophers 
of the Yedänta to derive all their teachings directly from the 
Veda, and only in passing and as an appendix to show their 
rational basis although this is by no means lacking; thus what 
is really the fundamental idea often appears as a dependent 
thought Besides this it is characteristic of Indian philosophers, \ 
that on the one hand they exhibit wonderfully profound' 


220 Second Fart: GoBmology or the Doctrine of the Worid. 

conceptions reached by no other people of antiquity, and at 
the same time, on the other hand, a total lack of feeling for 
sesthetic form; in consequence of this they constantly allow 
themselves to drift without organising their material and are 
chiefly guided by the desire to find a pro and contra for eTeiy 
question, thus satisfying a highly deyeloped taste for dialectic 
disputation, whether this leads to an explanation of the sub- 
ject, or merely hinders and confuses if The consequence 
is, that the same fundamental thoughts are dealt with again 
and again to the point of weariness, without a true insight 
into their connection with the system as a whole, and thereby 
an insight into the thoughts themselves, being gained after alL 

If while reproducing the content of the system of the 
Yedänta we did not at the same time refrain from reproducing 
its external form as it comes before us in the Brahmasütras, 
it would be difficult to perceive the excellence of Indian 
thought; Colebrooke's praiseworthy study has had so little 
effect, for the sole reason that, apart from its brevity and the 
(very questionable) introduction of different commentaries, it 
confines itself to unmethodical extracts from the original work; 
by this course a full insight into the inner unity of the system 
I is lost, not only by the reader, but even by the writer him- 
self; the outline of the teaching according to the Vedänta-sära, 
which was added as an appendix from a sense of this deficiency, 
cannot supply it, because it builds up the system on a basis 
essentially different from that of Qankara. 

The confusion in the treatment of the work on which we 
are engaged, is nowhere more noticeable than in the departs 
ment of Cosmology, treated in 1,4, 23 — 2, 3, 16, along with 
which are to be taken the conclusion of 2, 4 and 3, 2 (namely 
2, 4, 20—22 and 3, 2, 38--41) and certain sections of the 
Division on Transmigration 3, 1 (e. g. 3, 1, 20—21. 3, 1, 84). 

In Chapter YI and the translations from 4, 3, 14 which are 

** Great as is the resemblance in thii, to the Scholasticinii of the 
Middle Ages, yet in other ways the contrast is as great: there we have 
the Bible, here the Veda (cf. note 62), there Aristotle, here origiiail 
thought, there a compolsary belief, here a ehoice of the Yedie basis from 
free conviction. 

XV. Preliminary Remarks and Arrangement. 221 

added to it as aa appendix, we have shown the existence of 
the antithesis between the exoteric and esoteric doctrine in 
all parts of the system. If this antithesis exists, it cannot of 
coarse fail to be decisive for the disposition of the materials. 
Bat this is not the case with our authors: in their Section on 
Cosmology they give a general sketch of the exoteric teaching 
as to Creation, thereby involving themselves in a series of 
contradictions, which they seek to explain by appeals to the 
esoteric teaching, and then go on quietly with their empirical 
picture of the universe, just as if nothing had happened, while 
the whole realism on which this picture rests has been again 
and again overthrown and exposed in all its inadequacy. 
Nowhere do we find sharp lines of demarcation; but rather 
we have a tendency (very pronounced in the passage above 
page 110) to explain the exoteric passages of Scripture in the 
sense of the esoteric, an attempt which, especially in the Section 
on Cosmology, has given rise to an enquiry, as difficult as it 
is unsatisfactory, into the idea of causality. 

In order to bring clearness into the subject, and yet in no 
wise to do violence to our authors, we shall first of all treat 
of Brahman as Creator (Chap. XVI), and then (Chap. XVII) 
of the creation of nature, taking both in the exoteric sense, 
after which the few traces of natural science scattered here 
and there in the work can be gathered together. In another 
chapter (XVIII) we shall bring together all the problems 
that occur on our way, whose explanation our authors have 
reached by passing over to the esoteric teaching as to nature. 
Before we turn to the latter, we must deal further with our 
philosophers' conceptions of the idea of causality (Chap. XIX), 
for in it they find the justification of the esoteric teaching of 
the identity of the world with Brahman, apart from purely 
theological arguments. Only after explaining this doctrine of 
identity (Chap. XX), can the problems raised three chapters 
earlier find the solution dependent on this doctrine, according 
to the materials existing in the original work (Chap. XXI). 

XVI. Brahman as Creator of the World. 

1. The Motive of Creation. 

Sutras 2, 1, 32-33. 

We have learnt to know Brahman as an intelligent being; 
as such, he seems to require a motive for his actions. For 
we see in life that an intelligent being, who thinks before he 
acts, for example a human being, prepares for no undertaking, 
whether great or small, unless a motive leads him to it (p. 488, 
12). The application of this rule of experience to Brahman 
is, as it seems, confirmed by the scriptures, when they teach 
(above,''p. 173) that the world is dear to him not for the world's 
sake, but for the sake of his own self (^^489^2). — If we ascribe 
to God a motive which determined him to create, this contra- 
dicts his all-sufficiency (paritriptatvam)^ but if we do not ascnbe 
such a motive to him, creation becomes impossible (p. 489, 6). 
— Or shall we take it for granted that Brahman, like a thought- 
less maD, proceeded to create at random, and without a motive? 
This again would contradict his omniscience (sarvajfiatvam). 

We must then take it for granted that, as a prince or 
some great man who has all that he requires, undertakes 
something without a motive, purely for sport and pastime 
(p. 400, I), or as outbreathing and inbreathing go on by 
themselves, without external motive (p.49Q^2), so too God created 
the world of himself and without a motive, purely for sport 
{tüä^ist the iraTc ic«iC«»v of Heraclilus ) ; for a further motive 
is not to be found by reflection or revelation of the scriptures ** 


u Sach a motive is certainly to be found in the sytiem, «ad oar 
author does not find it only becaaso he cannot separate the idea of a 
motive from that of personal (egoistic) interest. According to the Vcdlnta, 

XYL Brahman aa Creator of the World. 283 

and it is impossible to ask God himself about it ( 4L14 9 O, 8 ). 
MoreoTer it is only to us that the arrangement of this terrestrial 
disk appears snob a difficult thing, for Ood, on the contrary, 
through the power of his immeasurable omnipotence, it is mere 
sport (pr490r6). And if in life a slight motiye must be 
present even for sport, for God we need assume nothing of 
the sort, for the scripture forbids us to attribute any desire 
to him (p. 490, 9)."" That he could* not for this reason proceed 
to act, is contrary to the teaching of the scripture concerning 
creation; that he acted without thought, and by chance, is 
contrary to the teaching concerning his omnisci encd (pi 490> 11). 
AboTe idl (thus Qankara concludes this section), we must 
not forget that the whole teaching as to creation refers to 
this world of names and forms, founded on Ignorance, and it 
has really only the aim of teaching the identity of nature with 
Brahman (p. 491, 1); — an observation that will also hold good 
for what we haye to put forward further, and which arises 
from the endeaTOur to hold fast to the exoteric teaching of 
of the scripture as completely valid. 

2. Brahman is the efficient and at the same time 

the material Cause of the World. 


Sutras 1, 4, 23—27. 

Brahman was defined at the outset of this work (1, 1, 2) 
as *^th(U by which the world originates^ etc. (subsists, and 
perishes)," (c£ the definitions above p. 123), and therefore as 
the cause of the world. The word ''Cause", however, may 
mean two things, either the material cause (prakrith upä- 
dänam)^ or the efficient cause (nimittam); so the cause of 
the vessel is, on one hand, the clay, and on the other the 
potter, that of the golden ornament is on one hand the gold, 

it ia the inner destination of this world to become the stage for the 
reward of the deeds of an earlier existence, and th^ c)iain of these 
existences stretches back for each individual ad infinitum. According to 
theae earlier deeds alone, God apportions weal and woe; and in them 
alone is to be sought the reason that he must create the world anew 
after each disappearance; for the fruit of deeds done outlasts that dis- 
appearance and requires each time a new creation for their explanation. 

224 Second Fart: Oosmology or the Doctrine of the World. 

and on the other the goldsmith (p. 396, 10). — The qnestion is, 
in which sense is Brahman to be regarded as the cause of 
the world? 

It might be thought that Brahman can only be held to be 
the efficient cause of the world, because it is said of him, 
before he proceeds to create: ''he intended'' (above p. 135), 
and because he is called ''the Lord" (tfvara)] both these seem 
only to apply to an efficient cause (p. 397, 6, 8). — To this is 
added, that cause and effect must be of like nature; the world, 
however, is manifold, unspiritual, and unclean (p. 397, 10), which 
does not apply to Brahman and seems to require a material 
cause besides him, which shall possess these qualities« 

The answer to these considerations is, that Brahman is 
both the efficient and material cause of the world (p. 398, 3). 

The proof of this assertion, in the introductory passage of 
the Cosmology which we here treat of, is purely theological 
(based on references to passages of the Yedas) and, from the 
point of view which we now occupy, cannot be otherwise, 
because (quite apart from the consideration raised, as to the 
unUkeness of nature of the world and Brahman, which is here 
passed over by our author, and only taken up again, and 
brought under consideration, in a later discussion, cf. Chap. 
XVIII, 1, a) a solution of the idea of matter, from the em- 
pirical standpoint, which we have not yet transcended here, is 
impossible, for the only true consequence of this standpoint 
would be the eternal duration of matter. 

Under these circumstances, it is comprehensible that Qan- 
kara here contents himself with references to the scripture 
according to which, with the knowledge of Brahman, all is 
known, and in which Brahman is compared to the clay, all 
the transformations of which are also clay; as, for example, it 
is expressly said: Before the beginning of creation, there was 
one only, without a second. Brahman desired to become mani- 
fold, he himself made himself, he is the birthplace of beings, 
he limits them from himself, and reabsorbs them into himself^ 
as the spider with her thread, etc. etc. (p. 398—403). In con- 
clusion, our author disposes of the objections given above, and 
the appeals to experience, by the explanation (translated above 

XVI. Brahman aB Creator of the World. 226 

p. 93), that we need not here remain in accord with experience, 
for here we have not to do with an object of rational know* 
ledge (anumänam)t but with revelation (403, 7), and further 
refers to subsequent investigations. 

3. Brahman creates without Instruments. 

Sutras 2, 1, 24-25. 

Widely separated from the enquiry treated of above, al- 
though in fact standing in close relationship with it, and even 
in part coinciding with it, is the question of the instruments 
which Brahman uses. As the demonstration was reached 
there by quotations from the Veda, so it is here reached by 
examples from nature; if it is (from the cause stated above 
p. 224) no less inadequate on this account, it still possesses a 
certain interest, because it contributes to make clear the view 
of nature held by the Hindus; for this reason we give the 
Adhikarapam in question 2, 1, 24 — 25 (p. 475 — 479) almost 
word for word: 

It might be objected that it is not feasible to assume the"^ 
spiritual Brahman alone and without a second as the cause I 
of the world, because in order to mould anything, all kinds I 
of instruments are needed; thus in actual life the potters etc./ 
when they wish to make vessels take all kinds of things, as I 
the clay, the stick, the wheel, or thread as instruments, and! 
thos we cannot assume that Brahman created the world witl^ 
out instruments. We reply to this, that creation takes place 
by the specific quality of the substance {dravya'SvabhAvor 
viQeshäd^ that is, Brahman) in much the same way that the 
change of milk into curds or water into ice takes place with- 
out exterior instruments. Certainly warmth assists in turning 
milk sour, still the milk follows nothing but the laws of change 
inherent in itself, and the process is only hastened by the 
warmth. Were the power to become sour not already in the 
milk, the warmth could not help it to change; since, for 
example, wind or ether cannot be changed to curds by warmth. 
The addition of the means onl)* completes the process; but 
even such a completion is not needed in the case of Brahman, 


226 Second Part: Cosmology or the Doctrine of the World. 

for he possesses all the necessary powers (gäkti of which im- 
mediately) perfect within himself. 

It is true that milk etc. are unintelligent substances, and 
we see that beings with intelligence, like potters etc., call in 
the aid of instruments. Thus we may suppose it to be with 
Brahman, as he also is an intelligent being. — To this can be 
opposed the fact that gods also, and ancestors, and Rishis, 
who are certainly beings possessed of intelligence, through 
their own power, without external means, according to their 
innate sovereignty, and through meditation alone, creat many 
variously shaped bodies, palaces, carriages etc., as the fiymns 
and Brahmanas as well as the epic and mythological works 
attest. Further, we must remember that the spider puts forth 
her thread from herself, that female cranes become fee- 
tilised without seed, and that lotus-flowers wander from onr 
pond to another without outward J means of transit The ap- 
plicability of these comparisons may be contested, because the 
gods accomplish their deeds only by taking bodily forms to 
aid them, and not by the spiritual Self alone, because the 
saliva of the spider, after it has been stiffened by eating 
smaller creatures, becomes threads, because the female cranes 
are fertilised ^^ when they hear the voice of the thunder, 
because the lotus-flowers do not wander among the ponds by 
means of their unintelligent bodies, but precisely because they 
are endowed with intelligence, as climbing plants find their 
way to trees; — but to all this we^can reply that the creatures 
named do not, like the potter, use [external instruments in 

95 p. 477, 15: baläkä ca antarena eva Qukram garbham ihatte\ p. 768* 
6: baläkä apt antarena eva retah-aekam garbham dhatta\ Hi loht rüähih\ 
p. 478, 8: baläkä ca stanayHnu-rava-Qravanäd garbham dhatte, Theae 
indications may serve to clear np the passage Meghadüta v. 9, which, as 
appears from Stenzler's note on page 29, has hitherto been nnderstood 

garbha-ädhäna^kshana-paricapän nünam äbaddha'-mäläh 
sevishyante nayana-subhagam khe bhavantam baiäkäh 

" Surely wilt thoa [0 Cloud], when thou floatest in the air, rejoicing the 
"eye, be honored by the female cranes in their serried ranks, because 
" they conclude (coUigunt) [from thy arising] that the moment for reoeiv- 
^'ing the fruits of the body [in the tempest] draws near.*' 

XVI. Brahman as Creator of the World. 227 

their activity, and that, like them, Brahman does not, in creat* 
ing, use any outward means to assist himself, which is what 
we wished to arrive at. 

— The defective knowledge of nature, and the weakness of 
the arguments on this [ground require no further comment, 
besides the examples we have given. 

4. Brahman and the Powers of Nature. 

Sutras 2, 1, 30 and 1, 3, 30. 

In all considerations of this section, it |is well to keep in 
mind that the Indian idea of creation differs essentially from 
our own. For whilst by creation, we understand something 
done once for all, and therefore at a given time, the conscious- 
ness of the Yedäntin is dominated by the concept that from 
eternity to eternity the world periodically emerges from and 
again returns to Brahman; and it emerges and returns times 
without number: ''the past and future world-periods (kalpa) 
are measureless," as the Purä9a passage quoted on p. 496, 10, 

But how comes it that the world, through all its new 
creations, remains the same in character? — This question 
compels us to seek the basis of this uniformity in Brahman 

Further: how can the manifold manifestations of the world 
arise from the uniform Brahman? — For this muUiplicUyf there 
must also be a sufi&cient reason in Brahman. 

In these postulates we must seek for the motive of the 
manifold powers ((oftti), which Brahman contains, the resem- 
blance of which to the Platonic teaching of ideas we have 
already referred to, above pp. 69 — 70. 

This valuable thought is unfortunately only slightly de- 
veloped in our system; it only appears sporadically, and its 
position is uncertain; sometimes the powers of Brahman appear 
simply as the expression of his omnipotence, sometimes they 
mean the fructifying power of those things which, at the de- 
struction of the world, enter as a germ into Brahman, to come 
forth again at the new creation. We will briefly gather 


228 Second Fart: Cosmology or the Doctrine of the World. 

together what is to be found scattered here and there, on this 

^That the uniform Brahman produces the diverse mani- 
festation of the phenomenal world/' so is stated on p. 486, 10. 
^is to be explained through His providing Himself with Tarious 
powers.** To prove this, certain Vedic passages are mentioned, 
which, however, do not appear to assert anything more than 
the omnipotence of Brahman ('all-working is he, all- wishing, 
all-smelling, all-tasting'): Brahman is furnished with all powers 
(p. 1126, 8), is connected with the unfolding of many powers 
(p. 446, 11), the Igvara possesses innumerable powers (p. 490,8), 
as appears from his being the cause of the origin, subsistence, 
and destruction of the world (p. 1126, 1); these powers with- 
out which Brahman could not create (p. 342, 6), are deduced 
from the multiplicity of their effects (p. 486, 2); as to their 
relation to Brahman, from the expression used on p. 476, 8. 
that Brahman ^ is filled with powers/' (paripürnagaktikam)^ we 
may conclude that these powers are believed to be immanent 
in Brahman. 

The Scripture (Qvet. 1, 3) leads to the assumption of one 
power of the highest 6od^ which orders and creates the whole 
world (p. 368, 6). It is this godlike power not unfolded in 
name and form, which is the original state (präg-aviisthä) of 
names and forms (p. 368, 10) ] in this original state, the nov 
manifested world existed before manifestation, in a state of 
seed-force (ttja-^akti-avasthä, p 341, 9); ''if" (it is said <m 
p. 342, 2 in the polemic against the S&nkhyas) *^ we acknow« 
''ledged a self-subsisting original state of the world as cause, 
*^ we should make room for the assumption of a material cause 
''(of the world); we assume though that this original state of 
"the world was not self-subsisting, but dependent on the highest 
" Qod. Such we must of necessity take it to be, and on good 
"grounds. For without it, the creative work of God is im- 
"possible, for an activity of God devoid of his powers is an- 
" thinkable . . . This unmanifested (avyaktam) seed-force, as 
"it is called, resting in the highest God, is in its inherent 
"charact(T Ignorance (avidyä), a deep sleep produced br 
^ «lamour (niäyä) in which lie those wandering soola, who hart 

XVL Brahman as Creator of the World. 229 

^'not awakened to the knowledge of their real nature [the 
''knowledge of their identity with Brahman]." 

According to these passages, it appears that 1. the creatiye 
power of Brahman, 2. the seed-forces of things, and 3. in- 
diridoal souls existing hy means of their subtle bodies^ are 
all confused together in the indeterminate idea of the powers 
of Brahman. We have already seen (above p. 70) that these 
powers were not annihilated at each destruction of the world, 
but remained in existence as its root (p. 303, 1), and in such 
a way that their character remained unchanged (p. 303, 2). 
From this, it follows, that in spite of the continual destruction 
of the world, the same elements (earth, etc.)f the classes of 
beings (gods, men, animals), and the worldly distinctions (castes 
and A^ramas), come forth anew (p. 303, 4). 

The multiplicity of these powers does not contradict the 
unity of Brahman who contains them, since the power of 
multiplying (vtbAd^a-foMi), before and after the existence of 
the world, as well as the tendency to multiplicity {vibhägor 
vyavahära), during the existence of the world, rest on false 
perception {mithyäjfiänam) (p. 433, 13); as we shall see more 
in detail, in the esoteric cosmology. 

XVIL The exoteric Picture of Creation. 

1. OeneraL 

Two passages of the Upanishads, which we now give, are 
the main standards for the ideas of the creation of the world.^ 

1) Taittiriya-Upanishad 2, 1: ** Truly from this Atman the 
^ Akäfa came forth; from the Akä^a, the wind; from the wind 
^fire; from fire, water; from water, the earth; from the earth, 
"plants; from plants, nourishment; from nourishment, seed: 
''from seed, man." 

2) Chändogya-Upanishad 6, 2, 2—3, 2: ''Existent, alone, dear 
" one, was this in the beginning, one alone and without a second. 
"It conceived the idea (aikshata): 'I will become manj, I will 
"'propagate myself; so it created fire (^^os).— This fire con- 
ceived the idea: 'I will become many, I will propagate my 

" 'self; so it created water. Therefore, when a man is hot 
"and sweats, from the heat arises water. — This water con- 
"ceived the idea: *I will become many, I will propagate mj- 
" 'self; so it created food. Therefore, when it rains, much 
"food arises, for from water arises the nourishment that nun 
" eats. — In truth, these beings have three sorts of seeds (I e^ 
" origins), those bom from the egg, those bom alive, and tho$e 

9A A third important passage, Aitareya^JJp» 1, 1, is only tonc^«^ 
upon incidentally in 3, 3, 16—17, and plays no farther part in the ayttem. 
We give the beginning of this passage here, for the take of eomparisoa ' 

^ Truly, this world was Atman alone in the beginning; there vtf 
*' naught else there to open the eyes. He conceived the idea: *I will now 
*** create worlds.' Then he created these worlds; [they are:] the floods. 
*" the rays, death, the waters [Qafikara reads p. 871, 6 mara\ 6pa»]. Yooder 
''is the flood, beyond the heavens; heaven is its support; the ray« are th< 
''atmosphere; death is the earth; underneath are the waters.** 

XYII. The Exoteric Picture of Creation. 231 

"born from the germ. That deity conceived the idea: * Verily, 
^ • I will enter into these three deities (fire, water, food), with 
^'this living Self [the individual soul], and spread forth into 
** ^ names and forms; and I will make each one of them three- 
*** fold.'— Then that deity entered into these three deities, with 
" this living Self, and spread forth names and forms; and each 
^one of them it made threefold" [of this, later]. 

As we see, in the first place five elements, Akaga, air, fire, 
water, and earth, are mentioned, but in the second, only the 
last three. Our authors detailed discussion of the absence of 
contradiction in this, because in the second, Akä^a and air 
must be supplied from the first, may very well be omitted, 
since they are wholly exegetical in character. This, however, 
occasions a controversy of considerable interest, concerning 
the origin of Aka^a. For Äkägay usually translated ether, is 
not so much this, as all-permeating, all-present space, — as may 
be understood from the popular expression, quoted for other 
purposes on p. 609, 7: äMgam ktiru, ^make room,'' äkägojätäh^ 
^room has been made^'; but still it is space, as something 
corporeal, as an element; — a conception that is not far from 
the ideas of all those which take space to be something self- 
existent (that is, independent of our intellect) and therefore 
reaL In this sense, the Indian thinkers make it the medium 
of sound (e. g. p. 557, 14), which therefore they did not recognise 
as a vibratory movement of the air, and, in consequence, the 
element of air receives a more concrete meaning, approaching 
the idea of wind. Of this material apprehension of space, Qan- 
kara (p. 558, 1) objects against the Buddhists, who define 
Akä^ as purely negative, as ^the absence of hindrances" 
(ävarana-abhäva), that, in that case, there could be no Akä^ 
io the space taken up by a body, a flying bird, for example; 
so that we must recognise in the Akaga not the absence of 
hindrances, but that reality, through which the absence of 
hindrances is constituted, literally: characterised (tad vastu- 
bhütam^ yena ävarana-ahhävo vigishyate), — all this in reality 
comes back to the verbal contention as to whether a negative 
can still be called real, and it clearly shows that the con- 
ception of the Akä^a wavers between that of space, and some- 


232 Second Part: Oosmology or the Doctrine of the World. 

thing materiaJL It has the same character in the following 
controrersy with Kanada, who correctly recognizes the hetero- 
geneity of Akä^a and the elements, and as a consequence, 
places Aka^a as a connecting link between corporeal nature 
and the power of nature manifesting itself therein (Brahman). 

2. The Origin of Space {Äkä(a). 

Sutras 2, 3, 1— 7 . 

With unconcealed irony, Qankara mentions those who 
follow in the footsteps of the illustrious Kanabhuj, (a nickname 
for Kanada): ^that we7 cannot conceive an origin of space" 
(p. 608, 6). — We will see how far this irony is well founded, 
by picking out from the chaos of discussion, the essential 
arguments and counter-arguments. 

Space can have had no origin, says Kanädaj for the follow- 
ing reasons: (1) How can one conceive the causal relation 
between space as an effect, and its cause? The cause (käranam), 
of an effect (for example, a textile fabric) has three moments, 
as samaväyi-asamaväyi'nimitta'Mranamj that is, inherent cause 
(the threads), non-inherent cause (the union of the threads), 
and efficient cause (weaver and loom). The inherent cause 
consists of a substance, which is (a) homogeneous (ekajatiyaki), 
(b) manifold (aneka) [like the atoms of Kanada]. ^Now for 
*^ space, there is no homogeneous and manifold substance, from 
^ which, as inherent cause, together with the union of the same 
''(that is, of its particles), as non-inherent cause, space could 
^ originate. And if this does not exist, much less can we think 
''of an assisting efficient cause for space" (p. 608, 8ff.). 

(2) In the case of created elements (for example, fire) we 
can picture to ourselves a difference between the time before, 
and the time after they had come into being. This difference 
we cannot conceive in the case of space [na satpbhavo' 
yitum gdkyate p. 609, 4), that is, therefore, we cannot picture 
a condition in which space was not]. ^'For how can a man 
"assume that before the creation there was no place, no 
^vacuity, no opening?" (p. 609, 6). 

(3) Space did not originate, for it is of a different nature 

XVII. The Exoteric Pieture of Creation. 233 

(vidharma) from the earth, Ac, in so far as its distinctiye 
character is, that it penetrates all things (tnbhiUvain) etc. 
(p. 609, 6). 

(4) Lastly, in the scripture itself, space is called ''undy- 
"^ing, all-present, eternal" (p. 610, 3). 

According to all this, we must assume that before the 
creation, when, as the scriptures say, there was ''one only, 
''without a second," space must have formed an all-penetrat- 
ing, formless unity with Brahman, like water mixed with milk; 
and this separated at the creation in such a way that space 
remained immovable, while Brahman exerted itself (t/atate) to 
produce the world (p. 612, 3). 

After Qankara has pointed out that water and milk, al- 
though mixed, yet remain different essentially, whilst for the 
existent before the creation, an essential unity was required 
(p. 617, 15), he sets himself to refute Kariada's arguments; 
first however he gives the following positive proof of the 
origination of space: 

(p. 618, 13) ''Whenever we see anything that has originated 
** through transformation, whether it be pitchers, pots, and 
''pails, or bracelets, clasps, and rings, or needles, iron arrow- 
** heads, and swords, we see division also in the world. On 
"the contrary, a thing without origin can never be thought 
**of as divided. The division of space is, however, shown by 
**the earth, etc. (that is in space); therefore space also must 
"be a transformation" (that is: all that has an origin is 
divisible; but space is divisible; ergo — !). 

Probably from a perception of the weakness of this argu- 
menty our author at once passes from it to the domain of 
metaphysics, where he is more at home: Atman, he says, is 
not divided by the earth, or anything else; for space (the 
principle of division) originates in Atman; consequently Atman 
is no transformation. With this thought, which takes its root 
in the profound perception that that which exists in itself is 
spaceless, Qankara goes on to the fine statement of the Self- 
existence of Atman, which we translated in Chapter YlII, 6 
(above p. 127). He then turns to the arguments of Kanada 
mentioned above, to refute them one after another. 

234 Second Fart: Cosmology or the Doctrine of the World. 


(1) The cause need not necessarily be homogeneous and 
manifold; (a) not homogeneous: for the threads and their 
combinations need not be homogeneous, and still less the 
efficient cause, the loom (but no one ever maintained this). — 
Or is homogeneity to be asserted of the inherent cause only? 
That cannot be maintained unconditionally. For a single 
cord is twisted out of yarn and cow-hair; and many cloths 
are woven from thread and [unspun] wool. Or does the 
homogeneity of the cause only demand that it must be one 
being and one substance? That |is self-evident, and the re- 
quirement is superfluous, (b) Further, the* cause need not 
be manifold. For also the atoms of Kai|;iäda work each for 
itself. It is not necessary that the cause should consist of 
several factors; for the effect can also be the result of trans- 
formation, since a substance passes into a different condition, 
and is then called the effect. The substance in this case 
may be manifold, as the earth and the seed that go to form 
plants, or uniform, as milk, which becomes curds. And so, 
according to the jscripture, from the uniform Brahman, the 
manifold world, with space and all creatures, has sprung 
(p. 621, 5—623, 4). 

(2) It is absurd to assert, with reference to space, that a 
difference cannot be imagined between the time before, and 
the time after creation; for that space, with all bodies, is 
there now, and that nothing was there before, is precisely the 
difference. [But here Eapada is not even understood, much 
less disproved.] Besides, the scripture expressly declares (Bfib- 
3, 8, 8, translated above p. 133), that Brahman, amongst other 
things, is spaceless (anäkägam, "not-ether," as we translated 
above p. 133) (p. 623, 5—12). 

(3) It does not hold good, either, that space had no origin, 
because it is different in essence from the earth and the other 
elements. For, firstly, where the scripture contradicts this, a 
logical conclusion of the impossibility of its origin is fallacious, 
and, secondly, its origination follows even as a logical con- 
clusion: for space is not everlasting, because it possesses 
qualities which are not everlasting (sound perhaps? — that 
would, however, under no circumstances be an essential 

XVn. The Exoteric Picture of Creation. 236 

quality of space;) therefore we must postulate a begiuning for 
it, as for Tases, etc. Do you maintain that, in this, it is not 
distinguished from Atman?— For of Atman, no one has e^er 
yet demonstrated to a follower of the Upanishads that he is 
the bearer of non-eternal qualities. Furthermore, it has never 
been proved that space is all-pervading (vibhu) (p. 624, 6; the 
same monstrous assertion p. 700, 4). 

(4) When space is said by the scripture to be immortal, 
it is only in the (relative) sense in which the gods also are 
said to be immortal [(on this, above p. 67). TVhen, however, 
it is said of Brahman, that he is, "like space, omnipresent, 
eternal;" that is simply a simile, as when it is said: "the sun 
flies like an arrow," whereby it is not meant that it has only 
the same speed as an arrow; then also it is said of Brahman: 
** greater is be than space" (above p. 163) and "what is separate 
from him, is afflicted" (above p. 142). — Thus the origination 
of space is proved (p. 624, 6—626, 7). 

3. The Origin of Air, Fire, Water, Earth. 

Sutras 2, 3, 8—13. 

As Aka^a came forth from Atman, so Yayu (air or wind) 
came forth from Aka^a; its immortality and imperishability, 
as taught by the scripture (Chänd. 4, 3, 1. Brih. 1, 5, 22) are 
to be taken as only relative (äpekshika), that is, in comparison 
with the other elements, which all come forth from, and return 
to it, and only hold good in the lower doctrine (p. 626, 6), 
which seems to mean that, in the passage in question (Brih. 
1, 5, 22), Väyu is the representative of aparam brahma. As 
from Akaga proceeds air, so from this proceeds fire (2, 3, 10), 
from fire water (2, 3, 11), and from water, earth (2, 3, 12), for 
this, and not rice or barley, is to be understood by "food" in 
the passage of the Chändogya at the beginning of this chapter, 
firstly, because the context requires this, and this is of more 
importance than the use of words (p. 634, 6) and also because 
"the food" is spoken of further on (Chand. 6, 4) as "black" 
and this refers to the earth which in some parts, it is true, 
is white like milk, and red, like [glowing] coals, (p. 633, 9), 

836 Second Fart: Cosmology or the Doctrine of the World. 

but as a rule is black, for which reason it is also called 
Qarvari (night) in the Puräi|;ias (p. 633, 11). Plants, according 
to other passages, spring from the earth later and therefore 
the word "food'* refers to the earth. 

How are we to understand this emanation of the elements 
from each other? They are without intelligence (acetana), but 
(a weighty axiom of our system) without intelligence, no 
motion is possible (p. 635, 1; compare 628, 7). Therefore 
we must assume that God himself changes himself into the 
elements (p. 636, 3) and after he has become air, for example, 
he creates fire (p. 630, 10) ; his position in regard to the 
elements is this expressed by the passage of scripture (Brih. 
3, 7, 3): ^He who, dwelling in the earth, is different from the 
^ earth, whom the earth does not know, whose body is the earth, 
**who inwardly goYcrns the earth, He is thy soul, thy inward 
''guide, the immortal" (compare aboTe p. 149 ff.). Consequent- 
ly, in all elements. Brahman is the inner guide and orerseer, 
and as such, brings about their motions (p. 636, 7). 

It must, therefore, be borne in mind that the elementary 
creation, that is, the whole body of inorganic nature, as such, 
is inanimate, and therefore incapable of movement, like 
a cart without a horse (p. 507, 9. 727, 1) and that according 
to this, when, for example, water flows, not water, as such, 
but the Brahman in it, brings this about (p. 607, 12); and the 
contradiction is not important, if, in his stead, the nature-gods 
(created by him, and dependent on him) hare the same 
functions assigned to them, of which we have spoken above 

p. aßff. 

vFurther, the psychic organs (Buddhi, Manas, and the senses) 
of which we shall learn more in our psychological section, are, 
like the elements, emanations of Brahman; whether it be assumed 
that they are of like nature, and therefore of like duration, 
with these (p. 640, 1), or that they are different in kind from 
the natural elements and must be looked on as having emanated 
before or after them (p. 640, 3). In any case, they, as well 
as the elements, are, in themselves, lifeless, and both elements 
and organs are only created as means to an end, as we shall 
see further on. 

XVn. The Exoteric Picture of CreatioD. 237 

4. Incidental Remark on the Destruction of the World. 

Sütram 2, 3, 14. 

Wb must assume that, in the periodical re-absorption of 
the world in Brahman, the elements, in the same way as they 
have emerged from one another, are withdrawn again into one 
another in rererse order; for so experience teaches us, as, for 
example, in a staircase, coming down is the reverse of going 
up (p. 637, 6); therefore, as the vessel becomes clay again, 
and the ice, water (p. 637, 6), so also the dissolution of the 
elements takes place in such a manner that the less subtle 
goes back to that which is finer, the more remote effect returns 
everywhere into the nearer (p. 637, 9), for it is not right to 
assume that the effect continues when its cause is destroyed 
(p. 638, 4). 

At the end of the Kalpa, therefore, the earth becomes 
water again; water, fire; fire, air; air becomes Aka^a, and 
Akäfa re-enters Brahman. — This view is likely to throw some 
Ught on the scientific motive of the teaching of the gradual 
evolution and absorption of the elements, as to which we have 
DO other information: the observation that solids dissolve in 
water, that water turns into steam through heat, that the 
flames of fire flicker out into the air (Cband. 4, 3, 1 : yadd vä' 
agnir udväi/ati, väyutn eva api-eti), air, according to the altitude, 
rarifies more and more into empty space, might lead us to 
the gradual progression of the dissolution of the world, and 
by inversion to its opposite, the creation of the world. ^^ 

^ A clmttification of the elements (with the omisBion of Aka^a), 
tccording to their greater or leBser density, and corresponding percepti- 
bility, is indicated p. 636, 7: ''the earth, as capable of being smelt, 
''tasted, seen, felt, is gross ($thüla)\ water, as being tasted, seen, and 
''felt, is subtle (sÜkshma); fire, as being seen and felt, is more subtle 
*i9Qk$hmatara); the air, as only to be felt, is most subtle {80cshmatafHay^ 
-^As a rule, the Indians add to these a fifth, and still more subtle element, 
Akä^a, with the quality of audibility (also possessed by the other four). 
Cf. Aristotle, de sengu 2, p. 488 B. 17 ff.: ^avepöv die (ti toGtov tov 
t^iffov dico8i(6vai xal irpoodirreiv Ixaoxov tobv aCodT^xTjpCoiv ivl rfiv otoi- 
Xciav. lou |i.iv 6|i.(jiaToc t6 6paTix6v SSaTo« ^isoXt^tttIov, dipoc 8i Ti 
TÄV 41690V o{o#Y)Ti«6v, icup6< 84 T1?|V 6o9pt)oiv,— t4 S*ditTt«ov Y^l«, Ti M 

238 Second Part: Cosmology or the Doctrine of the World. 

5. Organic Nature. 

Sutras 8, 1, 24. 20 -21. 

The creation of the world, properly speaking, which, as it 
appears, is to be thought of as a disk,^^ concludes with the 
creation of inanimate nature. For in organic nature, quite a 
new principle comes before us: it is the soul, which is in- 
carnate in all the thousand phenomena of life, in all forms of 
gods, men, animals, and plants. It is true that souls also are 
an emanation from Brahman, from whom they, according to 
the Upanishads (for example Mund. 2, 1, 1, translated above 
p. 131 ff.; Kaush. 3, 3. 4, 20. Brih. 2, I, 20) hare arisen as the 
sparks from the fire, and into which they return in the same 
manner; but neither their origination from Brahman, nor their 
return to him, is understood by our system in the strict sense 
of the word, f^or the soul exists together with its organs 
(Pränas) and the "subtle body," from eternity — and, unless 
liberation is reached, to eternity; its entrance into Brahman 
in deep sleep, death, and at the dissolution of the world, takes 
place in such a manner that its seed remains, from which it 
proceeds again unchanged, with its organs.^] Of this later. 

By embodied souls, we are to understand all living beings 
(hhiääni, more precisely [in contradistinction to the mahä" 
bhütäni or elements p. 140, 13] präninäh p. 300, 6. 303, 4), 
therefore not only all gods, men, and animals, but also plants 
(therefore the expressions: brähmädi - sthävaränta p. 61, 11; 
brahmädi'Stambaparyanta p. 604, 2). Therefore plants (sthd- 
vara) are also, as on p. 774, 6 it is expressly acknowledged, 
places of enjoyment (or sufiFering), they also have a living soul 
(kshetrajna p. 772, 5; jiva p. 773, 3), which has entered into 

-]feuoTix6v eIS6c xi d«pf)c Iot{v. — It should be noted that, while the Indians 
place fire between water and air, the Greeks, on the other hand, place 
air between water and fire. 

•s jagad'Vimbam p. 488, 11. 489, B. 490, 7.— The following exprestions 
ndkoiya prühthe (frequent in the Veda, for example, Mund. 1, 2, 10 
cf. Plato, FhaedruB, p. 247, C: ^ri Tcji toO o6pavou vf&T(|), and paro divo 
jyotir dxpyate viQvatdh pmhiheshu (Ohand. B, 13, 7, translated above 
p. 169) seem to point to the idea of a sphere or hemisphere. 

XVn. The Exoterio Picture of Creation. 239 

them in consequence of impure deeds (p. 774, 6), and they are 
sensible of enjoyment and pain (p. 772, 4), in which, howerer, 
the souls that return from the moon and stay for a while in 
plants as guests take no part If the plant is cut, crushed, 
or cooked, the plant-soul dwelling in it passes out (pravasati), 
like every soul, when its body is destroyed (p. 773, 13 ff.)« 
Plants must be in part endowed with perception, for, without 
it. the wandering of the lotus-flower from one pond to another, 
and the climbing of trees by creepers cannot be explained 
(p. 478, 9); for, as is often affirmed: without perception (cetanä) 
there is no movement (pravriiti). — It is true that the plant- 
world, as the immovable (sthävara), is generally contrasted 
with the animal-world, as the movable (jangama) (p. 769, 4. 
113, 1. 118, 17. 178, 6. 642, 1. 687, 4); it may serve as charac- 
teristic of the latter, that the cow (p. 607, 14) is said to have 
perception of, and love for, its calf, as also the goose (hahsa) 
can distinguish both components in a mixture of milk and 
water, while we cannot (p. 799, 3); for the rest, in regard to 
the difference between animal and human perception, we are 
confined to what the passages translated in note 34, p. 67 
above offer us.— It seems strange that p. 491, 7 to the gods 
ia assigned a condition of infinite enjoyment, to man a mixed 
state, and to the animals, ^infinite suffering." For the rest, 
such a conception could only be formed where the height of 
pleasure is to be measured by the degree of intelligence, and 
where, consequently, intellectual enjoyments are esteemed as 
the highesf j 

We find a classification of organic beings 3, 1, 20—21, 
where they (as in the Ait Up. 3, 3 p. 243) are divided accord- 
ing to their origin into 

(1) udbhijja, bom from a germ (plants), 
(3) svedaja, bom of sweat (damp heat, sveda^ for which 
Badar&ya^a has the singular word samQoka)^ for example, 

•* The trgoment on p. 102, 13 also reals on this view: if the (on- 
eonscioos) primordial substance of the Sa&khyas were the place of the 
liberated, liberation would be a misfortune. 

240 Second Fart: Cosmology or the Doctrine of the World. 

(3) andaja, born of the egg, 

(4) jarayuja, born of the womb *oo (literally, from the 

The two last classes originate by procreation, the two first, 
without it (p. 768, 10). The passage from the Ciiändogya- 
Upanishad, which we gave in the introduction to our chapter 
above, p. 230, exhibits only three classes, for it joins the two 
first together, as if both came forth from germs, the one firom 
earth, the other from water (p. 769, 3); yet the separation is 
justified, for the first class embraces immovable, the second 
movable beings (p. 769, 5). 

6. Physiological Remarks. 

Sutras 2, 4, 20—22. 3, 1, 2. 

In the passage from the Chandogya-Upanishad, the begin- 
ning of which we translated above, p. 230, it is shown further 
how all things are triply mixed from the three original elements, 
fire, water, and food. So, for example, in natural fire, in the 
sun, moon and lightning, the red comes from the fire-element, 
the white from the water-element, and the black from the 
food-element. A preponderance of one of the three elements 
over the two others, brings about the differences of fire, water, 
and the other elements, in nature (p. 737, 13; natural fire is 
trivritkritam tejas, "the triply formed fire," p. 144, 1, in contra- 
distinction with the atrivritkritam tejah prathamajam p. 143, 7). 
The motive for this theory of commingling seems to be the 
wish to explain how the human body, although it only takes 
up single materials in nourishment, yet consists of all three 
original elements, of which the finer portion, like the cream 
on the milk, rises, while the coarser descends. Thus the body 
is made up of the three original elements according to the 
following scheme: 

















100 These four classes are to be understood by the eaiurvidho bhüta- 
grämah p. 357, 6. 406, 7. 431, 10. 768, 9, while, on the other hand, bk(Ua- 
eatu$htof/am p. 956, 3 means the four elements. 

XVII. The Exoteric Fictare of Creation. 241 

That which accomplishes this tripled mingling >oi in nature, 
and in the body, is, as is shown on page 733 ff. not the in- 
dividaal soul, but Brahman. — That the body consists of the 
three elements, food, water, and heat, follows from the fact 
that their effects can be observed in it. On the other hand, 
it contains the three materials (dhatu): wind, gall, and mucus 
(p. 743, 8). It is not said in what relation these stand to the 
elements. In the body, watery substances preponderate, fluids, 
blood, etc. (p. 743, 11); ^in another respect,. indeed, the earthy 
^preponderates" (p. 743, 12; in what respect, remains unsaid); 
that, however, the human body is essentially watery, can be 
obserTed from the fact that it originally springs from two 
liquids, the (male) seed, and the (female) blood (p. 743, 13; 
of. Aristotle, Met H, 4 p. 1044 A. 35 and Ait. är. 2, 3, 7, 3). 

7. The Controversy with the Buddhists concerning 
the Reality of the Outer World. 

Sutras 2, 2, 28—31. 

Just as Kant, along with transcendental idealism, maintained 
the empirical reality of the external world, and defended it 
(against Berkeley), so the Yedantins are not prevented by 
their doctrine of Ignorance as the foundation of all Being 
expanded in name and form from maintaining the reality of 
the outer world against the Buddhists of idealistic tendencies. 
(In order to guard against misunderstanding, we must bear in 
mind the passage translated in note 31, above p. 65.) Because 
of the high importance of this question, and the difficulty of 
the section of our work which treats of it, we shall translate 
the passage here at length. >02 

t<>i A pa^Maranamt such as the Vedantasara § 124 teaches, is already 
foand in Govinda's Gloss, p. 139, 21. 733, 17; but not yet in Qankara*s 
Commentary to the Brahmasutras. 

<A> In what follows, we translate v\jfiänam presentation; jMnam 
knowledge; anulhava sensation, feeling; pratyaya perception; upalaJbdhi, 
wpaiambha apperception; grahanam comprehension; avagamanam ap- 
prehension; swnBkära impression; pratydkBham observation;— the meaning 
of these terms is, however, not so much to be gathered from the modern 
terms which we have chosen (in default of others), bat rather from the 


242 Second Fart : Cosmology or the Doctrine of tbe World. 

Immediately before this, stands the discussion on Buddk^: 
realism (S, 2, 18—27), to which the Buddhist idealist refers 
in the opening words. 

The Buddhist speaks: 

[p. 666, 12ff.] ^Because the attraction of many scholan 
"towards external things has been noticed, this doctrine o: 
"(the reality of) the outer world was put forward for their 
"sake. But this is not the Buddha's view; [p. 567] on thrr 
"contrary what he desired, is solely the doctrine of the sole 
"category (skandha) of presentation (vijnänam), AccordiL* 
"to the doctrine of presentation, the outward form is only il 
"the intellect, (buddhi), and the whole worldly action of knov- 
" ledge, what is known and [the enjoyment of] fiiiit is odIj 
"something interior; and even if there were exterior things, 
"yet without being in the intellect, this worldly action of 
"knowing etc. could not take place." 

" How then can it be proved that the whole worldly action 
"is only something interior, and that beyond the presentatioo. 
"there are no external things? — For the reason that they are 
"impossible! For let it be taken for granted that there are 
"exterior objects, e. jr., solid bodies, they must be either in- 
"finitely small (paramanu) or an aggregate of the infinitclj 
"small; now that of which our perception can trace the limit 
"as a solid body, etc., cannot be infinitely small, because tLt 
"infinitely small is not visible and knowable; so also no a^- 
"gregate of the infinitely small; for this can neither be thought 
" of, as different from the infinitely small, nor as identical viih 
"it [p. 568] [not different, for it is made up of the infinit^> 
"small, nor identical, for it would then escape observation in 
" all its parts]. The same is true of species [jäti^ which exist 
"only in individuals]." 

"Further: if knowledge (jMnam), which is in its natcr» 
"general, because it is produced by sensation (anubhin;a) alcne. 
"varies according to objects, as knowledge of columns, kcov- 
"ledge of a wall, knowledge of a vessel, knowledge of a doth. 
"this is possible only through the differentiation (vifed^a) whicb 
"concerns the knowledge. — Therefore we must nnqaestioDabl} 

XVII. The Exoterio Picture of Creation. 243 

"* grant the identity (särüpyam) of the knowledge with the ob- 
"ject If we grant this, howeyer, as the form of the object 
"^is determined only by the knowledge of it, the hypothesis 
""(kalpanä) of the existence of things is superfluous." 

*^Then too, as apperception (upalanibha) of necessity com- 
"^ bines both, no division of the object from its presentation 
^(vijfiänam) is possible; for it is impossible to apperceive the 
"one without apperceiring the other; and that would not be 
^80, if they were different in nature, for then nothing would 
^ exist to prevent it. For this reason also, external objects 
•^do not exist" 

"In this it is, for example, like a dream. As in dreams 
*^or hallucinations (mäyä) there arise perceptions (praiyaya) 
" of water in a mirage, Gandharva cities, etc., without outward 
"* objects in the form of apprehender and something to be 
''apprehended; just so [p. 669] in the state of waking, must be 
**the case with the perception of columns, etc., because we 
*^ cannot distinguish them from the former, in so far as they 
**are both perceptions^" 

"But if no external object exists, whence comes the variety 
**of perceptions? — We answer: from the variety of (subjective) 
''phenomena (väsanä). Because in the beginningless Saqisära, 
''the presentations and the phenomena, like seed and plant, 
"are in turn the cause and effect of each other, variety is 
"explained without contradiction. Also it is to be understood 
^ that, for the rule (waking), as well as for the exception (sleep), 
"variety of knowledge has its ground solely in phenomena. 
"And we both agree that in dream, etc., without any outward 
^things, a variety of knowledge is produced by phenomena; 
''only that I admit no variety of knowledge caused by external 
^objects and not by phenomena. And therefore again there 
^'are no external objects." 

To this the Vedintin answers: 

"It cannot be maintained that no external objects exist 

" Why? Because we apperceive them. For we apperceive an 

"external object according to our perception of it as a column, 

"a wall, a vessel, a cloth; and what we apperceive, cannot 

244 Second Part: Goimology or the Doctrine of the World. 

^not be. It is as though one who eats, while feeling ck.iz- 
''pletely satiated by what he is eating, should yet say: *I aii 
"'not eating, and I have not been satiated.' It is just ü.t 
"same when a person directly apperceires outward objets Ij 
"touching them with the organs of sensation [p. 670] and at 
"the same time assures us: 'I do not apperceive them, and 
" *the objects are not there.' — How can we care for such talk?" 

The Buddhist: 

"But I do not say that I do not apperceive an object; I 
"only maintain that I apperceive nothing beyond the apper* 

The Vedantin: 

"Yes indeed, you maintain that! But only because your 
"trunk is not goaded [elephants are guided by goads], arc 
"not because you have reasons. For we are compelled u 
"admit objects outside our apperception, and this by cor a:- 
"perception itself. For no one apperceives a column or ^ 
"wall as a mere apperception, but everybody apperceives ih' 
"column and the wall as objects of apperception. And iLa: 
"everybody thus apperceives, is shown by the fact that erei 
"those who deny outward objects bear witness to this whei 
"they say: *The form perceived interiorly seems as if it were 
"'outside.' For they also call to their aid the con8cioasIle^s 
"of an outside that everyone in the world has, when, in order 
"to deny the existence of outward objects with their *as if :* 
"^were outside,' they appeal to an assumed outside. For ho« 
"otherwise could they say *as if it were outside?' No oc? 
"says: such a one looks as if he were the son of a barrer: 
"woman. Therefore, when we according to our feelings ctc- 
"ceive the nature of anything that exists, we must say: I* 
"'appears outside,' but not 'as if it were outside.'" 

"But was not from the fact that no external things are 
" possible, the conclusion drawn that it only seems as if thct 
"were outside? — [p. 571] Yes, but this conclusion is not ;-*• 
"tified. For we determine what is possible or impossible, frux 
"what is proved or not proved; we do not, however, in tb« 

XVII. Tho Exoteric Picture of Creation. 245 

*" opposite way, determine what is proved or not proved, from ^ 
*what is possible or impossible... For what we apperceive ^ 
"through one of the instruments of knowledge, perception, etc. 
'^ (above p. 88) is possible (or: real, sanibhavati), and what we » 
"do not apperceive, through any means of knowledge, is not 
** possible (real). External objects are, according to their 
""kind, apperceived by all means of knowledge; how then can 
"anyone, on the basis of such arbitrary reflections as those 
^concerning exceptions and non-exceptions [dream and waking], 
"maintain that they are not possible, since they are apper- 

^And if knowledge has the same form as the object, this 
"is no reason to deny the object. For, were there no object, 
"there could not be a similarity of form; and, that the object 
"exists, follows from the fact that we apperceive it as external 
"(p. 572). Thus we are under the necessity of apperceiving'^' 
"perception and object at the same time, on the ground that 
"they are related, as cause and effect, and not because they 
"are identical." 

** Further: if we distinguish between the knowledge of a 
"pot, and the knowledge of a cloth, the difference lies in the 
"things which make different, the pot and the cloth, and not 
"ia what is made different, knowledge. A white cow differs 
"from a black cow in whiteness and blackness, not in the fact 
"that they are cows. Therefore, through the two, we are able 
"to distinguish the one, and the one through the two. [They 
*" could not be distinguished if they were not alike in being, — 
"or should we read: naikasmäc ca 'and not through the one?*] 
"Therefore object and knowledge are different, and we can 
"also appeal to the fact that we distinguish between seeing 
"the pot, and remembering it. For here also, the difference 
''lies in that which is distinguished, seeing and remembering,^ 
"and not in that which distinguishes the pot; just as in the 
"case of the words, smell of milk and taste of milk, the differ- 
"ence is in that which is distinguished, smell and taste, and 
"not in the milk, which distinguishes thenh" 

*'Also, between two [mere] presentations (vijilanam)^ which 
"are different in time, as they destroy each other by their 

246 Second Part: Cosmology or the Doctrine of the World. 

"own coming to consciousness, no mutual [p. 573] relation of 
''comprehended (grähyä) and comprehender (grahaka) ciiL 
''exist [as if the subject were also a presentation^ vijnänaml, 
"for thereby the theories which the Buddhists themselves harr 
"maintained . . . [the statement of which we here pass orer] 
"would fall through." 

"And besides: you assume a series of presentations, then 
"why do you not also take outward things, such as column> 
"and walls for granted? — You say, because we are conscious 
"of the presentation? — ^But we are also conscious of extertx 
"things!~Or do you say that we are conscious of the pre- 
"sentations in themselves, because it is in their nature t- 
"illumine, like a lamp, but not, on the other hand in tLt 
"nature of external things?— and so you take for granted tk^: 
"which is in its nature an absolute contradiction, just as i: 
"you said: 'Fire burns itself up;' but the general acceptation, 
"which does not contradict itself, that we are conscious of thf 
"outward object, through the presentation which reaches bejoL. 
"itself [p. 574], you will not assume? Truly this is great wis- 
"dom that you display! The presentation, in so far as i: 
'' extends beyond the object, is certainly not felt, for that woul : 
''be contrary to its own being." [Here, as often before, tit 
idea of the presentation changes into that of the presentic: 
subject, and this is made easy by the use of the word 

''It may be objected that, if, from its nature, the present- 
" ation must be apprehended by something extending beyond lU 
" then this again by something beyond it, this, by something eUe 
"beyond it, and so in ivfinitunL — And further, if knowledjt. 
"according to its nature, illumines like a lamp, and we assu: - 
"that this knowledge is known by another knowledge,—}^*. 
'* from the equality of these two, no relation of enlightener an : 
"enlightened can exist, and the assumption becomes superfluon« ' 

**But these two objections do not hold good. As only u- 
"presentation is apprehended, and there is no need of tl^ 
"apprehension of the subject (sakshin) of the presentati :. 
"therefore we are not face to face with a regressuM in ir\fiiutu.;. 
* for subject and perception are in their nature contrary :• 

XVII. The Exoteric Picture of Creation. 247 

"-each other, and are related as the apperceiyer, and the ap- 
^perceired; the subject, howerer, is, in itself, certain, and 
"cannot be denied [compare the discussion of this above 
**p. 127]. And if it be further maintained that the present- v 
^ ation, like the lamp, needs no other to illumine it, but makes 
^itself known by itself, then this means as much as a present- 
''ation which cannot be apprehended by any instrument of 
** knowledge, and which has no apprehender, which would no 
"more make itself known than would a thousand lamps if they 
"were set together in the middle of a block of stone. — But if 
"presentation is in its own nature sensation, have we not 
"[p. 575] in this granted the thesis of our opponents? — No; 
""but as the lamp, to illumine, requires yet another, to ap- 
"^ prebend, namely, the eye, in just the same way the present- 
**ation requires the power of making itself seen, and only, as 
''with the lamp, when another which apprehends it is present 
"does its light become visible. — But, the opponent might say, 
"if yoa explain the apprehending subject as ^elf proved, that 
"is just what I maintain about the presentation making itself 
'•known by itself, only expressed in other words. — But that is 
"not so, because the presentation has as its characteristics, 
"origin, perishability, and non-unity [accidentally, not as the 
"* subject is a necessity; this further concerns its contents only, 
"not the form which is just what constitutes the nature of the 
** subject]. Thus we have proved that, like a lamp, the present- 
"^ation also must be apprehended by something lying beyond it." 
"When, further, those who deny external objects maintain 
'•that, as in the case of perceptions in dream, so also per- 
"ceptions of pillars, etc., in waking, arise without an external . 
"object, because the two cannot be separated, as both are 
'•perceptions [p. 676], we answer: Perceptions in waking cannot 
"arise as do perceptions in dream. TV by? Because they are 
'•of a different nature. For between dream and waking, there 
•'is a difference of nature. In what does this difference of 
"nature consist? In the refutability or irrefutability. For 
-that which is apperceived in dreams, refutes itself; for he 
-who is awakened, says: *In error I apperceived a large 
•* 'assembly of people, for there is no large assembly, only my 

248 Second Fart: Cosmology or the Doctrine of the World. 

"^soul was confused by sleep, hence this error arose.' In the 
^^same manner, all illusions of the senses are refuted, accord- 
**ing to their character. On the other band, there is no con- 
edition in which the existence of an object perceired in the 
e waking state, a pillar, for example, can be refuted. A dream* 
eface is only a remembrance, whilst seeing in the waking state 
^is apperception. The difference between remembrance and 
e apperception is evident, and is felt of itself; for it consists 
^in the fact that a person is either separated, or not separated, 
efrom an object; when, for example, a beloved son is remem- 
"bered, he is not apperceived, but we wish to apperceive him. 
^[p. 677] As this is so, we cannot maintain that what is ap- 
"perceived in the waking state deceives, because, like apper- 
"ception in the dreaming state, it is [only] apperception. For 
"the difference between the two makes itself felt And that 
"which is felt by pretended sages cannot be denied by them. 
"But just because their feelings protest, and they cannot 
"demonstrate to themselves the groundlessness of waking per- 
^ception, therefore they wish to prove it by its relation with 
"dreaming perception. But a quality that is not in a thing 
"in itself, will not be put there by relating it to another thing. 
"For when we feel that fire is hot, it does not become cold 
"because [as an element] it is related to water. And we have 
"demonstrated the difference between dream and waking.** 

"Finally we must answer the assertion that variety of know- 
"ledge can arise without objects, by a variety of [subjective] 

■^"appearances (väsanä). We reply: The existence of appearance« 
"is not possible, if, as you take it, there is no apperception 
"of external objects. For the appearances in forms which 
"differ according to the object have their basis in the apper- 
"ception of the object [p. 578]; if, however, no objects are 
"apperceived, wherein have the various appearances their 
"foundation? If we accept the idea of beginninglessness, like 
"a row of blind people holding to each other, a regressus in 
^infinitum steps in, with no supporting basis, thus abolishini: 

« "the worldly action without proving your position. If, further, 
"he who denies the external world, appeals to the mle anl 
'^the exception [waking and dream] to prove that knowledge. 

XVn. The Exoteric Picture of Creation. 249 

^ in order to come into being, has, as its ground, appearances, 
^ and not objects, we must regard this also as refuted, if it is 
**as we said; for without the apperception of objects, appear-*] 
^ances cannot arise. And as, further, the apperception of-" 
'^objects can exist without the^ appearance, while, on the other 
''hand, the appearances cannot exist without the apperception 
^of objects, the rule and the exception [under discussion] serve 
^but to affirm the reality of objects. For appearances are 
"only certain impressions (sanishära); and, as experience shows, 
** impressions can only be brought about by means of a sup- 
sporting basis; for you, however, there is no such basis of 
" impressions, because you follow as your guide the axiom that 
s apperception does not exist" 

"[p. 579] If, finally, you setup a 'presentation of inwardness* 
"^ (qlaya-vijfiänam) as the basis of appearances, this can no 
^more co-exist with your theory of non-duration than can the 
""^ presentation of outwardness' (pravritti-vijMnam), and there- 
''fore cannot serve as the substratum of appearances. For 
" unless we either admit a Continuous Substance, which binds 
"^past, present, and future together, or an overseer of all ob- 
"^jects, an activity linking together remembrances—depending 
"'upon appearances conditioned by space, time, and cause —is 
"impossible. If, however, the 'idea of inwardness,' implies a 
^coniinaam, yon have thereby given up your principle (of non- 
** duration)," 

XVni. Cosmological Problems. 

The doctrine of the empirical origin of the world from 
Brahman, set forth in the two preceding chapters, gives rise, 
in the course of the discussion, to a series of doubts; their 
solution is sought from the empirical standpoint, which can 
only partially solve them; their full solution is to be reached 
only by having recourse to the doctrine of Identity,— the 
special metaphysical teaching of the Yedanta. We shall now 
gather these various objections together, under three chief heads. 

1. The Problem of Causality.] 

Sutras 2, 1, 4. 5. 8. 

a) The Difference of Essence {vilakshanatvam) between 
Brahman and the World. — Between two things which are 
different in essence, there can be no causal relation: the golden 
ornament can not have clay as its cause, and the earthen 
vessel cannot have gold as its cause (p. 419, 10); now, between 
Brahman and the world, there is a difference in essence, in 
so far as Brahman is pure and spiritual, and the world, on 
the contrary, is impure and unspiritual (p. 419, 8). For this 
world is impure, in that it consists, according to its essence, 
of desire, pain, and illusion (moha) from which joy, sorrow, and 
despair arise, and spread thoughout heaven and hell (p. 420, 4); 
it is unspiritual, first of all, because it is in the service of 
the enjoyer (the individual soul) and, according to its nature, 
it is only the means to produce the effects necessary lor en- 
joyment, and such a relation of service can never exist between 
two spiritual beings: for where one spiritual being serves an- 
other, for instance, in the case of a slave and his master, he 

XVUL CosmologicAl Problems. 261 

does not do this as a spiritual being, but in virtue of his un- 
spiritual part, consisting of Buddhi [Intellect, which in itself 
is unspiritual, a mere instrument] etc. (p. 420, 7 — 14). And 
if we deny the unspirituality of the world, by regarding wood, 
earth, etc. as transformed spirit, whose spirituality is hidden 
out of sight, as is the real spiritual, in sleep and swoon (p. 421), 
the impurity of the world still remains, and proves its difference 
in essence from Brahman (p. 422, 1). Further, the scriptures 
maintain the unspirituality of the world, in so far as they 
separate knowledge from Ignorance, from which it follows that 
the unspiritual exists (p. 422, 6); and when the same scrip- 
tures sometimes ascribe spiritual functions to the unspiritual, 
in 80 far as they say: "the earth spoke" (Qatap. Br. 6, 1, 3, 4), 
"the waters conceived the idea" (Ch&nd. 6, 2, 4, above p. 230) 
etc., we must understand here, not the elements, but the 
spiritual deities which are their representatives (p. 423, 5). 
— From this it is clear that the world differs in essence from 
Brahman and cannot therefore proceed from him (p. 424, 7). 

b) The Contamination of Brahman by the World. — 
If the world proceeds from, and returns to, Brahman, then, 
on its return, through its qualities of materiality (sthatdyam) 
articulation, unspirituality, limitation, impurity, etc. it must 
defile Brahman; therefore it is absurd to regard Brahman as 
the cause of the world (p. 429, 15 ff.). 

c) The Impossibility of a new Differentiation. — 
Further, it is absurd, because (p. 430, 6) after the world has 
been absorbed into the undifferentiated Brahman, no reason 
could exist for it to go forth again, differentiated into enjoyer 
and enjoyed [which is contradicted by the actual existence of 
these differences in each new world-period]. 

d) The Danger of a Return for the Liberated. — The 
basis of the ever repeated return of the world lies in the 
works performed in former lives which (apart from the liberated, 
whose works are annihilated) must be atoned for. In the case 
of a return of the world into Brahman, all works would dis- 
appear by absorption into unity. If, however, after this de- 
struction of works, a return be possible, then we cannot per- 
ceive what should prevent the liberated also from being bom 

252 Second Part: CoBmology or the Doctrine of the World. 

again [p. 430, 9; whereby a doubt is cast on the most precious 
jewel of Indian faith — the certainty of liberation]. 

2. The Problem of the One and the Many. 

Sutras 2, 1, 26. 30. 31. 

a) Total or partial Transformation. —In the trans- 
formation of Brahman into the world, we must of necessity 
assume one of two things: that either the whole, or only a 
part, of Brahman, changes into the world. In the first case, 
the root of Brahman would be destroyed, search after it would 
be aimless, for it would lie before our eyes as the world, 
beyond which there would be nothing, and the passages of 
scripture which declare that Brahman is unborn, etc., would 
be subverted (p. 480, 3). — If, on the contrary, we assume that 
only a part of Brahman becomes the world, then Brahman 
becomes subject to division, which is contradicted by the ex- 
press words of the scriptures which forbid us to assume that 
Brahman has members, parts, or differences (p. 479, 9); and 
were Brahman divisible, the necessary consequence would be^ 
that He is not eternal [p. 480, 8; that which is subject to the 
laws of space, is subject also to those of time; compare n. 43, 
above p. 68—69]. 

b) One Brahman with many Powers. — As we saw in 
Chap. XVI, 4 (above p. 227), in order to create the world, 
Brahman must unite with many powers. This assumption 
contradicts the teaching of the unity of Brahman, on the basis 
of which the scripture in the words: "it is not so, it is not 
so," negates in Brahman, all and every difference (p. 487, 13). 
Compare with this, the characteristics of the esoteric Brahman 
in Chap. XIV, 3 (above p. 210ff). 

3. The Moral Problem. 

Sutras 2, 1, 34. 21. 

a) The Creator of the "World as the Author of Evil. 
— (p. 491, 5): "God cannot be the cause of the world, for then 
" he would be unjust and unmerciful. Some, like the gods, he 

XVIII. Cosmological Froblema. 263 

^ would have destined to the enjoyment of infinite pleasure; 
"others, like the animals, to the endurance of endless pain; 
^ and still others, like mankind, to a mixed condition ; accord- 
"ing to this, 6od would have brought forth an unrighteous 
"creation, would be affected by love and hate, like an in- 
^ dividual being, and the purity of his nature maintained by 
"Scripture and Tradition would suffer injury. >03 ^i^j there- 
"fore good men also (reading akhdla^ p. 491, 10) would be 
*^ afraid of his mercilessness and cruelty (which would be con- 
"trary to Brih. 4, 4, 15 na tato vijiigupsate), because he in- 
''fiicted pains on them, and swallowed up all beings. So, 
"because of the injustice and mercilessness which would be 
** attached to him, God cannot be the cause of the world." 

b) The Creator of the World as the Cause of Evil. 
— The conception of sin which is so accentuated in the Hebrew 
world, from the very beginning (Genesis vi, 5. vm, 21) is want- 
ing in such a decided form, in Indian antiquity. Accordingly, 
the most effective argument against a divine creator of the 
world, namely, that he would be the (direct or indirect) cause 
of sin, is not brought clearly forward; the term "not good'' 
(ahiiam) in the passage 2, 1, 21, which we have under con- 
sideration here, rather holds the middle ground between the 
ideas of evil and of wickedness; it is more especially the first, 
with a tendency, however, to the latter, which becomes clearer 
from the answer to be brought forward later, to the objection 
which has its place here in the system, and substantially runs 
as follows: according to the Scriptures, God is not separated 
from the individual soul; by means of it he himself (above 
p. 231) has entered into nature (p. 471, 13). If he were the 
Creator of the world, then, as in his character of creator, he 
is free, he would have created good for himself, and not evil, 
such as birth, death, sickness, old age, etc. For no one who 
is free to do what he wishes, builds a prison, and then enters 
it himself (p. 472, 4). Again, as the absolutely pure, he would 

I <» ^ fruti • imriti • avadharita - svaecha tva - ddi • tgvara • wabhdva • vilopah 
pramjyeta. Or if we divide svacchatvad: "And in the case of purity, 
**Uioogh Scriptare and Tradition make (the contrary) certain, a contra- 
"diction would exist in the nature of God." 

364 Second Part: Cosmology or the Doctrine of the World. 

not enter the body, the absolutely impure, with his own self 
(p. 472, 6), and had he done so, he would leave it, remember- 
iDg that he himself had made it Without trouble the soul 
(in whose form God entered the world), would put an end 
to the world, just as the magician does to the glamour pro- 
duced by himself. As this does not occur, it follows that the 
world cannot be created by a spiritual being who knows what 
in good for himself (p. 472, 6—13). 

XIX. The Idea of CausaKty. 

The problems raised in the last chapter find their solution 
in the metaphysical teaching of the Yedanta concerning nature, 
according to which the world was perceived to be, not some- 
thing different from Brahman, or existing apart from Brahman, 
but identical with Brahman, who appears in the form of exist- 
ing nature. The identity of the two does not, therefore, mean 
that Brahman is like the world, but only that the world is 
like Brahman (p. 431, 13). Examined more closely. Brahman 
and the world stand to each other in the relation of cause 
and effect. But cause and effect are identical in their inner 
nature. Therefore our authors' teaching of identity is based 
upon an examination of the idea of causality; and this circum- 
stance is not affected by the fact that in the work before us 
the doctrine of the identity of Brahman and the world 2, 1, 14, 
is first presented with mainly theological proofs, and then, as 
it were, as a corollary to this, 2, 1, 16 — 20, we find the logical 
evidence of the inner identity of cause and effect. The logical 
order is rather the reverse: from the identity of cause and 
effect, follows the identity of Brahman and the world, and not 
only does this follow of necessity, but it is plainly expressed 
at the end of the section p. 471, 2: "Therefore the effect is 
^identical with the cause, and consequently (atagca) as the 
"" whole world is an effect of Brahman, they also are identical.'' 
— According to this, we shall first follow out the investigation 
of the idea of causality, and then the doctrine of identity 
which is based on this. But we have first to remark as 
follows : 

However natural it may be to mankind, to conceive the 

266 Second Part: Cosmology or the Doctrine of the World. 

relationship between Being -in -itself and the phenomenal 
world from the point of view of causality, and so to regard 
God as cause and the world as effect, — nevertheless this viev 
is false. For causality, which has its root in the organisatioo 
of our intellect, and nowhere else, is the bond which binds 
all the phenomena of the phenomenal world together, but it 
does not bind the phenomenal world with that which mani- 
fests itself through it. For between Being-in- itself and the 
phenomenal world there is no causality but identity: the world 
is the Thing-in-itself (das Ding an sich) as it displays itself 
in the forms of our intellect — This truth has been correctlj 
grasped by the Yedanta, which cannot free itself, however, 
from the old error of looking upon God as the cause of the 
world, and seeks to reconcile the two by interpreting the idea 
of causality as that of identity. To this end it forms too 
wide a concept of causality, in that it not only comprehends 
under this idea the bond of variations which only have to do 
with the qualities, forms, and conditions of substance, but also 
the bond between substance and qualities, and also between 
substance and substance. The continuity of substance 
forms the chief argument in these discussions, which we will 
now place before the reader in order, as we find them on 
pages 466—471. 

1. The Cause persists in the Effect 

Only while the cause continues, can the effect be perceived, 
but not when it does not continue. Thus the clay continues 
in the vessel, the thread in the cloth. In things which are 
different, the perceptibility of the one is not conditioned by 
the persistence of the other: for example, a horse can be per- 
ceived without the presence of a cow. So cause and effect 
are not different (p. 456, 12). 

S. The Kßect exists before its manifestfttion, namely, as Caasei 

Whon it is said: ''This was Existent in the beginning'* 

(ul)ovo p. 230), the statement means that the world was already 

f»«iNtiM)t bofore its manifestation, in the form of the Existent 

Hm onuKO. For where a thing is not already, according to its 

XDL The Idea of CftiisAlity. 257 

nature, it cannot arise: no oil can be pressed out of sand. 
But if the effect before manifestation was ahready identical 
with the cause, it remains so even after manifestation. As 
Brahman is never anything other than the Existent, so also 
the world is never anything other than the Existent The 
Existent, however, is of like nature with itself (p. 469). 

3. Wbftt is the difference between the effect before and after 


It is true that the Scripture also says: ''This was in the 
^beginning non-Existent" (above p. 129). But this non-Ex- 
istence is no absolute one but means only a difference of 
qualities (dharma). As the effect now consists in its quality 
as developed in name and form, so it existed before its mani- 
festation in its quality of not being developed in name and 
form; it existed as the same but in the form of its cause 
(p. 460, 2). 

4. The effect is prefigured in the cause. 

Sour milk comes only from milk, never from clay; while 
jars come only from clay, not from milk. This could not be 
so, if the effect did not exist before its manifestation; rather, 
in that case, anything could arise out of anything. But there 
lies in the cause a certain extension beyond itself (kagcid ati- 
(ayah) towards the given effect — as of milk to sour milk, and 
of clay to the jar; and this forbids our regarding the effect 
as non-existent before its manifestation. For each cause has 
its peculiar power (Qakti) and this power brings the given 
effect into manifestation, and no other. Therefore we may 
not regard cause and effect, substance and qualities, as differ- 
ent, like horses and oxen, but must regard them as of like 
nature (p. 461, 3 — 462, 5). 

This is followed first by a criticism p. 462, 6 — 464, 8 of 
the apprehension of causality as an inherent relation, most 
probably directed against Kanada^ and, like most of the polem- 
ical expositions of the work, of more interest for the teachings 
controverted than for the Vedanta. 



258 Second Part: Cosmology or the Doctrine of the World. 
5. The Activity of becoming manifest mast have a Sabject. 

If the effect did not exist before its manifestation, the 
activity of manifestation would be without an agent, and there- 
fore without a subject (nirätmäka). But every activity must 
necessarily have an agent. If the jar becomes manifest, who 
is the agent in this action, if not the jar itself? — The potter, 
perhaps? But then the potter would become manifest from 
his action, and not the jar. Or do you maintain that the 
effect originates and receives a self, after it has been previously 
connected with the Being of the cause? — But connection can 
only take place between two things which are, and not between 
what is and what is not— And just as unthinkable is the 
limit which you set to the non-existence of the effect, by the 
moment of becoming manifest: for only what is, and not what 
is not, can have a limit. — And through no activity can the 
non-existence of the effect become existent, as little as the 
son of the barren woman can be made existent by any effort 
(p. 464, 8—466, 7). 

6. The Activity of the agent is not soperflnons. 

If the effect was already existent before its becoming 
manifest as much as the cause, and was identical with it, 
surely it as little requires an agent as the cause itself^ iu 
order to become manifest? — Certainly not The mission of 
the agent is to transform the cause into the form of the 
effect; though it is to be firmly maintained that also the form 
of the effect is already contained in the being of the cause; 
for that which has no self, cannot, as we saw, attain to one. 
— For the rest, a thing is not changed by difference in out- 
ward appearance: Deradatta remains Devadatta, whether he 
opens Ins arms or folds them (p. 466, 7 — 467, 7). 

7. Generality of the Identity of Cause and Effect. 

If you only admit the identity of cause and effect in that 
which is not altered by manifestation and dissolution, we dis- 
pute this: for does not milk change into sour milk before 
our eyes? When, too, manifestation, like the springing of 
plants from seeds, is only a becoming visible of what was 

XIX. The Idea of Gautality. 269 

already existent, conditioned by the accumulation of like par- 
ticles; and, in exactly the same way, dissolution is only a 
becoming invisible, caused by the disappearance of these same 
particles. If we were to recognise a transition from non- 
Existence to Existence in them and from Existence to non- 
Existence, then the embryo would be other than the sub- 
sequently bom man, the youth would be other than the 
greybeard he becomes, and the father of the one would not 
be the father of the other (p. 467, 7—468, 4). 

8. The Actirity of the agent matt hare an object« 

If the effect were not in exi<stence before its manifestation, 
the actirity of the agent respecting it would be without an 
object, like sword-cuts through the air. Or is its object not 
the effect, but the inherent cause? Then the object would be 
different, and the result would also be different Or is the 
effect an extension beyond itself of the cause which is inherent 
in it? Then the effect would be there already, and would not 
require to be first brought about (p. 468, 4 — 9). 

9. Betnlt. 

**Then it comes to this, that the substances themselves 
'^ persist, e.^., milk, through its existence as sour milk, etc.; 
**that they take the name of effect, and that we cannot think 
''of the effect as different from the cause, even if we tried 
*for a hundred years. And as it is the original cause which, 
*ap to the last effect, appears in the form of this or that 
" effect, like an actor in all possible parts, it is thereby logic- 
"ally proved that the effect exists before its manifestation and 
''is identical with the cause" (p. 468, 10—469, 1). 

Here follow other arguments of a theological character, 
p. 469. 

10. lUoitratiTe Example«. 

1) So long as a cloth is rolled up, we cannot see whether 

it is a cloth or something else, and even if it be seen that it 

is a cloth, its real length and breadth are still unknown; i( 

howeTer, it be unrolled, we perceive what it is, and how long 


260 Second PatI: Cosmology or the Doctrine of the World. 

or broad it is; as the rolled up and unrolled cloth are iden- 
tical, so are cause and effect (p. 470, 1 — 10; the words 470. 
7<*9 seem to be an interpolation). 

3) As, when we hold our breath, in-haling and ex-haling 
only continue in the form of the cause (präna, life, breath', 
and produce as effect, life only, but not the muscular move- 
ment of breathing; but if the breath be set free, besides life, 
movement of the muscles is produced; and as the so-called 
life-breaths are not different from life (präna)^ of which they 
are branches, because the nature of both consists in animatioD 
(«aNifraitam), so also effect is not different from cause (p. 470. 

XX. The Doctrine of Identity. 

1. Introductory. 

Theeb is a changeable element in things (their forms, 
qualities and conditions) which is subject to the law of causal« 
ity, and an element of continuity (substance) which is not 
subject to this law. It was only by neglecting this difference, 
and by putting the whole complex of preceding and succeed- 
ing existence under the idea of cause and effect, that Qankara 
was able to deduce, from the persistence of the inner nature 
of things, that cause and effect are fundamentally identical 
notwithstanding all differences of outer form. 

In the beginning of the preceding Chapter (aboTe p. S56) 
we saw how our author infers the identity of Brahman and 
the world from the identity of cause and effect Yet this 
philosophical deriration of the chief position of the whole 
system of the Yed&nta appears as a mere supplement The 
same proposition has already been brought forward and ex- 
plained on a theological basis (2, 1, 14); p. 443, 12: '^The effect 
""is the manifested world, beginning with Aka^a; the cause is 
""the highest Brahman. With this cause, in the sense of the 
^highest reality (paramärthatdh)^ the effect is identical, har- 
•■ing no existence beyond it Why is this? — Because of the 
'^word of the Scripture, as to change depending only on 
"words, etc." 

The passage from which this inference is drawn, is the 
sixth Prap&thaka of the Chandogya-Upanishad, one of the 
most important portions of the Veda, which we shall give here 
in part translated, and in part in the form of an epitome, in 
order afterwards to analyse Qankara's reflections on it 

262 Second Fftrt: Cosmology or the DoctriDe of the World. 

2. Tat tvam asi—Thht art thou. 

Ghändogya-UpAnishad VI. 

1. **Qvetaketu was the son of [Uddalaka] ArunL His father 
^said to him: 'Qretaketu, go forth to study Brahman, for one 
**'of our family, dear one, is not wont to remain unleamedf 
■^ ' and [merely] an appendage of Brahmanhood.' — So he went 
''when he was twelve years old, to study, and at twenty- four 
*^ he had studied all the Vedas, and returned uplifted in mind, 
''fancying himself wise, and very proud. Then his father said 
"to him: 'Qvetaketu! since, dear one, thou art so uplifted in 
mind, fancying thyself so wise, and since thou art so proud, 
hast thou enquired concerning the teaching through which 
[eren] the unheard is [already] heard, what is not understood 
is understood, and what is unknown becomes known?'— 
What then, venerable Sir, is this teaching?' — 'Just as, dear 
one, by one lump of clay everything which consists of clay 
is known, and the change is dependent only on words, a 
mere name, it is only clay in reality;-— just as, beloved, by 
one copper button everything made of copper is known, the 
change is dependent only on words, a mere name, and it is 
only copper in reality; — ^just as, dear one, by one pair of 
nail-scissors everything made of iron is knovm, the change 
is dependent only on words, a mere name, and it is only 
iron in reality; — so, dear one, is it with this teaching/ — 
Of a truth my venerable teachers did not know this them- 
selves, for if they had known it, why did they not tell it to 
me? But do thou, venerable one, now make it clear to 
me!'— *So be it, dear one!' — " 
S — 3. "Existent alone, dear one, was this in the' beginning, 
^one only, and without a second. Some, it is true, say that 
"this was non-Ezistent in the beginning, one only, without a 
"second; that from this non-Existent was bom the Existent 
"But how could this be, dear one? how could the Existent 
"be bom from non-Existent?'' — Here follows the passage given 
above (p. 230 £f.) in which Aru^i explains to his son how the 
one Existent put forth from itself the three primordial ele- 

XX. The Doctrine of Identity. 263 

ments: heat, water, and food, and entered into these with the 
living self (ßva ätman, that is, the individual soul). 

4—7. This is followed by the teaching of the triplication 
of the elements. As the three primordial elements came forth 
from the one Existent, so all things in the world proceed anew 
from the three primordial elements: the red in things is 
radiance (tejas^ the primal fire), the white is water, the black 
is food. This is exemplified in the natural phenomena of fire 
(agni)f the sun, moon, and lightning, and it is said each time: 
''Vanished is the fire-being of the fire (the sun-being of the 
""sun, eta), the change is dependent only on words, a mere 
"name, only the three forms are there in reality.'^ Knowing 
this, the wise men of old said: ''Henceforth can no one bring 
** forth anything which has not been heard, known, and under« 
"" stood by us!" For they knew that what was unknown to 
them also could only be a combination of these three prim* 
ordial elements; from them, like all else, the human body is 
built up, whereby, like the cream in milk, the finest part rises 
and forms the psychical organs, so that Manas is formed from 
food, breath from water, speech from heat. (For more on this 
subject, see Chap. XYII, 6, above p. 240ff.) For this reason 
the mind of mankind is weakened by continual fasting, and 
strengthened again by taking food, just as the glimmering 
ember which remains, can be rekindled by adding fresh fuel 
to it [According to our system, A/anas, PränOy and Vac did 
oot come into being, but are the eternal companions of the 
souL For solution of this contradiction see later on.] 

8. On the conditions of a) Sleep, b) Hunger, c) Thirst, 
and d) Death. — 

a) When a man sleeps, he enters into the Existent, for he 
then [goes to himself (svam apUa), therefore it is said: he 
sleeps {svapiti). ''As a bird bound by a cord flies hither and 
*" thither, and after it has nowhere found a place of rest, settles 
^'on the place where it is bound {bandhanam as in naurhan^ 
""dhanam) so, dear one, Manas flies hither and thither, and 
** after it has nowhere found a place of rest, it returns into 
"Life, for Life is the place where Manas is bound." (Cf. 
Chap. XII, 4, c, above p. 190ff.) 

264 Second Part: Coamology or the Doctrine of the World. 

b) If a man is hungry and satiates himself, this is an effect 
((Ungarn) which as such must have a cause (mtdam). The 
satisfaction as effect has food as cause, food as effect, has 
water as cause, water as effect has heat as cause, heat as 
effect has the Existent as cause; all these creatures hare the 
Existent as cause, the Existent as support, the Existent as 

c) If a man is thirsty and drinks, this effect is caused bj 
water; water as effect has heat as cause, heat as effect has 
the Existent as cause; all these creatures have the Existent 
as cause, the Existent as support, the Existent as basis. 

d) ^When, dear one, a man departs hence, speech enters 
^to Manas, Manas to Life, Life to heat, heat to the highest 
^godhead: that which is that subtle (unknowable) essence, of 
^*its being is the universe, that is the Real, that is the Soul 
"that art thou, O Qvetaketu!" 

9. "When, dear one, the bees prepare honey, they gather 
"the juices from many sorts of trees and unite the nectar in 
"one. As in these nectars, no difference is maintained between 
"the trees whose juice they are, so, of a truth, beloTed, all 
"these creatures also, when (in deep sleep, and death) thej 
"return into the Existent, hare no consciousness that thej 
"return into the Existent Whether tiger, or lion, or wolC or 
"boar, or worm, or bird, or fly, or gnat: whatever they mar 
"be, to that form they return (yad-yad bhavanti^ tad [or 
"with Qankara p. 433, 12. 797, 16 tad-tad] ä6Aat;antt).— That 
"which is that subtle essence, of its being is this universe, 
"that is the Beal, that is the Soul, that art thou, O Qveta- 

10. "These streams, dear one, flow eastward towards the 
"morning, and westward towards the evening; from the ocean 
"[they come] and to the ocean they return; in the ocean thej 
"are bom. As these [in the ocean whence they take their 
"rise] know not that they are this stream or that — ^so, of a 
"truth, beloved, all these creatures, when they again go forth 
"from the Existent, know not that they again go forth from 
"the Existent Whether they are here tiger, or Hon, or wolt 
"or boar, or worm, or bird, or fly, or gnat: whatever they 

XX. The Doctrine of Identity. 266 

"may be, to that form they return. ^<)^ — That which is this 
*^ subtle essence, of its being is the universe, that is the Real, 
""that is the Soul, that art thou, O Qvetaketu!" 
• 11. ^^If, dear one, a man cuts this great tree at the root, 
-'it drips because it lives, if he cuts it in the middle, it drips 
** because it lives, if he cuts it at the top, it drips because it 
^'liTes; it stands penetrated through and through by the living 
-Self, exuberant and joyful. But if life leaves one bough, it 
*^ withers, if it leaves a second, it withers, if it leaves a third, 
*^it withers, if it leaves the whole tree, the whole tree withers. 
-*Thu8 also shalt thou know, dear one, said he: this [body] 
** certainly dies when the living one leaves it, but the living 
**one does not die. That which is this subtle essence, of its 
-" being is the universe, that is the Real, that is the Soul, that 
-art thou, O Qvetaketu!" 

12. ^^ 'Bring hither a fruit from yonder Nyagrodha tree.' 
- — *Here it is, venerable one.' — 'Divide it.'— 'It is divided, 
•"venerable one.' — ^•What seest thou therein?' — *I see here, 
- 'venerable one, very small seeds.' — 'Divide one of them.' — 
••'It is divided, venerable one.' — 'What seest thou therein?' — 
-* Nothing at all, venerable one.' — Then said he: 'the subtle 
** 'essence which thou canst not perceive, beloved, from that 
'''truly has this great Nyagrodha tree arisen. Believe me, 
'''dear one, that which is this subtle essence, of its being is 
-"the universe, that is the Real, that is the Soul, that art 
•*'thou, Qvetaketu!'" 

13. "'Here, put this piece of salt into water, and come 
"'back to me to-morrow.' He did so. Then said he: 'Bring 
"'me the salt which you put in water yesterday.' — He looked 
"for it, but did not find it, for it had melted.— 'Try on this 

to» According to the Commentary to Chand. (p. 447, 19: samdnam 
anyaf) the reading ii here exactly the same as in the preceding para- 
sraph; not as with Winditchmann in the first passage (Sancara p. 180) 
na ka instead of the certainly strange ta* iha (we expect tä* iha)i nor in 
the second with Roer Bampadya instead of yad-yad; and the latter's 
separation of toda f^vanti is to be rejected, not only because the Com- 
nentator (p. 445, 14: punar dbhavanti) is against it (for he often errs), bnt 
also because then it rather ought to be tato bhavanti in the first passage. 

266 Second Part: Cosmology or the Doctrine of the World. 

«•side!— How does it taste?'— 'Salt!'— »Try io the middle!— 
"*How does it taste?'- *Salt!'— *Try on that side!— How does 
"*it taste?' — *Salt!' — * Leave it alone, and sit down near me.' 
«He did so (and he said): 'It exists stilL' — ^Then said he: 
«'Truly so also thou canst not perceive the Existent here (in 
«'the body) but it is nevertheless in it. That which is this 
«'subtle essence, of its being is this universe, that is the Real 
«'that is the Soul, that art thou, O Qvetaketu!'" 

14. «Like as, dear one, a man whom they have led with 
«eyes bound from the land of the Gandharas and then let 
«loose in the desert, wanders towards east, or north, or south, 
«because he was led there with eyes bound, and was set loose 
«with eyes bound; but after some one has taken off his ban* 
«dage, and said to him: 'That way dwell the Gandharas, go 
«'that way,' he goes on asking his way from village to village, 
«with knowledge and intelligence, and returns home to the 
«Gandh^as, — ^thus a man who has found a teacher here, coo- 
«sciously says: 'I wül only endure this [worldly action] on tu 
«'I have attained deliverance, then will I go home.' — That 
«which is this subtle essence, of its being is this unirerse, 
«that is the Real, that is the Soul, that art thou, O Qveta- 

15. «Bound a man who is sick unto death, sit his relations, 
«and ask him: 'Dost thou know me? Dost thou know me?'— 
«So long as his speech has not entered into Manas, his Manas 
«into Life, Life into heat, and heat into the highest godhead, 
«so long he recognises them; but after his speech has entered 
«into Manas, his Manas into Life, Life into heat, and heat 
«into the highest godhead, he knows them no more.— That 
«which is this subtle essence, of its being is this universe, 
«that is the Real, that is the Soul, that art thou, O Qveta- 

16. ""They bring a man with his hands bound« and err: 
«'He is a robber, he has conunitted theft; heat the axe for 
«'him!' — If he is the doer, he makes himself untrue, speaking 
«untruth, he wraps himself in untruth, seizes the glowing axe, 
«is burned, and therefore executed; but if he is not the doer, 
"he makes himself true; telling the truth, he wraps himself ia 

XX. The Doctrine of Identity. 267 

^ truth, seizes the glowing axe, is not burned, and therefore 
^is set free. [That is, as p. 103, 9. 447, 6 explains this simile: 
"from untruth come bonds, from truth comes freedom.] That 
"by which he did not burn himself [the truth], of its being 
"is the uniyerse, that is the Seal, that is the Soul, that art 
«thou, O Qvetaketu!" 

^Thus was he taught by him." 

3. The Doctrine of Identity in the Yedänta System. 

Sütram 2, 1, 14. 
(a) The Extinction of plurality in Brahman. 

For the Hellenic consciousness, the existence of the world 
has its purpose in itself. Christianity, inclining to the Old 
Testament, seeks to understand Creation through the love of 
God towards mankind, towards a thing to be created, though 
not yet existing. According to the Indian view, the creation 
of the world rests upon a moral necessity. The deeds done 
by the soul in an earlier existence must be atoned for. To 
be the place of this atonement, is the only purpose of this 
huge world. Its plurality originates solely from two factors, 
which are indicated by the two words bhoktar and hhogyam: 
on the one side, is the hhoktar, he who enjoys, that is, the 
(indiridual) soul, the subject of enjoyment and also of sorrow, 
and on the other side, the hhogyam^ what is enjoyed, the fruit 
(phalam) of works done in an earlier existence, the object of 
the enjoyment and suffering of the soul. The world is this 
expansion of the Existent into the enjoying soul and the 
fruit to be enjoyed, and nothing else. 

This division into enjoyer and fruit, so Qankara explains, 
is true so long as we remain on the empirical (literally: 
practical, vyävähärika) standpoint; it is no longer true, when 
we rise to the metaphysical (literally: absolutely real: para- 
märthika) point of view (p. 443, 9); for it, the whole worldly 
action is one with Brahman, its cause. This is confirmed by 
the passage of the Chändogya-Upanishadj which we have just 
given. The comparison with the lump of clay (Chänd, 6, 1, 
above p. 262) teaches that, just as all transformation of the 


268 Second Fart: Cosmology or the Doctrine of the World. 

clay into vessels only depend upon words (we might say: upo: 
presentations) while in reality it is nothing but clay, and claj 
only. So all the transformations of the world, are Brahmit 
alone, and beyond this can have no being (p. 444). In thi^ 
sense, the Scripture (Chand. 6, 4 — 7, above p. 263) reduces all 
phenomena in the world to the three primitive elements, aod 
the three primitive elements (Ch&nd. 6, 2 — 3, above p. 263. S30, 
back to the Existent, to Brahman (p. 444, 13). And the sime 
thing is expressed by the formula at the end of the sections 
ChändL 6, 8 — 16, that the world, and (in the words: tat tvam 
asU that art thou) that the soul, (tvam) is identical with 
Brahman {tat). [This also is the meaning of etad vai tai, in 
Eäth. 4, 3. 5. 6 etc., above p. 155.] Thereby all plurality is 
declared to be unreal, as is expressly taught in the Terse 
(Brih. 4, 4, 19, above p. 195): 

"In spirit musing shall they see: 
^'That here is no plurality. 
"Their never-ending death they weave 
^ Who here a manifold perceive/' 

As the space in a vessel is identical with cosmic space, is 
the mirage is identical with the salt plain, so that it dis- 
appears when we examine it more closely, and in itself isvQ- 
rüpena) is not perceptible, so too, the world-extension of ei> 
joyer and enjoyed has no existence beyond Brahman (p. 44S, 7)r 

(b) The Relation of Unity to Plurality. 

How are we to consider the relation between the unity of 
the Existent and the manifoldness of its developments? k 
Brahman related to the many powers (above p. 2S7ff.) as t 
tree is related to its branches, because, as a tree, it forms a 
unity, while, as it spreads into branches, it is manifold, or as 
an ocean to the manifoldness of its foam, waves, etc^ or v 
the single clay to the plurality of vessels, — in such a manotf 
that with the knowledge of unity, liberation is bound up, whil< 
worldly action and religious worship are connected with tb« 
knowledge of plurality? — By no means; rather, as in the simile 
of the lump of clay, only the clay is real, while all its trutf* 
formations are only dependent on words, that is, unreal v 

XX. The Doctrine of Identity. 269 

Also in the world, the highest cause, that is, Brahman, is the 
one and only reality, and the embodied soul is no other than 
Brahman himself (p. 446, 10—446, 9). 

This Brahmanhood of the soul does not require to be 
called into existence by effort, but is already existent, there- 
fore only the inborn idea of the separateness of the soul re- 
quires to be refuted by the Scripture, as (in the well-known 
simile) by the knowledge that it is a piece of rope, the opinion 
that it was a snake is refuted. i<^& But if the separate existence 
of the soul be refuted, the whole worldly action which depends 
on it, and on account of which a plurality was assumed for 
Brahman is refuted at the same time. And this non-existence 
of the worldly action is not only conditional (in deep sleep 
and death), but, as the words tat tvam asi show, it is to be 
accepted unconditionally, and without restriction to any given 
circumstances. The simile of the thief also, Chand. 6, 16, 
above p. 266), as it shows that bondage follows from false 
speech, while freedom follows from truth-speaking, teaches that 
only unity is true in the fullest sense, and that manifoldness, 
on the contrary, proceeds from false perception. Were both 
unity and manifoldness real, we could not say of one whose 
standpoint is that of worldly action, that he is caught in un* 
truth, and ** weaves a never-ending death;" it could not then 
be said: **from knowledge comes deliverance,'* [jfiänän mokshahy 
—a sentence also found in KapUa 3, 23, jnänän muktih and 
which, in two words, gives food for much thought] ; moreover, 
then the knowledge of manifoldness could not be annihilated 
by the knowledge of unity (p. 446, 9 —447, 14). 

to» The simile of a rope (Brahman) which is taken for a snake (the 
world), occurs on p. 268, 12. 432, 14. 446, 12. 817, 12. 822, 18 and with 
^eater detail on p. 353, 7: «'As in the dark, one takes a fallen rope for 
"a snake, and flees from it in fear and trembling, and another sajs to 
"bim: *Fear not; it is not a snake, it is only a cord;' and be, when he 
"has nnderttood this, ceases to fear the snake, to tremble and flee, and 
"as there is not the slightest difference in the thing itself, at the time it 
*was taken for a snake, and at the time this opinion disappeared,— jnst 
"to is this also to be considered.'* 


270 Second Part: Cosmology or the Doctrine of the World. 

(c) How is the Knowledge of Unity ponible, from the standpoint 

of plarality? 

Only unity exists; plurality does not exist. This statement 
abolishes not only the empirical means of knowledge, perception 
etc., but also the Vedic canon of command and prohibition 
(compare above p. 66). But does it not also abolish the canon 
of liberation? For this certainly presupposes the duality of 
pupil and teacher, and thus rests upon untruth; and how 
can the teaching of unity from a false standpoint be true 
(p. 448, 5)?— 

To this, it is to be replied that all empirical action, until 
knowledge comes, is just as true as are all dream faces, until 
awakening comes. For every being has forgotten its original 
identity with Brahman, and takes the empirical ^I" and 
"mine" for the Self and its qualities. This is true until the 
knowledge of identity with Brahman arises. — True, but not 
beyond this! A rope snake cannot bite, ;a mirage does not 
really quench thirst; and so it is in dream: the poison of a 
dream-snake does not really kill, and dream water does not 
really wet! — Certainly not! But as (in dream) we perceive the 
cause, the water and the bite, in like manner we perceive the 
effect, death and wetness. — But this effect is still not real! 
[How can the real Brahman be known by means of unreal 
teaching?] — The effect is unreal, but the perception of it is 
real, and it is not remoTed by awakening. For when a person 
wakes, he perceives it to be untrue that the snake and the 
water were there, but not that he perceived thenu In just 
the same way, what is perceived in dream is untrue, but 
the perception of it is true (therefore, as Qankara remarks 
in passing, the opinion of the materialists, that the body is the 
Self, is refuted). It is also to be remembered that real events 
are often indicated beforehand by unreal dreams; does not 
the scripture say (Ch&nd. 6, S, 9), that love-adventures in dream 
betoken luck, and when we dream of a black man with black 
teeth, it signifies speedy death (according to Ait är. 3, 2, 4, 17). 
It is also well known that those who are acquainted with the 
rules and their exceptions (the interpreters of dreams) prophesy 
good and evil firom dreams. Thus the true is known from 

XX. The Doctrine of Identity. 271 

the untrue, in the same way as from written signs which are 
soundless, the real sounds are perceived (p. 447, 14 — 451, 4). 
From these discussions, we are to understand that in the 
non-reality of the world of appearances, the soul remains real. 
The teaching is directed to the soul, and thus it does not I 
cease when the world of appearances ceases. 

(d) The Value of the Doctrine of Unity. 
The perception of unity is final, for, as it contains every- 
thing in itself^ it does not leave anything beyond itself to be 
desired, as do the ritual precepts; it is attainable, as the 
Scripture shows by its examples and exhortations; it is not 
aimless, for its fruit is the cessation of Ignorance; and it is 
infallible, for there is no further knowledge which could 
remove it, for the Brahman unlike everything else, is not a 
mere transformation; He is the Highest, free from all change, 
and all qualities; only by the knowledge of Brahman, not by 
that of his transformations, can liberation be attained (p. 451, 4 
to 464, 1). 

(e) CriticiBm of Anthropomorphiim. 

The Yedanta maintains, on the one hand, the unity and 
non-duality of Brahman, which permits of no Being beyond 
itself, and, on the other hand, it calls Brahman ^the Lord," 
and sets him up as ruler of the world. But the designations 
of Brahman as Ruler, Almighty, Omniscient, refer only to the 
extension in names and forms caused by Ignorance, and are 
not to be accepted in the highest sense. For we must distin- 
guish between the two standpoints: the standpoint of world- 
ly actions (vyavahara-avasthd) and the standpoint of the 
highest reality (paramäriha-avadhä). From the latter stand- 
point, the Scripture teaches the non-existence of all worldly 
actions by sentences like: "But when all has become his own 
""Self for anyone, how could he see anyone else?*' etc. (above 
p* 175). From the first standpoint, it admits the relation 
of ruler and ruled, etc.; as when it is said (above p. 196): 
""He is the Lord of the universe, he is the Ruler of Beings, 
''he is the Guardian of Beings." And these are precisely Üie 

272 Second Part: Cosmology or the Doctrine of the World. 

two points of view admitted by the author of the Sutras, 
since on the one hand he teaches identity, while on the other 
hand he allows the concepts of Brahman as an ocean (ii 
contradistinction to its waves, foam, bubbles, 2, 1, 13; the in- 
adequacy of this picture is repeatedly brought into prominence, 
p. 446, 13. 446, 4. 456, 8, cf: 515, 11) and similar ideas, which 
presuppose the existence of the world, and are to be regarded 
as belonging to the adoration of Brahman possessed of attn- 
butes (p. 454, 1—456, 10) (above p. 102 ff.). 

— Thus our authors confine the anthropomorphic ideas of 
Q-od as a personality, which have their root in realism, to 
exoteric theology. 

XXL Solution of the Cosmological Problems. 

The cosmological problems which we gathered together in 
Chapter XVIII, abore p. 250 ff., with their respectiye solutions, 
are found in the original work in part before, and in part 
after, the exposition of the doctrine of identity. Our re- 
arrangement, and the division of the problems into two sepa* 
rate chapters, with the doctrine of identity between them, is 
justified by the fact that the raising of these problems is only 
possible from an empirical standpoint, and before the doctrine 
of identity is put forward, while their complete solution can only 
be given after this doctrine. If our authors follow a different 
course, it is because the difference between the empirical and 
metaphysical standpoints (vyävähäriki and päramärthikt avasthä^ 
above p. 106 ff.) so distinctly made by them, is imperfectly 
carried out in their work. So far as this shortcoming can be 
supplied by a mere re-arrangement, we have believed our- 
selves justified in supplying it, and, in doing this, we in no 
case go further than a translator who adds to a work the 
improvements suggested by its author; when, however, as we 
shall see, the solution of the cosmological problems is first 
sought from an empirical standpoint, and only when this 
method fails is the metaphysical teaching of identity called 
in, we do not hold ourselves bound to remedy this; on the con- 
trary, the fluctuations between the empirical and metaphysical 
standpoints, as we' shall see further on, must remain untouched, 
as historical monuments of a stage through which the philosopher 
first struggled to fuller clearness, without entirely effacing from 
his work the itraces of the intermediate stage he had passed 

through. It is also possible, and many indications speak for 




274 Second Part: Cosmology or the Doctrine of the World. 

it, (cf. above pp. 28 ff. 139 and notes 17. 45. 21. 22), that the foriL 
of the Commentaries to the Brahmasütras as we hare thexs 
bears the imprint of many hands; but these signs are to.> 
vague, and the whole work has too slight an individuality. fiT 
us to convert this possibility into a definite hypothesis. 

We give the solutions in the same order as the problen.^ 
which can be referred to, point by point, in Chapter XVIII 

1. The Problem of Causality. 

Sutras 2, 1, 6. 7. 9. 

(a) The Difference in Essence between Brahmaa 
and the World. — To the objection that Brahman conld nr: 
be the cause of the world, because the two are different in 
essence, an empirical answer is first given, by adducing ex- 
amples in which the effect is different from the cause; thus, 
from men, who are conscious, hair and nails which are un- 
conscious, proceed; from dung which is unconscious, the con- 
scions dung-beetle (vrigcika » gomayaJdta) comes forth. Bet 
as here cause and effect, in spite of every difference of fore:. 
\ have this in common, that they have both sprung from th* 
earth, so Brahman and the world have both this common 
characteristic, — Being {satta)* — Of what nature is the difference 
in essence {vilakahanatvam) on the ground of which the oppo- 
nent disputes the creation of the world by Brahman? Does 
it lie (1) in the fact that nature does not altogether harmou5(^ 
with the being of Brahman? Without a certain reaching^fortii 
beyond itself (atigaya), in the cause, we nowhere find th? 
relation of cause and effect. Or (2) is the difference between 
the two complete? That cannot be maintained; for the 
evidence teaches that the Being (saltd), which is the esseiice 
of Brahman, is also to be found in the things which make up 
Nature. Or (3) is it impossible for Nature to have spni£^ 
from Brahman because Nature lacks consciousness (caitanyam ? 
The examples we have given above are opposed to this viev; 
and not these examples only, but also the revelation of Scnr- 
ture. But it is a mere [unjustified] postulate (minora > 
mäiram) that Brahman, because it is in fact existent (parini^ 

XXL Solution of the Cosmological ProbleQiB. 275 

pannam), must also be perceptible by worldly means of know- 
ledge: for perception cannot comprehend Brahman, because 
Brahman is without form; inference also fails, because Brah- 
man has no characteristic {Ungarn)] and if reflection is never- 
theless recommended by the Scriptures, it is to be understood 
of reflection directed to the Scriptures, and not of reflection 
diyorced from them. — Furthermore, we must not believe that 
because the world is an effect of Brahman, it did not exist 
before it was created. Even then, it already existed, in the 
form of its causal Self (kärana-ätmanä), just as now it only 
persists through the power of this causal Self (p. 424, 9 to 
429, 13). 

— The last phrase points plainly to the doctrine of iden- 
tity, as it frees the causal relation from the form of sequence 
in time, and makes it simultaneous. 

(b) The Contamination of Brahman by the World. — 

To the objection that, on re-absorbing the world. Brahman 

is polluted by it, it is to be replied that, according to our 

experience, a cause, when the effect returns into it, is not 

affected by the qualities of the latter; thus vessels return to 

clay; golden ornaments to gold; living beings, to the earth, 

without the latter being altered by their qualities. For it 

would certainly not be a true return, if the effect retained 

its qualities when withdrawn into its cause. Bather (and here 

our author passes to metaphysical explanations) the doctrine 

of the identity of cause and effect presupposes that the effect 

is identical with the cause, but not the cause with the effect 

The above objection is taken in too narrow a sense; not only 

on its return, but also during its existence, would the world 

pollute Brahman; for in all time, past, present, and future, 

the world is identical with Brahman; but neither its existence 

nor its return pollutes Brahman, and this, because the world 

as effect, along with its qualities, is imputed only through the 

Ignorance [of the soul]. ^As the magician is not affected by 

"the illusion (mäyä) which he himself has created, because it 

''is without reality (avartu), so also PluramcUman is not affected 

''by the illusion of Samsära. And as the dreamer is not 

"affected by the illusion of a dream, because (Brih. 4, 3, 15. 16, 


276 Second Part: Coimology or the Doctrine of the World. 

"^ above p. 190) the soul is not touched by sleep, or waking 
''[this appears to be an addition and not authentic] — so also 
^the one unchangeable witness of the three states [waking, 
*^ dreaming, deep sleep] is not touched by these three chang- 
^ing states. For the appearance of the highest soul in the 
"* three states is only an illusion, like the appearance of the 
^rope as a snake. Therefore it is said by the teachers who 
^'are learned in the Vedanta-tradition (Oäudapäda ad Man- 
^ dükya-Up. h 16, p. 384): 

''When from illusion'i sleep that ne'er began, 
*'The tool awaketh, then in her awakes 
"The unborn One, that never slombereth." 

^Consequently, it is false to hold that the cause is polluted 
^by the qualities, materiality, etc., of the effect, if they return 
«into that cause" (p. 431, 1—433, 4). 

(c) The Impossibility of a new Differentiation. — 
To this objection, the reply is, that, as the soul, in deep sleep 
and meditation, returns (temporarily) to its original unity, but 
on waking from these states, because it is not free from 
Ignorance, it returns to its individual existence, so also is it 
with the return into Brahman. « For as at the time of the 
«duration of the world, in consequence of false knowledge, 
«the tendency to differentiate in the undifferentiated Para- 
«mätman goes on unchecked like a dream, so we must al<^> 
«take for granted that, after the return into Brahman, the 
«force of differentiation, conditioned by false knowledge, still 
«continues" (p. 433, 4--i34, 2). 

(d) The Danger of a Return for the Liberated. — 
From what has been said, it follows that the liberated cannot 
be bom again, for the false knowledge which conditions in- 
dividual existence, is taken away from them by perfect know- 
ledge (p. 434, 1 — 2), since, as is said in another place (p. 342. 7u 
the seed-force (above p. 228) is burnt up, in their case, by the 
fire of wisdom. 

XXL Solution of the Gotmologic«! Problems. S77 

2. The Problem of the One and the Many. 

Sütnt a, 1, 27. 28. 81. 

(a) Total or partial transformation. — First, we must 
bear in mind that Brahman is not wholly changed into the 
world. For the Scripture, wherever it speaks of the trans* 
formation of Brahman, presupposes his continuance; as when 
it is said that '^one part of him is all creatures, three parts 
^are immortal in the heaven" (RigvedaX, 90, 3, above p. 168); 
when it conceives deep sleep as a return to Brahman, where 
the transformed Brahman cannot be meant, for we are in Him 
already; when it is taught that Brahman cannot be reached 
by perception, which is not true of the transformed Brahman, 
etc. Moreover, the partial transformation of Brahman cannot 
be maintained, because the Scripture, which is the only author* 
ity here, most strongly insists on the indivisible unity of Brah- 
man. f<^*— But can the Scripture teach a plain contradiction? 
And that Brahman is neither wholly nor partially transformed 
into the world, is certainly one! — To this it is replied that 
the whole plurality of appearances rests on Ignorance. But 
a thing does not become divided because Ignorance takes it i/ 
to be divided. The moon is not duplicated because people 
with defective vision see two moons. The whole empirical 
reality with its names and forms, which can neither be defined 
as Being nor as nothing {^a\XvaranyQivdib}iydm anxnnicavixya 
p. 483, 9, a frequent formula, cf. p. 96, 6. 343, 1. 454, 10), rests ^ 
upon Ignorance, while, in the sense of the highest reality, the 

•0« The conceptioD here repudiated, is farther enforced by the limile 
of coemic epace and the space within vessels, which serves more 
frtqaently than any other to make clear the relation of Brahman to 
individual beings; p. 233, 3: "As the hollows of vessels, conceived 
"* without the determinations (i«pd<2At)— the vessels— are nothing else than 
"cosmic space, so also living sonU are not [apart from their wpficUu] 
** different from the highest souL" The same simile occurs: p. 121, 1. 
173, 17. 196, 8. 199, 8. 443, 6. 445, 7. 455, 8. 473, 11. 645, 11. 1134, 2. 
(Space and the eye of a needle:) 175, 2. 836, 12. Its value lies in the fact 
that it admirably iUustrates^the fact that Brahman is not affected (oMfi- 
^focMn) by the Upidhis, to which p. 266, 8 refers; cf. p. 176, 5 (Space 
does not bum with bodies), 690, 2 (does not move with vessels). 

278 Second Part: Cosmology or the Doctrine of tbe World. 

Existent persists without change or transformation« A trans- 
formation resting merely on words (above p. 262} can alter 
nothing in the indivisibility of the Existent — As the dreamer 
creates many forms, and yet remains one and undivided, as 
gods and magicians, without changing their nature, make 
horses, elephants, etc., appear, so the manifold creation arises 
in the uniform Brahman, without Brahman thereby undergoing 
the least change of nature (p. 480, 11 — 184, 14). 

(b) One Brahman with many powers. — Further, the 
contradiction that Brahman, though without differences, has 
yet many powers, is solved by the fact that all diversity of 
form belongs only to the realm of Ignorance. The unfathom- 
able depth of this subject cannot be reached by reflection, 
but only through revelation, through the Scripture which 
teaches that (Qvet. 3, 19): 

^It feeli without a hand, without a foot it runt, 
^ It sees without an eye and hears without an ear** 

it uses no instruments, and yet can do all things (p. 488, 1 — 8). 

3. The Moral Problem. 

Sutras 2, 1, 84-36. 22-23. 

That empirical theism (for which the world is real and 
different from God) is untenable appears nowhere so clearly 
as in the region of morals. For however the matter be 
turned, in a real creation, which* is seriously taken, the re- 
sponsibility for evil, and for the sin of the world finally Halls 
on Grod. This consequence does not trouble the morally un- 
developed conscience. Therefore it is said in Isaiah XLY, 7: 
*^I form the light, and create darkness: I make peace, and 
** create evil; I the LORD do all these things.** And in the 
Kawhitaki'Up. 3, 8: it is expressed even more strongly: *For 
''he makes those do good works whom he will guide out from 
''this world, and he makes those do evil, whom he will guide 
"downwards; he is the guardian of the world, he is the ruler 
"of the world, he is the lord of the world." — ^The Hebrews 
gained a solution of the question more apparent than real by 
adopting (or rather adapting) Satan from the mythology of 

XXI. Solation of the Coemological Probleme. 279 

Persia, and thereby satisfying themselves. The Indians in a 
more philosophical spirit recognised the fact that there are 
only two ways out of this: either by referring the constitution 
(essetitia)^ and also the creation (existentia) of the world not 
to Ood but to an immanent principle, or (idealistically) by 
denying the existence of the world altogether. We find Qan- 
kara taking both ways, by bringing forward, as he always 
does, both empirical and metaphysical arguments for the 
solution of the problem. 

(a) The Creator of the World as the Author of 
EtII. — To the argument that God, as Creator of the world, 
is responsible for the evil in it, the answer is first made that 
God, in the creation of creatures, does not act arbitrarily 
(nirapeksha), but is bound by a certain regard, namely, the 
regard for the good and evil works of each creature in an 
earlier birth (p. 492, 6). By this conception, for which, as 
we saw before (above p. 267), the world is nothing but the 
scene of atonement for the works of an earlier existence, the 
role of God as Creator sinks into a secondary, and purely 
instrumental one. The Body may be compared to a plant 
(p. 492, 10), which springs up from seed, grows, expands, and 
finally dies; yet not altogether, but so that something remains, — 
the seed, which, strewn in the kingdom of Ignorance, brings 
forth a new plant according to its kind. This seed of man 
(so Car as individual determination is conditioned by it), is 
his works. In exact correspondence to their moral quality, is 
the form of the new life, because all happiness and unhappiness 
depend on it under an inflexible necessity, and also, as we 
shall see, all virtue and vice of the new existence. In this 
growth of the present out of the seed of works, the task of 
the Creator can only be a secondary one: he is to be com- 
pared to the rain (the chief condition of growth in India), 
which causes the plants to shoot. That they grow, is the 
work of outward circumstances (water, soil, air, light, or, as 
the Indians say, rain), but what they shall grow to be, does 
not depend upon those conditions which come from G^d, but 
upon the nature of the seed: only rice can come from rice, 
only barley from barley (p. 492, 9). — This concept requires as 


280 Second Part: Cosmology or the Doctrine of the World. 

its unaToidable consequence, the assumption that Samsära is 
without beginning, for, as far as we go back, each existence 
draws its conditions from some prior existence (p. 494, 1). — 
This consequence is as yet absent from the older Upanishads; 
it contradicts their teaching, certainly intended seriously at 
£rst, of the Creation of the world from "the One withont a 
Second" (above p. 230), and of the predestination which neoess- 
•arily follows (above p. 278) from this. In the desire to do 
■away with this contradiction, we must recognise the real 
motive of the periodicity of creation, already mentioned above 
(p. 227) the alternating evolution of the world from^ and its 
re-absorption into Brahman, which is not mentioned in the 
older Upanishads. Qankara certainly manages to indicate it 
as already in them, when (p. 495, 1) out of the words: *^I will 
^ enter into these three divinities with my living Self' (Cb&nd. 
6, 3, 2, see above p. 231) he drags the meaning that the ^liv- 
ing Self" (the individual soul) must therefore have existed 
before the creation. But tliis argument is as little admissible 
as is his reference to the verse (Kigveda X, 190, 3): 
Sürffä'candramasau dliätä yath&pürvam akalpayat, 
which, according to the context, can only mean: ''the creator 
created the sun and moon" — yathäpürvam — ''according to 
their order," not, as Qankara says, "as before" (p. 495, 7). 

(b) The Creator of the World as the Cause of Evil 
— We have two answers to the arguments marshalled under 
this heading, an empirical answer, 2, 1, 23, and one which 
amounts to the doctrine of identity 2, 1, 22, and, remarkable 
to say, the former stands second. Even if these two parts 
were written down by the same hand, it is hardly thinkable 
that they were originated in the same head. We shall reverse 
their order, and examine the empirical answer first — Just as, 
it is said, 2, 1, 23, the same earth brings forth many kinds of 
stones, the most costly jewels, as well as the most common 
stones of the fields; as the same earth produces plants which 
vary in leaves, flowers, fruits, smell and taste, or as in men 
from the same essence of food (annarasa) spring blood, hair, 
and nails, all quite di£ferent; in the same way, from the one 
Brahman proceeds the division into the individual and highest 

XXI. Solation of the OoBmological Problems. 281 

souls, and the yariety of [good and evil] effects. — Quite another 
character than that of this empirical comparison is borne by 
the directly preceding section, 3, 1, 22. It is true that here 
also our author starts from the separation (only indicated by 
the Sütram) of God and the soul, in order to transfer aÜ 
moral guilt from the former to the latter. Brahman is omni- 
scient and omnipotent, everlasting, pure, wise and free. Be- 
cause he is free, he can do what he wills; for him, there is 
neither command nor prohibition, and therefore neither good 
nor OTiLio^ The individual soul, on the contrary, is affected 
by good and evil (reading ca instead of na, p. 473, 4), and of 
it we do not at all maintain that it is the creator of the 
world. — ^ Without committing himself to the question, unavoid- 
able from this standpoint, "Whence then springs the individual 
soul, with its good and evil?" our author at once passes on 
to the metaphysical explanation: '^But how is this? Are not 
''God and the soul the same, according to the words: tat 
"^tvam asi?^^ — To this it is replied: "When, by the teaching 
''of non-separateness, through sentences like tat tvam asi, the 
"consciousness of non-separateness is awakened, then the 
'^ wanderings of the soul and the creative function of Brahman 
"cease; for the whole tendency of the world of division springs 
"from false knowledge, and is removed by perfect knowledge. 
"Whence, then, the creation? and whence the responsibility 
"for not having brought forth good only? For Satnsära, which 
"has as its characteristics the doing of good and evil, is an 
"illusion produced by non-discrimination of the determinations 
"(which, produced by Ignorance, consist in the aggregate of 
"the instruments of activity formed by names and forms), and 
"this illusion just as the error (abhimäna) of division and 
"separation by birth and death, does not exist in the sense 
"of the highest reality" (p. 472, 14—476, 4). 

to7 For oar author, every good thing (hitam) is a command (l^orta- 
9yam) and every evil thing {akitam) it a prohibition (parihartavi/am) \ 
tbcrefore the freedom of Ood excludes both. He knows, therefore, like 
the Old Testament, only a hypothetical imperative, not, like the philosophy 
of Kanty a categorical, which only becomes possible through freedom. 





XXIL Proofs of the Immortality of the Soul. 

1. Preliminary Bemarks on Psychology. 

With Theology or the doctrine of the Existent, and Cos- 
mology or the doctrine of its manifestation as the world, the 
foundations of the system are naturally completed; it is therefore 
only a further elaboration of what has already been expounded 
when in Psychology and the following sections we turn our 
attention specially to a particular side of the Universe, in 
order to consider more closely both in its own nature and in 
its two states of wandering and liberation that most important 
of cosmic phenomena, which is immediately present to the 
inner consciousness of every one, namely the soul. 

There are two factors which constitute the Universe; one 
of them may be properly termed the stage in this drama of 
cosmic evolution, the other the players who appear on it; the 
first factor is inorganic Nature consisting of space, air, 
fire, water and earth; the second is organic Nature consist- 
ing of souls that have entered into the elements and wander 
as plants, animals, men, and gods. Both factors are ultimately 
resolvable into Brahman, into "the One without a second,'' 
who according to the exoteric view creates the elements anew 
at the beginning of each world-period and then enters into 
them (above p. 231) "with the living Self," i, e., with the in- 
diTidual Soul; but both of them, the elements as well as the 
souls, are, from the higher, esoteric standpoint of the doctrine 
of identity, the one undivided Brahman Himself; for an existence 
in the highest sense real (paramärihcUah) which passes beyond 
the one indivisible Brahman without a second cannot be pre- 
dicated of the extension (prapafica) of the elements in names 

286 Third Part: Peyehology or the Doctrine of tke Soul. 

and forms as they are "laden on" the soul as ''recompense 
of the deed on the doer" (kriyä-käraka-phalamt p. 273, 11 
291, 6. 447, 3. 987, 6), nor yet of the Brahman disguised br 
the Upadhis whereby He represents a wandering, enjoying. 
acting soul. 

This double fundamental view of the Yedänta: the esoteric 
doctrine according to which every soul is the whole indiyisibk 
Brahman, who admits of nothing outside Himself, and the 
exoteric doctrine according to which there has from etemitj 
existed a plurality of souls wandering but neyertheless (illogic- 
ally) conceived as emanating from the Brahman — ^this Tiev 
must be clearly kept in mind in what follows, even when (on 
the supposition that the reader is now sufficiently familiar 
with the leading conceptions) we do not treat the exoteric 
and esoteric Psychology in two strictly sundered sections 
which would involve too great a dislocation of the sequence 
of thought of the original In general, it may be noted, Qan- 
kara in the Psychology takes the esoteric view, and leares it 
to the opponent whose opinion is step by step developed m 
detail and then refuted, to represent the exoteric view; at th« 
same time having regard to the doctrine of metempsychosis 
maintained by him for the ^4ower knowledge." Qankara cannot 
avoid descending to the exoteric standpoint himself; in doing 
so he appropriates partially and conditionally the arguments 
which he himself combats, in order thereby to gain a found- 
ation for the doctrine of Satnsdra, i.e^ the "wandering" ct 
the soul, which he then treats of. — The individual enqoiri^ 
as found in the original work will be left as far as possible 
untouched; only in the order will certain changes demanded 
by the subject be made; therefore we shall first treat of the 
origin and nature of the soul (chap. XXTTT), of its relation to 
God (chap. XXIY), to the body (chap. XXY) and to its own 
works (chap. XXVI), all this from the esoteric standpoint; 
this course, however, from the continual connection with the 
exoteric point of view opposed to it will disclose many aspects 
which are true for the other doctrine also; these will be further 
developed when passing to the exoteric standpoint we consider 
the soul in relation to its empirical organs (chiq). XXTil) 

XXII. Proofs of the ImmorUlity of the Soul. 287 

and states (chap. XXVIII) in detail; to these preliminaries 
in the following section will be readily joined the doctrine of 

Howeyer before we enter on these discussions, we must as 
an introduction produce the proofs of the immortality of the 
soul which are not found in the psychological part of the work 
(2, 3, 15—2, 4, 19, and 3, 2, 1—10) but 3, 3, 53—54 among the 
miscellaneous matter which forms the sections 3, 3 and 3, 4. 
Though Qankara tries to justify artificially the interpolation 
of this episode at the place in question, it does not naturally 
belong there but to Psychology, and that as an introduction; 
for a conditio sine qua nan of the doctrine of the soul is the 
proof that the soul exists, that there is in man a part which 
"* reaches" beyond the body and is not a£fected by its dis- 

The word ^immortality" is here to be understood in its 
western sense as, used by us, of ^indestructibility by death." 
The Indians as a rule understand by the corresponding amrita- 
tram as has already been emphasised (aboYe p. 149) some- 
thing di£ferent, namely ^'the deliverance of the liberated soul 
from dying." lo^ What we call immortality is commonly called 
by them vyatireka the ^* reaching" (beyond the body); and this 
idea is the subject of the following controversy between the 
materialists and Yedantins, which, for the high interest of the 
question discussed, we add in a unabbreviated translation. 

9. Arguments of the Materialists against the Im- 
mortality of the Soul. 

^Some, namely those materialists (loJcäyalika) who see the 
^'Self in the body only, believe that there, is no Self which 
"* persists beyond the body; they assume that consciousness 
''though indiscoverable in the estemal elements, earth, etc.. 

>M Martyatvam on the contrary means, p. 193, 7 ^^ the necenity of 
dying again and again" of the individual sooL— However amrita too it 
occasionally foond in oar tenia; e.^., p. 197, 12, where it meant the tool 
* which cannot die" (beeaate there ttill exitt workt to be atoned for); 
et alto p. 241, 14. 

288 Third Part: Peychology or the Doctrine of the Soul. 

^^ taken individually and collectirely, is contained in them when 
^they take the form of the body; therefore they maintain that 
"consciousness proceeds from them in the form of intellect, 
"just as the power of intoxication [from fermenting matter], 
"and that man is only a body which is distinguished by this 
"consciousness. On the other hand they deny a Self which 
"persists beyond the body, by virtue of which consciousness 
"is in the body and which is capable of entering into heaven 
"or into salvation; on the contrary they assume that the body 
"alone is the conscious being and the Self, and cite as a 
"proof that this conscious being only continues as long as the 
"body. For when anything exists only as long as something 
"else exists, and ceases to exist with it, this is completely 
"expressed by terming it a quality of the other, just as heat 
"and light are qualities of fire. It is just the same with 
"breath, motion, spirit, memory, etc. which are considered qual- 
"ities of the soul by believers in the soul; for they too are per- 
"ceived only within the body and not without it, and as no 
"bearer of these qualities which reaches beyond the body can 
"be proved, therefore they can be nothing but qualities of the 
"body. Therefore the Self does not persist beyond the bodv" 
(p. 954, 5—955, 2). 

3. Proofs of the Immortality of the Sou). 

"To this we reply: it is not true that the soul does not 
"persist beyond the body; on the contrary its persistence 
"beyond the body must be assumed because its Existence 
"does not depend on the Existence (of the body). For 
"if from the fact that the qualities of the Self persist as long 
"as the body, the conclusion is drawn that they are qualities 
"of the body, then also from the fact that they do not persist 
"while the body persists must be concluded that they are not 
" qualities of the body because they di£fer essentially from the 
"qualities of the body. For what is a quality of the body, 
"e.^., shape, etc., must persist as long as the body. Breath, 
"motion, etc. on the other hand do not persist though the 
"body does, namely in the state of death. Not only so bot 

XXIL Proofs of the Immortality of the SoaL 289 

^the qualities of the body, as shape, etc., are perceived by 
"others, but this is not so with the qualities of the Self^ Spirit, 
''Memory, etc." 

"Further: it is true that from the existence of the body 
**in a living state can be proved the existence of those [qual- 
-^ities of the Self], but from its non-existence the reverse 
''cannot be proved; for there is always the possibility that 
"^ whenever this body perishes the qualities of the Self persist 
**by entering into another body; the opponents' opinion there« 
^fore is excluded by its being a mere hypothesis (samfaya).^ 

''The opponent must further be asked how he imagines 
** consciousness if he assumes its origin from the elements; for 
** beyond the four elements the materialists of course admit 
*" nothing existing. If he says: consciousness is the perception 
''of the elements and the products, consciousness has the latter 
''as its' objects and consequently cannot be a quality of them, 
^for an activity directed towards one's own Self is a contra- 
" diction; for though fire is hot, it does not bum itself, and 
'^however skilled a dancer is, he cannot climb on his own 
-* shoulders; if consciousness is a quality of the elements and 
-'their products, the elements and their products cannot be 
''objects of consciousness; for e.g, shapes cannot have their 
"own shape or another as object, while on the other hand 
*" consciousness has as objects the elements and their products 
"whether without or within the Self. As the existence of the 
''elements and their products is concluded from the fact that 
''they are perceived, so the conclusion must also be drawn 
''that this perception is different from them [perception makes 
-*the material world known, not vice versa]; and the proper 
^nature of perception is just what we call soul. Thus the 
** independence of the soul from the body and its eternity 
''follow from the unity of perception; and recollecting etc. 
"is possible through the recognition in a different condition 
*' of a thing once perceived because the percipient is identical 
''[with himself]." 

^Kow if it be said that perception is a quality of the body 

-'because it persists as long as the body, the method of reply- 

''ing has already been indicated; perception continues as long 


290 Third Part: Peyehology or the Doctrine of the Soal. 

"as the means e,g. the lamp, exists, and continues no longer 
"when it does not exist; but from this cannot be concluded 
"that perception is only a quality of the lamp; just in the 
"same way because perception continues as long as the body 
"exists and ceases when it ceases, it does not need to be a 
"quality of the body; for the body like the lamp seryes only 
"as a means. Moreover the help of the body is not un- 
"conditionally necessary in perception, for while the body lies 
"motionless in sleep we perceive many things. — Therefore the 
"existence of a soul persisting beyond the body is indisputable*" 
(p. 965—967). 

4. On the Doctrine of Immortality in generaL 

If human thought were what it is not and perhaps neyer 
will be — completely logical, there would probably be only two 
philosophical standpoints: Idealism which holds the world 
which surrounds us as not real in the strict sense, and 
Bealism which regards it as real If these standpoints are 
logically adhered to, there is place in neither system, as it 
seems to us, for the immortality of the soul. For it is essential 
to Idealism to reach by one of the ways indicated by as in 
chap. II, 1, above p. 47 ff. the conviction of the unreality of all 
plurality as well as of all origination and dissolution and to 
grasp as the sole certainty the existence of the Self {ego) : the 
logical consequence of this standpoint is the consciousness of 
the identity of the Ego with "Being-in-itself" and of the 
identification with it as soon as the dream of this existence 
is past — an identification which is not to be conceived so 
much as an absorption of the Self in the All, but rather 
(if we may speak spatially of the spaceless) as an absorption 
of the all into the Self, as a generalised realisation of what 
is in detail realised in every moral action. From this point 
of view the doctrine of immortality is superfluous; for it says 
us only what is self-evident. From the point of view of Realisa 
on the other hand it is logically impossible. If nature is 
real, its dicta are real; and they tell us unmistakably 
that we arise out of nothing by procreation and at death 

XXII. Proofs of the Immortality of the Sool. 291 

return to nothing.— These considerations seem to show that 
the doctrine of immortality is a compromise between Idealism 
und Realism; it is an attempt to maintain from the realistic 
standpoint which is the natural one for the human intellect 
the idealistic certainty, rooted in self-consciousness, of the 
iiachangeableness of the Self— a yain effort as the history of 
the doctrine of immortality sufficiently demonstrates. 

In the Yedänta system Idealism is represented by the 
esoteric view of the doctrine of identity. Realism by the exoteric 
doctrine of the Creation of the world. For the esoteric riew 
the soul is identical with the Brahman and to grasp this only 
the right knowledge of the Self is needed, and no proof of 
immortality. The exoteric view makes us emerge from and 
return to Brahman; with this conception no doctrine of im- 
mortality can be reconciled but only the riew of the üpani- 
shads, expressed in the words (Mtt94« S* h !)• 

"Just AS the sparks from oat the glowing flame 
"In thousand forms, all glowing skywards mount, 
"All creatures from the changeless one emerge, 
"And thus, dear friend, return unto their fount." 

According to this doubtless original riew the soul had an 
origin, and is as a necessary consequence, perishable. For 
what is so constituted that it can originate, is so constituted 
that it can perish. Ti {ii^Siv etc o&Siv ^iiztu — 

But the soul is the point in the universe where the veil 
^woren of time, space, and causality) that corers "Being- 
in-itself" becomes so transparent that we.perceiye facts through 
it. which protest against the cosmic laws of Realism and 
oppose themselyes to a logical elaboration of it. Such a fact 
is above all the metaphysical significance of human action, 
reaching as it does beyond the graye. When a human being 
dies and his body is scattered to the elements, there is some- 
thing in him which does not leave him; that is his works, as 
the Veda (Brih. 3, 2, 13) says; and this conriction of the in- 
destructibility of the moral part of man by death compels the 
Vedänta to maintain inconsistently instead of the absorption 
into Brahman demanded by the exoteric view a persistence of 


292 Third Part: Psychology or the Doetrine of the SoaL 

the soul in its indiridual character beyond the Brahman into 
whom it enters at death. 

We shall return later to these questions of exoteric Psycho» 
logy. The first question is not as to the empirical soul affecteJ 
by üpädhis and therefore wandering, acting and suffering, bat 
as to the definition of the metaphysical nature of the sool 
free from all this; we shall however often enough have oc* 
casion to refer beforehand to this disguising of the soul bj 
the üpädhis. 

XXTTT. Origin and Nature of the SouL 

1. Origin of the SouL 
Sfttm 9» 3» 16—17. 

Omb could imagine, says Qankara, that the soul (jtva) also 
originates and perishes like all else, because experience 
shows how man is bom and dies and even celebrates his birth 
by special ceremonies (p. 641, 6). But that idea is contra- 
dicted by the Scripture which accompanies its commands and 
prohibitions with promises and threats, and they are only 
accomplished in a future existence (641, 9). Therefore being 
bom and dying refer only to the body; for the soul on the 
other hand they mean no more than the entering into the 
phenomenal world as body and passing out of it again (prdr 
durbhäva and tirobhäva^ p. 642, 4); therefore birth is only to 
be regarded as the union of the soul with the body, death as 
the separation from it (642, 8). But by this only the in- 
dependence of the soul from the gross (material) origin and 
dissolution is demonstrated; the question is, what is the relation 
of the soul to Brahman, does it originate from him or not 
(642, 11)?— 

— It is clear that up to the present we have been speak- 
ing exoterically of the soul inrolTed in transmigration. We 
might expect to find further the proof that it does not originate 
from Brahman on the ground that when in deep sleep and 
death and at the end of the world it enters into him, it 
persists in the form of seed-force (cf. above pp. 288 ff. 238. 
S76. 279). Instead of this in what follows Qankara passes 
OTer to the esoteric doctrine in order to prove the non- 
origination of the soul from the fact of its identity with 

294 Third Part: Psychology or the Doctrine of the Soul. 

The origination of the soul from Brahman might he main- 
tained on the following grounds: Firstly: If Brahman is 
recognised, it is said in Mu^d. 1, 1, 3, all is recognised. This 
passage forbids us to assume anything existent outside Brah* 
man. — Secondly: Brahman and the soul are different in essence; 
Brahman is free from all evil [e. g. origination and dissolution] 
and the soul is not. — Thirdly: Everything divided and mani- 
fold in the world is transformed (not original); when the soul 
does good and evil and feels pleasure and pain, it is in- 
dividualised according to the bodies and manifold; therefore 
it must have an origin (cf. note 43).— Fourthly: It is equally 
true of enjoyers {bhoktar) and of the things to be enjoyed 
(bhogyam),\u e., the Präpas and Elements, that they proceed 
from Brahman as sparks spring from a fire (above p. 131 ff.); 
by this passage other passages are to be supplemented and 
explained; thus the passage as to the entrance of Brahman 
into the elements (Taitt. 3, 6. Chänd. 6, 3, 3; cf. above p. 280).-- 
Therefore the soul has originated from Brahman (p. 643, 7 to 
644, 11). 

To the fourth assertion is to be replied first that in most 
passages an origination of the soul is not taught [as for the 
others, they will be treated immediately]; and then that an 
origination is impossible because in many passages (Qafikara 
cites no fewer than ten) the eternal nature of the soul if 
maintained. — To the third of the above assertions that the 
soul must have originated because it is manifold, it is to be 
replied, that the soul in itself (svatas) is by no means mani- 
fold (p. 645, 8), for it is said (Qvet 6, 11): 

"One God alone in every being hid, 
** Perradeth all, the inner tonl of each.*' 

The plurality of the soul is only phenomenal and is conditioned 
by the Upädhis such as Buddhi etc., just as the plurality ot 
space by the vessels (note 106) which bound it In the same 
way we must take it as referring to the Up&dhis when the 
Scripture occasionally seems to speak of an origin and dis- 
solution of the soul; this means only an origin and dissolution 
of the IJp&dhis; e.g. in the passage (above p. 176) ^^after death 

XXIII. Ongin and Nature of the Soul. 296 

there is no consciousness." ^^^ — By the identity of the soul 
with Brahman the first of the above assertions is met — 
Lastly, as regards the second it is to be remarked that the 
difference in essence of the soul and Brahman refers only to 
the Upädhis, as is to be seen by the passage Chap. XU, 4» 
in which all qualities of Saipsära are denied to the soul ^con- 
sisting of knowledge." Thus it is proved that the 80uU'<^ does 
not originate nor perish (p. 644, 12—647, 5). 

2. Nature of the SouL 

Sütram 2, 8, 18. 

How is the nature of the soul to be imagined? Is it, as 
Kanada maintains, in itself not intellectual, so that its in* 
telligence is only accidental (ägantuka), or must we assume 
with the Sdnkhyas that the Soul is in its essence an eternally 
intellectual being (p. 647, 7)? — 

For the first eventuality, that the intelligence of the soul 
is accidental and produced by its association with the Manas, 
just as the heat of the pot is produced by its connection 
with the fire, we may adduce the fact that were the soul 
essentially intellectual it ought to be so in the case of sleepers, 
fainting persons, and madmen (ffraha-ävishta); but they affirm 
that in this condition they have had no consciousness. There« 
fore, since the intelligence of the soul is only temporary, we 
must assume that it is not essential but accidental (p. 647, 9 
to 648, 2). 

To this we reply: the soul is an eternally intellectual being; 
this follows from the fact that, as we have proved, it does not 

IM Here p. 646, 8 and 891, 8 an annihilation of the Upadhis, upddhi- 
pralaya i» taught. But according to the tystem only the grots body ia 
annihilated; the remaining Up&dhit (the subtle body and the Pränai) did 
not originate and (except in liberation) are imperiihable ; but by them 
the plurality of tonlt it conditioned, from which the opponent concluded 
their origination. Hit objection therefore remains unantwered. 

tto That it, at we mutt add, the toul which the etoterio doctrine 
reeognitee at identical with Brahman. — The indettructibility of the tool 
effected by Upftdhit followt on moral groundt at it developed e. g. above 
p. 112 C 

296 Thiid Part: Psychology or the Doctrine of the Soul. 

originate but is the highest unchangeable Brahman itself^ 
which when disguised by the Upadhis appears as the indiridnal 
-souL Now the highest Brahman is as we have proyed (chap. 
IX, 4 above p. 134ff.) naturally intellectual; consequently to 
the soul also intellectuality is as essential as heat and light 
to fire. Yet the organs of perception are not for thif 
reason superfluous; for they are the gates through which the 
intellect receiyes the specifically different sense-impressions, 
B.g. the perception of smells by the sense of smell etc.— If 
sleepers etc. do not perceive, this is to be explained by the 
passage: ''If he then sees not, yet is he seeing, though be 
''does not see" etc. (above p. 191); i.e., the soul does not then 
perceive, not because perception is wanting but because the 
objects are wanting; just as light does not become visible in 
space, as long as there are no objects to be illuminated 
(648, 2—649, 13). 

XXIV. Relation of the Soul to God. 

Uia>EB this heading, making a change in the arrangement 
of the Sutras we treat the section 2, 3, 43 — 53, which, like 
the concluding sections in several other cases, makes the im« 
pression of a later addition, and in respect of its contents 
stands in close relationship to the thoughts of the preceding 
chapter; therefore we include it here; it is impossible in our 
presentation to avoid completely the numerous repetitions of 
the original if we wish to avoid too great a departure from 
the original line of thought 

1. Non-identity and Identity. 

pp. 684, 18—688, 8. 

The relation of the soul to God is presented by the Scrip- 
ture in two ways, partly [exoteric] as the relation of a servant 
to his master and of the part to the whole, and partly [esoteric] 
as a relation of identity. 

The position of the soul as servant with 6od as its master 
can be conceived in the following way: Ood (tgvara) by virtue 
of his connection with unsurpassable {nirati(aya) üpädhis 
exercises authority over the soul which is a£fected only by 
imperfect (nihina) Upädhis (p. 688, 1; our author contents 
himself here with the remark that the whole relationship 
depends on the Upädhis; for greater detail see chap. XX, 3, e, 
ahove p. 271).— ^The soul is further conceived as a part of 
God; e,g. by the simile of the Fire and the sparks (p. 685, 6; 
c£ above p. 131); further in the passage of the Rigveda X, 
30, 3 (c£ chap. XI, 3): 

298 Third Part: Psychology or the Doctrine of the Soul. 

" Howerer great it nature's majetty, 
** The spirit is yet higher raised hy far 
" Of it hut one foot do all heings make 
" Three feet are immortality in heaven." 

where under one foot all animated beings, the immoTable 
(plants) and the movable, are to be understood (p. 687, 3). 
The passage oi BhagavadgM 16, 7 affirms the same (p. 687, 9). 
However this view of the soul as a part of Brahman is 
not to be taken strictly, for Brahman has no parts (p. 685, 7); 
and the case is the same with the passages in which the soul 
appears as different from Brahman (p. 686, 9); for it is taught 
on the other hand that all souls, as they have entered **into 
^the complex of organs formed of names and shapes^ {näma- 
rüpO'krita'kärya'karana'Sanghäta, i. e. the body), are Brahman 
Himself (p. 686, 5). Not even the lowest creatures are to be 
excepted here, as a verse of the Brahman song of the Afhar- 
vanikas (not found in our collection of Atharva songs) says: 

" Brahman are fishers and slaves, and even the players are Brahman " 

and another (Qvet. 4, 3 — Atharva-V. X, 8, 27): 

" The woman art thou, and the man, the maiden and the boy, 

^ Thon art born, and growest in every form, thoa totterest in old age.'* 

Thus the soul is sometimes regarded as identical with Brah- 
man, sometimes as a part of Him (p. 686). 

The passages p. 1127, 14 — 1128, 14 (translated above p. Ill) 
serve to complete what this passage leaves uncertain; it is 
there proved from the esoteric standpoint that the soul can 
be conceived neither a part nor a transformation of Brahman 
nor as different from him but only as identical with Brah- 
man.— An explanation of this is offered by the image (used 
pp. 690, 3. 695, 1. 809, 12) of the sun and its reflections in 
the water (above p. 208) and that of cosmic space, whose 
local divisions depend only on the limitations of vessels which 
produce no change in its nature (note 106, above p. 277); ct 
also p. 120, 13: "It is however forbidden, in the sense of the 
"highest reality (paramärthatOB) to assume a seer or bearer 
"different from the highest God, when we read (Bfih. 3, 7» 83): 
"* There is no seer besides him,' etc. (above p. 149); on the 
"contrary the highest God differs from the individual kmiI 

XXIV. Relation of the Soul to God. 299 

^created by Ignorance and termed Vijnänätman (cf. note 83) 
"which acts and enjoys only in the same way as the magician, 
"who in reality remains upon the earth, is different from the 
"magician, who with sword and shield climbs up the rope." 

2. Illusion of all Pain, 
pp. 688, 8—691, a. 

One might imagine that, if the soul is a part of God, God 
must feel the pains of the soul also, just as when one member 
of the body suffers, the whole body suffers with it (p. 688, 3); 
Day the sufferings of God must be much greater than those 
of the individual soul, and it is better for us to remain as 
indlTidual souls in the state of Samsära than by the gaining 
of perfect knowledge to rise to a consciousness of identity 
with God (p. 688, 6). 

To this is to be replied (in connection with what was 
brought] forward above p. 164): only through Ignorance 
does the soul fall into the illusion of seeing the Self in the 
body, and upon this illusion (ahhimäna) alone, from which 
God is free, depends the sensation of pain. Pain is consequently 
a delusion (bhrama) which arises from our not distinguishing 
the Self from the limitations, such as body, senses, etc. which 
have their origin in the realm of names and shapes created 
hj Ignorance (p. 689, 1). Therefore pain depends only on a 
mistaken idea, as is proved by the fact that it persists even 
beyond the body. If for example a son or friend of ours dies, 
we feel pain from the mistaken idea that they belong to us. 
The Boirivräjaka (above p. 17) on the other hand, who has 
delivered himself from that illusion, feels no pain at it. In 
the same way he too feels no more bodily pain who has by 
perfect knowledge delivered himself from the illusion that his 
body belongs to him (p. 689, 9). 

Just as sunlight falling on the finger appears straight 
when the finger is straight, and crooked when it is crooked 
bat in reality is neither the one nor the other — ^just as space 
in vessels seems to move when they are moved but in reality 
remains motionless^just as the sun does not quiver when its 

300 Third Part: Psychology or the Doctrine of the Soul. 

reflections quiver in the water — so 6od does not suffer when 
the individaal soul suffers, and even the suffering of the in- 
diyidual soul depends, as we saw, only on Ignorance. Such 
words of the Yedänta as tat tvam asi, "that art thou/' serre 
to drive away this illusion of the existence of the individual 
soul and to produce the consciousness of the Brahmanhood 
of the soul (p. 689, 16—690, 9). 

3. Subjection to and Freedom from Law. 

pp. 691, 3—694, 3. 

"If there is only one soul in all beings, how then are the 
^worldly and Yedic prohibitions possible?" 

— So far as the individual soul is a part of God. 

"But the Scripture teaches also that it is not simply a 
"part of him but also identical with him!" 

— The difference and identity consists exactly in its being 
a part of Him. 

"But where the Scripture speaks seriously, it surely teaches 
"the identity of Ood and the soul and reproves the natural 
"view of difference! It still remains therefore to be explained 
"how commands and prohibitions are possible." 

— Let us take commands such as: a man shall visit his 
wife at a fit time — a man shall ask his consent of the sacri- 
ficial animal— a man shall stand by his friend; and prohibitions 
such as: thou shalt not commit adultery, — thou shalt not kilL— 
thou shalt avoid thy enemy, such commands and prohibitians 
are valid in spite of the unity of the Atman, on account of 
the connection with the body. For on this connection with 
the body depends the mistaken opinion that we see the Self 
in the body, which is and remains common to all creatures 
with the exception of such as attain to perfect knowledge. 
The commands and prohibitions refer to this distinction [of 
the Ego from the non-Ego] though it depends on Ignorance 
and is caused by the connection with the body and the other 
Upadhis; and only for him who has attained perfect knowledge 
do they cease to hold good; as he has no further object to 
aim at, he has also no further obligations. For him there is 

XXIV. Relation of the Soul to God. 301 

nothing to be toiled after or avoided because there is nothing 
that reaches beyond his own Self (ätman) ; but a duty towards 
one's own Self is meaningless (na ca ätmä ätmani eva niycjyah 
9t/ät). It is true he has a body, but he knows that its struc- 
ture (samhataivam) is a mere illusion. Only for him who is 
still subject to the illusion of the body does the illusion of 
duty still persist: how should it persist for him who has re- 
cognised the unity of the soul? 

"But if the sage has no duties, can he do what he will?" — 
— Not at all! For it is only illusion that moves to 
action and it is just this illusion that exists no more 
for this sage. — But in spite of the unity of all existence, 
command and prohibition exist for him who has not attained 
knowledge. For as one shrinks from the fire which has burnt 
a corpse, though it is as much fire as any other — as one 
avoids sunlight in unclean places, though it comes just as 
much from the sun — as one flees from a human corpse though 
it consists of the same materials as the living body — so there 
are certain things to be avoided, though all things are one in 
the Atman. 

4 How are the individual Souls separated from each 


Sutras 2, 8, 49-50. 

The works of souls are individually di£Perent, and so are 
the fruits (reward and punishment in the succeeding existence) 
which correspond to the works in each case. How is this 
possible if the soul is in reality only one? — How can it happen 
that works and fruits of di£Perent souls (which at death return 
to unity and proceed out of it again to a new existence 
Chänd. 6, 10, above p. 264) do not mutually intermingle? 

To this we have two replies: 

1) The soul is, it is true, as a result of its unity with 
Brahman (as we shall soon see more in detail) omnipresent 
(i.e. spaceless); but this omnipresence does not mean that the 
acting and enjoying soul also pervades every thing and is thus 
connected with all bodies. For this individual soul is only 

302 Third Part: Psychology or the Doctrine of the Soal. 

conditioned by the üpädhis; as these üpädhis are not all 
peryading, the individaal soul is not so either, and no con- 
fusion of works and fruits happens (p. 694, 5 — 10). — Compare 
with this what has been said above pp. 228 ff. 276 as to the 
persistence of the power of differentiation after entrance into 

2) Individual souls are to be regarded only as phantoms 
(äbhäsa) of the highest soul, comparable to images of the sun 
in water. Just as when one of these reflected suns quivers, 
the others do not quiver too, the deeds and fruits of one bodI 
do not concern the others. These phantoms and with them 
the whole of Samsära with its deeds and fruits depend on 
Ignorance (avidyä)7) Only when this is removed, is unity 
with Brahman attamed (p. 694, 12 — 695, 6) and thereby, as 
we may add, a point of view, from which questions as to works 
and fruits and consequently as to their intermingling, have 
no meaning. 

Of these two answers the one refers the plurality of souls 
to the Upädhis, the others to AvidyA. What is the relation 
of these two to each other? This question leads us to collect 
here the most important passages on ' the Upädhis^ a fun- 
damental idea of the system, which is however nowhere treated 
connectedly by Qankara. 

6. Brahman and the Up&dhis. 

In reality (paramärthatas) there is nothing else besides 
Brahman alone. If we imagine we perceive a transformation 
(vikära) of Him into the world, a division (bheda) of Him into 
a plurality of individual souls, this depends on AvidyA, Bat 
how does this happen? How do we manage to deceive our- 
selves into seeing a transformation and a plurality, where in 
reality Brahman alone is?— On this question our authors give 
no information. 

Since Avidyä is, as we saw above (p. 55) innate, and out 
birth depends on the works of a previous existence, one might 
imagine the innate obscuration of our knowledge was a result 
of previous offences reaching back ad infinitum. But the 

XXIV. Relation of the Soul to God. 303 

system gives no real ground for this assumption. Ävidyä 
cannot properly be a result of Samsära, for on the contrary 
the reverse is the case and the whole of Samsdra depends on 
Avidyä, Under these circumstances nothing remains but to 
recall the negative character of the idea of Ävidyä. It needs 
no explanation so far as it is not a positive defect, but only 
Ignorance, the absence of knowledge. It is true something 
very positive depends on Avidya; viz. the whole existence of 
the world and of the individual soul. It is however just the 
meaning of this reference of all empirical existence to Ignor- 
ance, that this whole world, the whole beginningless and end- 
less Sainsara, is only for us something positive and real, but 
is in actuality non-Brahman and (as Brahman alone is the 
Existent) non-Existent, a mere mirage (niäyä, mfigatrishnikä), 
a product of Ignorance. 

The extension of the world and the plurality of wandering 
souls, this hybrid which is neither Being nor non-Being (tattva- 
anyatväbhyäm anirvacaniycnn) and comparable to an hallu- 
cination or to a dream, is produced by Ignorance by virtue of 
the OpadhiSj the limitations, literally "the ascription'' (with 
the secondary idea of the unpermitted) by means of which 
we ** ascribe" to Brahman what does not naturally belong to 
him, and through which, as we shall show in detail, he becomes 
1) a personal God, 2) the world, 3) the individual soul. All 
this depends on the Upädhis, and the Upddhis on Ävidyä. 
Ävidyä alone is the cause of the origin of the Upädhis (they 
are avidyä-kriia p. 1133, 12, avidyä-nimitta p. 692, 14, avidya- 
praiyupasthäpüa pp. 199, 5. 690, 5) and is the cause of their 
persistence so far as the essence of Ävidyä is the non-dis- 
crimination of Brahman from the Upädhis (upädhi-aviveka 
p* 473, 17. 689, 1. 98, 8, cf. 186, 10); Brahman himself on the 
other hand is not in the least affected or changed by the 
Upadhis, just as little in fact as the crystal by the red colour 
with which it is painted p. 266, 7. 803, 14. It is in this sense 
that a contact of the Upädhis (upädhi-samparka p. 389, 2. 
794, 7) and a contamination (p. 389, 2) by them is spoken of. 
Brahman is merged in the Up&dhis (upädhi-antarbhäva p. 811, 
5. S) and thereby his nature is hidden {svarüpa-tirobhäva 

304 Third Part: Psychology or the Doctrine of the Sonl. 

p. 837, 2) and his natural omniscience (in his existential form 
as soul) suffers a limitation (the knowledge of the soul is 
upädhi'paricchinna p. 231, 1). 

On this connection of the Brahman with the TJp&dhis 
depend, as we have said, three phenomena, and it is character* 
istic that all three are included under this conception without 
distinction: 1) Through the Upadhis the higher Brahman 
becomes the lower, the object of worship p. Ill, 3. 662, 13. 
1142, 9; the Upadhis of the Igvara are however perfect (nir- 
atigaya) in contrast with those of the individual soul which 
are imperfect {nihina) (p. 688, 1); details of this distinction 
are not given. 2) The extension of nature too (näma-TÜpa" 
prapanca) which is commonly referred directly to Avidyä 
{e.g. 1132, 10. 607, 1. 473, 17. 787, 13) seems occasionally to 
be reckoned among the üpädhis of Brahman; this is the case 
p. 803, 12. 807, 4 (pnthivi'ädi'Upädhi'yoga), 391, 2 (upadJii- 
äfraya^nämarüpam), 1133, 12 (nämarüpa-upädtiika) just as 
external objects (vishaya) also appear among the Upadhis of 
the soul (p. 265, 6, cf. 787, 10. 1056, 1. 739, 7). This description 
of nature however as Up&dhi of Brahman is uncertain and at 
any rate seldom. 3) But so much the more frequently is 
everything regarded as Upädhi^ which makes BraJiman into 
a Jiva or Qärira^ i.e., individual soul, whose existence as a 
being different from Brahman depends solely on the Upadhis. 
p. 736, 3. 244, 13. 360, 2. 199, 8. 836, 8. 799, 6. 982, 5. 
173, 16. 162, 16. The best explanation of this relationship 
is the comparison of the Upadhis with vessels which limit 
cosmic space locally (cf. note 106 above p. 277). In this s^tse 
can be considered as Upadhis firstly all psychic organs or 
Pranas (Mvkhya präna, Manas, and the Indriyas; for details 
see chap. XXYU) together with the subtle body and the 
moral determination of the soul (p. 1091, 9) which all share 
together in transmigration; further the gross body which only 
exists until death (kärya-karana-sanghäta or defco, c£ 473, 17. 
199, 5. 787, 13. 389, 2. 98, 4. 9. 692, 14. 811, 5. 9); and 
finally to these are added occasionally external objects and 
sensation (vishayorvedand p. 265, 6. 787, 10. 1056, 1, where 
it must be taken as a Dvandva). In waking and dreaming 

XXIV. Relation of the Soul to God. 305 

contact with the üpädhis (upädhi-samparka) takes place, in 
deep sleep release (upa^ama) from them (p. 794, 7. 836, 6). 
Frequently only such are to be understood as Upädhis as 
share in transmigration; then for example p. 793, 14, where 
yeins and pericardium are termed receptacles of the Upädhis 
{upädhi-ädhära); thus the definition of the Upädhis fluctuates 
and must in each case be settled by the context 


XXV. Relation of the Soul to the Bodv. 

In the section 2, 3, 19 — 32, which we propose to analyse 
in the present chapter, the question raised by this heading i< 
handled chiefly from the quantitative side, in so far as the 
enquiry into the size of the soul holds the foremost place. 
This leads however to discussions which are of considerable 
help to us in gaining in the sequel a clear idea (so far as this 
is possible) of the relation of the soul 1) to its organs (MuhJiya 
pram, Manas, and Indriyas), 2) to the subtle body which 
consists of the seed of the elements and shares in trans- 
migration, 3) to the gross body which consists of the elements 

A clear idea of the spacelessness of Being-in-itself is want- 
ing in our system; in its place we find the doctrine of the 
infinite size (vibhutvam) or omnipresence (sarvagatatvam) of 
the soul; two other views are opposed to this; that according 
to which the soul is of minute size (ami), and the opinion of 
the Jainas, according to which the soul is of a certain, moder- 
ate size, vi^. as large as the body. We begin with the dis- 
cussion of the last view, which we take over from 2, 2, 34—36 
to insert it here. 

1. The opinion of the Jainas that the Soul is as large 

as the Body. 

If the soul is, as the Arhatas affirm, as large as the body, 
it is limited and therefore, like all limited things, not etem&l 
(c(^ note 43, above p. 68 ff.)- Moreover the size of the bodt 
changes. If, e. g. the human soul, as a fruit of works, enter» 
into the body of an elephant, it cannot completely fill it; and 

XXV. Relation of the Soul to the Body. 307 

if it enters the body of an ant, it has no room in it. The 
same objection may be raised in respect of the varying size 
of the body in youth and manhood (p. 687, 6). 

Or does the soul consist of an infinite number of corpus- 
cules (avayava) which in a small body close up, and in a large 
one open out? Then there is a question whether these corpus- 
cules possess impenetrability (pratighäta) or not K they are 
impenetrable there is no room in a limited space for an in- 
finite number of corpuscules; if they are not, they take all 
together no more room than one corpuscule, they cannot 
produce the [necessary] extension and the whole soul is of 
minute size (p. 687, 12). 

Or must we assume that with the increase and diminution 
of the body the soul gains new or loses old corpuscules? But 
then the soul is subject to change and perishable like the 
skin; and the doctrine [of the Jainas] of binding and liber- 
ation cannot hold good; the doctrine namely which asserts 
that the soul, clad in the eight kinds of its works and sunk in 
the ocean of Saipsära, rises like a gourd (dlavii) after the 
connection is broken (p. 588, 9). Moreover such changing 
corpuscules belong as little to the Self (ätnmn) as the body 
does; and if a part of him remain as soul, we cannot deter- 
mine which (p. 688, 12). — And where do the new parts come 
from and the old go to? Not from the elements and not 
back into them; for the soul does not consist of the elements; 
and another common receptacle of soul - corpuscules is not 
demonstrable (p. 689, 6). 

Or does the soul perhaps persist through all change of 
parts like a stream whose waters change? This is not ad- 
missible either; for if this continuity is not real, there is 
no soul at all; if it is real, the soul is subject to change 
(p. 690, 4). 

If the dimensions of the soul remain for ever, as the Jaina$ 

maintain, as they were at the moment of liberation, this final 

state is to be regarded as its real dimensions; and therefore 

a given body and not every former body is to be taken as 

its measure; but then it is not discoverable why it should not 

have just as much right to remain in every former state as 


308 Third Part: Fsychology or the Doctrin« of the Soul. 

in that final state (p. 590, 9). We come therefore to the 
conclusion that the soul is unchangeable, whether it is minute 
(anu) or large (tnahant), but it cannot be taken to be of the 
(changing) size of the body, as the jainas assert (p. 691, 2). 

2. The Opinion that the Soul is of minute (anu) size. 

Sutras 3, 3, 19-28. 

1. That the soul is as large as the body has been refuted 
in the examination of the doctrine of the Jainas (p. 651, 2;. 
Therefore it is only possible to regard it as either very large 
(i.e. infinite, vibhu) or as minute (anu). The infinitely large 
cannot move (p. 651, 1), and we must assume of the soul that 
it moves because a passing (out of the body), a going (to the 
moon) and a return (to a new incarnation) are ascribed to it 
by the Scriptures (p. 650, 9). And even if the passing, so far 
as we regard it as a cessation of lordship over the body, 
could possibly be reconciled with immovability (p. 651, 5) a 
going and return could not; but they must certainly be re- 
cognized as motion (p. 651, 7) and we are thus compelled to 
regard this passing as a real going away (p. 651, 9). Since 
the soul, being mobile, cannot therefore be infinitely large, 
nor yet, as shown, of middle size, we must assume (p. 651, 8t 
that it is minute (anu)» 

2. The soul is, it is true, termed by the Scripture large, 
omnipresent, infinite, but these expressions refer only to the 
highest, not the individual soul (p. 652, 9); and when we read 
Brik4, 4,22 (above p. 195): ''Truly this great, unborn Self. 
'48 that among the life-organs which consists of knowledge** 
the individual soul is certainly termed "the great" but only 
so far as, in virtue of an innate power as seer, such as Yama- 
deva had (Rigv. IV, 26, 1. 27, 1. Brih. 1, 4, 10. Ait 2, 6; ct 
above p. 180 and note 83) its identity with the highest soul 
is perceived (p. 653, 1). On the other hand in other passages 
the soul is expressly termed minute; e.g. Mu94* 3, 1, 9 ^tbe 
subtle Self' (anur ätmä)^ Qvet. 5, 8 "large as the point of an 
awl," and Qvet. 5, 9 as large as the hundredth of a hundredth 
of the end of a hair. 

XXV. Relation of the Soul to the Body. 309 

3. But if the soul is minute, it can only be at one place 
in the body; how comes it thus that it perceires throughout 
the body? For after a bath in the Ganges one feels the 
cold« and in summer one feels the heat all over one's body 
(p. 653, 11). — We answer: /ust as a piece of sandalwood, eren 
when it only touches the body at one spot, refreshes it all 
OTer (p. 654, 2) so the soul is only in one spot, viz., as the 
Scripture teaches in many places, in the heart (p, 655, 5) and 
from here it feels throughout the body (p. 65 4^3). This comes 
about by means of the sense of touch (tvac) ; the soul is con- 
nected with the sense of touch everywhere and the sense of 
touch pervades the whole body.^^i Or perhaps this power of 
the minute soul to feel throughout the body can be explained 
(p. 655, 10) from its spirituality (caitanya-guna) which here 
extends beyond the substance; just as we see in other cases 
in experience that the quality extends further than the sub- 
stance, when e.g. the light of a jewel or of a lamp, which is 
only in one place in a room, extends from there through the 
whole room (p. 655, 11) or when we smell the scent of flowers 
without touching them (p. 656, 9). So too the Scripture teaches 
of the Soul, that though it is minute and dwells in the heart, 
by means of its quality of spirituality it penetrates the body 
(p. 658, 1) «to the hair and nails" (Kaush. 4, 20; cf. Bj-ih. 1, 4, 7> 
and also in other passages (Kaush. 3, 6. Brih. 2, 1, 17) the 
soul is distinguished from the intellect (prajiia, vijFiänam) with 
which it pervades the body (p. 658, 4). 

t>i {». 654, 5: tvag-ättnanar hi sambandhtih hrittnäyäm tvaci vartate, 
ttak ca krit-ma'^arira-vj/äpint. As the soul according to this view is 
minate and dwells in the heart, the outer skin cannot possibly be under- 
stood [if the passage really belong^ to the context in which it stands; 
p. 654, 14 — 655, 1 anutvam seems to be opposed to tvaksambandha; it is 
true that in this enquiry there is in places terrible confusion] but only 
the Indriyam termed tvac; for by this Manas and by Manas the soul 
feels cold, heat, pain, pleasure, etc. in the whole body. At Death this 
ttae or more accurately the tvagvritH enters into the Matuu and like all 
the Indriyiu shares in transmigration. 

310 Third Fart: Psychology or the Doctrine of the Soul. 

3. The Soul is infinitely great (vibhu). 

Sütram 2, 8, 89. 

The soul has not originated (chap. XXIII, 1) but depends 
only on the entrance of the highest Brahman into the elements 
(above p. 231); from this the identity of both follows; the in- 
dividual soul is nothing but the highest Brahman himself 
(p. 658, 11). If this is so, the soul must be as large as Brah- 
man and therefore all pervading (p. 6o8, 13) as is expressly 
asserted in the passage Brih. 4, 4, 22: ^ truly this great unborn 
** Self is that among the organs of life which consists of know- 
^ ledge" (p. 659, 1). To the arguments of the opponent we 

(To 3.) If the soul were minute, it could not feel through- 
out the whole body. The connection with the sense of touch 
(tvac) does not suffice to explain this; the thorn too, on which 
one has trodden, is connected with the whole sense of feeling 
(p. 659, 5) and yet one feels the pain from it only in the sole 
of the foot and not in the whole body (p. 659, 6). That the 
quality extends beyond the substance, we do not admit; the 
flame of the lamp and its light are not related as substance 
and quality; on the contrary both are fiery substances, but in 
the flame the corpuscules (avayava) are drawn closer together, 
and in the light which radiates they are more widely separated 
(p. 656, 5). Just in the same way the perception of smell 
depends on the subtle atoms (paramänü) streaming out in all 
directions from the objects without diminishing their volume 
(p. 657, 1) and penetrating into the nasal cavity (p. 657, 4). 
If this is not admitted, because atoms are not perceptible bj 
the senses (p. 657, 5), because not the objects but their odours 
are smelt (p. 657, 6), or because what is perhaps true of the 
sense of sight may not be transferred to the sense of smell 
(p. 657, 8) — we must dispute the assertion that smell is only 
a quality; for if it were, it could only disseminate itself from 
its own substance and not from other substances to which it 
has been transferred (p. 659, 10). That this is so the sublime 
Dvaipdyana testifies when he (Mahäbh&ratam 12» 8518) 

XXV. Relation of the Soul to the Body. 311 

^'To water the unlearned folk ascrihe, 
"The odour which their senaes show them there; 
"But eyer to the earth leads hack its trace, 
"And thence it goes to water and the air." 

If it were true therefore that the spirituality of the soul 
pervaded the whole body, the soul could not be minute, for 
spirituality is not related to it as a quality to its sub- 
stance but is its yery essence, as warmth and light are of the 
fire (p. 660, 3); and we have proved that the soul is not of 
the same size as the body: therefore it is only possible that 
it is infinitely great (p. 660, 5). 

(To 2.) But how can the soul be termed anu by the Scrip- 
ture? — ^As answer to this serves the following: hecause in the 
state of Saipsara it is the nucleus («tira) of the qualities of the 
Buddhi.1^2 Such qualities of the Buddhi are: Love, hate, 
pleasure, pain, etc. (p. 660, 7). For we must distinguish the 
soul outside the state of Saipsara, which means that it is not 
acting, not suffering and eternally free, and the soul in the 
state of Saipsara, when it acts and suffers only through the 
qualities of the Upädhi of Buddhi being transferred to it 
(p. 660, 10). In this state the soul has the dimensions of the 
Buddhi (p. 661, 1), is therefore (according to Qvet 5, 9) as 
large as the ten thousandth part of the end of a hair, 
(p. 661, 4) or (according to Qvet. 5, 8) as large as the point 
of an awl (p. 661, 11) and dwells like the Buddhi in the heart 
(p. 662, 7). The minute size of the soul is therefore to be 
taken figuratively {aupacärika)\ from the point of view of the 
highest reality (paramärtha) it is infinitely great (p. 661, 7). 
We therefore find in the passages to which the opponent 
appeals (Qvet. 5, 8—9): 

"Through qualities of Buddhi and the body, 
"The other seems as large as an awVs point. 

" Divide a hundred times a human hair, and take thereof the hundredth 


-'That know thou as dimension of the soul, and this enlarges to in- 

IIS Under Buddhi (Intellect) Man€U is to be understood from here 
to tlie end of the chapter, as will be evident further on. 

312 Third Fart: Psychology or the Doctrine of the Soul. 

When on the contrary Mu^4- 3, 1, 9 the epithet anu (minute) 
is applied to the soul, this either does not imply its smallness 
but the difficulty of perceiving it which is possible only by 
the grace of knowledge (p. 661, 13) not by sensual perception, 
or it refers here also to the Upadhis. 

(To 1.) So too the passing, going and return of the soul 
only refer to it so far as it is connected with the Upadliis 
and therefore infinitely small (p. 662, 8) ; for in the same way 
for the purpose of worship the highest soul is represented in 
the Sagunä mdyäh as connected with Upadhis and therefore 
(Ghänd. 3, 14, translated above p. 153) as ''smaller than a 
^ grain of rice or barley" (p. 662, 13). 

— Our author's inconsistency in first disputing the possibility 
of a sense of feeling throughout the body for the minute soul, 
and then himself admitting the minute size of the soul in the 
state of Saipsara, is self-evident. An explanation of how the 
soul perceives the conditions of the body in the state of Saqi- 
s&ra can only be gathered from the arguments which he dis- 
putes.^It is true he says on p. 715, 2: "The above mentioned 
"Präpab [the Manas and the ten Indriyas] must be assumed 
''to be minute (anu); but the minuteness in their case means 
"subtlety (saukshmyam) and limitation (pariccheda) not atomic 
" size iparamanu-tulyatvam) because [in that case] action that 
"pervades the whole body is impossible." But in the passage 
which we have considered he disputed the possibility of bodily 
sensation not for the soul of atomic size (paramänu-tidya) but 
for the minute (anu) souL — The fact is, arguments and counter- 
arguments are thrown together in such confusion that the 
assumption of a fusion of different texts is in the highest 
degree probable^ 

4. Connection of the Soul with the Intellect (buddhi\ 

Sutrai 2, 3, 30—32. 

The highest soul becomes the individual soul, as we have 
seen, by imiting itself with the Upadhis (which depend on 
Ignorance) and especially with the Upadhi o( Buddhi; by this 
is to be understood here, as the sequel will show, on the ooe 
hand the intellect exclusive of the sense-organs (Indriyas) and 

XXV. Relfttion of the Sool to the Body. 313 

on the other hand the ^onlooking" soul (Säkshin), that is to 
say exactly what the System calls Manas. 

(a) Duration of this CoDnection. 

What becomes of the soul when it separates itself from 
the Buddhi? Is this separation a passing oyer into non-Being 
or an escape from Saipsara (p. 663, 3)? — To this the reply is: 
as long as the state of Saipsara is not removed by perfect 
knowledge, the connection endures; and as long as the con- 
nection endures, the individual soul as such endures (p. 663, 8). 
But from the standpoint of the highest reality it does not 
exist at all; for beyond the eternal, free, omniscient God there 
is no other spiritual element (p. 663, 12) as is proved by the 
passages: ^ there is no other seer besides him" (Bph 3, 8, 11), 
«that art thou" (Chand. 6, 8, 7), »I am Brahman" (Brih. 1. 
4, 10). The continuance of the soul's connection with the 
Buddhi even after death and until liberation is taught firstly 
by the Scripture when it says (Brih. 4, 3, 7 translated above 
p. 189): "It is that among the organs of life which consists 
"^of knowledge and is t^ie spirit which shines in the heart 
" within. This spirit wanders unchanged through both worlds ; 
"^ it is as though it reflected, as though it moved unsteadily;" — 
*^ consisting of knowledge" means here ''consisting of Buddhi;" 
that it wanders unchanged through both worlds proves that 
at death no separation from the Buddhi takes place; its thinking 
and moving are conditioned by the thinking and moving of 
the Buddhi; therefore it is said: ''it is as though it reflected 
— moved"; in itself (svatas) it does not reflect and does not 
move (p. 66i, 13). — Moreover the persistence of the connection 
follows from its dependence on false knowledge (mithyä-juänam)^ 
for this can be removed by no other means than perfect 
knowledge (samyoff-jMnam); therefore the connection must 
persist till the awakening of the consciousness of unity with 
Brahman (p. 664, 16), for only by this awakening can it be 
broken, as the Scripture also says (Qvet. 3, 8): 

"The mighty spirit oat beyond the gloom, 
*'My eye« have seen ^rith sunlike radiance glow; 
*'Who teeth him escapes a mortaVs doom; 
** There is for as no other way to go/* 

314 Third Fart: Psychology or the Doctrine of the Soul. 

(h) Potentiality and Actuality of the Connection. 

But bow is it with this connection in the states of deep 
sleep and death, in which according to the Scripture (Chand. 
6, 8 translated above p. 263) an entrance into Brahman takes 
place? — It is in these states potentially (gakti-äbnanä) present, 
and becomes manifest (actual) by awakening and birth, just 
as the power of procreation is present as a germ (vija^ätmanä) 
in the child, but only becomes manifest when he becomes a 
man (p. 665, 8). A potential continuance of this sort must be 
assumed because nothing can arise without a given cause, for 
otherwise everything would arise out of everything (p. 665, 13|. 

(c) Necessity of a connecting Organ of this Sort. 

The Upädhi in question of the soul, — "whether it be called 
^ Antahkaranam, Manas, Buddhi, Vijnänaniy Cittaniy or whether, 
''as some do, a distinction be drawn between Manas smd Buidhl 
''and the function of doubt assigned to the former and that of 
"resolution to the latter" (p. 666, 7) — ^is indispensable as a 
connecting link between the soul and organs of sense; for 
without it, if soul and senses suffice for perception, there would 
be continuous perception, or, if they do not suffice, no per- 
ception at all; for the soul is unchangeable and in the senses 
there is no reason why they should at one time be active and 
then again become inactive. Therefore a connecting link must 
be assumed between the two, by whose attention {avadhänam^ 
and inattention arise apperception and non-apperception; this 
connecting link is Manas (mind). Therefore the Scripture 
says: "My mind was elsewhere, so I did not see, did not hear'' 
and "one sees with his mind, hears with his mind" (Brih. 
1, 6, 3); and as functions of the Manas it mentions ( 
"Wish, resolution, doubt, belief, disbelief, constancy, incoo- 
"stancy, shame, thought and fear" (p. 666, 6—668, 3). 

XXVI. Eelation of the Soul to its ActioiiH. 

1. Preliminary. 

It may repeatedly be observed how psychological problems 

familiar to us reappear in a di£ferent form in Indian philo« 

Bophy. The question as to the size of the soul gave us some 

informations as to the relation of the soul to the body; the 

question as to how the soul is related to its actions includes 

an enquiry into the will. Essential to the soul is as we saw 

(chap. XXIII, 2) intelligence; but this intelligence is at the 

bottom imaginary; for the Indians, as will be more exactly 

shown later, separate the whole apparatus of perception from 

the soul and unite it to the physical (i.e. dependent on 

Avidyä) part of man, which indeed shares in transmigration 

but is extinguished by liberation. Now what is the position 

with regard to the will? Must we recognize in it perhaps 

an eternal absolutely inseparable determination of the soul? — 

The negation of this question which will appear in what 

follows, may at first seem strange to him who has accustomed 

himself to see in Will the final origin of Being. The denial 

however, as will be shown, comes to this, that besides the 

Vdle another state of the soul is possible, viz. a Nolle; and 

it makes in the end no great difference whether this for us 

quite incomprehensible state is characterised in our Cashion 

as a Negation of all volition, or in the Indian manner as 

an imaginary cognition, which, as may be seen by the 

sketch of the Akämayamäna (chap. XII, 4, f, above p. 194), 

presupposes this Negation of all volition. 

316 Third Part: Psychology or the Doctrine of the Soul. 

2. Reasons for Supposing the Soul to be essentially 
an Agent {i.e. exercising Volition). 

Sutras 2, 3, 33—39. 

1. The canon of Scripture with its commands and pro- 
hibitions presupposes that the soul is an agent, for it pre- 
scribes for it a certain course of action« If the soul were 
not an agent, these prescriptions would be purposeless, which 
cannot be assumed to be the case (p. 668, 5). 

2. Of the soul in the state of dreaming it is said (BriL 
4,3,12, above p. 190): 

** Immortal soars the soul where'er it will." 

This presupposes that the soul is an agent (p. 669, 4). 

3. On the same presupposition depends the absorption 
ascribed to it in the passage (Brih. 2, 1, 17): "The soul ab- 
" sorbs [in deep sleep] by virtue of its intelligence the intelligence 
« of those vital spirits [into itself] " (p. 669, 8). 

4. Taitt. 2, 6 says: 

^^ Intelligence performs the sacrifice, and does the works** 

By intelligence (vijnänam) the soul is here to be understood, 
not the Buddhi (p. 670, 5); for otherwise the word "intclligcnc€'' 
would have to be in the instrumental (p. 670, 7) and the 
passage would have to read: "it (the soul) by means of in- 
" telligence performs sacrifice and works." — Therefore the soul 
is an agent. 

It might be objected: if the soul independently of the 
Buddhi [without the Upadhi, and therefore as it really is] is 
an agent, why does it not, as it is in this state free {svaianira*, 
bring about only what is pleasant and profitable to it? For 
experience shows that it often brings about the contrary of 
what is good for it (p. 670, 11).— Answer: the soul is free too 
with regard to perception and yet perceives what is pleasant 
and what is unpleasant So it is too with action (p. 670, 16).— 
But in perception the soul is influenced by the causes of per- 
ception and is therefore not free (p. 671, 1)! — Answer: That 
is not so! The causes of perception only determine the ob- 
jects of perception but not the act of perception, for the soul 
is in this by virtue of its spirituality free [! p. 671, 2; the 

XXVI. Relation of ibe Soul to its Actions. 317 

difference between receptivity which is present in perception, 
and spontaneity which is present in thinking and acting, is 
here completely overlooked; in the same way empirical psycho- 
logy asserts for both a common faculty, the Manas]. Besides 
in action the soul is not absolutely free but is determined by 
differences of time, space, and causality (dega-käla-nimitta 
p. 671, 4; the same formula is found pp. 38, 3. 40, 2. 482, 1. 
579, 5. 671, 4. 684, 9. 775, 2. 3. 4. 781, 3. 4. 1043. 6. 7. 10. 1075, 
17. 1078,9. 1129,11); the soul is however all the same an 
agent, just as the cook remains a cook, though he makes use 
of fuel and water (p. 671, 5). 

5. If you insist that not the soul but the Buddhi is the 
agent, you make the latter an agent instead of an organ; but 
in that case the Suddhi must also be an object of Self- 
consciousness (ahampratyaya) without which no action is poss- 
ible; it takes the place of the agent, and therefore needs 
something else as its organ, and so the whole dispute is about 
a name (because you call Buddhi what we call soul); p. 671, 9 
to 672,7. 

6. Moreover the meditation on the highest soul demanded 
by the Yedänta is impossible if the soul is not an agent (for 
that too is an action); p. 672, 12. 

3. The Soul is naturally not an Agent (exercising 


Sütram 2, 8, 40. 

The section in question — one of the most important in 
Qankara's work — we translate literally: 

(p. 673, 3:) "Activity cannot be the real nature of the soul, 
** because then no liberation would be possible. For if activity 
"were the real nature of the soul there would be no release from 
-'it, jttst as fire cannot lose its heat;>i3 but without release 
*'from activity the attainment of the goal of man is impossible, 

"' The contradiction with the last sentence of p. 1130 (translated 
above p. 113) is reaolved by the soal being spoken of there in an exoteric 
bat here in an esoteric. 

318 Third Part: Psychology or the Doctrine of the Soul. 

"for activity is naturally painful (kartritvasya duhkha- 

"But cannot the goal of man be attained if one avoids the 
"effects by shunniog the occasion of activity even when the 
"power of activity continues; just as witli fire the effect of 
"burning does not follow if wood is withdrawn, though the 
"fire still possesses the power of burning? — By no means! 
"For it is impossible to avoid the occasions altogether because 
"they too are connected potentially ^^^ [with the soul]." 

" But cannot liberation be attained by employing the meaos 
^ (sädhanam) necessary to it? — No! Because what depends on 
"means, is not eternal." 

"Moreover the consummation of liberation is said to foUow 
"from the teaching as to the eternal, pure, wise and free soul 
"[identical with Brahman]; but the teaching that the soul is 
"of this nature is not possible if activity is its proper nature.** 

"Therefore the activity of the soul depends only on the 
"qualities of the Upädhis being ascribed to it (upädhi-dharma- 
^adhyäsena) and not on its own nature." 

"And so the Scripture teaches when it says (Brih. 4, 3, 7. 

"above p. 189): *it is as though it reflected, as though it 

"< moved unsteadily' and in the passage (Kath. 3, 4): 

'^ Bound up with Manas, senses, and the body, 
^'The sages call it *the enjoying one.^" 

"where it asserts that the soul passes into the specific state 
"of enjoyment [and activity] only by the connection with the 
" Upädhis. For in the opinion of competent persons there is 
"no agent and enjoy er different from the highest soul and 
"termed 'individual soul' (Jiva), because the Scripture says: 
" * besides him there is no other seer,' etc. (Byih. 3, 7, 23, trans- 
"lated above p. 149, cf. above pp. 133, 191)." 

"But if besides the highest soul there is no individual sonl 
"endowed with intelligence, which exists after the withdrawal 
"of the aggregate of Buddhi, etc., it follows that the highest 

11« p. 673, 9: nimittänäm apt fakti-lalcshanena ianUHtndMena tambad- 
dhänäm atf/anta-parihara-asambhavat; cf. note 66, above p. 113; tbept»* 
age to which it refers must probably be understood in this 

XX VL Relation of the Soul to its Aotions. 319 

^soul is itself a wanderer, agent, and enjoyer? — O no! For 

«^eDJoyment and activity are based on Ignorance. For so 

"* teaches the Scripture (Brih. 4, 5, 15, translated above p. 175): 

^'For where a duplicity exists as it were, one sees the other;' 

"^and after it has shown in these words that activity and en- 

**jo7ment exist for Ignorance, it denies the existence of the 

^activity and enjoyment for knowledge, continuing: 'but where 

^'all has become for a man as his own self, how should he 

**'see anyone?' — In the same way the Scripture shows (Brih. 

^4, 3, 19, translated above p. 190), how the soul in the states 

** of dreaming and waking in consequence of the contact (sam' 

** parka) with the Upädhis grows weary like a hawk soaring 

""in the air, but in deep sleep on the other hand, where it is 

** embraced by the Self of knowledge there is no weariness: 'this 

"^ 'indeed is that nature of his, in which his desire is satiated, 

**'in which he is himself his desire, without desire and free 

''*from sorrow;' and further (above p. 191) summarizing: 'this 

^^is his highest goal, this is his highest happiness, this is his 

"'highest world, this is his highest bliss.' — This is just what 

**the teacher [Bädaräyana in the Sütram in question] says: 

^''and as a carpenter in both toays^ where 'and' has the same 

''meaning as 'but' [a remark which possibly hints at fun- 

**damental differences between Bädaräyana and Qankara]. Le., 

''we must not believe that activity is in the proper nat ure of 

^the soul, like heat in that of fire. On the contrary/ as m 

**life a carpenter busies himself with the axe and other tools 

''in his hand, and feels pain, but afterwards goes home, lays 

"aside the axe and other tools and in his natural state 

"rejoicing and at ease feels pleasure, so too the soul, as long 

"as it is affected by the duality founded on Ignorance, is 

"busied in the states of dreaming and waking and feels pain; 

"hot when it enters into itself, to throw off weariness, into the 

"highest self, it is freed from the complex of the organs of 

"work [the body], is not an agent and feels pleasure in the 

"State of deep sleep; it i^ t he same in the state of liberation 

"where it is pure so ul ^ evaia), reposes and is happy after 

** the gloom of Ignorance is driven away by the torch of know- 

" ledge. The simile of the carpenter is to be taken as follows: 


320 Third Fart: Psycholos^ or the Doctrine of the Soul. 

'Hhe carpenter is, in respect of various kinds of work each as 
^* fitting, etc. with regard to certain tools such as his axe, etc.. 
^^an agent, but a non- agent so far as his body goes; so too 
"the soul in its exertions with regard to the organs, Manas, 
"etc. is an agent, but a non-agent in its own selfl The soul 
"as opposed to the carpenter has not like him limbs with 
"which it could take up the organs, ManaSy etc. or lay them 
"aside, as the carpenter with his hands takes up and lays 
"aside his tools [for all these organs belong to the Upädhis 
"which are attributed to the soul only by Ignorance].*^ 

Then follows a refutation of the argumentsBrougnt for- 
ward in the preceding section, so far as they maintain an 
activity of the soul dependent not on the Upädhis but on its 
own nature (p. 673, 1). We go through these briefly in order, 
according to the numbers above on p. 316. 

1. Certainly the Canon of Scripture presupposes an actiTity; 
it is not part of its real nature however but one which is 
founded on Ignorance (p. 676, 13). 

2. If the soul is still an agent in the dream-state, this 
depends on its being in this state not yet [as in deep sleep] 
wholly free from the Upädhis, in so far as the sense-organs 
are at rest in the dream-state while the Manca remains active, 
as the Smriti (Mahäbhäratam 12, 9897) says: 

"When senses rest, and understanding crakes, 
"And plays its part, this state is called a dream.'* 

it is further to be noticed that action in dreams is a matter 
of appearance only {väsanä) and not real in the fall soise 
(p. 678, 1). 

3. When it is said that the soul by means of intelligence 
absorbs intelligence in itself, no activity of the soul delivered 
from its organs is to be recognised but only a phrase like 
"the king fights by means of his soldiers'' where it is meant 
that only the soldiers fight (p. 678, 9). Further in the passage 
in question what is spoken of is only an entering into rest, 
not an activity properly so called. 

4. In the passage Taitt. 2, 5 by "intelligence" not the soul 
but the Buddhi is to be understood, as is further proved 
pp. 679, 3 — 680,1 from the context.— Qankara does not here 

XXVI. Relation of the Soul to its Actions. 321 

return to the controversy as to the freedom of the soul in 
perception and action. 

"i^ ^ There is in no sense a change of functions on the part 
-*of the fiuddhi if we ascribe activity to the organs; for all 
** organs are in respect of their functions necessarily agents; 
**bat the activity of these organs demands in addition apper- 
**ception (upalabdhi) and this belongs to the soul; but activity 
-*is not thereby ascribed to it; for its essence is eternal apper- 
** ception (nüya^upaloMhirSvarüpatvät). It is true self-conscious- 
"ness (ähankära) precedes activity, but it is not antecedent to 
-^ apperception, for it is itself apperceived." [Only the individual, 
active and enjoying soul is on the one hand dhafikartar and 
prcUyayiHy on the other hand aham-pratyayorvishayai p. 73, 5; 
the upädhi-less soul is neither the one nor the other but in 
its state of freedom is opposed to them as säkshin or pure 
upalabdhi; cf. note 30, above p. 64]. 

6. Finally as to meditation (safnädhi)^ it certainly assumes 
an activity of the soul but only in the same sense as the other 
prescriptions of the canon discussed under no. 1, of which it 
is a part (p. 680, 8). 

4. Freedom of the Will and Determinism. 

Sutras 2, 3, 41—^^ 

That the soul is metaphysically speaking identical with 
God and therefore like him ^eternal, pure, wise, and free" 
we have already seen repeatedly. But how is it with the soul 
so far as it is an empirical being connected with the Upadhis? 
Is it free or unfree in this state which is conditioned by 
Ignorance but has nevertheless existed from eternity? — This 
question in our system takes the following form fp. 680, 12): 
^'Is the activity of the soul, which, from the standpoint of 
''Ignorance, is conditioned by the Upadhis, dependent on God 
-(ifwara) or not?" 

It is a fundamental principle of the original Brahman 

doctrine that everything existing, and therefore the soul also, 

is absolutely dependent on God; from this follows that He is 

on the one hand the necessary cause of the fate and sufferings 


322 Third Fart : Fsychology or the Doctrine of the Soul. 

of the soul, and on the other hand of its actions, whatever 
they are. The philosophical elaboration of the doctrine of 
the Yedanta has yiolated this principle in both directions by 
referring both the action and sufferings of man to a cause 
inherent in himself. It is true both are none the less dependent 
on God; but only in the same sense that the growth of plant? 
depends on rain, which causes the seed to develop, but exer- 
cises no influence on its nature. We have already seen that 
the seed of the sufferings and destinies of this life is to be 
found in the works of the previous existence, which demand 
to be atoned for (above p. 279); and so too are the works of 
each existence necessarily determined by the works of the 
former existence — how this is possible is, as in the case of all 
moral questions, not plainly developed. According to p. 1131 
(translated above p. 113) works are the product of the nimiWis 
or motives and of the gakti^ power, t.e., character; and this con- 
sists generally speaking in the natural disposition (destructible 

lias it produces works that differ individually, character most 
■be imagined as specially modified in the case of each individual 
We must think of an innate character of this sort, conditioned 
by the works of the previous existence, when the soul, in 
what follows, is described as '^ connected with defects like 
love and hate" (räga-dvesha-ädi-dosha'prayyJääh p. 681, 3); and 
when as the seed from which works grow appears the *^ effort 
of the soul directed towards good and evil" (kritah prayatno 
jivasya, dharmoradharma-lakshanah)^ which seems to be summed 
up just in that innate disposition of character. 

One might think, says Qankara, that we have no ground 
for assuming an influence of God on human action (p. 681. 2) 
so far as the soul alone, connected as it is with such defect? 
as love and hate and equipped with the apparatus of the 
organs, suffices for activity (p. 681, 3); for it, like the ox at the 
plough, needs no further cause to move it to action (p. 681, 5> 
The actions of beings proceed only from their sense of justice 
and injustice; if the actions are referred to God, there happens 
dkritOrdbhyägamaJi (p. 681, 11; cf. p. 798, 12) "the occurrence 
^of something that has not been incurred [by the actions ot 

XXVI. Relation of the Soul to its Actions. 323 

the previous life]," — an expression applicable M) the motivation 
of saffering but not of actions, which seems to show that ourk 
thinker had not made clear to himself the difference between " 
the two. 

In reply to these objections Qankara (in the passage trans- 
lated aboYe p. 86) explains that the soul involved in Ignorance 
is dependent on God in respect of its action and sufferings 
(kartritvam and bhoktriivam) because by his permission (anujnä) 
Saipsara results, and by his grace (anugrdha) liberation (p. 682, 5). 
For even if the soul is connected with defects like love, etc., 
and equipped with the apparatus, yet in all activity God is 
the active cause, for thus says the Scripture (Kaush. 3, 8, 
above p. 179): '^for he alone causes him to do good works, whom 
" he will raise out of these worlds, and he alone causes him to 
**do evil works, whom he will make to descend." — 

(p. 683, 2:) ^God causes the soul to act, but in so doing 
"he has regard to the efforts made by it towards good or 
«"evil; hence the objections raised do not hold good. The good 
**and evil done by the soul is unequal; having regard to this 
^God divides the corresponding fruits unequally, for he like 
"-the rain is only the efficient cause {nimittam). For as in 
^life the common cause of different bushes and shrubs, of rice, 
"^barley, etc. that spring each from their own seed, which is 
^not common to all, is the rain, because without rain their 
^differences in respect of sap, blossom, fruit, leaf, etc. could 
"-not develop any more than they could without the special 
*-seed of each sort — so God, having regard to the efforts made 
"-by the souls, apportions good and evil (^bha-^gubham) among 
"^them. — But can this regard to the efforts made by the 
"" souls exist together with the dependence of all activity on 
*-God? — Certainly!/ For though the activity depends on God, 
^it is only the soul that acts (karoti), while God causes it to 
**act (kärayati) when it acts; and as He now in causing it to 
"act pays regard to former efforts, so too He in causing it 
^to act formerly had regard to still earlier efforts; for Saqi- 
^sara is without beginning." / 


XXVIL The Organs of the Soul. 

1. Preliminary Survey. 

Beoabdeb from the standpoint of knowledge the soul 
is Brahman Himself and completely identical (ananya) with 
Him. The plurality of souls is illusoiy; each one of us is the 
whole, undivided Brahman; as such each is infinite, omni- 
present, all-pervading, eternal and changeless, omnipotent and 
omniscient; without dififerences and without organs, neither 
agent nor enjoyer, neither sinning nor sufifering, in his essence 
pure intelligence (caitanyam), an organless, objectless, painless, 
pure cognition. As such the soul is in us merely an onlooker 
(säkshin) who in all cognition, present as its innermost nucleus 
looks on idly at worldly actio n ^ P[d^ at itsulh^ons without 
being m^'e least mixed up in it: »«a, yat tatra kiucit pa^yati, 
dn^anvägatas iena^^avati; asango hi ayam ptirushdh (Brih. 
4, 3, 16). 

This is not so from the standpoint of Ignorance. For 
just as a man whose eyes are affected sees two moons where 
there is in reality only one — or as the sun is reflected in the 
water in a thousand images, each of which is not a part but 
the whole of the sun, though in truth a mere phantom without 
real existence,— so the Ignorant sees instead of one Brahman 
without a second (which is his own Self) a plurality consist- 
ing of 1) a God (igvara) whose office is that of dispensing 
retribution, 2) a world which is the scene of this retribution, 
and 3) a given number of souls subject to the limitations of 
individuality; they wander from eternity and in each new 
existence suffer retribution for the works of the previous life; 
for this purpose after each death a new body, corresponding 

XXyn. The Organs of the Soul. 325 

exactly to the merits and faults of the preTious life, arises 
out of the seed of the body with which the soul is inseparably 
connected; and this happens again and again without cessation 
during all eternity.— It is true these souls are in reality neither 
indiridual nor wandering; each one of them is on the contrary 
the Atman (besides which nothing else exists), i.e., the omni- 
scient and omnipotent Brahman itseK in his completeness. 
But the soul does not know that this is so, because it has 
not the proper knowledge of its own Self, in that its own 
nature is hidden from it. What prevents this seK-knowledge, 
in which the soul is at once the perceiving subject and per- 
ceived object, is Avidyä] Avidyä puts itself between the soul / 
as subject and the soul as object; and is sometimes character- ■ 
ised subjectively as defective intellectual force, sometimes ob- 
jectively as defective perceptibility. The soul is from the 
subjective point of view compared to a blind man (above 
p. 87), whose lost sight can only be restored by the remedy-, 
of grace; objectively it is the Upädhis by which the divinely 
nature of the soul is disguised and as it were rendered latenUj 
hke fire which slumbers hidden in the wood: 

(p. TäZr^y^^The omniscience and omnipotence of the soul 
"is hidden by its connection with the body, i.e., by the con- 
"-nection with body, senses, Manas, Buddhi, external objects 
"-and sensation. On this subject we have this simile: just as 
''fire has as properties burning and illuminating; but the heat 
'-and light are hidden when the fire has entered into wood or 
^is covered with ashes, in the same way through the connection 
"of the soul with the Upädhis such as body etc. which are 
"created of Ignorance and formed of name and shape, arises 
^the error of not distinguishing ourself from them [the Upädhis] 
"and this produces the concealment of the omniscience and 
"omnipotence of the soul." ^ 

These Upädhis which condition the individualis^tion of the 
soul, are, taking these all in all, the following: 

I) The coarse body (dehOj sthüla-gariram) consisting of I 
the elements; the soul casts it ofif at deatL 

II) Among what accompanies the soul on its migration 
we distinguish: * 

326 Third Part: Psychology or the Doctrine of the Soul. 

A) a chaDging part: viz, moral determination (/ranno- 
ägraya) which accompanies the soul into each life 
as a new moment, not previously (apürvam) existent, 

B) an unchanging part with which the soul was in- 
vested from eternity and remains invested until 
liberation; this includes: 

1) the subtle body (sükshmO'gariramf hhütc^^ägraya) 
consisting of the "subtle portions of the elements 
which compose the seed of the body" (deha- 
vijäni'bhüta'SüJcBhmäni) ; 

2) the life-organs, termed Pränas (in the more ex- 
tended sense), i.e. vital breaths, spirits. These 
fall into two classes, the first includes the prin- 
ciples of the conscious, the second those of the 
unconscious life. 

a) The system of the conscious life is formed by 
a) five organs of sense (buddhi-indriyani): 

sight, hearing, smell, taste, touch; 
ß) five organs of action (karma' indriydni)^ 

including the functions of speech, of the 

hands, the feet, the organs of generation 

and evacuation; 
Y) the Manas, the central organ of conscioos 

life, directing the organs of perception and 


b) The system of the unconscious life consists 
of the Prana in the limited sense, more 
properly termed Mvkhya präna, i.e., chief 
breath of life. This again is divided into 
five single Pranas, viz., prana (in the strictest 
sense), apäna, vyäna, udäna and samäna, on 
which depend the functions of respiration and 
nutrition as well as the act of dying. 

We shaU deal with the subtle body (bhuUnigrcufa) and 
moral determination (karma -äfraya) when we consider 
transmigration; here we have more especially to consider 
according to the section 2, 4, 1 — 19 the psychic apparatus, 

XXVII. The Organs of the Soal. 327 

consisting of the systems of the conscious and anconscious 
life, which the soul (like a snail with its horns) puts out dur- 
ing life and at death withdraws into itself; the special enquiry 
is preceded by the question as to the origin and nature of 
the IVäfiaSj i.e., of the whole psychic organism. 

2. Origin and Nature of the Organs of Life (präna). 

By organs of life (Pränas in the more extended sense) are 
to be understood in the present case: the fiye organs of action, 
the five senses, the Manas and the Mukhya fVdna with its 
five branches. 

Though this apparatus appears in strict and (except in 
liberation) inseparable connection with the soul, it does not 
belong to it aU the same but to another non-spiritual part of 
nature. In the drama of world-development it does not belong 
to the player but the scenery; it is therefore in a similar 
position to the elements (earth, water, fire, air, ether) and 
appears in close connection with them; and if the metaphor 
is carried further one might say: the elements form the 
scenery (stage and wings) and the organs of life the costumes 
which the actors put on. For the rest, the idea of the Präpas 
is not clearly worked out; on the one hand they are the in- 
separable companions of the soul on its wanderings and there- 
fore parcelled out individuals, on the other hand, as in what 
follows, they appear as a complex mass from which the soul 
draws its organs as it takes its body from the correspond- 
ing mass of the elements. 

The question as to the nature and origin of the Präpas 
is twice treated, 2, 3, 16 and 2, 4, 1—4 without our arriving 
at settled ideas in the matter; in the first passage (as we saw 
above chap. XVII, 3 p. 236) Qankara is undecided whether 
the Präpas are to be regarded as of the same nature as, or x 
as different from the elements ; in the former case, he thinks, | 
they must have originated (in the creation at the beginning 
of each Kalpa) at the same time as the elements, in the latter 
before and after them; at any rate it is certain, he says, that 
they, like the elements, have arisen from Brahman. — The 

328 Third Part: Psychology or the Doctrine of the Sonl. 

Terbose treatment which he deals out to our question in the 
others passage, 2, 4, 1 — 4, does not bring us much further, 
fpr the essential content of his explanation is limited to the 
following: the question is whether the Prä9as had an origin 
or not (p. 701, 6), for passages can be cited in support of both 
assumptions (p. 701, 7. 702, 1); one may not however therefore 
take the origin of the Präi^as in a figurative (gauna) sense 
(p. 702, 7); on the contrary they are sprung from Brahman 
just as much as the rest of the world (p. 703, 11), for the 
Scripture teaches this expressly (p. 704, 7). If on the other 
hand the Scripture (Qatapathabr. 6, 1, 1, 1) makes them exist 
before the origin [of the world], they are for all that not 
absolutely primordial in their nature (mida-prakriti) but only 
relatively so {aväntara-prakrüi) viz. with respect to what has 
originated in its turn from them (p. 706, 6). Whether their 
origin from the elements as taught Chand. 6, 6, 5 (above 
p. 263) is to be taken literally or figuratively (p. 708, 6). it 
follows in any case from it that they like all else have arisen 
from Brahman (p. 708, 9). 

But this is in no way a satisfactory settlement of the 
question. For the Prapas exist, like the subtle body which 
carries them, as long as Saipsära endures (p. 1096, 11), and 
they accompany the soul inseparably even if it should enter 
a plant (p. 1096, 14), in which case Manas and Indriyas natur- 
ally cannot unfold themselves; now Saipsara exists, as we have 
seen many times already, from eternity; therefore the soul 
must have been equipped with the psychic organism of the 
Prai^as from eternity too. Our author is everywhere only 
concerned to reconcile this eternal existence of the individual 
soul and its psychic apparatus with the entering into and 
origin from Brahman, taught by the Scripture of all tliat 
exists; this he does by making the soul continue in Brahman 
in the form of seed {vija'ätmanä) or potentially ((^oMi-^inatvit 
which makes its destruction and origin merely apparent;'but 
these Vedic apologetics have far less interest for us than the 
question as to the relation between the eyes and ears, hand» 
and feet, etc., which wander forth with the soul and exist lor 
ever, and the material parts of the body which bear these 

XXVII. The Organs of the Soal. 329 

names and originate and perish with the body. — Qankara giyes 
a hint to guide us in solving the question when he, as we 
shall see, declares repeatedly that the function (vritti), not the 
organ wanders forth with the soul; that therefore even when 
the organs of sight, hearing, moving and grasping perish at 
death, the capability (we might say the will) to see, hear, 
move and grasp, etc. persists with the soul (cf. the passage 
from Chand. above p. 186 fif.). We find no further information, 
but a solution of the question in conformity with the system 
is not lacking. In this matter we must regard as fundamental 
the view that the body is related to the psychic complex as 
the developed plant to its seed. Since everything originates 
only from its seed, the wandering soul must necessarily, besides 
the Pranas, take with it the seed of the gross body in the 
form of the ** subtle body" which we shall examine more 
closely in the section on transmigration. As the material body ^ 
is the bearer of the material sense-organs, so this subtle body 
is the bearer (äfraya) of the psychic organs. They must like 
the body be conceived as germs which, on entering into 
material existence, by drawing homogeneous corpuscules from 
the whole mass of Pra^a-materials, develop into material organs, 
just as the seed of the subtle body absorbs the materials of 
the elements and ripens into the gross body. 

3. The System of the conscious Life: Organs of 


In accordance with the anatomical theory which makes the 
brain, as the central organ of conscious life, branch out on 
the one hand as sensory nerves into the organs of sense and 
on the other hand as motor nerves into the muscles of volun- 
tary movement, we find the Indians conceive the existence of 
a central function, ManaSy and two systems dependent on it; 
viz. the five organs of perception (buddhi-indriyas) and the 
five organs of action {karma-indriyas). In these eleven organs 
according to Qankara the whole complex of conscious life is 
included. — How many Pranas, he asks (p. 709, 1), must we 
assume if we leave out of account the Mukhya Prana (the 

330 Third Part: Psychology or the Doctrine of the Soul. 

principle of unconscious life)? Their number is yariouslv 
stated and passages may be cited which make them seven, 
eight, nine, ten, eleyen, twelve and thirteen in number (p. 709, 
3 — 9). The right number is however eleven. 

For there are in the first place five classes of perception 
(buddhi'bheda), according as their object is sound, the object 
touched, form, taste or smell [as to the order cfl note 97, above 
p. 237]; to these correspond the five organs of perception 
(p. 711, 7). There are further five classes of action {karma- 
bheda), speaking, grasping, going, evacuating, and procreat- 
ing; these purposes are served by the five organs of action 
(p. 711, 9). 

These external organs [which are limited to the present] 
have as correlative the inner organ (antahkaramm) or Manas 
(the two expressions are for Qankara completely interchange- 
able cfl 711, 4. 21, 4. 666, 6) which extends (p. 711, 10) to pa< 
present and future (p. 723, 9); "by division of the functions some 
"distinguish ManaSj Buddhi, Ahanikära, Cittam^ (p. 711, 11;; 
— ^this inner organ which serves the soul as Upädhi is here 
"and there variously termed Manas, Buddhi, VijMnam, Cittam; 
"others even distinguish separate functions and term the 
"faculty of reflection (samgaya^ p. 340, 6 vikalpa) Mcmas, that 
"of decision (nifcaya, p. 340, 7 adhyavasäya) Buddhi" (p. 666. 7). 
Qankara mentions these different views without refuting them 
but also without making use of them; for him there is only 
one inner organ, the Manas\ and even the Buddhi is for him 
not a distinct faculty but sometimes the activity of perception, 
, sometimes the mind in general (though it occasionally in con- 
' nection with Käth. 3, 3 appears coordinate with the Manas. 
i p. 638, 11; cfl 263, 8. 389, 2. 265, 6. 787, 10. 1056, 1).— So too 
Ahamkära is in our system not a distinct organ but mean^ in 
the first place "the word I" (p. 157, 6), then as a synonym of 
Ähampratyaya "the idea of the Ego*' "self-consciousnes«^'' 
(pp. 672, 1. 2. 680, 5. 6) whose object (ahampratyaya-vidiafjiV 
is the individual soul (pp. 73, 5. 78, 6. 672, 1, while on the other 
hand p. 15, 2 asmat-pratyaya-vishaya refers to the highest soul); 
as subject of presentation of the Ego sometimes the individual 
soul (äharnkartar p. 73, 5) is mentioned, sometimes the Manas 


XXVII. The Organs of the Soal. 331 

{ahampratyayin p. 21, 5); the highest soul on the other hand 
is not subject of the Ahainkaray for that inyolTes activity; on 
the contrary, like all else, the Ahamkära (with its perceiving 
subject and perceived object) is for the üpädhi-less Soul 
simply an object of perception (p. 680, 6). Cfl above p. 321. 
As we have already seen (above p. 314) the necessity of 
the assumption of the Manas is deduced by Qankara from 
the fact that while the soul is essentially an eternal cognition, 
there is no reason discoverable in the organs of sense for their 
different behaviour at different times; from this would result 
that we [in a waking state which alone comes in question 
here] should either not perceive at all or should perceive con- 
tinuously, unless there were between the soul and the organs 
of sense the ManaSj ''by whose attention {avadhänam) and 
"non-attention apperception (upalabdhi) and non-apperception 

**[of the soul] results" (p. 667, 6). 

As the central organ of the organs of perception and / 
action Manas is on the one hand what we term understand- ' 
ing, on the other hand conscious volition. The ideas on 
these objects are not however further developed. Qankara 
contents himself instead (p. 6^7, 7, cf. p. 21, 4) with a reference 
to the unsystematic information in Brih. 1, 5, 3: ''My mind 
^'was elsewhere (anyatra-manas), I did not see, my mind was 
"elsewhere, I did not hear, so we say; for only with the mind 
''does one see, only with the mind does one hear;^^^ karna, 
*samkalpa, vicikitsä, graddliä, agraddhä, dhfiti, adhritij h% 
^dhi, bhi^ — all these are Manas; therefore when we are touched 
**from behind, we recognise the fact by the Manas.^* — The 
faculties mentioned are explained by Qankara on Brih. he. cit 
as follows: ^Mma, desire, the longing for sexual enjoyment, etc.; 
'^samkalpay decision, the determination of the character of a 
"presented object by differences such as white, black, etc.; 
^vicikUsäf doubt; graddhä, belief, the perception of the existence 
"of invisible objects, e.g. the gods, by their effects; agraddhdf 
"disbelief, the contrary; dhriti, steadiness, keeping oneself up- 

11» Cf. Epicharmos in Plat. Mor. p. 961 A: 

Nod« op{ xat voO« dxoOei, T&XXa xm^d xal TUf Xd. 


332 Third Part: FBjchology or the Doctrine of the Soul. 

"right when the body is tired; (zdhriti, the opposite; hrl 
"shame; dht, cognition; bin, fear/* 

The Pränas mentioned (Manas^uddhi-indriyasj and Kamia- 

I indriyas) are minute (anu) which means that they are 1) subtle 

I (siikshma), 2} limited (paricchinna), but not that they are of 
atomic size {paramänvrtulya), "because in this case the per- 
"yading of the whole body would be impossible." *^« Their 

, subtlety is deducible from the fact that otherwise (if they were 
sthüla, coarse, material) they would necessarily be seen at the 
time of death, when the soul passes from the body, by the 
bystanders, just as a snake is seen which glides from its hole 
(p. 715, 6); and they must be limited and not (like the sou. 
free from Upddhis) infinitely great, because for the infinitely 
great no passing, going and return would be possible (p. 715, 7> 
"If you maintain that the infinitely great can by reason of 
" its function (vfitti) be at a given spot in the body, we must 
"remark that the organs [of the soul] are altogether mere 
"functions; for the function or whatever it is, that brings about 
"perception we call an organ; the dispute is therefore onlj 
"about names and the assumption of omnipresence a purpose- 
"less one" [the Fracas enter into the question only in respeci 
of what they are in the body, even if we call them here organs 
or functions, and assume as their bearers infinitely great or- 

r gans]. Therefore the Präpas are to be regarded as the functiocs 
or faculties of seeing, hearing, feeling, grasping, going, etc 
which, as they cleave to the soul, are not annihilated at deat^ 
with the corresponding parts of the body but produce then, 
again and again from themselves as seed produces plants. 

ii> p. 715, 4; above (p. 310 ff.) on the other hand the possibility cf 
action throughout the body is disputed, not for the soul of atomic sixe. 
but for the minute soul (which in the state of Samsara has the saiM 
size as the Buddhi, i. f., the Manas). If we disregard this and ask whi; 
in the strict logic of our system is the nature of the reciprocal action of 
the minute soul, "large as the point of an awl," and the body, we hsv« 
as answer that it is doubtless brought about by the Pränat which sts&i 
in the middle between soul and body ; the nature of this connection how- 
ever e.g, of the function or faculty of sight with Manas and soul on i£« 
one hand, and with the Ego on the other, is not cleared np. 

XXYIL The Organs of the Soul. 333 

4. The System of the unconscious Life: Organs of 


The principle of the unconscious, Tegetative life is the 
MuJchya Fräna, an expression which originally meant '^ Breath 
in the mouth" (thus Chänd. 1, 2, 7 where Brih. in the parallel 
passage 1, 3, 7 reads äsanyäh pränah; cf. Brih. 1, 3, 8); in our 
system howeTer where respiration is only a part of its task it 
has taken the meaning of ^ chief breath of life." Its primacy over 
the other organs of life is a favourite theme of the XJpanishads; 
e.g^ in the parable of the contest of the organs (Brih. 6, 1. 
Chand. 6, 1; cf. Kaush. 3, 3. Pragna-Up. 2) according to which 
the organs: speech, eye, ear, Manas, etc. go forth in order, 
and, when it is the turn of the (Mukhya) Prapa, become con- 
scious of its indispensability and their own dependence on it. 
A variation of the same theme is the story of the quarrel of 
the gods (». e., the organs : smell, eye, ear, Manas, and Mukhya 
Prai>a) with the demons, who visit evil on the other organs, 
but fly to dust on the Pra^a like clods of earth on a stone 
(Brih. 1, 3. Chand. 1, 2). 

With many references to these stories Qankara sets forth 
(2, 4, 8 — 13) that though the Mukhya Pram is also a creation 
of Brahman, it is still the oldest and noblest among all organs. 
It is true, he says, the Näsad-äsiya song says (Rigv. X, 129, 2): 

'^ Death was not known nor immortality, 
"Night was not bom, and day was not yet seen, 
^'Airiess, he breathed in primeyality 
"The one beyond whom noaght hath ever been;" 

but that which "breathed" is not the Prä9a in this case; on 
the contrary as the words '^ without air" proves, it is the 
highest cause (p. 716). Therefore the Pra^a too [in the same 
sense as the other organs, i.e., from its seed which has from 
eternity been connected with the soul] has originated, but is 
the oldest among the organs because its function begins from 
the moment the sperm is introduced, if it actually germinates 
in the Toni (p. 717, 3), while the activity of the others is only 
possible after the auditory passage etc. have originated (p. 717, 5); 
so too the Präpa is the best, because the other organs in the 

334 Third Fart: Psychology or the Doctrine of the Soul. 

parable of the quarrel of the organs confess to him: ^of a 
"truth without thee we cannot live" (p. 717, 7). 

What is then the constitution of this Prana? It is in the 
first place not air alone, though one passage of Scripture 
(p. 717, 10) seems to assert this; for it is, ChancL 3, 18, 4, ex- 
pressly distinguished from air (Väyu); it seems rather to ht 
a psychic analogue of the (cosmic) divinity of the air (vaf/ur 
evOy adhyätmam äpannähj p. 719, 8). Further, it is also no: 
to be regarded simply as a combined function of the orgsns 
{Manas and Indriyas) as the Tantrantariyas (p. 717, 12, i.e^ 
the Sänkhyas) maintain when they say: 

^'The working of the organs when combined 
*^Are the five airs with Prana at their head;" i^^ 

for if it were no more than this it would not be spccial'j 
mentioned Mu^d. 2, 1, 3 in addition to Manas and Indriyiy- 
But could it not be the result of the united action of the>e 
eleven organs, which produce the life of the body in something 
the same way as eleyen birds shut up in a cage raise it ic 
the air, when they fly upwards? i^s To this is to be rephed, 
that the organs cannot possibly produce the phenomenon •*: 
life, because it is absolutely heterogeneous from hearing, etc. 
(p. 719, 4). It is rather included in the primacy of the Prar^ 
as taught by the Scripture, that the other organs are sub- 
ordinated to it as qualities (guna) [p. 719, 6. 12; without pre- 
judice to their original essential difference from it; of th> 

But the Praxia cannot therefore, like the individual scu'.. 
be termed the sovereign of the body (p. 719, 12); for even if it 
alone remains awake, while the organs sleep (Brih. 4. 3. 12 
above p. 190) and does not fall into the grip of death (wearine7> 

117 This verse, cited by Qafikara (p. 718, 2) is found in the SaiMy^' 
Kärikä v. 29 and in the Sänkhya-sütras 2, 81, where it has manifestly b««- 
taken over from the Kärikä as the artificial metrical form (it is a cois- 
plete Aryä-hBÜ'-Yene) sufficiently proves. Further examples in EmI 
Sänkhya-S4ra, p. 12. 

11) p. 718, 13; this image too seems to belong to the SfiRiAy» «' 
any rate it is found in a distorted form in Oaudapäda on SaiUd^-Ki^- 
29, ed. Wilson p. 26, 5. 

XXVn. The Organs of the Soal. 335 

like them (Brih. 1, 6, 21), eTen if it is called the ^absorber'' 
because in sleep it absorbs them into itself (Chand. 4, 3, 3, 
above p. 61) and guards them as a mother guards her children 
(Pragna 2, 13) still it is only the prime minister of the soul, 
just as eye, ear, etc. are its servants (p. 720, 7). For the rest, i 
it is on the same level as the organs, (p. 720, 9), is like them \ 
an aggregate [sanihata, Le», produced from its seed by the 
depositing of corpuscules from the Prä^a-material] and non- 
spiritual (p. 720, 11); it has not, however, as they have, an 
object (p. 721, 1) and cannot be reckoned with them as a . 
twelfth organ; it rather supports, nourishes, and animates the 
whole body, as is further proved on p. 722 from the parable 
of the contest of the organs. — With this agrees the fact that 
the Mukhya Prä^a is termed p. 161, 9 prajnä'Sädhana-präna' 
antara-^ifraya ''the support of the other Präpas which sub- 
'^ serve the purpose of perception" and that as its task $ami' 
ranam is mentioned p. 471, 2, and parispanda pp. 378, 6. 380, ' 
12. 732, 6. 1090, 10, both of which seem to mean stimulation, \ 

As animating and supporting principle of life the Mukhya 
Ptana has five branches: Präna, Äpäna, Vyäna, Udäna, and 
SamänOj which are frequently enumerated {e.g., Brih. 1, 6, 3. 
3, 9, 26. Chand. 3, 13. 6, 18. Pra^na 3; the three first only: 
Brih. 3, 1, 10. 5, 14, 3. Chand. 1, 3, 8; four: Brih. 3, 4, 1) and 
are sometimes very differently explained. According to Qan- 
kara (p. 723, 1 — 4) Pram is exhaling (uccAt;ä«a), Apana in- 
haling {mq}A$QL)\ Vyäna is a sort of combination of both, viz. 
what supports life when the breath is held for a great effort ^i* 

II* This explanation of Qafik%ra of Pränay Äpäna^ Vyäna rests on 
Chand« 1, 3, 3—5 and agrees with Qaokara's Commentary on this passage 
in which he expressly defines I^na as exhaling (väyum vahir nihtära" 
ytitiK and Apäna as inhaling {antar äkarshati väyum). On the other 
hand contradicting himself he explains Apäna in the Commentary on 
Chand. 3, 13, 3 and again on Fra^na 8, 5 as mütra-pufisha-ädi-apanayan, 
i.f. Secretion. The former view agrees with his explanation of Bpih. 
3, 2, 2, that smell is associated with Apäna; the latter, as it seems, with 
his Commentary on B|ih. 3, 9, 26 as well as with the theory of the 
Vedantasara § 95. — A reconciliation is perhaps attainable from the fact 

336 Third Part: Fsychology or the Doctrine of the Soal. 

[in Indian medicine Vydna is the principle of the circulation 
of the juices and the blood, cfl the St Petersb. Diet s. t\ as 
well as Pra^na 3, 6]; Samdna is the principle of digestion: 
and finally Udäna is the faculty which at death brings about 
the passing of the soul from the body. — We see therefore 
that the Indians are not so far from our triple division of 
the regulative system into respiration, circulation, and digestioi. 
Quantitatively the Mvkhya Präna is of minute size {anur. 
here too this means, not that it is of atomic size; for by means 
of its five functions it pervades the whole body (p. 724. 3 : 
but that it is 1) not coarse, for it is not perceived at the 
passing of the soul (p. 724, 4), and 2) not infinitely great f«*^ 
otherwise passing, going, and return would not be possible 
(p. 724, 6); and when (Brih. 1, 3, 22) it is termed ''as large as 
" a termite, as a midge, as an elephant, as these three worlds, 
''as this universe" this is to be understood in a cosmological 
sense of Hirapyagarbha (a mythological personification of 
Brahman, cf. note 41) and not in the psychological sense; for 
in this sense his dimensions are, as the words ''as large as -a 
termite" show, limited according to the size of each individoa: 
being (p. 724, 10; from the expression: the pram ispratiprat - 
vartin may be concluded that with its five branches it com- 
pletely fills the body it happens to be in). 

5. Mutual Relation of the Systems of the consciou> 

and unconscious Life. 

Sutras 2, 4, 17-19. 

There is a doubt whether the remaining JMinas (the Mann 
and the ten Lxdriyaa) are mere functions of the MukhwJ 
Präna or are separate entities (p. 729, 3). The former opini n 
might be maintained, because we read (Brih. 1,5,21) ^'thfj 
all became part of its nature" and because they too bear tL 
name Fräna (p. 729, 6). But this is not so; they are separat 
entities, as follows from their having the special name Indriyam\ 

that inhaÜDg is of importance for the promotion of the movement o(\tt 
contenti of the intestines. 

XXYIL The Organs of the Soal. 337 

it is tme the Qruti (Muxid. 2, 1, 3) mentions the Manas as 
well as the Indriyas, but the Smriti (Manu 2, 89) enumerates 
eleTen Iniriyas^ and includes the Manas among them, which 
is neTer done with the Prapa (p. 730). The difference is also 
exhibited in the fact that in the quarrel of the gods and 
demons (Bph. 1, 3. Chand. 1, 2) all except the Präpa are oyer- 
come (p. 730, 12). 

The difference of the two consists in the following: 1) eyen 
if all others sleep, Prana remains awake; 2) all except it are 
subject to death, Brih. 1, 5, 21, by which here weariness is to 
be understood (p. 732, 2); 3) the Präna^ not the Indriyas, con- 
ditions by its remaining the continuance, and by its remoTal 
the destruction of the body; 4) the activity of all Indriyas is 
directed to objects [they are organs of relation] but not that 
of the Pr&na\ 6) that ^they became part of its nature" (Bfih. 
1, 5, 21) means that the Indriyas are dependent on the Pr&na^ 
so far as it brings about their stimulation {pari8panda)\ and 
for this reason also bear its name (ftana) in a metaphorical 
sense (p. 731, 8^732, 11). 


6. The Cooperation of the Gods. 

Sutras 2, 4, 14—16. 

The general tendency of the Indians to draw parallels 

between cosmic and psychic potencies is also displayed in the 

relation in which the single organs of life are brought to the 

corresponding elements conceived as gods. Thus in Brih. 1, 

3, 11 after the Präpa in the fight with the demons has warded 

off evil and death from the organs, the latter are " led beyond 

death;" speech becomes fire and illuminates, breath becomes 

wind and purifies, the eye becomes the sun and burns, the 

ear becomes the poles, and the Manas the moon and shines. — 

On the other hand Ait. 1, 2, 4 says of the gods who arose 

from the primitive man and, desiring a fixed abode, enter into 

human beings: ''Fire entered as speech into the mouth, wind 

''as breath into the nose, the sun as sight into the eye, the 

"cardinal points as hearing into the ear, herbs and trees as 

^ hair into the skin, the moon as Manas into the heart, death 


338 Third Fart: Psychology or the Doctrine of the Soul. 

'^as Apana into the navel, and water as seed into the organs 
"of generation." — In agreement with this according to Bfih. 
3, 2, 13 at the death of man speech becomes fire, breath wind, 
the eye becomes the sun, the Manas the moon, the ear the 
cardinal points, the body the earth, the soul ether [in the heart], 
the hair on the body becomes herbs, the hair of the head 
trees, and blood and seed turn to water. 

On these passages is based the Yedänta theory of the 
directorship (aihishthätritvam) of the gods oyer the organs. 

CThe organs of life, so Qankara sets forth^. 726 — 726 on the 
basis of the texts cited [can only act, so far as they are guided 
by the corresponding gocLs; of their own force they cannot do 
it though they are equipped with the strength requisite for 
their action (pt-726^, 14); just as a waggon though it is strong 
.(Qokta) needs the oxen to move it (p« 797, 1). This last com* 
;pari8on points to the fact that the organs surrounding the 
'soul are conceired as a mechanism in itself lifeless, which 
needs in addition a special principle of motion. The soul 
cannot be employed as such, because it is not an agent and 
only becomes an agent (kartar) through the Upadhis (i.e., the 
I organs); therefore the activity of the organs is referred partly 
to the ''inner ruler" (above j)«J^), i.e., the exoteric Brahman; 
and partly as here to the gods who are in other respects 
superannuated.! Still their role is a purely subsidiary one; 
they do not Sfiare in enjoyment and sufifenng; this is wholly 
reserved for the individual soul affected by good and evil 
pleasure and pain (p. 728, 3). At death the gods withdraw 
their assistance; this is all that is meant by the above mentioned 
return of speech into the fire, etc. (p. 745, 8) ; nevertheless the 
organs themselves, the Fräna as well as the Manas and 7m* 
driyas withdraw with the soul and accompany it on its wander- 
ings (p. 728, 7). 

7. Retrospect 

After the Indians had early attained the knowledge that 
the key to the enigma of the world is to be sought nowhere 
else than in the Self (Ätman)^ they asked themselves further 

XXVIL The Organs of the Soul. 339 

which part of our Ego is to be regarded as the clearest ex- 
pression of the thing-in-itself— unconscious life which in 
waking and sleeping goes tireless on its way, or conscious 
life in whose preponderance consists the advantage of man 
over other beings? — As it seems to us, both these paths were 
taken ; in earlier times principally the first by the identification 
of the Pr&na (breath, life) with Brahman and the correspond- 
ing theory of an entrance into Brahman in deep sleep (where 
according to Qatapathabr. 10, 3, 3, 6 all organs are absorbed 
into the life); later there was manifested an inclination to 
the Atman rather in the subject of cognition within us, and 
to characterise it therefore as drashtar (Brih. 3, 7, 23. 3, 8, 11), 
prajM • atman (Eaush. 3), pr&jfia dtman (Brih. 4, 3, 21. 35), 
prajnäms^hana (Brih. 4, 5, 13) etc, and to regard the entrance 
into Brahman in deep sleep rather as an unconscious because 
objectless Cognition (Brih. 4, 3, 23) or even as a fancifully 
elaborated ascent to the highest light (Chänd.8, 12,3); Cbänd. 7 
would there be a polemic of the younger school against the 
older and Kaush. 3 an attempt to reconcile the two; until 
finally the extreme intellectualism of the system of the Yedanta 
was reached, for which Brahman is pure intelligence (eaitan* 
yam), while the Pr&na in the shape of the MiCkhya Pram 
sinks to a mere Upädhi of the soul. 

This view which can for the present only be presented as 
a hypothesis, would among other things explain the singular 
position of the MuWiya Präna in the system, which on the 
one hand gives it the primacy over all other Upadhis, and on 
the other hand connects the soul not so much with it as with 
the Manas (dependent on the Mukhya Pra^a). For while 
the Mvkhya Prana^ suiting itself to the size of the body what- 
ever it is (above p. 336) pervades all parts of the body with 
its five branches, the soul in the state of Saipsara is ^ the nucleus 
"(quintessence) of the qualities of the Buddhi" (above p. 311), 
Le^ of the Manas\ it is like the Manas ^ large as the point 
of an awP and dwells with it in the heart in quasi-identity; 
from there the Manas sends out the Indriyas as its feelers 
(organs of perception) and performers of its commands (organs 

of action) throughout the body. In deep sleep, as we shall 


340 Third Part: Psychology or the Doctrine of the Soul. 

/'see, the Indriyas creep into the veins, and these enter into 
/ the Mukhya Pram, and, like the Manas, attain repose in it 
while the soul, united with Brahman, sojourns in the ether of 
the heart This liberation of the soul from the üpädhis 
(upadhuupagama) is conditioned by the cessation of the actir- 
ity of the Indriyas and the Manas, but not of the MtMiya 
Präna, whose activity continues in sleep as it does in the 
waking state; this makes clear how loose the connection 
between it and the soul is; its repose is not necessary for the 
repose of the soul, and its activity is without influence on the 
state of the soul. It appears rather as the antipodes of the 
soul in the life of the organism, as the gathering-place of the 
TJfädhis and therefore as the central point of all that in- 
dividualises the soul and obscures its original divinity. True 
the Mukhya Präna is not, like the Manas and Indriyas. ser- 
vant of the soul but its prime minister {mantrin p. 720, 7); it 
is however a minister with whom the sovereign is not on the 
best of terms; the weal of the land is committed to his care, 
but his Highness prefers to reside in the castle of a favourite 
(the Manas) whom he prefers, but who is subject to the 
minister; — this is a position which may be reached in the 

I' course of political evolution, but it is certainly nowhere the 
original state of things. 

The matter is somewhat different with regard to death; 
here, as we shall see, the Indriyas first of all enter into the 
Ma7ia8, and then in succession the Manas into the Mukhya 
Präna [in which it already is, spatially considered], the Mukhijti 
Präna into the Jiva (individual soul), and therefore into the 
heart; finally the Jiva enters into the ^subtle parts of the 
"elements which form the seed of the body," i.e., into the 
subtle body, which is their bearer during the migration. 

As this subtle body is related to the coarse body, so are 
the organs which pass out with it related to the material organs 
which perish with the body ; they are their continuations vij-i* 
ätmanä or gaktüätmanä as seed or power; i.e., while eye and 
ear, hand and foot perish at death, their function (vriUi). the 
power of seeing, hearing, going, grasping, etc. connected with 
the soul, wanders out with it (in a latent state) and server 

XXVn. The Organs of the Soul. 341 

for a new incarnation as the seed from which the material 
organs proceed just as the coarse body arises from the subtle 
body. [A combination of the material of the subtle body from 
the three original elements, and of the material of the coarse 
body from their triply or quintuply mixed derivatiyes is not 
yet discorerable in Qankara's commentary]. 

According to this the interaction of body and soul must 
be conceived as follows: the Indriyas are simply the powers 
or functions of the Karanas] i.e., of the material organs; these 
they produce out of themselyes and remain in the closest and 
most intimate connection with them; these Indriyas have their 
common centre in the Manas; the Manas is homogeneous with 
them and itself an Indriyam] it dwells, large as the point of 
an awl, in the heart; in the ManaSj filling it completely and 
(except by liberation and temporarily in deep sleep) inseparably 
connected with it, is the Soul, which, by the mediation of the 
Manas and Indriyas^ governs the movements of the Earanas 
and receives their impressions ; while the Mukhya Prana with 
its five branches pervades the whole body and provides for 
its nutrition on behalf of the soul; it is subject to the soul, 
but, leaving death out of the question, a connection between 
the two is not discoverable. 

XXVm. Special States of the Soul. 

There are three states of the indiyidual soul which sojooms 
in the body: they are: Waking, dream-sleep, and deep 
sleep (p. 799, 14), and these three are also to be understood 
when the highest soul is spoken of as ''changeless onlooker 
''at the three changing states" (as e.g. 432, 12, above p. 276». 
A fourth state is dying consisting in a passing oat of the 
body (p. 799, 15); we have further swooning, which is how- 
ever not to be reckoned as a fifth state because it is onlv an 
occasional and exceptional phenomenon, which is in the sphere 
of the healing art (p. 802, 13). 

We shall now consider these three states on the basis oi 
the material afforded by the appendix 3, 2, 1 — 10 supplement- 
ary to the Psychology, prefixing a brief definition of them from 
p. 107, 12 ff.: "the soul is awake, when, in consequence of its 
" connection with the yarious Upädhis [the ten Indriyas] which 
" proceed from the Jlancis, it apprehends sensuous objects and 
"examines their differences; — when, modified by the impress- 
«"ions^^^^ of these, it sees dream-pictures, it is [occasionallT. 
" viz. Chand. 6, 8, 2, above p. 263) described by the word JlafMg 
" [in the dream-state the senses repose, while the Manas remains 
"active, above p. 320]; in the state of deep sleep in which the 
"two kinds of Upädhis [Indriyas and Matias, or, as Govinda 
"maintains: the coarse and fine] are in repose, and the differ- 
"ences conditioned by the Upädhis cease to exist, the soul is 
"as it were dissolved (pralina) in its own self and therefore 

ISO The dream-pictiiret have m cante the unpreetiont (väsonä) of th« 
waking state; cf. p. 788, 11: jägarita'prabhava'Vdsanä'mmiUmivät tu n^p- 
nasya-f p. 270, 8: tad-vasana-nimittSf'tc ea wapnan nSdi-earo *fn M $ ya ^ 

XXVIIL Special States of tbe Soul. 343 

^it is said: it has entered into itself (Chänd. 6, 8, 1, aboye 
«p. 263)." 

1. Dream-Sleep. 

Sutras 3, 2, 1—6. 

In the principal passage, Brih. 4, 3 (a knowledge of which 
from Chap. XII, 4, aboye p. 189 we shall in what follows 
assume in the reader) it is said: "there are no chariots, no 
** teams, no roads, but he creates for himself chariots, teams, 
^and roads." The question is (p. 778, 7) whether a real 
creation is here to be understood or one depending on illusion 

The first yiew might be taken, for it is said: "he creates;" 
and further: "for he is the creator" (p. 779, 6). Moreoyer 
another passage (E&th. 6, 8) says of dream-sleep : 

''The spirit that in the sleeper never tires 

"And gives the form he will to his desire«, 

"He is the Brahman, he the stainless one, 

"Immortal is his name. 

"And all the spheres 

"Repose in him; beyond him there is none." 

It might be imagined that by wishes here as before (Käth. 
1, 23 — 24) real objects are to be understood, and that by 
the creating spirit (Käth. 2, 14) the world-creating highest 
Soul (präjna) is meant (p. 780, 1. 5), so that the dream-creation 
is to be conceiyed as real just as much as the actual creation 
(p. 780, 10). 

To this is to be replied: the dream- creation is a mere 
illusion« and not a reality (p. 780, 17) because it is not con- 
sistent with time, space, and causality and is refuted by 
them (p. 781, 3). 1) Not with space: for there is no room for 
chariots, etc. in the limited confines of the body (p. 781, 6). 
It might be imagined that the soul leayes the body in sleep 
because it is said (Brih. he, cit) "it soars from the nest and 
'^ borers where it will" and because in dreaming, going and 
standing still are only possible on this supposition (p. 781, 6). 
But that is not so; for it is not possible to pass oyer the 
space of a hundred miles in a moment; besides a man who 
goes to sleep in the country of the Kurus and reaches in his 

344 Third Fart: Psychology or the Doctrine of the SouL 

dream the country of the Pancälas, ought to be able to wake 
up there too; but in reality he always wakes in the coantrr 
of the Kurus (p. 781, 10, 14). MoreoTer objects in foreign 
countries are in reality not at all the same as they were in 
the dream (p. 782, 1). The aboye mentioned passage is there- 
fore to be taken figuratively, and the going and standing still 
in dreams are an illusion (p. 782, 6. 7). The dream is just as 
unreconcilable with 2) the conditions of time; for one sleeps at 
night and belieyes it to be day, and often a dream that lasts 
an hour seems like a number of years (p. 782, 8); and the 
dream is in conflict 3) with causality; for one grasps chariots 
without hands, sees them without eyes, builds them without 
wood; besides their existence is refuted by the awakening 
(cfl above p. 247), and not by this alone but also by the coarse 
of the dream itself^ for the chariot suddenly turns into a man. 
and a man into a tree (p. 782, 11). 

True the dream is not completely illusory, for it is pro- 
phetic of good or ill luck. For thus says the Scripture 
(Chänd. 6,2,9): 

''For him who dreamt of happiness in love, 
''Good fortune when he wakes is near at hsnd;" 

while (according to Ait är. 3, 2, 4, 17) a black man with black 
teeth indicates a speedy death (p. 783, 7). Again those skilled 
in dream-books (svapna-adhyaya p. 783, 10) explain the dream, 
when they for example teach that riding on an elephant is a 
foretoken of riches, and on a donkey of poverty. Here what 
is presaged is true, but what presages, the dream namely, is 
not true (p. 783, 14; cf. above p. 270).— Besides it is the pur- 
pose of dream-pictures to excite joy and fear, and that as a 
result of the good and evil that one has done (p. 784, 7). 

Therefore the passage as to the creation of the chariot is 
to be understood figuratively (p. 784, 2) and serves to elucidate 
how far the spirit is its own light (p. 784, 9). The indiridual 
soul is in the first place to be regarded as the creator of 
dream-pictures (p. 786, 3); and if the context of the Ääthaka- 
passage we have cited indicates the highest soul, this depends 
on the two being properly speaking identical (p. 786, 6) in the 
sense of the words tat tvam asi [it would have been more 

XXVni Special SUies of the Soul. 345 

appropriate to recall the words etad vai tat which we find 
not far from these cited]. God directs all things and there- 
fore dreams too; but the dream-creation is not a real one in 
the same sense that nature is. "Further the creation of nature 
* is not an absolute reality (ätyantikam satyatvam) ; for on the 
^ basis of the words of scripture referring to its depending on 
^ words (above p. 262) we hare proved its identity with Brah- 
^ man (chap. XX), as well as that the whole extension of the 
"world is a mere illusion (mäyä);^^^ its difference from the 
"* illusion of a dream consists only in the continuance of the 
^ extension of the world until the soul is recognised as Brah- 
^man« while the extension of the dream is refuted daily*' 
(p. 786, 10). 

"But are not God and the soul related as fire and sparks; 
"^and does not the soul therefore of necessity share in God's 
"omniscience and omnipotence, as sparks have their share of 
"light and heat; and cannot it therefore at will {samkaljya) 
"create in a dream?" 

— ^Beply: the homogeneity of the soul and God is a fact, 
but is concealed by Ignorance, and only becomes manifest to 
him whose eyes are opened by the grace of God. 

"But how does it come about that this homogeneity is 
"hidden from us?" 

— ^It is, like fire under the ashes, hidden in consequence 
of the connection with the Vpadhis, to wit the body etc. which 
are produced by the world of names and forms dependent on 

"But if the soul does not possess the omniscience and 
*" omnipotence of God, it is essentially heterogeneous from 
"^Him, and does not need to become so by the connection 
*^with the body?" 

lit The theory of the extension of the world m mäyä, the occurrence 
of which in ^ankara is doubted hy Colebrooke, and in Bädaräyana by 
Cowell (Colebrooke, M. E.*, p. 400) is quite clearly expressed in (^veta^- 
cvztora-Up. 4, 9— 10 which it accepted by both of them; from <,;aflkara's 
Commentary the following passages are applicable: pp. 120, 16. 269, 2. 
342, 12. 406, 6. 432, 8—13. 472, 9. 484. 11. 785, 12; cf. aboTe pp. KM), 187. 
226. 254, 276, 277, 299. 

346 Third Fart: Psychology or the Doctrine of the Sonl. 

— By the connection with the body it comes about, that 
the soul's (own) omniscience and omnipotence are concealed 
from it, and that is why it cannot create at will in a dream. 
If it could do so, no one would hare an unpleasant dreanu 
for no one creates what is not pleasing to himself (pp. 7S6 
to 788). 

2. Deep Sleep. 

S&tras 8, 2, 7—9. 

In deep, i. e. dreamless sleep, the soul becomes temporariij 
one with Brahman. In course of time this doctrine, which, in 
our opinion, only expressed the extinction of conscious in un- 
conscious life, that is perceiyed in sleep by simple obserration. 
assumed an essentially different meaning. According as the 
soul came to be regarded as an essentially intellectual potencj 
a separation of it from the Mukhya Fräna as principle of the 
unconscious life and a closer connection with the organs of 
conscious life, viz. Manas and Indriyas, became necessary. In 
deep sleep this connection is temporarily dissolred in such a 
way that Manas and Indriyas enter into the PranOj and the 
soul on the other hand is submerged in the Brahman who 
sojourns in the ether of the heart. Qankara's statem^its on 
this point are concerned with special questions and rest on 
assumptions which are nowhere clearly developed; we most 
therefore by putting things together attempt to lay down whst 
these were. 

In the waking state the soul, connected with the Manas. 
has its seat in the heart and from here by means of the h^ 
driyas exercises its influence throughout the body. — ^In dream- 
sleep the functions of the Indriyas are extinguished, for 
(Pragna 4, 2) they are absorbed into the Manas ; and the soul 
surroimded by the still active Manas and the reposing In- 
driyas (above p. 320) passes through the whole body^ as % 
prince surrounded by his vassals makes a progress throug£i 
his kingdom. This Tiew based on Brih. 2, 1, 18 seems to hover 
before Qankara's mind when he says p. 270, 8, the seal enjoys 
the dream*pictures which are dependent on waking impreesions 

XXVIU. Special SUtes of the Soul. 347 

nädieara, "as it passes through the veins J' — In deep sleep, 
as is said in the same passage (p. 270, 9), the two illusions of 
waking and dreaming are destroyed, and the soul, freed from all 
Upadhis enters into Brahman in the ether of the heart What 
becomes of Manas and Indriyas in this case? According to 
Chand. 4, 3, 3 the Fräna absorbs them and this yiew is adopted 
by Qankara p. 720, 1. On the other hand it is said in the 
statement to be given below, the Upadhis (Le,, here Manas 
and Indriyas) sojourned in deep sleep in "the pericardium 
(puriiat) or the veins," which, 72 000 in number (according to 
Brih. 2, 1, 19) starting from the heart surround the Furitat 
and thence (Qankara on Brih. p. 367, 8) pass to all parts of 
the body, 101 of them subserving the withdrawal of the dying 
soul from the body. This information leads us to believe that 
the veins were taken to be the main seat of the Mukhya 
Prana; with this agrees the statement that the Vyäna acts in 
them (Pragna 3, 6) and that the Udäna leads the soul from 
the body at death by the 101 principal veins. 

After these preliminary remarks we turn to the statements 
of Qankara, which we shall give in some detail on account 
of certain special difficulties. 

On the question of the state of the soul in deep sleep 
(stishuptamj supti, sushupti), as we read in the Commentary 
on 3, 2, 7, the scripture seems to contradict itself; for there 
are passages according to which the soul in deep sleep "has 
crept into the veins" (Chand. 8, 6, 3), "lies in the pericardium" 
(Brih. 2, 1, 19), "has attained unity in the Prä^a" (Kaush. 
4,19), "sojourns in the ether of the heart" (Brih. 4, 4, 22), 
"has entered into the Existent" (Chand. 6, 8, 1), "is embraced 
by the Self of knowledge" (Brih. 4, 3, 21).— One might think 
that different places are to be here understood, because they 
all subserve the same end and therefore cannot be dependent 
on each other (p. 789, 12). That is also the reason why they 
are mostly in the locative, and where this is not the case, as 
in the passage about "the Existent" (p. 790, 3) the locative 
meaning is made certain by the connection and context 
(p. 790, 8). As the essence of deep sleep consists in the sus- 
pension of individual cognition {vigesha-vijfiäna'Upafama), and 

348 Third Part: Psychology or the Doctrine of the Soul. 

all the spots mentioned subserve this purpose, it seems that 
the soul in deep sleep can enter one or the other at choice 
(p. 790, 10). — To this is to be replied: not at choice (vikalpenai 
into one or the other, but at the same time (samuccayenai 
into all the places mentioned does the soul enter in deep 
sleep (p. 791, 1), because otherwise we should have a partial 
denial {pakshe bädhah) of the evidence of scripture. From 
the uniformity of case it does not follow that all (each for itself^ 
fulfil the same purpose; they may fulfil different ends which 
require to be combined (p. 791, 7) and as a man can be at 
home and in bed at the same time, the soul too can be 
simultaneously in the veins, the pericardium, and the Brahman 
(p. 791, 8). Where (as in Chand. 8, 6, 3) the veins alone are 
mentioned, without excluding Brahman who dwells, as we 
know, in another spot [in the ether of the heart], an entrance 
into Brahman by means of the veins (nädi-dvärefia) is to be 
understood (p. 791, 16); this is not in contradiction with the 
locative; for he who by means of the Ganges (Oangaya) jour- 
neys to the oc^n, has journeyed on the Ganges (Oaügäyäm'y 
(p. 792, 1). Moreover the passage in question is concerned 
with another matter, viz. the way through the veins and sun- 
beams into the Brahman-world [in heaven]; and in treating 
of this it is, to exalt the veins, mentioned that no evil touches 
him who has entered by them [into the heart], and that because. 
as Chand. 6, 8, 3 says, "he has thus become one with heat^ 
(p. 792, 6). By heat (tejas) is here to be understood either 
the juice (pittam) in the veins that surrounds the organs of 
cognition (p. 792, 6) or Brahman; for (p. 792, 11) that it cannot 
be touched by evil agrees with the facts of the Brahman- 
world [in the heart, cf. above p. 164) while the complex of 
veins issues (anugata) in Brahman, as the place of deep sleep. 
So too the pericardium is in close relationship (anugu^^a 
p. 793, 4) with the place of deep sleep. For the envelope of 
the heart is termed pericardium, |)t<rHa(; what is in the heart 
is also in the puritat, just as what is in a town is surrounded 
by the walls of the town (p. 793, 8). Of the three places of 
deep sleep, veins, pericardium and Brahman, the two first are 
therefore only to be regarded as entrances (p. 793, 13). *The 

XXVIII. Special States of the Soul. 349 

^ Teins too, or the Puritat are only the receptacle of the UpädJüs 
"of the soul; in them its organs sojourn [probably only the 
*^ Indriyas^ and if a removal from its natural position be 
^assumed, the Mana8\ For apart from the connection with 
'^the Upädhis, the soul in itself (svatas) needs no receptacle 
^but in its non-difference from Brahman reposes in its own 
"^ majesty" (Chänd. 7, 24, 1), and thus identity (tädätmyam), not 
a relation of receptacle and contents, exists, between it and 
Brahman (p. 794, 2); ''true the entrance of the soul into Brah- 
''man is never unrealised; it cannot give up its own nature; 
«'but in dream and waking by virtue of its mingling with the 
" Upadhis it is as though the soul had passed into a different 
''nature; therefore the release from the Upadhis in deep sleep 
"is regarded as an entrance of the soul into its own nature'' 
(p. 794, 7). The aim of deep sleep, the suspension of individual 
cognition, would not be attained by a mere entrance into 
veins and JVirito^, for (p. 794, 14) they involve plurality (bheda- 
vishaya); and "where a plurality as it were exists, one sees 
"the other," as the scripture (Brih. 4, 6, 15) says. True sus- 
pension of cognition can be effected by the great distance of 
the objects but only where the subject is limited, which is 
not the case with the soul, if the Upadhis are left out of 
account (p. 795, 2); if however a removal of the Upadhis is 
meant it is just this release from them of which we are speak- 
ing (p. 795, 5). We do not maintain either that veins, peri- 
cardium and Brahman are to be regarded as possessed of 
equal rights; for the two first do not come in question at 
all (p. 795, 8); the important thing is that Brahman is un- 
changeably the place of deep sleep, and that the Brahman- 
hood of the soul is adhered to, and a release in deep 
sleep from the activity of the waking and dream states 
(p. 795, 12), 

Just as deep sleep is an entrance into Brahman, so awak- 
ing out of it is a withdrawal from him (p. 795, 15). 

But how is it possible, if deep sleep is a complete union 
with Brahman, that each soul on awaking finds its way back 
to its individuality? If a drop of water is poured into a body 
of water and a drop taken from it again, it can hardly be 

350 Third Fart: Psyohology or the Doctrine of the Soul. 

assumed that you get the same drop again! ^^^ Just so, as 
it seems, must we assume that after its union with God in 
deep sleep the same soul cannot return to its indiyidualitr: 
that on the contrary it is another soul or even God himself 
who awakes in its place (p. 796, 8 — 797, 1). 

But this is not so, as Qankara shows p. 797, 2ff.; he who 
awakes can neither be another soul nor God but must be the 
same who went to sleep and that for the following reasons 
which the words of the Sütram also set forth: 

1) On account of works] it cannot be assumed that a 
[religious] work begun in the evening and completed in th^ 
morning is divided between two different souls; and that ati- 
prasangät "because too much would follow from it;'' to wit 
that then to every one could be apportioned the works of 
another and be imputed to him at the retribution. 

2) On account of remembrance] for one remembers when 
one wakes: '^I saw this and this yesterday'' and ^I am so 
and so." This continuity of the consciousness of external 
objects and the Self proves that the same soul awakes as 
went to sleep. 

3) On account of the text of scripture] ^^ then it harries 
"back according to the entrance, according to the place, into 
"the waking state" (Brih. 4, 3, 34); — "all these creatures go day 
"by day into the Brahman-world and yet do not discover it" 
(Chand. 8, 3, 2); — "therefore of a truth, dear one, when all these 

131 The queBtion raised above it explicable from the view that the 
tool as such is a completely indifferent principle, t. e. like Ood himself 
(chap. XIV, 3) niwi^ha without any difference, and that therefore all iu 
individuality is to be sought in its empirical existential form. Bat 
wherein is this indiridnality to be found?— Not in the Up&dki» for thtx 
are only a mechanical apparatus, in themselves dead, which are alike aa 
attribute of all. Therefore if the individual character can neither be 
found in the soul as such, nor in its üpädhis^ it must be discoTerable 
in some tertium quid, and this is moral determination, which we beiv 
characterise by three expressions from Bfih. 4, 4» 2: vidy6i, karman^ pÜrra- 
prqjnä (or as we preferred to say above p. 193 apürvapre^nä)^ know- 
ledge, works, and previous (or newly acquired) experienca. Wc 
return later (p. 374ff.) to this question; here we had to anticipate it t^ 
make what follows intelligible. 

XXVIIL Special Staiei of the SouL 351 

''creatures proceed out of the Existent again, do they not 
''know that they proceed out of the Existent again; whether 
^ they are tigers here, or lions, or wolves, or boars, or worms, 
''or birds, or midges, or gnats, whatever they may be, that 
"they become again" (Chand. 6, 10, 2). 

4) On account of the precepts as to knowledge and works, 
which in the absence of personal identity would become in- 
valid; for otherwise deep sleep would mean complete liberation, 
and what would become then of the works that still remain 
and have to be atoned for, and of the (lower) knowledge? 
So too in the case of the other in whose person the soul 
would have to wake, the continuity of his actions would be 
destroyed. How can one even assume that any one goes to 
sleep in the person of A and wakes up in the person of B? — 
Finally the really liberated might also awake again in that 
case [for nothing distinguishes him from the others] and 
liberation would not be definitive. But this is, after Ignorance 
has once been destroyed, impossible; and from this it follows 
that God (igvara)^ for whom Ignorance is eternally annihilated, 
cannot awake in the place of the soul. — That is; for the reason 
that otherwise man would suffer for what he has not committed, 
and not atone for what he has committed (p. 798, 12), it is 
impossible to assume that a different person from him who 
went to sleep wakes up. The comparison with the drop, which 
cannot be recovered from the body of water, does not agree 
with the facts; for the distinguishing cause is wanting in this 
case, but in the case of the soul it is present, namely in the 
shape of works and knowledge [in which therefore consists 
the individuality of the individual]. Moreover things which 
are hard to distinguish for such as we are, are still distinguish- 
able; thus the goose (hamOj for a domestic animal must be 
meant here) is able to distinguish water and milk when they 
are mixed (p. 799, 3). " There does not exist an individual 
**soul different from Brahman, distinguishable from the Existent 
^'like a drop of water from a body of water; but the Existent 
''itself is, in consequence of the connection with the Upädhis, 
"termed individual soul in a metaphorical sense, as we have 
* often set forth; and therefore the matter stands thus: the 

362 Third Part: Psychology or the Doctrine of the SouL 

** action of a giyen individaal soul extends so far as the con* 
^nection with a given Upädhi['Comf\ei] exists, and where 
^another Upädhi is present, we have the action of another 
"individual soul; but one and the same Upädhi is in deep 
"sleep and the waking state in the position of the seed and 
"the plant; therefore it is the same soul which wakes np 
" again." 

— If in the course of these discussions it appears occasioc- 
ally as if the exoteric theory could not be maintained through- 
out in the doctrine of deep sleep, the last remark shows that 
it is not so. The union with Brahman in deep sleep and 
death and at the destruction of the world is in every case 
merely apparent, for the individualities continue to exis; 
potentially and arise again from their seed unchanged; and 
this is at the bottom synonymous with a real contiBned 
existence of the soul. 

3. Swooning. 
Sutram 8, 2, 10. 

Besides the states of waking, dreaming, deep sleep, an: 
death there is a special state, which is different from all. aL 
intermediate condition between several of them, namely swoon- 
ing (p. 799, 12). It is in the first place not the waking state: 
for in it the senses no longer perceive the objects. True th^» 
arrow maker perceives nothing beyond his work when he :s 
buried in it; but he has all the same consciousness and contn<. 
over his body, both of which are absent in the fainting perso:: 
(p. 800, 7. 11). Further swooning is not dream-sleep on accouLt 
of the accompanying unconsciousness, and not death becaoK 
it is distinguished from it by bodily warmth and breath. That 
is why people look for warmth in the region of the heart, ari 
breath in the nostrils to find out whether anyone is dead or 
only fainting; if both are absent people say he is dead asi 
fetch wood to bum the body; if on the other hand warmth 
and breath are still present, he is cared for in order to restore 
him to consciousness (p. 800, 13). By his coming to himtel: 
again we see that he was not dead: for from Jamais realm 

XXVni. Special States of the Soul. 353 

no return is possible [though Naciketas in the Eathaka^Upa- 
nishad, like Er^ the Armenian, in Plato Rep. 10, 13 p. 614£, 
gains information as to the Beyond bj sojourning in the king- 
dom of the dead]. Finally swooning is not deep sleep either; 
for while fainting is characterised by interrupted breathing, 
trembling of the body, a frightful expression on his face, and 
widely opened eyes, a person in deep sleep has a peaceful 
expression; he draws his breath regularly, and has his eyes 
closed, and his body does not tremble; moreoyer he is waked 
by merely stroking him with the hand, while not even blows 
with a hanuner can rouse a fainting person. [Perhaps from 
obserrations during torture]. The causes of the two pheno- 
mena are different also; in the one case the blows of a club 
and the likä produce it, in the other simple weariness (p. 801, 10). 
Therefore swooning is half deep sleep, not in the sense that 
it is a half union with Brahman, but in so far as it is inter- 
mediate between deep sleep and death. It is a gate of death 
(p. 802, 9): ^if there remain works [that still haye to be atoned 
^for] speech and consciousness return; if nothing remains 
** breath and warmth depart" 

4. Metaphysical Significance of Death. 

This last assertion is of importance because it shows how 
the strict predestination that goyems life also controls its ter- 
mination. The whole empirical reality is, as we know, nothing 
more Üisai kriya-karakorphalam ^the requital of works on the 
doer," and the whole bodily existence is kärya-karana-sanghäta 
^a complex of the organs of work" intended to produce that 
requital in the form of action and suffering. True the poss- 
ibility is not excluded, that the works of a single existence 
haye to be atoned for in seyeral succeeding existences (c£ 
p. 1129, 11 translated aboye p. 112); and in souls bom as 
plants such an assumption is unayoidable; for the rest howeyer 
the yiew is that life both in quality and quantity is in respect 
of the works of the preyious existence an atonement exactly 
measured and completely fulfilling its aim. The atonement is 

brought about by bhoktritvam and kartritvam (the states of 


364 Third Part: Psychology or the Doctrine of the SooL 

enjoyer and agent); the latter condition has as its unavoidAble 
result works which have to be atoned for again in a following 
existence, so that the clockwork of atonement in rmming down 
always winds itself up again; and this goes on for ever, — un- 
less perfect knowledge is gained which, as will be seen, does 
not depend on merit; it makes its appearance independently 
to dissolve the existence in its innermost essence, to consume 
the seed of works and thus for all time make a continoation 
of transmigration impossible. On the other hand, knowledge 
cannot put an end to the present existence because this is 
conditioned by the works of an earlier birth, whose seed has 
already germinated and cannot therefore be consumed bu: 
demands its full retribution. So long as a balance of works 
remains from a preyious existence, death cannot occur; if thej 
are however exhausted, life must go out, like a lamp when 
the oil is burnt up, — and lead the Ignorant on fiuicifiilij 
elaborated ways to a retribution in the Beyond, and then 
back to new forms of 'existence; while the sages who possess 
the higher knowledge are immediately swallowed up in identitj 
with Brahman, and those who possess the lower knowledge 
indirectly by the Devayana or way of the Gods. 

It only remains for us to examine the Eschatology of our 
system, to follow the soul on its wanderings after death and 
to consider the two possible ways of its entrance into Brahnuin. 







XXIX, The Eschatology of the Vedanta, 

1. The main Phases of Indian Eschatology. 

Ih general we can distinguish three stages of development 
in the views of the Indians as to the condition of the Soul 
after death. 

1. The oldest view, that which prevails in the hymns of 
the lUgveda, knows as yet of no transmigration of the soul. 
The sonls of the good pass after death into Yama's heaven 
of light where they lead a blissful life in the company of the 
Fathers (pitardh);^^^ the wicked are shut out from it and 
pass (according to a less definite and perhaps already second- 
ary view) into the ^nether darkness." ^^^ A return either of 
the former or of the latter to a new earth-life does not occur. 

2. According to the doctrine of transmigration in the 
Upanishads, as we shall become more closely acquainted with 
it in the next chapter, there are three Paths. The Wise, 
after death, will be carried ever higher and higher upon the 
Devaydna (sc panthä) that is the ''Path of the Gods," on- 

t» l^gT. 10, 14, 10: athd pitfint tuvidaträn upehi, 

Yamena yt iadhamädam madantL 
eompare St. Matthew's Gospel viii, 11: itoXXol inh dvaToXwv xal &ua|jiwv 
^lvj9\ xal dvaxXi^^oovTot (j^exd 'Aßpod^i. xal 'loadx xal 'laxuß iv t^ ßaot- 
X(ia T«0v oOpavdiv. — 26, 29 : ou (iifj icio dicdpTi ix toOtou toO f •v'^H-atoc t9j( 
i^k-xiXo'jf £oi( tijc T)|i.ipa( ixeCvrjc, ^Tav aüxb sCvoi |jit^' U|x.dftv xouviv iv x{ 
^3oiXe{a To5 i:aTp6; |i.ou. 

i>« Rigv. 10, 152, 4: yo a8mdn abhidäsatif adharam gamayd taimah. 
Atharvav. 9, 2, 4: nudatva Säma, pranudatva Kama; 

avartim (the downward way) yaniu, nutma ye iapatnäh; 
te$häm nuttänäm adhamä tamätoi 
Agne vä$tQm [amft-jntniaAa tvam! 

358 Fourth Part: Samsara or the Transmigration of the SonL 

wards into Brahman, whence there is no return. The doen 
of works go upwards by the Pitriyäna, the ^Tath of the 
Fathers," into the luminous realm on the moon, enjoy there the 
fruit of their works and then descend once more into a new 
incarnation, differing according to the moral character of the 
preyious life. Finally, those who possess neither knowledge 
nor works come to the ^ third place," that is, they are reborn 
as lower animals or [Käth. 6, 7] plants, without haying tasted 
bliss on the moon. 

3. According to the esoteric Yedänta doctrine, which al- 
ready finds expression in the Upanishads, the soul is identical 
with Brahman and the entire existence of the manifold world 
is an illusion. For him who sees through this iUnsion, there 
is neither a migration of the soul nor an entering into Brah- 
man, but " Brahman is he, and into Brahman he is resolved,*' 
as is said in Brih. 4, 4, 6 (translated above p. 194) ; compare 
with this, as also with what follows, the section of Qankara*8 
Commentary, p. 1132—1133, translated under the title of 
*^ Esoteric Eschatology" above p. 114 ff. 

2. Exoteric and Esoteric Eschatology. 

Our system is a combination of all the three views just 
stated. It retains, from the first stage of development« the 
doctrine of reward and punishment in the Beyond and unites 
this with the second theory in such a way as to assume a 
double retribution for the good and the evil: the one after 
death in the Beyond, the other through a descent to new in- 
carnation following thereon and through the particular form 
of that incarnation. Opposed to the transmigration of the 
IHtriyäna is the liberation of the Devayäna; but both, the 
Path of the Fathers and the Path of the Gods, are valid only 
in the exoteric, lower knowledge. Only for him, to whom this 
whole world still appears as real, can the two Paths into the 
Beyond be real too: the Pitriyäna, which leads back again 
to earth-life, and the Devayäna, which, as reward for the 
lower exoteric knowledge and the accompanying worship (upd- 
$anä) of the lower (aparamy sagunam) Brahman, leads the soul 

XXIX. The Esehfttology of the Vedlnta. 359 

to him. In contradiction with the chief passage in the Upa- 
nishads on transmigration, the system regards this liberation 
attained through the Devayana as being not yet complete. It 
becomes so only when those, who throagh the lower knowledge 
have entered into the sagwiam brafima, there obtain perfect 
knowledge, the samyagdarganam. For only the latter, that is 
the knowledge of the identity of one's own Soul with Brahman, 
brings about absolute liberation, or rather is in itself already 
that liberation: hence, as soon as that knowledge dawns, eren 
here on earth, liberation is accomplished and the persistence 
of corporeality till death is only an illusion of the senses, 
which when once true knowledge is attained, can no longer 
deceive us, even though we are unable to remove its appear- 
ance. — Thus a man suffering from a disease of the eyes sees 
the moon double and cannot prevent himself from doing so; 
but he knows that there is really only one moon there. 

3. No Transmigration from the Esoteric Standpoint. 

From what has been said it is clear that, in the Theory 
of Liberation to which our last part will be devoted, we shall 
again meet with the twofold doctrine that we have followed 
out in detail as the lower and higher knowledge in Theology, 
and as the empirical and metaphysical standpoint in Cosmo- 
logy and Psychology; while in the present part, on the con- 
trary, which deals with transmigration we shall encounter only 
the lower, exoteric, not the higher, esoteric doctrine which 
puts precisely in the place of this pilgrimage of the soul, the 
knowledge of the soul's identity with Brahman, through which 
liberation is gained at once, so that from the standpoint of 
the higher knowledge there can be no question of anything 
like transmigration. Accordingly the reality of the Sattmii'a 
stands or falls with the empirical reality of the world: as the 
latter is a mere illusion, so also are the ideas as to the former 
not so much, as with Plato, elxoxe; {jlu&oi, but rather a con- 
tinuation of that illusion into the domain of transcendent; the 
question remains open however how far our author's mind, 
deeply embued as it was with belief in transmigration accord- 






/ Fourth Part: Samsara or the Transmigration of the Sonl. 

«o the general views of his people, reached a clear, scien- 
— consciousness of the mythical character of this doctrine 
of transmigration. It is true that he declares often enougL 
that neither the world, nor the individual wandering soul in 
truth exists; but this did not prevent him, as we have seen, 
from putting forward a detailed theory of world-creation; and 
with the same earnestness he treats of the doctrine of 8am- 
9SLra^ according to the Yedic revelation and in close connection 
with those passages of the Upanishads which treat of trans- 
migration; amongst which we must specially single oat the 
Pancägnividyä from BriL 6, 2 and Chand. 6, 3 — 10; then the 
Paryankavidya in Kaush. 1; together with the Upakosalavidyä. 
Chand. 4, 10 — 15 (translated above p. 164 ff.), the Ddharavidyd. 
Chand. 8, 1—6 (above p. 168 ff.); further Käth. 5, 7, Pragna 5 
(above p. 198 ff.), and other passages. 

These and other passages we shall make use of according 
to the requirements of our present task; one only among them 
need be placed before the reader in extenso, because not only 
is it the most extensive monument from Yedic times of the 
doctrine which more than any other has dominated the entire 
thought of the Indians, but also because it underlies in general 
as well as in particular all the explanations of Badar&yana 
and Qankara in this and our last part: this is the Panca^Ufffii- 
vidydy that is ''the Doctrine of the Five Fires," which is found 
in Brih. 6, 2 and Chand. 5, 3 — 10 in two recensions, which 
generally agree verbally, and yet again diverge materially from 
each other. Moreover, Brih. is simpler, more beautiful, more 
ancient, Chand. smoother, more modem, more detailed towards 
the end, so that the two stand to each other very much in 
the same relation as the many parallel passages in the Grospels 
according to St. Matthew and St. Liike. The additiona in 
Chand. are such that, as we shall see, a further development 
of the doctrine is recognizable in them. For this reason and 
because our Yedanta authors take their stand chiefly on Ch&nd^ 
we shall take that version as our basis and make use of B|ih. 
only when the latter is of special interest 

XXX. The Vedic Doctrine of the Five Fires. 

Chftndogya-Up. 5, 3—10 (Brihadannyaka-Up. 6, 2). 

1. Introduction. 

QvetaketUy the son of Änmi (cf. abore p. 262), comes to 
the assembly of the I^incälas. There king Fravähanay son of 
Jibalc^ asks him five questions: 

1. ^Knowest thou whither the creatures go from hence?" 

2. ''Knowest thou how they return hither again?" 

3. ^Knowest thou the parting of the two ways, the Path 
of the Gods and the Path of the Fathers?" 

4. ^'Knowest thou why that world does not become full?" 
6. '^Knowest thou how at the fifth offering the waters 

speak with human voice?" 
To all these questions Qvdaketu knows no answer. Downcast, 
he comes to his father and complains that he has been in- 
adequately taught by him. The latter declares that he him- 
self is unable to answer the questions asked. Both then set 
out and come to the king who grants Äruni a boon. As this 
boon Äruni chooses the solution of the questions asked, and 
after some resistance the king consents to impart the follow- 
ing instructions to him and says he is the first Brahman who 
had received them (cf. above p. 18). 

2. The Five Sacrificial Offeringf . 

As in the sacrifice the offerings are thrown into the fire 
to come forth from it again in a spiritualised form, so too 
the fire, wherein the corpse is burnt, is a sacrificial fire, 
through which man passes to come forth out of it again '^in 
a luminous form" (Brih.). This conception of the rising from 

362 Fourth Part: Samaara or the Transmigration of the SooL 

the body as an offering, is also applied by the section under 
discussion to the descent of the soul into the body from the 
Beyond: this descent is a passing through five transformations, 
which are spoken of as five successive sacrificial acts and are 
described in detail. 

The first sacrificial fire, through which man passes, is the 
other world; its elements (fuel, smoke, flame, coals, spaife 
are the sun, its rays, the day, the moon, and the stars. In 
this fire the Gods offer Faith, and from this offering goes 
forth King Soma. 

The second sacrificial fire, consisting of wind, Tapour. 
thunderbolt, and hail, is Parjanya, that is, here: the storm 
cloud; in this fire the Gods offer king Soma, and from this 
offering goes forth Rain. 

The third sacrificial fire, consisting of the year (that is 
time), space, night, and the cardinal points is the Earth 
(Brih.: this world) ; in this fire the Gods offer rain, and from 
this offering goes forth Food. 

The fourth sacrificial fire, consisting of speech, breatL 
tongue, eye, ear, is Man; in this fire the Gods offer Food, 
and from this offering goes forth the Seed. 

The fifth sacrificial fire, consisting of the generative organs 
and functions of woman, is Woman; in this fire the Gods 
offer the seed, and from this offering goes forth the Embryo. 

^ Thus it happens that at the fifth offering the waters [one 
^'may understand by this either the subtle body or the 
»moral character; of this, later] speak with human voice. 
^Then when this embryo, surrounded by its chorion, has laic 
"for ten months or however long it may be, in the womb, it 
» is bom. After it is born, it lives as long as may be. Theo 
"when it dies, it is borne away to its destination in the fire, 
"even thither whence it came, whence it arose." 

3. The Path of the God (devayana), 

" Those now who know this, and those others who practise 

"faith and penance (Brih.: Truth) in the forest, enter into iLc 

"flame, [of the funeral pyre] from the flame into the day, from 

" the day into the light half of the month, from the light half 

XXX. The Vodic Doetrino of the Five Fires. 363 

**of the month into the summer months [literally: into the six 
^months in which the sun journeys northwards], from the 
^months into the year, from the year into the sun (Bjih.: the 
^ world of the Gods), from the sun into the moon, from the 
**moon into the lightning — there indeed is a man, who is not 
^as a human being, he leads them to Brahman." (Addition 
in Brih.: ** there in the world of Brahman they dwell far, far 
«*away. For such there is no return,") 
" This is the Path of the Gods." 

4. The Path of the Fathers (pitrii^äna). 
''On the other hand, those who [only] practise sacrifices, 
^ pious deeds, and alms-giying in the village (Brih.: who 
"^through offerings, alms, and penance gain heaven), these 
*^ enter into the smoke [of the funeral pyre], from the smoke 
*^into the night, from the night into the other [dark] half of 
"the month, from the other half of the month into the six 
** winter months [literally: the six months, in which the sun 
''journeys southwards]; these do not reach the year, but pass 
''from the months into the world of the Fathers, from the 
"world of the Fathers into the Akaga, from the Akä^a into 
"the moon, who is King Soma, therefore he is the sustenance 
"of the Gods, him the Gods enjoy." (Otherwise Brih.: "When 
^they have attained to the moon, they become food; in that 
"place, just as one enjoys King Soma with the words: 'swell 
"*up and shrink,'* 2ft so also are they enjoyed by the Gods.") 

1'* 1. The Soma-plant is placed in water which makes it swell; then 
it is pressed, which makes it shrink and the Soma-drink trickles out — 
2. To this earthly Soma corresponds as a heavenly Soma the moon, which 
decreases when the Gods drink it, and then increases ag^ain; Kigv. 10, 
85, 5: yat tvä^ deva^ prapibanti, tatd' äpyäyau punafi. — 3. The increase 
and decrease of the moon is however on the other side conditioned hy 
the rising of the dead to the moon, where they enjoy the fruit of their 
works, and their subsequent re-descent to a new life upon earth. — 4. A 
combination of these ideas gives us the concept, that the dead, in virtue 
of their works, rise to the moon, where they, that is, their works, are 
enjoyed by the Gods (according to Atharva-V. 3, 29, 1, the Gods take 
^y Vis ^^ ^^ works as tribute), until they are consumed. The being* 
enjoyed by the Gods is on the other hand an enjoying of the fruit of 

364 Fourth Part: Samsära or the Tranimigration of the SonL 

"' — After they have dwelt there, so long as anj residnnm is 
^left, they return by the way they came, back again into the 
^Äkäga, from the Aka^a into the wind; after they hare be- 
^ come wind, they become smoke, after becoming smoke, yapoor. 
^ after becoming vapour, cloud, after becoming cloud, thej 
"descend as rain; these same are bom here below as rice 
"and barley, as herbs and trees, as sesame and beans. ThcQcc 
"truly it is more difficult to escape; for only the man who 
"eats him as food, who emits him as seed, only his increase 
"(descendant) does he become. — (The following down to the 
"end only in Chänd.) Now those whose conduct here was 
"fair, for them there is the prospect that they will come into 
"a fair womb, the womb of a Brahman, or a Kshatriya or a 
"Vaigya; — those, however, whose conduct here was foul, for 
"them there is the prospect that they will come into a fool 
"womb, a dog's womb, a swine's womb, or (even) into the womb 
"of a Ca^daia," 

5. The third Place. 
(Ghandogya-Up.) (Brihadaranyaka-Up.) 

"But upon neither of these "But those who know not 

"two ways are to be found "these two paths, those are 
"those minute, ever-returning "the worms, birds, and wh:it- 
" beings, who originate and pass " soever bites." 
" away, as quickly as one says 
"it bites. This is the third 
" place. — 

" Therefore that world 
"grows not full." 

6. Epilogue (only in Chandogya-Up.). 

"Therefore should one beware! — On this there is this 

works on the part of the dead; just at, when a man enjoys a woaao, m 
the woman on her side enjoys the man (Qafik. on Chand. p. 848» 10). Tfas 
person and his works melt into one another in these fancies; mora of 
this, later. 

X2X The Yedie Doctrine of the Five Firea. 366 

^The thief of gold mnd drinker of strong drinks, 

''The slayer of a Brahman, and he who defiles his teacher's hed, 

"These four perish and fifthly he who goes with them." 

**But on the other hand, he who thus knows these five fires, 
^ he Terily consorts not with them and is not stained with their 
''eTÜ, but remains pure and unspotted in the world of the 
"pore, he who knows this, who knows this." — 

7. On the two Recensions of the Doctrine of the Five Fires. 

The difference between these two passages cited from Brih. 
and Ch&nd. is, in spite of all verbal agreement, very consider- 
able. Penance (tapas) according to Brih. does not liberate 
but according to Chand. it does liberate; further the whole 
system of the three paths after death is essentially modified 
and much confused by the additions in Chand.; — their con- 
fusion is increased in the Yedänta-sütras since they go back 
generally to Chand., but also to Brih., so that it is hardly 
possible to obtain a uniform and consistent yiew. 

The conception in Brih. is perfectly clear: the wise by 
the Devaydna enter into liberation, the performers of pious 
works rise on the Pitriydna to the moon, and thence des- 
cend, as it seems, only into human bodies. Those who possess 
neither knowledge nor works are shut out from both paths 
and enter as punishment into the bodies of animals. 

It is otherwise in Chand. ; here too the Path of the Fathers 
according to the opening words, is destined for those who 
hare practised pious works. But this determination is quite 
lost sight of in the addition at the end, which distinguishes, 
among those who return upon the FUriyana, between those 
of fair conduct and those of foul conduct and accordingly 
destines the former to life in one of the three higher castes 
and the latter either to animal life or to existence in a lower 
caste. Through this "the third place" properly becomes super- 
fluous and is left to low and short lived animals, which ac- 
cordingly, as it seems, remain entirely shut out from ascent 
and descent in the transformation of the soul, quite contrary 
to the drift of the Yedanta system. — It is a further incon- 
sistency, that Chand. recognises both reward and punishment 

366 Fourth Fart: Samsära or the Transmigration of the SooL 

for those who go by the Pitriyäna on their return to earth« 
life, but in the Beyond on the contrary reward only; this in- 
consistency our system removes by inserting, as contrast u 
the reward on the moon, the pains of hell in the Beyond also. 
How it further finds a way through the contradictions of iU 
Vedic sources, we shall see further on. 

We turn now to an examination of the single phases of 
transmigration; and in this we shall give the remaining Vedic 
texts in their proper places, assuming on the other hand that 
the main passage translated in the present chapter is alwajs 
present in the reader's mind. 

XXXI. The Passinp^ of the Soul from the Body. 

Siitrai 4, 2, 1-11. 17. 3, 1, 1—7. 

1. The Yedic Basis. 

Thb doctrine of the passing of the soul, which is the same 
for all, except those who possess the Samyagdarganam^ (that 
is, for the ignorant and for the worshippers of Brahman 
possessed of attributes, who follow the lower knowledge), bases 
itself partly on the conceptions contained in the preyious 
chapter of the Waters, which speak with human voice in the 
fifth offering, and of Faith, which the Gods offer in the first 
sacrificial fire^ partly on the following passage from Chand. 
6. 8, 6 (translated with the context above p. 264): 

^ When now, dear one, man departs hence, speech 
^enters into Manas, Manas into life, life into heat, 
^heat into the highest God-head.'' 


2. The Involution of the Organs. 

Sutras 4, 2, 1—5. 

1. At death, according to the passage just quoted, speech 
first of all enters into Manas (p. 1087, 6); under speech here 
the remaining nine Indriyas (above p. 329) are included, for 
another passage says (Pra^na 3, 9): "therefore, when his 
"splendour is extinguished, he passes to rebirth together with 
'^his senses, which have entered into Manas" (p. 1089, 5). Are 
we now to understand by the senses, for example, speech, the 
sense itself or only its function (vritti) (p. 1087, 8)?— This 
question appears strange, after our author, as we saw above 
p. 332, has already stated p. 715, 10 that the organs (karanam) 

368 Fourth Part: Samsara or the Tranfmigratioii of the Soiil. 

are only functions (vritti), as indeed we can understand under 
the Indriyas, which depart hence with the soul, naturallj not 
the material organs, but only functions conceived as indepen- 
dently existent potencies. In this sense it is a matter of 
course that only the function (vritti) of the Indriyas enten 
(sampadyate) into Manas, while the bodily organ perishes with 
the body. The question here raised on the other hand« as is 
apparent from the way it is answered, must be understood in 
the sense that by vritti are not to be understood these fonctions 
themselves, but only their activity, and by their sampatH no: 
their entering into Manas, but their complete dissolution 
(pravHaya p. 1088, 1, upagama p. 1088, 4). Accordingly ve 
must interpret the question under discussion to be: whether 
at death the sense organ (the vritti^ according to p. 716, 10 
attached to the soul, when it enters (sampadyate) into Manai 
is, on this entering in, dissolved (sampadyate) only in its 
functional activity (vfitti) or in its very essence? The answer 
is that only the functional activity, not the Indriyam perishes 
(väg-vrittir manasi sampadyate p. 1088, 1), in the first place, 
because otherwise complete non-separateness (avibhäga) would 
ensue, and the condition of non-separateness, according to 
4, 2, 16, belongs only to the liberated and not to othen 
(p. 1088, 5); again, because the perception which shows hov 
the activity of the senses dies out at death, while that of 
Manas (consciousness) persists for some time longer, only gives 
us the right to speak of an extinction of the functional activitT. 
not of that of the agent (p. 1088, 10); finally, because a thins, 
according to its essence, can only enter into that from which 
it arose, as a pot into clay, but according to its functio&il 
activity, it can enter into something else, as for instance the 
functional activity of fire springs from fiiel and is extinguished 
in water, although both are different from it (p* 1088, 14). K 
notwithstanding, the passage says that speech enters into 
Manas, this depends on usage (upaoära), which does not dis- 
tinguish between the action and the agent (p. 1089, 3). — ^Tbe 
ambiguity displayed by the author in the use of these expressions 
vritti and sampadyate is to us unintelligible« 

XXXI. The Passing of the Soul from the Body. 369 

2. The second act at death, according to Chänd. 6, 8, 6, is 

that Manas enters into Pram (as the principle of unconscious 

life, above p. 333 ff.). Here the same question repeats itself 

One might think that Manas as an organ enters into Pra^a, 

because it is said, in Chand. 6, 6, 6 (above p. 263), that Manas 

is formed from food, and Präna from water, while again it is 

said (above p. 235) that food, that is, the earth, arose from 

water (p. 1090, 4). Bat here too it seems rather to be the 

fact that only the function (functional activity) of Manas is 

to be understood as entering (dissolving into) Prä^a; for it is 

only the function of Manas that we can observe coming to 

rest (p. 1090, 9) in Prä9a in one who falls asleep and in one 

desirous of liberation (c£ Käth. 3, 13); and again we cannot 

conclude from the mediate (pranälika, found only here as adj.) 

arising of Manas from Praua that the former must re-enter 

into the latter, since otherwise it would also follow that Manas 

must dissolve itself in food, food in water, and Prapa in water 

(p. 1090, 13). Here too therefore we must understand by 

Manas only its functional activity, not the agent, since usage 

does not distinguish between them (p. 1091, 1). 

3. When further it is said in Chand. 6, 8, 6 that Prä9a 

merges into heat (^os), we must note that, in the first place, 

it enters not into heat but into the overseer (adhyaksha) by 

which is to be understood ^the overseer of the- cage of the 

^'body and the organs," that is, the individual soul (jiva) 

(p. 1091, 6); the latter (jiva) is defined on this occasion as 

''self of knowledge endowed with the limitations (upadhi) of 

"knowledge, works and previous experience" (p. 1091, 9), by 

which, as we shall show immediately, the moral character is 

to be understood. With the latter the soul seems to be more 

closely united than with its organs ; for while these must first 

enter into it, the moral character clings to the soul of itself. — 

Even though in the successive stages of the entering in the 

fundamental passage Chand. 6, 8, 6, does not mention the 

individual soul, yet its insertion between Präna and Tejas 

is justified by another scriptural passage (Brih. 4, 3, 38, 

translated above p. 192) in which it is said that at death 

all the Pr&uas enter into the soul, and that, when the latter 


370 Fonrth Fart: Samsara or the Transmigration of the SooL 

departs, life and with it all the organs of life,^^* depart wid 
it (p. 1091, 12). 

4. Onlj after the Prapas hare entered into the soul vhicii 
is accompanied hj the moral character, does the soul enter 
with them into heat, by which here, as will shortly be farther 
shown, are to be understood the other elements also, as well 
as heat (tejas), in that sublimated form, in which they con- 
stitute the seed of the body (p. 1092, 2). This absorption of 
the Prapas into the soul, of the soul into heat, does not con- 
tradict the words of the fundamental passage, according to 
which the Prä];Las enter into heat; for if a man goes free: 
Qrughna to MaOmrä and from Mathurä to I^taliputram, he 
has thereby gone from Qnighna to Pataliputram (p. 1093, 2- 

3. The subtle Body. 

Sutra« 4, 2, 6—11. 3, 1, 1-6; of. 1, 4, 1—7. 

The soul with the organs of conscious and unconscious life 
(Indriyas, Manas, Pram) which have entered into it, farther 
needs in order to be able to withdraw from the body a Tehicie 
(ägraj/a) of material nature, since without such, withoot i 
material basis, as experience shows, nothing liring can more 
or stand (p. 744, 9). This basis is the subtle body, sükdiwuim 
fartram (p. 341, 3. 1097, 14), or, as Qankara usually para- 
phrases it: deha-vijäni bhüta-sükshmäni (p. 740, 8. 741, 3. 744.3: 
cf. 1095, 10. 1092, 10), that is, ""the fine parts of the elemesu 
"which form the seed of the body.""' In order hereafter 

1» That the soul takes the Pranas with it depends on the fact ;h»t 
without them the soul can neither move nor enjoy in the life after dctu 
(p. 745, 5); therefore when it is said (Brih. 3, 2, 13) that the Pranss »t 
death go to the Qods, the eye to the sun, the breath to the wind, ete^ 
this is only a metaphorical {bhäktai ffauna) expression (p. 745, 1), wbivb 
means that at death the Gods withdraw (p. 745, 8) their atsiitance froa 
the organs (above p. 337 Q\). 

127 Cf. bhüta-sükahmam 206, 1. 207, 1. 341, 6. (plur.) 743, 1; and hkAta- 
mäträh 740, 13. 14; the expression tanmäträni is, so far as we know, do: 
yet to be found in ^aflkara^s Commentary. — These fine parts of ^ 
elements, which form the seed of the body, are of like nature with t^ 
seed from which the world after its destruction comes forth anew esc^ 

XXXI. The Passing of the Soul from tlie Body. 371 

to attain a body consisting of the different elements, the soul 
must take with it the seed of this body, and this seed, not of 
heat alone, but of all the elements, is to be imderstood, when 
in the fundamental passage, Chand. 6, 8, 6, it is said: Life 
enters into heat. For the scripture says (Brih. 4, 4, 5): "(this 
^sool is) of the nature of earth, water, air, ether, heat" 
(p. 1093, 12), and the Smriti (Manu 1, 27) declares: 

''The infinitely minute parts of the Five, 
''From which arises all in order.** 

Now these elementary germs of the future body, embraced 
by which the soul leaves the body (p. 741, 3), are also to be 
imderstood in the explanations in 3, 1, 1 — 6 by the term 
waters, which according to the doctrine of the Five Fires 
speak with human voice at the fifth offering, after having been 
offered five times in succession, — as Faith, Soma, Rain, Food, 
and Seed,— by the Oods in the Fires of Heaven, the Atmo- 
sphere, the Earth, Man, and Woman (p. 741, 6). True, only 
water is there spoken of (p. 742, 11), but under that name 
the germs of all the elements are to be understood (p. 744, 2) 
and these are called water, first, because according to p. 240 
above water contains in itself (p. 743, 4) all elements (of which 
here, following Chand. 6, 2, three only are named; on this see 
p. 231 above), then because in the body, which likewise con- 
sists of them all (above p. 240ff.), water preponderates (p. 743, 9). 

These waters then, representing the totality of the element- 
ary germs, are thus what forms the bridge from one human 
existence to another by being offered successively as Faith, 
Soma, Rain, Food, and Seed. The description of the last four 
as water is readily explained from the preponderance of the 
water element in these materials (p. 746, 1); but by faith, 

time (above p. 70. 228); they are both regarded as being alluded to by 
the avyaktam of Eath. 3, 11 and the aksharam of Mund. 2, 1, 2; p. 341, 12 
jagad idam anabhivyakta - ndmarupam, vija'dtmakam, prdg-avoitham 
avyakta-fobda-arham—ttad-atmand ea gariroiya (that is, of the subtle 
tody) opt avyakta-gabda-arhatvam; and p. 2<)6, 1: the tUcsharam is avy- 
ikritam, ndmarHpa-vijagakti-rHpam bhütasükshmamt tcvara-ägragam (the 
material substratum in the creation of the world), ta8$/a eva upddhi'bkii- 
tarn (only an Upadhi of the Igvara, not a pradkdnam inde{>ettdent of him). 


372 Fourth Fart: Samtlra or the Transmigration of the SoqL 

which appears as the sacrificial element in the first offerw 
the same waters are equally to be understood (p. 746, 6), firvt 
because only in that way can question and answer harmonise 
with each other (p. 746, 10), then, because the first offerinf . 
being the cause of the subsequent ones as its e£fects, cannot 
be essentially different in nature from them (p. 746, 13). '^ Farther 
**it is not possible, in so far as Faith, being an idea (pratyai/a'. 
^'is a quality of Manas or the soul, to tear it away from the 
"substance in which it inheres, like the heart, etc. of a sach* 
"ficial victim, to use it as an offering. By the word * Faith* 
** therefore the waters are to be understood" (p. 747, 1 — 3). 
This designation corresponds to the usage of the Veda (Taitt 
saqih. 1 , 6, 8, 1 : (raddhä vS äpdh), and is explained by the 
fact, that the waters as seeds of the body assume a subtletj 
like that of faith (p. 747, 5), somewhat as one might call t 
hero of lion-like courage, a lion (p. 747, 6). — We shall see 
shortly, how our author brings himself into palpable contra- 
diction with this express explanation of "faith" as the element- 
ary seed of the body. 

This "subtle body," forming the seed of the body,— 
subtle, because it departs through the veins (p. 1097, 7) — has, 
according to its essential nature, on one hand extensioD 
(tanutvam) and so the capacity of locomotion (p. 1097, 8), cm 
the other, however, transparency (ßvacchatvam), in virtue of 
which it meets with no obstacle in departing and also is not 
seen by those standing round (p. 1097, 8). The bodily warmth 
proceeds from it (p. 1097, 14; otherwise Ch&nd. 3, 13, 8, trans- 
lated above p. 169); hence during life the body feels warm to 
the touch, after death on the contrary cold, while in other 
respects the body is yet unchanged (p. 1098, 1). Finally, it is 
owing to the subtle nature of this body, that it is not also in- 
jured when the (gross) body is injured : for example (p. 1097, lit 
by burning (by which we must naturally not think of the burn- 
ing of the corpse). 

Sütram 4, 2, 8: ^ Until the entratice, because of the dedar- 
atian as to Samsdra.^^ — Conmientary: "When further on io 
"the text (Chand. 6, 8, 6, above p. 367) it is said: «the hest 
"'enters into the highest Godhead,' this means that the 

XXXI. The Pasring of the Soul from the Body. 373 

^ aboYe-mentioned heat [meaning the subtle body] accompanied 
^ by the Onlooker, by Prä9a, and the host of the organs and 
'^ united with the other elements, enters at death into the 
*^ highest Godhead. But of what kind is this entrance? this 
''is to be considered. One might think it to be a final dis- 
** solution of the own being in the highest Godhead, from 
*^ which it came forth; for the origin of all existence, of all 
** that has become bodily is, as we hare established, the highest 
** Godhead; and thus also this entering into non-separateness 
'^ would be final — To this we reply: this subtle body formed 
"^out of heat, etc., as it is the bearer of the organs, ear, etc, 
^continues to exist until the entrance, until liberation from 
**Saip8&ra, as that liberation follows upon the perfect know« 
"" ledge; because of the declaraiion as to Samsära, as it is given 
"^ in the words (Eäth. 6, 7): 

''The one attains a mother's womh and takes a hnman form, 
"Another animates a plant, as deeds and knowledge fate.'* 

"* For otherwise mere dying would be for everyone a dissolution 
''of the Upadhis and a final entrance into Brahman; but then 
"the Canon of Law would be purposeless, and equally so the 
*" Canon of Knowledge. But bondage has its ground in false 
*' knowledge and can therefore be loosed in no other way than 
"by perfect knowledge. Hence, in spite of its origin from it, 
"this entrance of the soul there into the Existent, like that in 
«deep sleep and at the dissolution of the world, is such that 
"" a seed remains over and persists ^ (p. 1096, 3—1097, 3). 

— In reality this entrance into Brahman, retained for the 
sake of the Yedic texts, is a mere passing through Brahman, 
and not even that: for the system, as such, knows nothing of 
it, but makes the souls pass immediately after death either 
by the Pitfiyäna to the moon, or into hell, or finally by the 
Devayäna into the (lower) Brahman. 

Upon all these Paths the soul is accompanied by the subtle 
body: for the latter, as we saw, continues to exist as long as 
SatHsärOj but Satnsara has existed from Eternity (aboye 
p. 280) and endures until liberation, whence it follows that 
as the soul is clothed from all eternity with the organs (above 
p. 31 S) so also it is clothed with the subtle body and so it 

374 Fourth Part: Samsära or the Transmigration of the Soal. 

remains until it gains perfect knowledge, that is, esoteric 
knowledge. On the other hand, the exoteric knowledge, as it 
leads upwards into the lower Brahman by the Devayana^ does 
not free the soul from the subtle body. True, as this subtl« 
body is a support of the soul by the elements, this support is 
for the purpose of rebirth, but rebirth no longer takes pUce 
in one who has (exoteric) knowledge, since according to the 
scripture he attains immortality (which means that he is no 
longer subject to death, above pp. 149. 287), for these reasons 
one might think that only the Ignorance (p. 1094, 12) departs 
(clothed with the subtle body); but this is not so: rather i: 
is exactly the same in the case of the ignorant and of the 
possessor of (exoteric) knowledge except the difference of tfatr 
Paths which they respectively take; the ignorant passes with 
the subtle body to new embodiment, the (exoteric) knower 
passes on his own special path to immortality (p. 1095, 10 ; 
true, immortality in the full sense of the word is not the so- 
journ in a given place and thus requires no going thither and 
therefore no material substratum (p. 1095, 13); but the im- 
mortality of the (exoteric) knower, with which we are here 
concerned, is only relative (apekshika), since he has not jtt 
burned up all Ignorance; hence for it a going, and, in order 
that this may be possible, a subtle body as material vehicle. 
are required, as without it no going can occur (p. 1096, 1). 

4. Moral Determination of the transmigrating Soul. 

(a) Prefatory Remark. 

All the Upadhis hitherto discussed, clothed with which the 
soul departs (namely, indrlyäni, manasy mukhya prima, «m* 
Jcshmam gariram), are purely neutral, not individually determined 
principles, and the soul itself is the same, as, according to 
its nature, it is identical with Brahman and is only apparent- 
ly different from him through its being clothed with the said 
Upadhis. Thus the soul with all its organs is entirely neutral, 
bearing in itself no moral distinction, — quite consistently with 
the Indian and, indeed, with every other standpoint, which 
like it, places the essential nature of the soul in Knowing 
not in Willing. 

XXXI. The Fusing of the Sonl from the Body. 375 

But whence then the moral determinations, which con» 
dition the differences of character, the differences of Paths 
in the Beyond, the contrast of reward and punishment in the 
other world, and the form of the suhsequent rebirth in thin 
world? — 

We must assume for the departing soul, besides the just 
described elementary substratum (bhüta-ägraya) a second, vis. 
a moral substratum (karma-ägrayä), and these two are ex- 
pressly distinguished by Qankara (p. 1094, 5) under these 

Now in what does this moral substratum consist, which 
conditions all differences of character and of destiny? 

Liike all moral points, this important question is very in- 
adequately dealt with by Qankara (for reasons indicated above 
p. 59), and all that we find about it consists in occasional 
references to certain passages of'^ scripture, which therefore we 
are to follow, according to the intentions of our author. 

(h) The Karma-äfrajfo. 
Sütram 4, 2, 6, p. 1094. 

In Brih. 3, 2, 13, the son o{Ritäbhäga questions Täjnavalkya: 

^ ' Täjnavalkya,^ he said: 'when after a man dies his speech 
** 'enters into fire, his breath into the wind, his eye into the 
'^'SUD, his Manas into the moon, his ear into the cardinal 
^ ^points, his body into the earth, his Atman into the Aka^a, 
"* 'the hair on his body into plants, the hair on his head into 
'''trees, his blood and seed into water, — where then does the 
''•man remain?' — Then spake Täjnavalkya: *Take me, Artor- 
^^hhaga^ dear one, by the hand; upon this we two must speak 
*• 'alone together, not here in the assembly.'— Then the two 
"went out and conversed together; and what they spoke of, 
''that was work, and what they praised, that was work. — 
''Verily, through good work one becomes good, through evil 
"work, evil." 

''Then the son of Eitabhaga was silent'* 

Upon this remarkable passage, in which we seem to have 
the very birth of the doctrine of transmigration before our 
eyes, Qankara merely remarks (p. 1094, 6), that it only lays 

376 Foarth Fart: Samsära or the Transmigration of the Soal. 

stress upon works and does not thereby exclude the other, 
material-substratum of the soul, the hhüta-äfraya, that is, the 
subtle body, which is spoken of loc. cit The contradiction 
that the organs, according to this passage, enter into the 
forces of nature, while in our system the soul withdraws them 
into itself, he puts aside in the manner indicated in note 126. 
above p. 370. — In another respect the circumstance that besides 
the (ariram the ätman also (according to Qankara, it would 
be indeed the ätma-adhishthänatn hridayoräkägam) dissolyes. 
while the karman persists, is very remarkable, in its bearing 
on Buddhism. 

(c) Vidyä-karma-pürvapr^jHä. 
Sütram 3, 4, 11. 

Of the soul after death it is said in Brih. 4, 4, 2 (trans- 
lated above p. 193): ^then their knowledge and their works 
^and their newly gained experience take them by the hand«** 
— the last, as we read apürvaprajfiä and find here already 
the conception of the apürvam^ which will be further spoken 
of shortly. Qankara, indeed, reads (p. 740, 4. 1091, 9) puna- 
prajfiä, ^previous experience" (which in the Com. on Brit. 
p. 843, he understands as pürva-anubhüta'-vishayä prajnäj * the 
''consciousness of what has been experienced before^« The 
contrast between knowledge and works he explains 3, 4, 11 at 
first following the Sütram to mean that the former (those wb3 
go by the Devayäna) are taken by the hand by knowledge, 
the latter (those for whom the soul's transmigration continue^ 
by the Pitriyäna), are taken by the hand by works (p. 984, 4 : 
but then he remembers that here it is not yet a question of 
liberation (to which the Devayäna also leads), but only of 
Saipsära, and explains, in harmony with his commentary on 
Brih. 4, 4, 2 that the question is only one of knowledge con* 
ceming Samsära, that therefore by Vidyä is to be understood 
here ^^ ordained and forbidden knowledge" (Govinda cites as 
an example of the former the üdgUha^ of the latter no^jta- 
8trudarcanam)y as by karman the doing what is ordained anJ 
what is forbidden (p. 984, 9). By PürvaprajM in Brih. L c. 
he understands, as already observed, ''previous experience" 

XXXI. The PasBiDg of the Soul from the Body. 377 

and explains it as impressions (väsanä) which things leave 
behind in the soul, and upon which depend inborn gifts for 
artistic work (he gives as an example talent for painting) and 
perhaps also for moral conduct, ^28— the last if we may thus 
understand vishayorupabhogeshu and karmani (on Brih. p. 844, 
5. 7) where however this idea, so important for us, of an inborn 
determination of the moral character is only touched on 
casually, not distinctly developed. 

(d) The Äpürvam. 
StitrM 3, 2, 38—41. 3, 1, 6. 

In the endless chain of transmigration, every new life is 
conditioned in its doing and suffering by the works of the 
preceding life; these therefore bring about the changes in the 
soul's destiny, and these changes interpose as a new moment, 
as ^something which was not there before" (opftrvam), (although 
they too, consistently with the system, cf above p. 32S, are 
necessitated by the life preceding them). This conception of 
the Apürvam ^^^ belongs to the Karmamimänsä school and is 
for it the metaphysical link between work and its retribution, 
that which persists when work has passed away and its fruit 
has not yet appeared. The opinion of Jaimini is thus sum- 
marised on p. 841, 6 of our work: ^It is not possible that 
** previous work should bear within it the fruit as yet hidden 
'in the future, unless it causes a given Apürvam to proceed 
*'from itselt Therefore certain subtle persisting elements of 
''the work, or preparatory elements of its fruit, are termed 
^ Apürvam.^^ Now this conception of the Apürvam is disputed 

lis On Bfih. p. 844, 2^8: Drigyate ca kahäftcit käaucit kriyäsu citra- 
karma'ddi'lakikanäMU vinä eva ika-athyätena janmata^ eva kaufcUam; 
kasueid atyanta ' saukarya - yuktäsu apt akaugalam kethäneit; tatkä 
viskaya^upabhogeshu svabhävata' eva keshäfieit kaugala • akau^e 
'ingyeU; tae ea etat sarvam purvapre^fid-udl^va-anudbhava-nimittam. 
Tena pürvaprqjnayä vinä karmani vä phala-upabhoge vä na kasyacit 
pravriUir upapadyaie, 

13* Betides the pasiages cited shore we find the ÄpürtMim only on 
p. 1139, 5 (on p. 1020, 6 it occnn in its etymological meaning). On the 
nearly allied conception of the Adrisktam compare pp. 697, 4. 9. 697, 12. 
15. 696, 7. 699, a 7. 8. 703, 1. 2. 754, 10. 819, 10. 521, 2. %8, 8. 1074, 2. 




378 Fourth Fart: Samsära or the Transmigration of the Soal. 

by Qankara in the passage cited, in so far as the Vedanu 
places retribution in the hand of God (cf. on this point aboTe 
pp. 279, 323); the Äpürvam is something non-spiritaal and 
cannot therefore act without being moved hj something spiritual 
(p. 840, 2); hence the fruit cannot be explained by the mere 
Apürvam (p. 842, 1); "whether therein God has regard to tbe 
^action, or to the Äpürvam, in either cas^ the fruit comef 
"from Him" (p. 842, 2). 

We must not see in this passage an unconditional rejectioD 
of the Äpürvanij if we do not wish to place ourselves in contra- 
diction with 3, 1, 6, where the Apürvam makes its appearance 
directly as a well known and admitted conception, in order 
to explain the Faith which, according to the doctrine of the 
Five Fires, is offered in the first fire, and this indeed in quite 
another way than that which we have consid^ed in Chapter 
XXXI, 3, above p. 371. 

(e) The Qraddhd. 
Sutras 3, 1, 2. 5. 6. 

The explanation of Faith {graddha) given above p. 372 as 
'^the waters, as these represent the subtle parts of the elemect» 
"which form the seed of the body," appears indeed very forced: 
first, because, so far as we can see, the conception of the 
subtle body accompanying the soul, has as yet no existence 
whatever in Brih., Chänd. or any of the older Upanishads: 
then because the Indian graddha (just as, though wron^lj 
most probably, by Lactant. inst. 4, 28 the Latin rdigio) is 
etymologically traced back to the conception of knitting t<^ 
gether and means the link between man and the Beyond. th.:> 
appearing to require a moral explanation. Such an explanation 
is offered without forcing the meaning: for it is quite natun^^ 
to understand by graddha (which Qankara, on Pra^na, p. 950. 6 
defines as guhha-karjnorpravriiti-helu) in Brih. and Chani. 
loc. citf the works of man produced by faith, as they conditio:- 
his weal and woe in the Beyond ; and this very explanation is 
also offered by Qankara, whereby he brings himself into ir- 
reconcilable contradiction with himself. For after he has, oc 
p. 747, given the explanation of Faith, quoted above on p. 37:^. 

XXXI. The Pauing of the Sonl from the Body. 379 

as the Waters, meaning the subtle body, he then immediately 
on p. 747, 7ff. explains Faith as the Waters, rising upwards 
in the sacrifice, they are the bearers of the works conditioned 
by Faith; — thus in the one case they were the garment of the 
dead, here they are the moral treasure, which the still living 
performers of the sacrifice lay up for themselves in heaven: 
*^ thus the Waters consisting of the sacrificial libations wherein 
^^ inheres the work conditioned by faith, these waters in the 
*^ form of the Äpürvam clothe the souls which bring the sacri- 
^fice and lead them, to receive their reward, into the other 
^ world '^ (p. 748, 10); in the same manner Qankara explains 
^raddhäj p. 743, 16 as the karma-samavät/inyä^ äpas and again 
two lines afterwards as the dehorvijani bhüta-siikshmänL By 
this all the explanations in 3, 1, 1 — 6 are rendered very far 
from clear and the impression is produced not so much that 
they originated from two different hands, as rather that a 
single hand had endeavoured to preserve two mutually ir- 
reconcilable interpretations and work them up into an apparent 

5. The Path into the Beyond. 

Sutram 4, 2, 7. 

After the soul has drawn back into itself its perceptive 
powers, the organs, in the way just described, it then (accord- 
ing to Brih. 4, 4, 1) enters into the heart (in which, however, 
according to p. 311 above it already is); "thereupon the point of 
''the heart becomes luminous; from this, after it has become 
^ luminous, the soul departs, either through the eye, or through 
''the skull, or through other parts of the body" (Brih. 4, 4, 2, 
above p. 192 f.); up to the moment when the point of the heart 
becomes luminous and thereby lights up the way (p. 1 104, 9), 
everything is the same for the ignorant and for the (exoteric) 
knower; here, however, the way divides, in that the knowers 
depart through the head, the ignorant through other paits of 
the body (p. 1104, 10), for thus says the Scripture (Chand. 
8, 6, 6 — Eath.6, 16): 

380 Fourth Part : Saxnaara or the Tranimigration of the Soul. 

''One hundred and one are the veins of the heart, 
** Of these the one leads upward to the head, 
*'Who upward mounts hy that, has conquered death; 
"The others serve to lead the soul elsewhere.*' 

While the knower thus mounts by the lOlst vein ^'^ to tread 
the Path of the Oods, which, as the exoteric Path to Liiber- 
ation, will occupy us further in the following part, the others 
depart through other veins (p. 1106, 3). The further stages 
of the Pitriyänaj upon which Bädaräyana and Qankara give 
no further details, are according to the doctrine of the Five 
Fires, the following, in their order: (1) Smoke, while the 
Devayäna leads through Flame. Originally in both cases the 
smoke and flame of the funeral pyre seem to have been meant 
(although already in Chand. 4, 15, 5, translated above p. 166, 
the entrance into the arcis, ray or better flame, is made in- 
dependent of the performance of the funeral ceremony); in 
our work, which makes the departure of the soul occur, not 
on the burning, but already on the growing cold of the corpse 
(p. 402), Qankara explains the 'aflame" (arcis), as we shall se« 
here after, as ^the Godhead presiding over the flame,'' and 
in accordance with this, in the Commentaries on Brih. 1059. 11. 
Chand. p. 341, 13, "Smoke" is also taken to mean the God- 
head of the smoke. — The following stages also are referred to 
the Gods presiding over these phenomena: (2) Night, (3) the 
halves of the month wherein the moon decreases, 
(4) the halves of the years wherein the days decrease. 
We must here think of these not as phases of time, bat 
spatially as planes one above another, through which the 
soul mounts upward, in order to reach the following stages; 
these are: (5) the world of the Fathers, (6) (only Chlnd.) 
the Ether, (7) the Moon, upon which retribution takes 
place, subject to the limitations, of which we have now to treat 

^iiM ^m m I I II I ■ ■ - - .-L-l ■ — ~ 

uo This artery is caUed tuihumnd Maitri-Up. 6, 21 ; as also ia ike 
Commentaries on Brih. p. 877, 8, on Pra^na p. 190, 8, on Taitt p. 85, R 
on K&th. p. 167, 5 and in the gloss to Qafikara's Commentary on tks 
Brahmasutras p. 1104, 24. In the latter itself, on the other hand, we do 
not yet find this name hut in place of it paraphrases snch as tkat also 
employed on Chand. 529, 7. 568, 6. 570, 5,— : mCtrdkanyd nodi (e£ et* 
peeially p. 1105, 1). 

XXXII. The Destinies of the Soul in the Beyond. 

1. Contradictions of the Vedic Texts. 

1. According to Bph. 6, 2 those who have obtained know- 
ledge pass by the 2)et;a^ana into Brahman, the performers 
of works ascend by the I^riyäna to the moon and, haying 
receired their reward, descend, and become men (Brih. 6, 2, 16, 
p. 1062, 1); those who hare neither knowledge nor works 
become worms, birds and ''whatever bites;" by the last ex- 
pression seem originally to have been understood not Agnats 
and flies," as the scholiast has it, but, correspoding to the 
ascending scale indicated in the first-named classes of animals, 
higher, in particular perhaps fierce animals, or snakes etc. 

2. These plain and clear facts are entirely distorted in the 
parallel passage, Chänd. 6, 3 — 10, as was remarked above 
(Chap. XXX, 7), by an addition distinguishing, among those 
who return by the Pitriydna, between those of fair conduct 
who are reborn in one of the three higher castes, and those 
of foul conduct and who go into the bodies of animals or 
Ca^dalas. Thus on the one hand there arises the question, 
quite overlooked by Chftnd.: since reward upon the moon is 
the lot of those of fair conduct only, what is the fate in the 
other world of those whose conduct is foul? Moreover, if the 
wicked also go along the Pitriyäna, then the ''third place" 
(first so named by Chand.) becomes superfluous; and accord- 
ingly suppressing the words in Brih.: ''those who know not 
^ these two Paths," this ''third place" is abandoned to the lowest 
Animals, who quickly come into existence and as quickly perish, 
while the problem whether any transition between them and 
human existence is possible, remains undiscussed. 

382 Foarih Part: Sams&ra or the Tranamigration of the SoaL 

3. To increase the confusion, a passage from the 
taki-üp. 1, 2, is cited (p. 763, 2) which expressly says: ^all 
''who depart from this world, all go together to the mooo,"* 
and teaches a return thence to all kinds of human and animii 

4. This last difficulty our work gets rid of very easily, bj 
interpreting the passage of the Kaushitaki, without regard to 
its context, in the sense that only ''all who are called thereto 
^ (adhikritay^ are to be understood. The difficulty preyiouslj 
mentioned, however, is disposed of on the one hand by means 
of a passage dragged in from the Käthaka-Üpanishad (3, 6) 
in which, as a contrast to the reward of the good upon the 
moon, the pains of hell are added in the other world for the 
eyil, while on the other hand the ''third place" is pointed 
to as the place of punishment. These two are not, howeTer. 
connected by coordinating the pains of hell and the third 
place, but remain unconnected beside each other (p. 62, 7. tjo 
gives no help), so that it is difficult here to escape from the 
impression that different hands have worked at the Sutras as 
well as on the Commentary. 

To elucidate what has been said, we will lay before the 
reader the leading thoughts of the section which treats^ of the 
punishments of hell and the third place (3, 1, 12 — 21), in the 
sequence in which we find them in Qankara. 

2. The Punishments of HelL 

Do not those also, who have not performed sacrifice and 
other works, go to the moon (p. 762, 11)?— Since it is said in 
Kaush. 1, 2 that all go to the moon (p. 763, 2), and since the 
fivefold sacrifice through which the new body is attained, 
implies the going to the moon (p. 763, 4), one might think thit 
both, the performers of works and the non- performers, went 
to the moon, the latter however without enjoying reward 
(p. 763, 7). 

But that is not so. For the ascent to the moon ocean 
for the purpose of enjoyment, not without a purpose or merüj 
in order to re-descend, as one climbs a tree to pick its blossoms 

XXXII. The Destinies of the Soal in the Beyond. 383 

and fruits, not aimlessly or merely to fall down again (p. 763, 11). 
Now for those who do not perform works there is no enjoy- 
ment on the moon (p. 763, 13); consequently only those who 
hare performed works such as sacrifice ascend to the moon, 
not the others (p. 763, 15). ''But the others enter into Samya- 
^manam (that is, constraint) the dwelling of Yama^ suffer 
''there the Fama- tortures corresponding to their evil deeds 
*^and then descend once more to this world. Of this nature 
^are for them the ascent, and the descent [p. 764, 2, aroha and 
'^avarohuy both expressions are found in the Sütram also]. — 
"^For thus teaches the scripture by the mouth of Yama him- 
**self (Käth.2, 6): 

^'The other world >)i is hidden from the fool, 
"Who hlind with riches staggers on his way; 
" * This is the world,* he raves ' there is nought else,' 
''And then he falls again heneath my sway." 

In these words then, according to Bädaräyapa and Qankara, 
are meant the punishments of hell (p. 764, 2), while according 
to the context of the passage and also according to Qankara's 
Commentary on it they refer only to a continual succession 
of births and deaths. The Smriti authors also, Manu, Yyäsa 
etc. mention the city of Yama^ Samyamanam, in which foul 
deeds come to fruition (p. 764, 10), and the Parana poets 
speak of seven hells, Baurava ("the roaring," to be under- 
stood like Arist. anal, post 2, 11, p. 94b 33, or like St Matthew 
xxir, 51) etc. as the places of retribution for evil deeds (p. 764, 
13); and if, as the rulers thereof, not Yama but Citragupta 
and others are named, it must be remarked that these latter 
are in the service of Yama (p. 765, 3). 

3. The Third Place. 

Immediately after these reflections our author passes on 
in 3.1,17, to a discussion of the "third place," wherein he 

1» Instead of aämparäya we have on p. 764, 5 samparapa^ which 
ilso Govinda faithfuUy explains as sach: iamyak paraatat präpyata\ iti 
9ampar&pah paraiokas; tad-upäyah aämparäpah. 

384 Fourth Part: Samsara or the Trantmigration of the SonL 

Beems to have completely forgotten his theory of the pnnisb- 
xnents of helL — There is, so he develops his thought p. 765 
fusing together the accounts of Brih. and Ohand. (Chapter 
XXX, 5, above p. 364), first the Path of the Grods for knov- 
ledge, secondly the Path of the Fathers for (religious) worb: 
^but those, who neither in virtue of knowledge are called to 
''the Path of the Grods, nor in virtue of works to that of the 
^ Fathers, for them there exists this third Path which embraces 
"minute creatures and leads back to earth again and again: 
"therefore also (hence: because they have nothing to dc 
"on the moon, and because the third place is destined for 
"them) those who do not perform works do not go to the 
"moon'' (p. 766, 3). One must not think that they first ascend 
to the moon's disk and then pass down among minute crea- 
tures, "because the ascent (ärohä) would be purposeless** 
(p. 766, 6;— but above p. 383 an äroha and an avarcJia were 
also taught for those fated to suffer the punishments of hellv 
Hence therefore that world is not overfilled (p. 766, ly no: 
because they constantly descend again, although this in itsel: 
would be possible (p. 766, 10), but because they go, as the 
Scripture teaches, to the third place (p. 766, 11). Were they 
(the evil) not different from the performers of works in this 
respect, that they descend again, the doctrine of the third 
place would be superfluous (p. 766, 13). 

The punishments of hell are quite left out of sight in these 
discussions as they are in the following, where the author 
passing them over entirely goes back to what was stated at 
the beginning of Chapter XXXII, 2 (above p. 382) in order 
to dispose of the doubts there noted. He continues: when n 
is said, Kaush. 1, 2, that all go to the moon, we must under- 
stand thereby all who are called (p. 767, 1); and when, for 
the attainment of a new body, the passing through the fiv^ 
fires and with it the journey to the moon have been maic- 
tained to be necessary (p. 767, 3, cf. 763, 4), it is to be 
remarked that the process of the five fires takes place onlj 
in the case of human rebirths and not in the case of rebirtLs 
as a worm, a bird, etc. (p. 767, 11); as it is also said that s: 
the fifth offering the waters speak with human voice (not with 

XXXn. The DMtinies of the Soal in the Beyond. 386 

the Toice of an animal) (p. 767, 12); hence only those who 
ascend and descend go through the process of the five fires 
(p. 767, 14), the others, without the fivefold offering, receive a 
new body by the mingling of the water with the other elements 
(p. 767, 16). Moreover the possibility of becoming man even 
without the five fires is not excluded (p. 767, 13); thus, for in- 
stance, Drona is said to have come into existence without the 
fire of woman, Dhrühtadyumna and others even without the 
fire of man and of woman (p. 768, 3); and other such elusions 
of separate fires also occur, as for instances female cranes 
conceive without seed (p. 768, 6, cf. note 95 above p. 226), and 
of the four classes of beings (bom alive, egg*bom, bom from 
sweat, and bom from germs, above p. 239 f.) the two last are 
said to be produced without sexual intercourse (p. 768, 10). — 
Only just previously our author had restricted the process of 
the five fires to those coming from the moon; here he extends, 
in part at least, even to the animals. A consistent view cannot 
be gained from his words. 

4. Felicity on the Moon. 

The Indian belief, which regards the moon's peaceful realm 
of light as the abiding place of the pious dead, and associates 
her waxing and waning with the ascent and the descent of 
their souls, is a lovely poetical thought 

But if this temporacy felicity is a reward, how then can 
it be said, Brih. and Ch&nd. I. c, that the pious on the moon 
are the nourishment of the Gods? Surely there can be no 
enjoyment in being devoured by the Gods, as if by tigers 1 
(p. 749, 10). 

The answer to this is that being the food of the Gods is 

to be taken metaphorically not literally (p. 749, 13), since 

otherwise it would be unintelligible that a man should merit 

the sojourn on the moon through arduous works (p. 760, 2). 

If the Gods are said to eat this does not mean chewing and 

swallowing, but signifies the enjoyable intercourse which they 

hold with the pious, just as one finds enjoyment in intercourse 

with virtuous women, sons and friends (p. 760, 5); moreover 


386 Fourth Part: Samsara or the Transmigration of the SonL 

^the Gods neither eat nor drink," as is said in Chänd. 3,6.1 
(p. 760, 7). But that nevertheless the Gods enjoy the pioos 
and thereby derire benefit from them, depends on the fact, tbt 
the pious do not possess the highest knowledge, namely that 
of Atman, and hence are as serviceable to the Gods in the 
other world as in this, in reference to which it is said (Brih 
1,4, 10): "He who worships another Godhead [than the Seit 
''the Atman] and says ^he is one and I am another,' he » 
''not wise, but is like unto a domestic animal of the Gods' 
(p. 750, 12). Thus the being enjoyed by the Gods indicates th' 
inadequacy of the whole Pancägnividyä (p. 761, 3). That this 
being enjoyed is at the same time an enjoying on the part of 
the pious, we have already seen in note 1S6, above p. 363. 
from a passage of the Commentary on Chänd. p. 343, 10. 

XXXIIL The Cause of the Return to Earthly 


1. Prefatory Remark« 

OuB System teaches a twofold retribution for good and 
evil works: once in the Beyond, and then through a rebirth 
on earth* We have already pointed out (abore p. 368), as the 
ground of this double retribution, the endeavour to hold fast 
at the same time both to the older view of a retribution in 
the Beyond and to the later one of a retribution through 
rebirth. But by this the system now becomes inconsistent 
with itself: for if good and evil receive their due reward in 
the other world, one fails to see why penance should be done 
for them over again in a new existence upon earth; or vice 
versa, if the retribution consists in the particular form of this 
earthly existence, then no sound reason is forthcoming for the 
assumption of rewards and punishments in the other world. 
We shall see how the Indian theologians deal with this in* 
consistency (into which, moreover, Plato also fell), by reproduc* 
ing in brief the contents of 3, 1, 8—11, p. 761 — 762 in the 
present Chapter. 

2. In Retribution a Residue remains (anufaya). 

The question arises whether in the retribution of works in 
the other world a residue ^ '2 ig left or not (p. 762, 2). — One 

1*2 anufayo, literally renduum. ^heel Upt," whereby Badarayana, at 
it eeamt, alladet to the correiponding aampatüt ''the tediment of any 
liquid, which runt together at the bottom of the Testel," in Chand. 5, 
10, & In the Commentary to Ch&nd. p. ^44, 8, sampata it indeed taken 


388 Foarth Part: Samsara or the Transmigration of the Soul. 

might think that no residue was left, because in Ohand. 5, 10, 5 
(aboye p. 364) it is said: ^they remain there so long as any 
** sediment (sampata) exists'' and in Brih. 6, 2, 16: they descend 
^when this is consumed (pari-ava-eti),^ as further another 
passage of Scripture says (Brih. 4, 4, 6, translated above p. 194 

"After he has received reward 
*'For all, that he has here performed, 
«<He comes back from that other world, 
"Into this world of deeds, below;" 

and if the meaning of death consists in its being the revealer 
of the fruit of works (p. 752, 13), then it must be the revealer 
of all the fruit of works, for the same cause cannot bring 
forth dissimilar effects (p. 752, 16); and if the lamp makes the 
pot visible, it must also make the dress visible at a hke 
distance (p. 753, 1). 

In contradiction to these arguments we maintain, that % 
residue of works is certainly left over. For while on the moon 
works are gradually consumed by enjoyment, the water-forz: 
of these works (am-inayafn'Oariram^ that is, the karma-äfraya. 
above p. 375 which is thus distinguished here from the karmaa 
itself) melts away, through the fire of pain at the dwindUcg 
away of works, like hoar-frost in the sun, or like the hardness 
of butter in the fire, and the descent takes place, while i 
residue is still left (p. 753, 8). This follows, in the first place, 
from the fact that the Scripture (Chänd. 5, 10, 7) makes a 
difference as regards those who descend between fair and foul 
conduct; here we are to understand by conduct {caranam) ths 
very residue of works (p. 763, 14); and moreover the varioas 
allotment of earthly goods from birth onwards compels as, 
since nothing is without a cause, to admit such a residae 
(p. 763, 15). Thus too teaches the Smriti (c£. Apastaml^u 
dharmasutra 2, 1, 2, 3), that, after the retribution for worb 
has taken place in detail, it is through a residue (^esha) that 
difference of re-birth in respect of country, caste, family, form« 

to mean karmanah kahat/ah ("until the destruction of works ttnh»'\ 
in oar work on the contrary, p. 752, 5 to mean karma-äfaya (" so bag ^ 
an aocumulation of worki remains"). As to this maanio^ of X«nM« 
acaya cf. p. 909, 12. 915, 3. 916, 5. 7. 1081, 1. 1066, 6. 

XXXni. The Cause of the Return to Earthly Ezittence. 389 

duration of life, Vedic study, destiny, wealth, desire and in- 
telligence is conditioned (p. 764, 4). 

3. How is this Residue to be conceived? 

But how are we to conceive this residue of works, by 
which the course of the new life is conditioned? (p. 754, 6). — 

Some think of it as a viscous fluid, which clings to the 
vessel (p. 764, 7) ; this, they think, does not contradict the law 
of e£Pect [which must operate completely] (p. 764, 10); for even 
if the purpose of the ascent to the moon is the enjoyment of 
the fruit vnthout exception, yet a continuance there becomes 
impossible when the residue of works has become very small 
indeed (p. 764, 13), just as a wandering knight who has come 
well provided to the king's court, can no longer maintain 
himself when his outfit has dwindled down to an umbrella 
and shoes (p. 766, 1). 

But this explanation is not attractive (peQcda). For in the 
case of the vessel and that of the knight one understands 
that a residue can be left, but not here (p. 766, 10); on the 
contrary such a residue is contradicted by the canon of scrip- 
ture as to the reward in heaven (that is, in the realm of the 
moon), which takes place without diminution (p. 766, 11); 
further such a remainder of good works would only explain 
rebirth in a fair form, and not a rebirth which serves as 
punishment (p. 766, 1). 

We must rather distinguish two classes of works, the first 
bearing fruit in the other world, the second in this; the former 
are recompensed in the Beyond, the latter through the rebirth 
here (p. 756, 3). In accordance with this, one must take the 
verse quoted above (p. 388): ''for all, that he has done,^' as 
referring only to those works which bear fruit in the other 
world (p. 766, 8), and the same limitation must be made when 
death is conceived as the revealer of works (p. 766, 9). For 
why, we ask, is death the revealer of works? Because, no 
doubt, this life is demanded for the manifestation of other 
works. Now it is just that which prevents those works which 
death reveals from being revealed previously, which makes it 

390 Fourth Part: Samtara or the Trantmigration of the Soul. 

impossible that works, bearing an opposite kind of froitr should 
be rerealed at the same time after death (p. 757, 3). That 
all works cannot receive retribution at once, may be readily 
seen from the fact that, in the following birth, all accumulated 
works do not always work themselves out, because each one 
of them demands its own special retribution (p. 757, 9); and 
a remission, with the exception of those actions which have 
been atoned for by penance (präyagcütam), does not take 
place (p. 757, 11). If all (religious) works were recompensed 
in one birth, then, for those who have passed into heaven*^ 
or hell or the bodies of animals [and plants], since in this 
state they perform no ritual works, there would be no cause 
for a subsequent existence which thus would be impossible 
(p. 758, 5); for we have no other authority for the doctrine of 
retribution except the Canon of Works (p. 758, 8). — It is thus 
unconditionally true that death is the revealer of works: crice^ 
like the murder of a Brahman require, according to the Smp*^- 
more than one life for their atonement (p. 758, 6), and on tie 
other hand works like the rain-sacrifice (käriri) bring their 
fruit in the present life already (p. 758, 9). — The example i>f 
the lamp (above p. 388) does not apply; rather, just as th-? 
lamp at the same distance renders coarse things visible^ but 
not subtle things, so by death the ^stronger" works are revealed 
but not the "weaker" (p. 759, 5). Finally if anyone should 
object that, if some residue of works is always left, there can 
be no liberation, he must be reminded that through perfect 
knowledge all works without exception are dissolved (p. 759. 8% 

4. Ritual and Moral Work. 

As the foregoing shows, our author seeks to solve the 
question of the basis of double retribution by drawing a dis- 
tinction between those works which bear fruit in the Beyond 
and those which bear fruit here. But he makes no effort t. 

**> Meaning here not the realm of the mooo, but heaven at the pjut 
of rebirth, which may take place in heaven, in the world, or in hall : Vbie 
»amtura is brahma'ddi'sViuvara-anta p. 61, 11, näraka-^VMtara-cnta 6S. 7 
cf. pp. 300, 7. 303, 4. 420, & 604, 2. 

XXXHI. The Oause of the Retarn to EaHhly Existence. 391 

determine what works belong to the one or the other cate- 
gory, and he only allows it to appear incidentally that the 
difference is quantitative, in so far as the stronger works 
reveal themselves first, and therefore in the Beyond, while the 
weaker remain behind as a residue and condition the rebirth. 
We have already encountered a similar straggle for existence 
among works above p. 112; in contradiction to the passage 
there translated, as also to various statements in the section 
we have just analysed, is the remark to which we called 
attention above p. 363 according to which death means just 
the moment when the store of works conditioning life has 
been completely exhausted. 

Ifow it would be very easy to make the twofold retribution 
follow from the difference between ritual and moral works, 
the former being recompensed in the Beyond, the latter in 
the new career on earth; and it seems as if some such dis« 
tinction had been attempted by the Vedanta school, but rejected 
by the authorities, but yet without the latter being able to 
come to a complete agreement on this point. We shall en- 
deavour to gain an insight into these interesting but somewhat 
obscure circumstances, by translating here word for word the 
section bearing upon them, 3, 1, 9 — 11. 

(3,1,9:) "'Because of conduct? Nof because it denotes it 
""'as weU; thus Kärshnäjini.^ — That may be so; but the passage 
**of Scripture, which was quoted in proof of the existence of 
''a residue of works {anugaya): 'who now are of a fair con- 
"^ 'duct,' (Chand. 5, 10, 7, above p. 364), teaches that entering 
''into the womb results from conduct {caranam) and not from the 
''remainder of works; for conduct is one thing, and the residue 
*'of works another. For conduct can mean nothing but 
"behaviour {caritram)^ manner of life {äcära)^ character {QiUim)\ 
"by residue of works, on the other hand, is meant a balance 
'^ remaining over from the works which have received retribution; 
"and the scripture too distinguishes work and conduct, for it 
''is written (Brih. 4, 4, 5, translated above p. 193): 'according 
"*as he acts, according as he walks, according to this is he 
"'bom,' and (Taitt. 1, 11, 2): 'the works which are blameless, 
"'those shalt thou perform, no others; what among us is 

392 Fourth Part: Samsara or the TransmigratioB of the SooL 

** ^accounted good conduct, that shalt thou follow!' Therefore 
^ the passage of Scripture which makes enteringliiito the womb 
^follow on account of the conduct, prores nothing as to a 
''balance of works. — To this we answer: Not because this 
''passage of Scripture concerning conduct denotes aUo the 
"remainder of works, thus thinks the teacher KärshnäjinL^ 

(3, 1, 10:) ^^Purposdessness, you think? Not because it ü 
*^ ^thereby conditioned t^ — Good, one might say, but why must 
" one abandon the Vedic meaning of ' character,' for the word 
*^caranam and accept the metaphorical one of 'balance of 
"works?' Should not the character rather receive the entrance 
"into a fair or a foul womb as retribution for the good com- 
"manded and for the evil forbidden by the scripture? For 
"of course one must assume a reward of some kind for the 
"character. For otherwise there would be purposdessness of 
" character.— TjT you think so, then we answer: not Why? 
^Because it is thereby conditioned] that is, the work done, such 
"as sacrifice etc., is conditioned by conduct; for no one who 
"does not lead a good life is admitted thereto: 

"The Veda cleanseth not immoral men," 
"as the Smriti says. Further there is no purposdessness of 
"character, because it also belongs to the goal of man. For 
"when the work performed, such as sacrifice etc., reaps its 
"fruit, then too conduct, because it is therAy conditioned, will 
"also receive a certain surplus (atifaya) ; and work accomplishes 
"all purposes, as both scripture and tradition admit There^ 
"fore work alone, because it indicates the character as weli. 
"is, in the form of the residue of works, the cause of entering 
"into the womb; such is the opinion of Karshpajini For as 
"the work is there, an entering into the womb on account of 
"the character cannot properly be assumed; for he who is 
"able to run upon his feet, does not need the crawl upon his 

(3, 1, 11:) ^^Only good and evil work on ihe contrary, says 
^'BMari.^ — On the contrary the teacher Bädari holds, thit 
"by the word 'conduct' only good and evil works are to be 
"understood. For, as is seen, the word 'conduct' is used of 
"a^ mere work. For of him who performs holy (punya) works. 

XXXin. The Cause of the Return to Earthly Existence. 393 

"^such as sacrifice etc, people say: 'this noble man walks in 
*< 'the path of duty (dharmam caratiy — Moreover manner of life 
^itself is only a kind of duty, and the distinction between 
"work and conduct is only the same as that between Bräh- 
^ma9a and Pariyräjaka [that is, genus and species, cf. 382, 2. 
^640, 3]. Thus those of fair conduct are those whose works 
''are of good repute, and those of foul conduct those whose 
''works are of ill repute; this is certain." 

— However far the foregoing thoughts of Qankara fall short 
of clearness, it is evident from them, that a tendency showed 
itself to distinguish between ritual and moral conduct or 
character, and to regard the retribution in the Beyond as 
conditioned by the former, and the shaping of the succeeding 
existence by the latter; and further that this tendency did 
not prevail in the Yedänta-schooL—Such an attitude may 
seem strange to our consciousness which has been well schooled 
in this very question (the comer-stone of difference between 
the morality of the Old and New Testaments). We must 
remember however that we are here concerned with the doings 
of men only in so far as they call for reward and punishment 
aud thus serve egotistic purposes. And in so far as they are 
in the service of Egotism, the value of all human deeds lies 
not in themselves, but in what they aim at; and it is in fact 
quite a matter of indifference whether this object is attained 
by ritual or by moral acts. 

XXXIV. The Descent of the Soul 
for a new Embodiment. 

Sutras 8, 1, 22—27. 

1. The Stages on the Way. 

The road by which the soul descends is like that by which 
it ascended (p. 759, 10. 769, 9). But it reminds us more of 
the manner in which the individual elements came forth from 
Brahman (cfl above p. 230 fif.). As the elements: Ak&^ Air. 
Fire, Water, Earth, there emanated one after the other in 
order from the Ätman in progressively increasing densitj. 
so the descending soul passes first into the Akaga, from the 
Akaga into the Air, from the Air into Smoke (which here 
takes the place of the Fire), from smoke — or vapour— it is 
condensed into Cloud, from which it pours down as Rain, 
as such nourishes Plants and passes over in the form of 
plant food into the male body as Seed, whence it comes into 
a womb corresponding to the merit of its works, to emerge 
thence in a new embodiment 

2. Duration of the Descent 

Scripture gives no definite information as to the duration 
of the stay in these various stages (p. 771, 4) ; still one mtj 
assume that the stay is not very protracted (p. 771, 5): for 
after the entrance of the soul into plants the Scripture say« 
(Chand. 5, 10, 6): ''from thence truly it is more difiScnlt to 
escape" (dumishprapataramj according to Qank. p. 771, 9, c£ on 
Chand. p. 351, 13 for durnishprapata^taram « dumishkramor 
taram) whence it may be inferred that the remaining stage» 

XXXIV. The Descent of the Soul for a new Embodiment. 395 

are more easily escaped from (p. 771, 11). The endeaTOur to 
escape which in these words is ascribed to the Soul, depends 
on the fact that it desires enjoyment which it does not attain 
in these intermediate stages but only after entrance into its 
new body (p. 771, 13). 

3. The Soul sojourns in the various Stages only as 

a Guest. 

How must we conceive the relation of the Soul to the 
elements through which it passes? Does it actually become 
Aka^a, Plant, Seed etc.? — That is not so, but rather the soul 
on its descent only enjoys the passing hospitality of the 
elements and^ souls, through which its road leads, as is proved 
in detail by our authors. 

When on the moon the watery body, which has been allotted 
to the soul for its enjoyment (above pp. 371, 378), disappears 
through the consumption of the enjoyment (p. 770, 5), the Soul 
passes over into a subtle condition resembling the Aka^a 
(p. 770, 6), and this the scripture expresses by saying that the 


Soul becomes Akaga. That this is not to be taken literally 
follows from the fact that a thing cannot be transformed into 
the being of another thing (p. 770, 8), and that in this case 
an escaping from the Akäga to the Air etc. would not be 
possible, since the soul in virtue of the omnipresence of the 
Äkä^ would have to remain eternally united to it (p. 770, 10; 
that is, probably: from what is everywhere one cannot escape 
to anywhere else). Thus the Soul does not pass over into 
the AkaQa, but only into a condition like it; and the same 
applies to the passing into Air, Smoke, Cloud and Rain. 

The entrance of the Soul into the plant, too, is not to be 
regarded as a transformation into the soul of that particular 
plant; for on the contrary each plant has its special soul 
(jiva p. 773, 3; which, like every embodied soul, is atoning for 
the deeds of a former existence, and therefore necessarily 
possesses sensation); the Soul descending from the moon is 
only received by the plant and takes no part in its pleasure 
and pain (p. 773, 5, cf. above p. 238ff.), since enjoying or 
suffering is only possible as retribution for works done (p. 773, 9). 

396 Fourth Part: Samsära or the Transmigratioo of the SoaL 

Further if the soul entered the plant as its own proper soul 
it would have to depart at the cutting, shelling, breaking up. 
cooking and chewing of the plant, for every soul departs as 
soon as its body is destroyed (p. 774, 1). By this we do not 
deny that plants also [according to Käth. 5, 7, translated aboTe 
p. 373] are places of expiation for souls, which by reason of 
impure works have sunk down into plant life (p. 774, 6), bat 
we deny that the souls which come from the moon become 
plant-souls on entering into the plants (p. 774, 8). Further i: 
is not to be admitted that this entering into the plant serves 
as a punishment for the killing of animals in connection with 
the work of sacrifice (p. 774, 10); for the privilege (anuffrahcL 
p. 775, 6) of killing for the purpose of sacrifice, rests on the 
injunction of the canon of Scripture, which is the sole authoritj 
in reference to good and evil works, because these relate to 
the Beyond (p. 776, 1); and if the prohibition of killing animals 
forms the rule, then the injunction to kill them in sacrifice 
is an exception to it (p. 775, 9). 

In the father's body also, as his own soul has long beec 
there, the soul, which enters into him through food, sojourns 
as a guest (p. 776, 7), to pass as seed from him into a womb 
corresponding to its works, whence it comes forth in nev 
embodiment for the retribution of its previous works (p. 776, 13). 

4 Retrospect. 

However full of contradictions in detail the doctrine of the 
Soul's transmigration has become through the endeavour to 
uphold the different accounts in the Veda, as also through a 
certain carelessness in the handling of secondary matters, 
peculiar Ho the Indians, yet in its main outlines this fundamental 
dogma of Indian religion lies quite clearly before our eyes. 

For perfect knowledge, there is no world and therefore 
also no transmigration of the Soul. According to the highest 
truth the Soul cannot wander, because it is the omnipreaent 
that is, spaceless. Brahman itsel£ But this the Soul does n^-t 
know: what prevents its knowing is the üpädhis which veu 
from the Soul its own proper nature; these Upadhis it regards 
as belonging naturally to its own Self, while in truth they ar« 

XXXIY. The Descent of the Soul for e new £nibodiment. 397 

to be referred to the non-Ego and therefore, like the whole 
world of plurality are non-existent and without reality. 

We saw how to these üpädhis, apart from the gross body 
which is laid aside at each death, belongs in the first place 
the complicated psychic organism, consisting of the organs of 
cognition^ the organs of action, the Manas, the Pra^a, and 
the subtle body, which accompanies the Soul on itis wanderings; 
the Soul has been connected with this unchanging apparatus 
from eternity, and remains so, liberation apart, for eternity. 

With this is further associated, conditioning its re-embodi- 
ment, a Tariable element: namely works, whether ritual or 
moral, performed by the Soul in the course of each life. The 
system declines to make any difference between these two, 
and not wrongly, in so far as we here find ourselves not in 
the sphere of morality but in that of Egotism; all works have 
Talue and meaning only in so far as they condition the weal 
and woe of the Soul in the Beyond and in the coming existence. 
' — True, it is 6 od, who assigns this weal and woe to the soul; 
but he is bound, or binds himself, in this by the works of the 
previous existence; from these result not only the enjoyment 
and suffering of the Soul in the following birth; but also 
the works of the new existence depend on moral determination, 
that ip, on the works of the previous life, with just the same 
necessity as a plant depends on its seed; and thus one life 
determines another throughout all world -periods, — for even 
during the periodical absorptions of the world in Brahman 
the Soul with its organs, bhUUa-ägraya, and karma^ä^raya 
continues to exist like a seed, — and so without cessation ad 

To what extent in this the works of one life exert their 
influence not only upon the next in succession, but upon several 
lives to come, is a question that cannot be made clear from 
the statements of our author. Similarly we remain in the 
dark as to the possibility of a gradual moral purification of 
the character; true, reference is made p. 1045, 7 to the verse 
of the Bhagavadgita (6, 45) : 

"By many a new birth made pare 
"He treads at last the highest path,'* 

398 Fourth Part: Samsara or the Transmigration of the Soul. 

but how this purification is to be understood in accordance 
with the system, is hard to say; for the Soul, and equally the 
organism with which it is clothed, are unchanging in their 
nature; the moral does not lie in any esse whateyer, but ir 
the operari on each case; the latter can raise the soul step 
by step, but always remains external to it; whence also it 
does not lead to liberation. Rather it is just these works. 
which continually reproduce themselves from the works of the 
previous existence, which hold the Soul emprisoned in tbt 
eternal cycle of birth and death (samsara), which embraces 
everything that has life (jiva), all Gods, men, animals, and 
plants, in which an ascent to the divine, a descent to plant 
life can occur, but from which no escape is possible. 

One thing alone is possible: the awakening to perfect know- 
ledge, in consequence of which the Soul recognises itself as 
identical with Brahman, and Brahman as the only Being; and 
thus recognises the whole empirical reality, the Samsara in- 
cluded, as an illusion. 

He who has reached this esoteric knowledge of the attribute- 
less Brahman, is at his goal; he knows all that is manifoli. 
the world as well as his own body with all its organs as noc- 
£go, non-Atman, non-£xistent, — for him death means only tie 
cessation of an illusion, which has already been recognised a^ 
illusory, and as unreal, as nothing. 

With the exoteric knowledge it is otherwise: he who hikS 
by this recognised Brahman as having attributes, as a persona 
God and has worshipped him according to this theological 
form of knowledge, after death mounts upwards on the Dtx-J- 
yäna to the lower Brahman and there at last gains the perfK*: 
knowledge and therewith liberation. This mediate liberauo:. 
by the Path oi Devayana is called JTramamuMi, ^progressite 
liberation" because it is attained by progress towards Brah- 
man or ^liberation by steps" because it is attained by the 
intermediate step of the exoteric felicity. 

We now turn to describe liberation first in its pure, esoteric 
form, and then we shall depict the attainment of the samt 
goal by the indirect way of the exoteric Kramamukti 





XXXV. The Path of Liberation. 

1. Definition of Liberation. 

(p. 64, 7:) ''That [entity] in the absolute sense real, highest 
''of all, eternal, all-penetrating like the ether, exempt from 
"all change, all-sufficing, undi?ided, whose nature is to be its 
"own light, in which neither good nor e?il has any place, nor 
"effect, nor past, nor present, nor future, — this incorporeal 
"[entity] is called Liberation." 

As may be seen from this passage, the conception of 
Liberation contains the same characteristics as serve as a 
rule to define Brahman; and indeed Brahman and the state 
of liberation are identical terms (p. 1046, 4: brahma eva hi 
fnukti-ava8ihä)'y for liberation is nothing else than the becom- 
ing one with Brahman, or rather, since the identity of the 
Soul with Brahman has always subsisted and has only been 
hidden from it by an illusion, liberation is nothing else but 
the awakening of the consciousness that our own Self is 
identical with Brahman. Accordingly, in liberation there is 
no question of becoming something which does not already 
exist, but only of the attainment of the knowledge of what has 
existed from all eternity. It is because of this, that liberation 
is not accomplished through any sort of work, nor through 
moral improvement, but by knowledge alone (as the Christian 
redemption is by faith alone, sola fide, which comes very near 
to the metaphysical knowledge here spoken of). 

We shall now consider more closely Qankara's explanations 
of these points. 


402 Fifth and last Part: Moksha or the Teaching of Inheration. 

2. Liberation impossible through Works. 

All works, good as well as evil, demand their retribation 
in the following existence. Hence no performance of works. 
of whatever kind it may be, ever leads to liberatioD, but onlj 
back again ever to Sainsara. — But granted, thus Qankara 
proceeds in the passage translated on above p. 112 ff^ that a 
person abstains from all works, then there would be no material 
left for a new life for him, and thus after death liberation 
would be attained? — Not so! For in the first place one is 
never certain that there may not be works demanding for 
their atonement several lives (a conception analogous to that 
of Exodus XX, 5); and even if one were successful in getting 
rid of the evil works by ceremonies, yet the good works would 
still be left, and even these same ceremonies may possibly 
also bring with them not only this annihilation but in addition, 
positive fruits to be enjoyed in a future life. And, further, it 
is practically impossible to avoid all works throughout an 
entire existence, so long as the natural disposition of the soul 
to action and enjoyment persists ; for actions continually come 
forth afresh from this inborn nature, through causes which 
are always potentially inherent in the soul, just as much as 
its natural disposition to action. So long, therefore, as this 
natural disposition is not removed through perfect knowledge 
(on which see above p. 317 fip.), there is no hope of liberation. 

The discussions of this same question go still deeper in 
1, 1,4. Here Cankara first explains (p. 61, StL) that works 
are of two kinds: ordained and prohibited, good and evil, and 
accordingly bear also two kinds of fruit, namely, pleasure and 
pain, which, in order to be experienced, demand a body (^ the 
place of the enjoyment of the fruit of the yarious kinds oi 
works,'* p. 601, 3), which body, according to the quality of the 
works, may be that of a god, man, animal, plant But then 
our author recalls (p. 63, 6) the passage, Chänd. 8, 12, 1 (trans- 
lated above p. 184) according to which pleasure and pain per* 
tain only to corporeal and not to incorporeal Being, and shews 
that, as Liberation is such an incorporeal Being, and is thus 
untouched by pleasure and pain, it cannot be produced by 

XXXV. The Path of Liberation. 403 

works which demand these as their atonement (p. 64, 3). 
Further, he urges the fact, that liberation, if it were dependent 
upon works, would necessarily be: (1) transitory (owing to 
the consumption of the works), (2) graduated (because of 
their different yalue), both of which contradict the conception 
of liberation as an eternal and paramount condition (ad- 
mitting neither less nor more) (p. 66). 

3. Liberation impossible through moral Improyement. 

(p. 71, 9:) ^But also for this reason is liberation not con- 
^^ditioned by any action, that it is not attainable by [moral] 
"purification (samskära). For all improyement takes place in 
"him who is to be purified by the addition of yirtues or the 
" diminution of faults. Liberation does not come about by the 
"addition of yirtues: for it consists in identity (avarüpatvatn) 
"with Brahman, who is incapable of any augmentation of per- 
"fection; and just as little by the diminution of faults: for 
"Brahman, in identity with whom liberation consists, is eternally 
"pure. — But if, according to this, liberation is a quality {dharma) 
"of our own Self, which howeyer remains hidden from us, can 
"it not then be made yisible by the purification of the Self 
"through our own efforts, just as brightness, as a quality of 
"the mirror, becomes yisible through the action of cleaning? 
" — That cannot be so, since the Self (ätman) is no object of 
"action. For an action cannot realise itself otherwise than 
"by altering the object to which it relates. If now the Self, 
"the Atman, were altered through any action, it could not be 
"eternal and phrases such as 'changeless is he called' would 
"be incorrect, which is not admissible. Consequently there 
*<can be no actiyity which relates to the Self as object; but 
"if it relates to some other object, then the Self is not touched 
* thereby and consequently also not improyed.'' 

Obseryation. Christianity sees the essence of man in 
Will, Brahmanism in Knowledge; therefore, for the former, 
salyation consists in a transformation of the Will, a new birth 
whereby the old becomes the new man; for the latter in a 
transformation of Elnowledge, in the dawning of the conscious- 

404 Fifth and last Part: Moksha or the Teaching^ of Liberation. 

nesa that one is not an individual but Brahman, the totality 
of all Being. — In this respect, we think the Christian view the 
more profound, but for that yery reason the more incompre- 
hensible; for a transformation of the Will (of that which is 
fundamental in us and in all being) is totally beyond oar 
understanding. It we desire to understand it, we can do so 
only as it manifests itself as phenomenon, that is, upon the 
superficies of our intellect (on which the entire phenomenal 
world is based). Mow the innate fundamental form of the 
intellect, to which an understanding is fettered, is Causality; 
and in it all human action without exception appears as the 
product of an Egotism which is determined by motives. 
While the intellect forces even moral action into this form of 
intuition, morality also seems to result from Egotism, which, 
however, enlarging its natural boundaries as the result of a 
new mode of knowledge (Vidyä), draws the not- Ego within 
the sphere of the Ego and treats it accordingly: even the 
good man (according to the law of Causality) loves only his 
Ego, and yet he loves ^his neighbour as himself,'' just becaase 
he has recognised him as his owu Self. This is the direct 
consequence of the Indian doctrine that the world is Brahman, 
and Brahman is the Soul; and we do in fact find this con- 
clusion drawn, though not in Qankara and indeed nowhere to 
the extent we should have expected ; compare the verse of the 
Bhagavatgitä translated in note 36, above p. 69. This is, we 
believe, the deepest explanation of the essence of moraUty, 
which can be reached with the plummet of the intellect (bound 
to causality). Yet even this remains inadequate; for in truth 
morality lies beyond Egotism, but therefore also beyond causal- 
ity and consequently beyond comprehension. Thus it is ia 
Christianity: therefore Christianity demands, not like Brah- 
manism Self-knowledge (destruction of error), but Self- 
denial (destruction of Egotism). This is verified by expehencc 
and felt by us to be the highest attainable; but regarded 
from the standpoint of the intellect, it remains something ud- 
intelligible, unthinkable, impossible: ßXiicojuv ^ap apn 6i im- 
tpoo iv alvl^fJiaTu 

Hence there would remain to [Christianity the merit of 

XXXV. The Path of Liberation. 406 

haying more profoundly grasped morality, to Brahmanism, on 
the other hand, that of having set forth the highest attainable 
explanation of it 

4. Knowledge without Works liberates. 

Sutras 3, 4, 1-17. 25. 1, 1, 4. 

The goal of man, liberation, is to be gained through Know- 
ledge of Atman, attainable by the Vedanta (that is, by the 
Dpanishads). This knowledge is independent (8v<Uanira) of 
performance of works and in itself alone (kevala) suffices for 
Uberation (p. 973->974). — When on the contrary Jaimini 
maintains that this knowledge is an Appendix to works 
(p. 974, 12) and only serves the purpose of proving the im- 
mortality (vyatireka) of the Soul, because without this proof 
the theory of retribution would not hold good (p. 976, 5), the 
answer is this: if the Vedanta had only the purpose of prov- 
ing the continuance beyond this bodily existence of the trans- 
migrating, individual, acting, and enjoying soul, then it most 
certainly would (as Jaimini contends) be subordinate to the 
doctrine of works (p. 980, 7); but in fact it goes further and 
teaches us to know the highest Soul, which stands above the 
individual, is God {igvara, here used in the esoteric sense) and 
remains freed from all the qualities of Saqisara, such as activity 
etc, as well as untouched by all evil; and this knowledge does 
not impel to works, but rather abolishes them (p. 981, 1). — If 
it is further objected, that even the knowers of Brahman, as 
for instance Afvapati (above p. 156) who makes known the 
Vaifvänara-vidyä (Chänd. 5, 11—24), still perform works and 
that they would not do this if the goal of man could be 
reached through knowledge alone (p. 978, 1), then one can 
oppose to them as of equal weight (tulya, p. 982, 9) the con- 
duct of those in whose case knowledge makes its appearance 
unconnected with works; for thus says a passage of scripture 
(Ait är. 3,2,6,8): *" Knowing this of a truth the Rishis of 
*^the family of Kavasha spoke: 'What good is it for us to 
<^^read the Vedas, what good is it for us to sacrifice!' know- 
*^ing this of a truth the ancients did not offer the fire-sach- 

406 Fifth and last Part: Moksha or the Teaching of Lnwration. 

"fice." And Brih. 3, 5, 1 (aboye p. 142): «Verily, after they 
«haye found this Soul (vidüvä in the sense of vittvä)^ the 
« Brahmans cease from desiring children, from desiring possess- 
« ions, from desiring the world, and wander about as beggars.** 
Further it is to be remembered that the Vaifvänaravidyäy in 
which knowledge appears accompanied by works, is an exoteric 
passage (sa-upädhikä brahmavidyä), (p. 983, 7). — Finally, to 
pass oyer the other objections, when in iQ4-üp. 2 it is said: 

*<Let him perform whateyer works he will, 
"And with to lire a handred years below," 

yet the following proves in what sense this is meant: 

"If he knows Brahman works are of no weight, 
"To him there deavei no stain of earthly woe;" 

that is, eyen though thou performest works all thy life long. 
yet in so far as thou hast knowledge, they cannot stain thee 
(p. 986/6). — Whether the knower shall perform works rests 
with himself to choose (p. 986, 8); no necessity for so doing, 
for example, for begetting offspring, exists (p. 986, 10), hence 
it is written (Brih. 4, 4, 22, aboye p. 196): "This our fore- 
''fathers knew, when they did not desire offspring and said: 
*** Wherefore do we need offspring, we whose soul is this 
'^ 'universe '" (p. 986, 12). For the fruit of knowledge does 
not, like the fruit of works, consist in something future, bat 
is anubhava-^rüdha, based upon immediate (inner) perception 
(p. 987, 1 ; cf. 66, 7). — To this must be added that this whole 
extension of the world which as the requital of works on the 
doer, is the cause of the duties of works, is based only upon 
Ignorance and for the Knower has been annihilated in its 
yery essence (p. 987, 6); even as also, by those who live under 
the yow of chastity (ürdhvaretas '^ parivräjakay according to 
Anandagiri on p. 989, 13), Wisdom indeed is sought, but no 
longer the works prescribed by the Yedas (p. 988, 3). 

But is not the knowledge itself, which conditions liberatioQ. 
a work in so far as it is still an action of the intellect (moii^) 
(p. 74, 6)? — By no means! For an action is always dependent 
upon the will of the agent, by whom it can be done, be left 
undone, or be done otherwise; eyery sacrificial work is snch 
an action, such too is meditation (p. 76, 2). Elnowledge on the 

XXXV. The Path of Liberation. 407 

contrary cannot like a work be done in one way or another, 
indeed it entirely depends not upon any human action, but 
upon the quality of the object to be known (p. 75, 4). When 
therefore it is said, for instance in the Banca-agni-vidyä 
(Chapter XXX): "man is a fire," ** woman is a fire" (aboye 
p. 362), this is an inyitation to conceive of man, or woman as 
a fire and its realisation depends upon the choice of the con- 
ceiyer; on the contrary the knowledge of actual fire as such 
depends not upon any invitation or action of man, but only 
upon the object which lies before the eyes, and thus it is 
knowledge and not action (p. 76). Similarly the cognition of 
Brahman is dependent upon the nature of Brahman, but not 
upon any invitation (p. 76, 1). "Hence, all imperatives, even 
"those found in the Scripture, when they refer to the know- 
pledge of Brahman, which is not the object of any command, 
"become blunt, as the edge of a razor when applied to a 
^ stone" (p. 76, 2). — But then what meaning have such express- 
ions as: " Atman truly is to be seen, to be heard, to be sought 
"for, to be known" (Brih. 2, 4, 5, above p. 174), which at any 
rate appear to contain a command? — Their purpose is only 
to divert man from the natural drift of his thoughts. For 
everyone is by nature turned to external things and anxioua 
to attain the objects of his desire and to avoid the objects of 
his aversion. In this way he can never reach the highest aim 
of man. In order to attain it, the stream of his thoughts 
must be diverted from natural objects and turned towards 
the inner soul, and to this end serve such commands as those 
quoted. To him who has turned to the investigation of At- 
man on account of them the true nature of Atman, which 
can neither be sought after nor avoided, is pointed out in 
8uch phrases as: "this whole universe is what that Soul is" 
(Brih. 2, 4, 6). Thus the knowledge of Atman is neither an 
object to be sought for nor avoided, as also its purpose is 
liberation from all that is to be done; "for that is our orna- 
''ment and our pride, that after having recognised the soul 
^'as Brahman all obligation of action ceases, and the goal 
*" (krUa-kniyata) is reached" (p. 76—77). 

408 Fifth and last Fart : Moksha or the Teaehing of Liberation. 

6. How is this saving Knowledge brought about? 

Liberation as the fruit of knowledge is distinguishable fron 
the fruit of works in that the former is not, like the latter, 
produced only in the future, but is produced at once and 
simultaneously with the knowledge (p. 987, 1). In this sense 
it is said (Mupd. 3, 2, 9): ^He who knows Brahman, become« 
"Brahman," as also (Mu^d. 2, 2, 8): 

''In him who lees the One both high and low, 
<<His heart's strong fetters bursting, fall apart; 
''For him all doubts are solved, 
"All works are naught,'* 

and (Brih. 1, 4, 10): ««That knew itself and said: 'I am Brah- 
'"man'; thereby it became this universe," — these and like 
passages of Scripture imply that simultaneously with Brahma- 
vidy&y and without any other effect intervening between the 
two, liberation results (p. 66, 6) ; to behold Brahman and to 
become the Soul of the Universe occur simultaneously (p. 66, 7); 
for liberation is nothing elso but our true Self^ existent from 
all eternity, but it is hidden from us through Ignorance: 
whence also the knowledge of Atman has not to produce any* 
thing new whatever as its fruit, but only to remove the ob- 
stacles of liberation (p. 67, 6). 

This knowledge of Atman is thus not a becoming anything, 
not doing anything, not occupying oneself with any work (p. 68>. 
is altogether independent of human activity, and like the know- 
ledge of every other object, it also is dependent upon the 
object itself (p. 69, 8; cf. 819, 4). Therefore it cannot be 
brought about by the action of investigating (p. 69, 10) or of 
adoring (p. 70, 3), and even Scripture produces the know» 
ledge only so far as it removes the obstacles to it, that is» 
the division into knower, knowledge and thing known, which 
springs from Ignorance (p. 70, 9). Therefore also the Scripture 
says (Kena-IJp. 11): 

"He only understands who understands it not» 
''From him who understands, 'tis evermore concealed, 
"For it is not disclosed to him who knowledge hath 
"But unto him who hath it not the aeoret ia revealed,'* 

XXXV. The Path of Liberation. 409 

and teaches (Brih. 3, 4, 2), that one cannot see the Seer of 
seeing, nor hear the Hearer of hearing, nor know the Knower 
of knowing (p. 71, 1). 

We here perceive most clearly the impossibility of attain- 
ing liberation by any effort on our part True, liberation 
consists only in Knowledge, but in Knowledge of a special 
kind, in that there is no question of an object which in- 
Testigation could discoTor and contemplate, but only of that 
which can never be an object, because in every cognition it 
is the subject of cognition: everything can be seen, but not 
"the Seer of seeing." Since in all empirical knowledge the 
Atman is the subject and for that very reason unknowable, 
the first condition of its attainment is, that all empirical 
knowledge separating subject and object, should cease: "he 
''who knows not, alone doth know if For all empirical 
knowledge is from its very nature directed to external things, 
therefore turned away from the inner Soul and consequently, 
where it is a question of comprehending the latter, is actually 
an obstacle. To destroy this obstacle is the object of the 
teaching of scripture; it turns the stream of thoughts away 
from external things and towards Atman; but to impart the 
knowledge of Atman, that even scripture is not able to ac- 
complish unconditionally ; therefore it is written (Käth. 2, 23): — 

"Not by instruction can he be attained, 
^'Not yet by understanding, nor the word: 
''Whom he elects, by him will he be gained; 
^'To him reveals himself the eternal Lord." 

According to this, the knowledge of Atman is attainable 
neither by thinking, nor by investigating the scripture, nor by 
any effort whatsoever of our will: for the latter, that is, ^the 
acting and enjoying soul," belongs only to our phenomenal 
form, the removal of which is what is required, in order that 
knowledge may arise: — and yet again, on the other hand, the 
attainment of knowledge must depend solely and entirely upon 
ourselves: for the knowledge of Brahman can be conditioned 
by nothing else except that which in it is at once object and 
subject, by the Atman, the Self; and this is our own real, 
metaphysical Ego. This metaphysical Ego appears in the 

410 Fifth and last Part : Moksha or the Teachings of Liberation. 

exoteric doctrine personified as G-od (igvara^ sagunafn br€Uima\, 
and corresponding to it this knowledge, which depends upoa 
him, appears as Grace of God, concerning which we hare 
already collected together the leading passages in Chapter 
lY, 4. What corresponds to this "Grace of God" in the 
esoteric system it is difficult to say, and we look in rain for 
a satisfactory solution. We may compare what was said in 
Chapter XIV, 4, on the knowledge of the esoteric Brahman. 
The metaphysical knowledge, in which the Self comes back to 
itself from its absorption in the contemplation of the external 
world and thereby comprehends all else as non-Self, non-Ega 
non-Being, this knowledge does arise as a matter of fact; but 
we cannot enquire into its cause because, as already dearly 
appears in the Yedänta, it is not within the sphere of causal- 
ity ; the Atman lies beyond Cause and Effect (anyatra osmdL 
krita-akrität, Käth. 2, 14), and therefore into the knowledge of 
it^ a knowledge of which the Ätman would be the cause, no 
further enquiry is possible: it arises, when it does arise; how. 
why, whereby it arises, remains an insoluble probleuL 

As we saw above p. 318, the impossibility of bringing 
about liberation by any means whatever has been expressiv 
emphasised; under these circumstances we must regard it as 
a deviation from the logical structure of the system and a 
concession to practical demands when we treat of the means 
(sädhanam) of knowing of Brahman, and these means refer 
not only to the exoteric, but also to the esoteric Brahman, 
which two are in general not separated in respect of this 
question. Of these means there are two, with which we may 
compare the requirements of those who are called to this 
knowledge, Chapter lY, 2, namely, first Works, and secondly 
devout Meditation. We have now to examine according to 
our sources these two kinds of means of attaining the saving 

XXXV. The Path of Liberation. 411 

6. Works as Means to Knowledge. 

Sutras 3, 4, 26-37. 32—35. 36—39. 51—52. 

Although, as is once more repeated in 3, 4, 26, the goal of 
man is to be reached only through knowledge, not through 
works (p. 1007, 2), yet religious works, such as Sacrifice etc., 
are very far from being without significance in this connection 
(1008, 3); true, when once that knowledge is realised they 
have no further importance, but they are nevertheless auxiliary 
to its attainment (p. 1008, 6). For thus says the scripture 
(Brih. 4, 4, 22, above p. 196): ^Him the Brahmans seek to 
"know by Yedic study, by sacrifice, by alms, by penance, by 
''fasting,'* from which it may be gathered that pious works are 
a means to the attainment of that knowledge (p. 1008, 8). The 
works named cease when knowledge is attained; certain other 
obligations, however, still persist for the knower; for the scrip- 
ture says (Brih. 4, 4, 23, above p. 196): ''Therefore he who 
"knows this, he is calm, subdued, resigned, patient, and collect- 
"ed;" the former (Yedic study, sacrifice, alms, penance, fastr 
ing) are the more outward (vahya), the latter (tranquillity, 
self-restraint, renunciation, patience, concentration, c£ above 
p. 81) are the "closer" (pratyäsanna) means to knowledge 
(p. 1012, 4). [The concentration (samädhi) here mentioned 
must be distinguished from the Meditation (dhyänam, upä- 
sanam) of which we shall presently have to speak; for Medi- 
tation ceases, as we shall see, after the attainment of know- 
ledge, while concentration still continues even in one who has 
attained knowledge.] 

StiU the works named do not, strictly speaking, produce 
knowledge as their fruit, because knowledge is subject to no 
prescribed rule, and because its fruit (liberation) cannot be 
brought about by any means (p. 1018, 8). These works are 
only auxiliaries (sähakärin) to the attainment of knowledge, 
in as much as the man who leads a life of holy works is not 
overpowered by affections (Jdega) such as Passion, etc (p. 1021, 
2). According to this their role in the scheme of salvation 

412 Fifth and last Part: Mokiha or the Teaching of Liberatioii. 

would be not so much meritorious as ascetic; cfl 1062, 

Howeyer works are not indispensably necessary as a con- 
dition of wisdom, since scripture shows by the examples of 
Raikva (note 37, above p. 61) and others, how knowledge may 
come even to such as from poverty (p. 1021, 8) cannot perform 
the works of the Agramas (above p. 16); in consequence of 
common human actions, such as the muttermg of prayen, 
fasting, worship of the Gods, or perhaps in consequence of 
works performed in some former existence by them the grace 
of knowledge is vouchsafed to them (p. 1023, 1. 6); yet a life 
in the Agramas is to be preferred as a means of knowledge 
(p. 1024, 2). 

Knowledge as the fruit of these means ensues either here 
and now or in the succeeding birth; here, if no hindrance 
exists, that is, if no other works with greater supersensuons 
power come to ripeness (p. 1044, 1) ; for even the hearing of 
the Veda, by which knowledge arises, is only effective in so 
far as it succeeds in overcoming those obstacles (p. 1044. 4», 
which according to Käth. 2, 7, is not always possible (p. 104L 
6); — otherwise knowledge ensues as the fruit of these means 
in the following life, when it may occasionally, as in the case 
of Vämadeva, exist from birth onwards (p. 1045, 1); and the 
Smriti too teaches a gradual ascent to perfection, when it 
says (Bhagavadgitä 6,46): — 

''By many a new birth made pure, 
" He treads at last the highest Path.'* 

i'4 The question of the value of pious works for liberation ia 
ventilated in an Appeodix to 4, 1 (4, 1, 16 — 18), which is perhaps a later 
addition, with the tendency to reconcile Jaimini and Bädardjfonti (cf. 
p. 1083, 7). Works, it is there stated, are auxiliary to liberation, jnst m 
even poison may serve as medicine (p. 1082, 5); they may farther liber- 
ation from a distance (p. 1082, 7), by bringing about knowledge and. 
through the latter, liberation (p. 1082, 8). In the nir^und ritfyS they 
cease with the attainment of knowledge, in iagund vidydk, which are net 
yet exempt from activity, they continue (p 1062, 11). This effect belosigs 
to works whether connected with knowledge or not; only that in the 
former case the effect according to Chacd. 1, 1, 10 is vtryoeollBra« mort 
powerful, whence it follows that even works without knowledge arast be 
to a certain extent powerful (p. 1085, 6). 

XXXY. The Path of Liberation. 413 

Of course such a gradual progress, is only admissible for the 
exoteric branches of knowledge (p. 1047, 9), not for the esoteric, 
which knows no differences, no ''more" or ''less," and brings 
forth as its firuit the liberation which is an absolutely uniform 
state and nothing else than the undifferentiated Brahman 
Himself (p. 1046, 4). 

7. DoTout Meditation (upasanam) as Means to 


S&tras 4, 1, 1-12. 

When it it said: "Ätman verily is to be beheld, is to be 
"heard, is to be tought upon, is to be meditated upon" (Brih. 
2, 4, 6), — "him shall ye inyestigate, him shall ye seek to know" 
(Chand. 8, 7, 1), then the question arises: is the conception 
(pratyaya) with which worship is concerned, to be called forth 
once only or repeatedly? — To this is to be answered, as the 
accumulation of expressions shows, this meditative conception 
is to be made repeatedly (p. 1050, 8), that is, until intuition 
occurs (p. 1061, 2), just as one must go on threshing until the 
grain is freed from the husk (p. 1061, 3). Here, search and 
worship have to alternate; sometimes worship follows search, 
and sometimes search worship, as the examples of scripture 
show (p. 1061, 8). 

One might object: Such a repetition of the conception is 
thinkable, where we are concerned with a result which is 
capable of being increased (p. 1062, 9); but what end can this 
repetition serve in the case of the highest Brahman, who is 
eternal, pure, wise, and free? If this Brahman is not com- 
prehended at the first hearing of scripture then no repetition 
can be of any use (p. 1063, 1); and how can he who does not 
understand the first time, the words: tat tvatn asi (that art 
thou) grasp it through repetition? And the case is just the 
same, if we are concerned, not with a single notion, but with 
a combination of notions (p. 1063, 6). Or is one perhaps to 
assume, that through once hearing, knowledge in abstract 
form (BämänyO'mshaya) is attained, like that of the sufferings 
of another, while through repetition knowledge in intuitive 

414 Fifth and last Part: Moksha or the Teaching of 

form (vifesha'vishaya)^ is gained like that of one's own suffer- 
iDgs (p. 1053, 7)?— This cannot be so either: for if the intnitiTe 
knowledge is not brought about through a single hearing, then 
one fails to see how it can be brought into existence eren by 
hundredfold repetition (p. 1053, 13). Such repetition may be 
serviceable in respect of a worldly object, which consists of 
many parts and comprises abstract and intuitive characteristics 
(p. 1054, 4) or again in the study of a longer treatise, bat not 
in respect of the undififerentiated Brahman, who is free from 
abstract (general, common to others) characteristics and con- 
sists of pure spirit (p. 1054, 6). 

To this is to be answered: Only for such as grasp the 
identity of the Soul and Brahman from once hearing the tai 
tvam asij is the repetition superfluous, but not for those who 
are unable to do this and in whom first one doubt and then 
another must be removed (p. 1054, 8). Here a repetition ii 
most certainly suitable, as is proved by experience with scholars 
of slow understanding (p. 1055, 2). Further, the sentence tat 
tvam asi consists of two concepts (padärtha): (1) taty the 
Existent, the Brahman who is called the ruler and the cause 
of the world and is described by the scripture as seeing, not 
seen, knowing, not known, unborn, not aging, immortal, neither 
coarse nor fine, neither short nor long; ami (2) tvam, the inner 
Self, that which sees and hears in us, which with the body 
[the outer Self] as a starting-point is grasped as the inner 
Self and retained as purely spiritual. Now to understand tbf 
words tat tvam asi, it is necessary for many first to lay hold 
on the two concepts of which it consists. — Further: The Self 
which is to be grasped is indeed without parts; but the false 
knowledge of it as though it consisted of Body, Senses, Manas. 
Buddhi [which here, as is olten the case, is inconsistentlj 
named along with Manas], has many parts and requires for 
its gradual dissipation repeated devout contemplation, so that 
for many, even in this knowledge, a gradual advance takes 
place (p. 1055). Others again, whose minds are quicker and 
have not to battle against Ignorance, doubt and contradicüoD. 
can grasp the tat tvam asi on hearing it once only. 

Bat can it really be possible that anyone ever completeh 

XXXV. The Pftih of Liberation. 415 

grasped this doctriDe? Granting even, that he came to the 
consciousness that all else outside Brahman is not real, yet 
he must take as real the pain which he feels (p. 1056, 10)? — 
*^Bj no means! For the feeling of pain like the entire body, 
"is based on illusion. For the feeling that, when my body is 
^'cut or burnt, I myself am cut and burnt, is a delusion, like 
"the delusion that I myself suffer, when other persons, for 
" instance my children or friends, suffer. The case is just the 
"same with the delusion of feeling pain: for like the body, 
"all feeling of pain lies outside the spirit; wherefore also it 
"ceases in deep sleep, while the activity of the spirit is not 
''interrupted; for ^when he does not see then, yet he is see* 
" *ing, though he sees not,' as the Scripture says (Brih. 4, 3, 26, 
"above p. 191). Thus the knowledge of the Self consists in 
'^this that I am conscious of myself as pure painless spiritual- 
"ity; and he who possesses this knowledge for him there 
"remains nothing more to do; therefore the scripture says 
"(Brih. 4, 4, 22, above p. 195): 'What shall we do with off- 
" 'spring, we, whose soul is this world,' and the Smpti says: — 

"The man who in the Self hath his delight, 
** Who in the Self contentment finds, and peace, 
''For him no duty more hath binding force." 

But how are we to understand the identity of God and 
the soul which is taught by the Vedanta, since the two are 
different? For Ood is free from evil, but the soul is entangled 
in it. Now if God is the transmigrating soul, then he cannot 
be God; if on the contrary the soul is God, then the duty 
imposed upon the soul by the canon of scripture is super- 
fluous; moreover this view is contradicted by perception 
(p. 1058, 10). — To this is to be replied: One must conceive of 
the soul as God; for thus it is said in a passage of the 
Jäbälas (which is not found in our Jäbäla-Upanishad): ''Verily, 
«I am Thou, holy Godhead, and Thou art I;" further 
Brih. 1,4, 10: ««I am Brahman;" BriL 3, 7, 3: ^He is thy 
""ioal, thy inner Ruler, thy Immortal;'' Chänd. 6, 8, 7: «"That 
*'i8 the real« that is the soul, that art thou," etc.; and again 
it is written Brih. 1, 4, 10: ^ But he who worships the God- 
**head as another, and says: *that Godhead is one and I am 

416 Fifth and last Part: Moksha or the Teaching of Liberation. 

^ 'another/ he knows it not;" B^rih. 4, 4, 19: ''His neTer-aadxng 
^ death he weayes, who here plurality perceives;" Bnh.S,4.6 
^The uniyerse shuts out him, who regards the Unirerae as 
^outside the Self," etc. — ^Thus God and the soul are not 
different, since their difference rests only on illusion; if the 
soul is stripped of its Saipsära state, it is God and henee 
free from evil, and what contradicts this is mere illusion. Bnt 
as regards the duties of the canon of scripture and perception, 
they both continue to exist as long as Saipsära, that is, until 
awakening. This being attained perception becomes naaght; 
and if you base on the objection, that with it the Veda is 
also annihilated, then it is to be noted that according to our 
own teaching, ''then the father is not father, the Veda not 
''Veda" (above p. 191): 

"But who then is the not-awakened?" 
— Thou, who askest. 

"But I am God, according to the teaching of scripture!" 
— When thou knowest that, then art thou awakened 
and then there exists no unawakened more (na a#ä 
kasyacid apräbodhäh).^^^ 

So much concerning the inner nature of devout meditation. 
As regards outward attitude, the position of the body is a 

i3i Compare with this logical consequence of the System my * Kl> 
ments of Metaphysics," § 292, p. 305: *'The saint to whom true ksov- 
** ledge has arisen, knows himself as the entire Will to life. Aocordin^A 
*'he is filled with the consciousness that he removes the sofferings of tbc 
'^ whole world in removing his ego which he knows is the bearer of tbeee. 
*^And this consciousness indeed does not lie, for the saint, in remoTing 
"and delivering the Will in himself, has removed and delivered this 
' whole world. For him, who is enlightened by transcendental knowledge*. 
*" there remains of it nothing but an unsubstantial phantom, a shadow- 
^play without reality. To us alone it will not seem so, just becaose w« 
^'are still on the empirical standpoint of affirmation, and oniy eo far a« 
^ transcendental knowledge awakes in us, can we take part in his dehvcr^ 
^ance."— § 174, p. 131: *'Thus the regenerate saves himself and the groaa- 
''ing creation: and yet affirmation still continues, even after he has fo*aaa 
^the way out of its circle; also this world for ever and aye will exis*. 
*^will affirm, will suffer,— but again all time in the light of denial is no- 
rthing, and all that it coutains fades away as the shadow-play cm tJbe 
«« wall for the Will, when it has turned." 

XXXV. The Path of Liberation. 417 

matter of indifiference both in those meditations which are 
undertaken for the purpose of attaining perfect knowledge, as 
well as in those ^meditations which are connected with the 
serrice of works (p. 1070, 14). In the remaining kinds of 
worship (that is, presumably, in those used in the exoteric 
knowledge) one should not walk, run or stand, because this 
distracts, nor lie down either, because one might then be over- 
taken by sleep, but sit (p. 1071, 7). Moreover in regard to 
direction, place and time, one need only be careful about 
them, so far as they promote the undivided concentration of 
the mind as much as possible (p. 1072, 9). — The forms of 
worship which lead to perfect knowledge come to an end with 
the attainment of this knowledge (p. 1073, 8); those on the 
contrary, whose fruit is felicity (as it seems not only those of 
the Pitriydna, but also those of the Devayäna), must be con- 
tinued until death, since the attainment of their fruit in the 
other world is dependent on the thoughts at the moment of 
death (p. 1074, 2; cf. 112, 8). For the scripture says (Qata- 
pathabr. 10, 6, 3, 1): ''with whatever mind a man departs from 
""this world, with the same mind he enters into the other 
''world, after death,'' and the Smriti declares (Bhagayadgltft 
8. 6):— 

"The ssture that he thinks upon, when he deperte this life, 
^'E'en this he will pnt on whene^r he reaches the Beyond." 

In the exposition of these means no distinction is main- 
tained between the esoteric and the exoteric doctrine; so much 
the more, however, does this distinction dominate the liber- 
ation which appears as their result We turn next to con- 
si'ler the man who has fully and unconditionally reached the 
goal of humanity, the man of esoteric knowledge, the Sage 
possessing Samyagdarganam, to study his condition in Life, 
Death, and in the Beyond. After we have come to know in 
him the essence of liberation in its purity and completeness, 
we shall in conclusion have to consider the Path, upon which 
the Devotee, the man who*^has recognised and adored Brah- 
man in his exoteric form, is led to the same goal by means 
of KramamuktL 


XXXVI. Condition of the Sage in this Life, 

1. Characteristics of the Sage. 

In contrast to the DeTOtee, who knows and worships 
Brahman in the exoteric, theological form, we understand in 
this and in what follows by the term Sage, him to whom has 
come Samyagdarganam, perfect knowledge, that is, esoteric 
knowledge of the higher, attributeless (param^ nirgu7}amf 
Brahman, and who in consequence of this possesses an im* 
mediate consciousness i^e on the one hand of the identity of 
his own Self with Brahman, on the other of the illusorr 
character of all that is di£ferent (nänä) from the Sool« from 
Brahman, therefore of the whole extended world (prapaftxi. 
his own body and the other Upädhis of the Soul {indriyas. 
manas, mukhya präna, sükshmam cafiram^ karman) included. 
For such a one there is no longer any world to be perceireJ 
nor any perception, and even his own suffering, since it depends 
upon perception, is no longer felt by him as pain; on which 
point compare the fidler treatment abore p. 299 and p. 41S. 
Further since all works have only the purpose of attaining 
pleasure and avoiding pain, while pain and pleasure concern 
not bodiless, but only embodied Being based upon iUusion 
(above p. 402), for him who has seen through this illusion, aD 

IS* amtbkava; p. 917, 5: *'The fruit of Knowledge depends upon :s- 
<* mediate contcioasnets ; for the tcriptnre sayt (Brih. 8, 4, 1, translated 
''above p. 141): *the immanent, not transcendent Brahman;' and the 
* words 'That art thou' (Chand. 6, 8, 7) denote something already txa^ 
"ing and mast not be understood as if they meant only: 'That wilt the« 
"'become after death;'... consequently for the knower of Brakmia 
« liberation is absolutely accomplished." Gf. p. 987, 1. 68, 7. 1056, 1 . 
"1067, 8. 

XXX VL Condition of the Ssge in this Life. 419 

works (Yedic study, sacrifice, alms, asceticism, fasting) are 
abolished, as also all the injonction of the Veda which com- 
mand them. And not only does the Part of Works become 
superfluons, bat also that Part of the Veda which treats of 
knowledge, above p. 21; for this is also only a means to an 
end: ''Thinking and meditating have like hearing (only) 
'^ attainment as their purpose;" when that purpose is attained, 
the scripture has fulfilled its object; as there exists for the 
awakened neither perception, nor pain, nor action, so there 
exists for him no Veda either; to him ''the Yeda is not Veda" 
as the scripture says (above p. 416). In a word: everything 
outside Brahman, that is the Self, the Soul, has no more 
reality for him and can no longer disturb him, just as little 
as the rope which he mistakenly held to be a snake (note 105, 
above p. 269) or the trunk, in which in the darkness of his 
ignorance, he thought he saw a man (p. 86, 19). 

(p. 84, 6:) "And yet experience shows how, even for one 

"who knows Brahman, Saipsara still persists, so that he has 

^'not attained his goal, as in the simile of the rope? — To this 

"we reply: It must not be maintained that for him who has 

"recognised that the Soul is Brahman, Saipsära persists as 

"before, because the knowledge of the Self (the Soul) as 

" Brahman contradicts this. For so long as he held the body 

"etc. to be the Self, so long was he affected by pain and 

"fear, but after that delusion has been destroyed by means of 

"the knowledge (produced by the Veda), of the Self as Brah- 

"man, then it can no longer be maintained that he is affected 

"by pain and fear since that depended upon erroneous know- 

" ledge. For so long as for instance, a rich householder has 

"the consciousness of his wealth, pain arises for him from its 

"loss; but after he has gone away as a hermit into the forest 

"(above p. 16) and has freed himself from the conciousness of 

"his wealth, then there can arise for him no more pain from 

"the loss of it. And so long as one wears ear-rings, pleasure 

"arises from the consciousness of wearing them; but after 

"one has laid them aside and freed oneself from the conscious- 

"ness of wearing ear-rings, then the pleasure in wearing them 

"no longer exists for him. Therefore the scripture says 


420 Fifth and last Part: Moksha or the Teaching of Liberalion. 

"(Chänd. 8, 12, 1): 'Verily, the bodiless is not touched by pain 
'''and pleasure.' If you maintain that bodilessness is onlj 
''attained after the dissolution of the body, not during life, 
"then we do not admit this, because being clothed with the 
"body depends (only) upon false cognition. For the circuin- 
"stance of the Self's being connected with a body can be 
"understood in no other way, than by conceiTing it as erron- 
"eous knowledge, consisting in the delusion of the body be- 
ting the Self. For we have seen that [for the Self] the 
"condition of bodilessness is an eternal one, and this because 
"it is not conditioned by action [only what belongs to the 
"fruit of works is perishable]. If however you maintain that 
"being embodied is the consequence of good and evil works 
"done by it [the bodiless Atman], then we deny this; for 
"since its union with the body is untrue, therefore the assertion 
"is also untrue that the Atman has done good and eriL For 
"the assertions that it is clothed with a body and has done 
"good and evil works are always supported by each other and 
"therefore lead to the assumption of a regressus in ii]finäum: 
"and this is comparable to a chain altogether of blind 
" persons each holding the other, since it is impossible for the 
" Atman to be affected by works, the Atman being no acting 
"principle." — (p. 87, 5:) "Consequently being clothed with a 
"body depends only upon a false conception, and thus it is 
"proved that the knower of Brahman is, in his life time, 
"already bodiless. Therefore the scripture says (Brih.4,4,7. 
"translated above p. 194): 'As the slough of a snake dead 
" 'and cast off lies upon an anthill, thus lies this body then. 
" 'but the bodiless, the immortal, the life is pure Brahman, is 
"'pure Light;' and [where is unknown to me]: 'with eyes as 
" 'if without eyes, with ears as if without ears, with speech 
" 'as if without speech, with Manas as if without Manas» with 
" *life as if without life,' and the Smriti shows in the passage: 
" 'What is the essence of him who is firm in knowledge?^ etc 
"(Bhagavadgita 2, 54) where it enumerates the characteristics 
"of one who is firm in knowledge and reckons as soch that 
"he is set free from all work. — Thus for one who has recognised 
"the Brahmanhood of the Soul, Saipsära does not coatiiiiw 

XXXYL Condition of the Sajj^e in this Life. 421 

^as before, and he for whom it still continues, has in truth 
''not jet recognised that the Soul is Brahman; that is cer- 

2. The Destruction of Sin. 

Sutnm 4, 1, 8. 

Existence without works is, as we hare seen repeatedly, 
(above pp. 112. 390. 402) impossible. But it lies in the nature 
of works to have as purpose the production of a definite fruit, 
and without its having brought forth this fruit— one might 
think — no work can be annihilated, provided that the authority 
of the scripture is to be maintained (p. 1076, 9). That liber- 
ation thereby becomes impossible, need not be admitted; only 
one would have to incorporate liberation, like the fruit of 
works in the chain of Space, Time, and Causality (p. 1076, 17; 
that is, regard it equally as a fruit of works). — But that is 
not so! On the contrary, when once Brahman is known, sin 
committed is annihilated, and future sins cannot cleave to 
such a one (p. 1076, 2). For the scripture says (Chänd. 4, 14, 3, 
translated above p. 166): ''As water does not cling to the lotus 
"leaf, so no evil deed clings to one who thus knows;" and 
(Ghänd. 6, 24, 3; translated above p. 167) "as bums the leaflet 
'*of the bulrush when thrust into the fire, so are burnt up all 
^his sins;" and yet again (Muxi4* 3» ^i ^)' 

^For him who lees the One, hoth high and low 

^'flii heart's strong fetters, hursting, fall apart, 

''For him all doahts are solved, all works are naught" 

We do not thereby deny the fruit-producing power of works; 
such a power certainly exists; but we assert that it is checked 
in its development by a cause of another kind, namely, by 
knowledge (p. 1076, 14). For the canon of the doctrine of 
works holds good only on the assumption, that the power of 
the works exists; where the power is checked, the canon then 
loses its validity (p. 1076, 16). When then the Smriti says: 
"^no work can be lost," this remains the rule and implies that 
no work, without having borne its fruit, can be annihilated, 
and even the penance (präyofcUtam) prescribed for certain 

422 Fifth and last Part: Mokiha or the Teaching of Liberation. 

deeds forms no exception, in that it is itself a kind of re» 
tribution (p. 1077, 1). The case is otherwise, on the contraiy, 
with knowledge. If one takes exception to the fact that this 
(knowledge) is not, like penance, prescribed as a means of 
purification from sin (p. 1077, 6) then it is to be noted that 
the attribute-ascribing forms of knowledge (soffund vidf^) do 
likewise also belong to the doctrine of works and in con- 
sequence are also accompanied by promises of heayenly lord- 
ship and release from evil (p. 1077, 9); in the attributeless 
knowledge, on the contrary, the prescription does not hold 
good, and yet the ** burning up" of works is accomplished by 
it, and this by the knowledge that the Atman is not an act- 
ing principle (p. 1077, 12). This knowledge that the sool is 
by nature a non-agent brings about in the first place the 
result that future works no longer cleave to the knower of 
Brahman who is no longer an agent, and further, that the 
former works which he performed under the false delusion of 
being an agent are annihilated through the dissipation of this 
delusion by the power of knowledge (p. 1078, 1). For the 
knower of Brahman says: ^ That Brahman the nature of which 
''is opposed to the nature of formerly held to be true, being 
^an agent and enjoyer, that Brahman which is in its yeiy 
''nature in all time past, present and future not-agent» not- 
"enjoyer, that Brahman am I, and therefore I never was 
"either agent or enjoyer, nor am I such now, nor shall I erer 
"be one'' (p. 1078, 4). — Only thus can liberation take place; 
in any other way the destruction of the works which have 
been taking their course from eternity in the past, and there- 
fore liberation itself also, becomes impossible. "Hence liber- 
"ation cannot, like the fruit of works, be conditioned by Space» 
"Time, and Causality, for then the fruit of knowledge would 
"be transitory and would lose its transcendent character 
*" (parokshatmm)'' (p. 1078, 10). 

XXXVI. Condition of the Sage in this Life. 413 

3. Destruction of Oood Works also. 

Siktnm 4» 1, 14. 

When knowledge arises, past sins, as we have seen, are 
annihilated, and future sins can no longer cleave to the SouL 
But how about the good works? For these indeed are com- 
manded hj the same scripture which is the source of know- 
ledge and it cannot contradict itsel£ Must not good works 
therefore be excepted from annihilation?— We reply: annihilation 
and non-cleaving apply equally to good works and evil, for 
the following reasons: 1) good works also bring their own fruit 
and thereby hinder the fruit of knowledge; 2) the scripture 
teaches that both, the good and the evil works, disappear at 
the appearance of knowledge (Brih. 4, 4, 28, translated above 
p. 196): "[Who thus knows] him both overcome not whether 
('he therefore [because he was in the body] has done evil or 
"has done good; but he overcomes both; him neither what he 
"has done nor what he has not done bums;" 3) in the de- 
struction of works resulting from the knowledge that the Soul 
is not an agent, good and evil deeds are of equal value (ttüyä); 
of both it is said indifferently (Mu^^- 3, 2, 8) ^'and his works are 
"naught;'' 4) where evil works only are mentioned, good works 
must be understood as well, because their fruit, in comparison 
with that of knowledge, is inferior; 6) when the scripture says 
(Chand. 8,4; translated above p. 162): "this bridge day and 
"night traverse not, nor old age, nor death, nor pain, nor 
"good, nor evil works, and from it all sins turn back," then 
in the words "all sins" both the good and evil works just 
mentioned are included (p. 1079). 

—We may compare with this, the explanations of the 
Apostle Paul in the Epistles to the Romans and Galatians 
u to the impossibility of a redemption through the law. Ac- 
cording to Paul the law, if fulfilled, would set us free; but, in 
consequence of the sinfulness of our nature, it cannot be ful- 
filled; according to Qankara the law can he fulfilled» but its 
fulfilment does not bring liberation, but only reward on the 

424 Fifth and last Part: Moktha or the Teaching of Liberation. 

path of transmigration. The former has the deeper conscious- 
ness of the sinfiüness of our nature, the latter the more correct 
estimate of the value of the works of the law; — ^both combined 
give the philosophical truth. The law (for instance the Yedic 
or Mosaic) can unquestionably be fulfilled, but, in am- 
sequence of our innate egotism can be fulfilled onlj from 
selfish motives; hence its fulfilment has no moral valoe: 
lawful and unlawful actions both depend upon egotism, and 
are therefore, morally considered, both equally valueless and 
do not lead to liberation. This is only accomplished through 
that transformation of our Ego, which according to the 
Christian view proceeds from Faith, according to the 
Hindu view consists in Knowledge. — Both, Faith and Know- 
ledge, are at the bottom one and the same, — that meta* 
physical consciousness which lifts us above the world and 
raises us above all possibility of sin. Whether this consdoos- 
ness, assuming its genuineness, leads over into Quietism as 
among the Indians, or, as among us, is realised in deeds of 
love, tenches only its form of appearance and establishes no 
difference in the value of what appears here. 

4. Why the Body, in spite of Liberation, 
still continues to exist 

Sutras 4, 1, 15. 19. 

Knowledge bums up works, but only works whose retri- 
bution has not yet begun, whether they originate from this 
life as led before the awakening (prabodha)^ or consist in a 
balance from some previous life which could not come to 
realisation in the present existence (above pp. 112. 390). Ba: 
knowledge does not destroy those works whose seed has al- 
ready germinated, that is, those from which the present life, 
serving as basis for dawning knowledge, has been fashioned 
(p. 1080, 9; the same predestination of the course of life as 
we find in Plato's Republic 10, 15, p.617E). For if this were 
not so, if all works without exception were annihilated bj 
knowledge, then quiescence (kshetna) would not arise only after 
death, but immediately upon the attainment of knowledge. 

XXXVI. Condition of the Sage in this Life. 425 

Bince there would be no farther cause for the continuance of 
life [no further work to be atoned for] (p. 1080, 12). For this 
fjBict certainly startling in our system, that in spite of liber- 
ation the body still continues to exist for a while, Qankara 
gives two explanations, of which the one is more realistic, the 
other more idealistic (1) As the vessel which is being formed 
requires the potter's wheel to support it, so liberation requires 
a life as a substratum; and as the potter's wheel continues 
for a time to revolve, even after the vessel has been com- 
pletedy so also life continues after liberation, since it contains 
no cause to check the impetus already gained (p. 1081, 2); 
hence only after works, like the velocity of the flying arrow, 
have expended themselves, does liberation become an accom- 
plished fact for all who possess knowledge; therefore it is 
said (Chänd. 6, 14, 2; translated above p. 266): ""To this 
^[worldly action] I shall belong only until I am liberated, 
"then shall I go home" (p. 916, 8). (2) As when a man suffer- 
ing from eye disease, continues to see two moons even after 
he has attained the conviction that there is only one moon 
there, owing to the force of the impression (samskära-vagät), 
so too the impression of the sense- world persists, after a man 
has attained the knowledge of its non-existence (p. 1081, 6). — 
In view of the questionable character of these explanations, 
our author falls back upon the inner certainty of liberation: 
"Here, he remarlcs, no discussion at all is admissible; for 
how could anyone who is convinced in his heart that he is 
firahman, be refuted by another, even when he is in the 

Truly there are venerable, holy words, which prove how 
profoundly the Indian was convinced of what he lays before 
us! — But the condition here described (to which, as the highest 
goal of existence, humanity vnll ever return, whatever else 
man may undertake)— this condition must have been nothing 
very rare in India, as is proved by the fact that later ages 
had a technical expression for it, namely jivan-mukti (liber- 
ation during life) and jtvanrmukta (the living liberated), al- 
though we do not yet meet with these expressions in Qafi- 

426 Fifth snd ImI Part: Moksha or the Teachings of LibeimtaoiL 

Thus after works, whose retribution has not yet begnu 
have been destroyed by knowledge, while those whose seed 
had already germinated, have been consumed through con- 
tinuance of life, death comes, as the outward sign of this con- 
sumption (abore p. 363), and with death comes definitife and 
eternal union with Brahman; for the works on whose account 
one had to live are exhausted, while the balance, and in them 
the seed of a further existence, has been burnt up, through 
the destruction of false knowledge, on which they depend, bj 
perfect knowledge (p. 1086). 

XXXVII. The dying Sage. 

1. His Soul does not depart. 

The Uikränti, that is, the ''withdrawal" of the Soul from 
the body described in Adhyäya 4, 2, which as we saw (aboTe 
p. 379) was common both to the ignorant and the possessor 
of exoteric knowledge, is interrupted (4 2, 12 — 16) by an 
episode pertaining to the higher knowledge (präscUigikt para» 
vidyä-gatä cintäj p. 1103, 12), which treats of the death of him 
who possesses esoteric knowledge and is consequently free 
from desire (akämayamäna). Of such it is said in Brih. 4, 4, 6 
(translated abore p. 194): — 

''And now of him who desires not — He who is 
"without desire, free from desire, whose desires are 
^stilled, whose desire is the Self, his vital breaths 
''do not depart, but Brahman is he and into Brah* 
^man is he resolved.'' 

One might think, says Qankara, since instead of ''his 
'^(tasya) vital breaths do not depart'^ we read in the other 
(Mädhyandina-)recension : " out of him (tasmäd) the vital breaths 
''do not depart "—that what is denied in this passage is not 
the departure of the Soul from the body (dehat (arfram), but 
that of the organs from the individual Soul (dehin^ gätira); 
that one who is liberated departs from the body is, it might 
he believed, self-evident; what is taught here being that from 
him (that is, from the Atman) his vital organs do not depart, 
hut remain united with him (p. 1099, 2). 

But this is not the case; this passage rather teaches that 
the Akämayamäna^ he "who does not desire," that is, the 
completely liberated sage, does not, at death, like others (the 

428 Fifth and last Part: Moksha or the Teaching of Liberation. 

pious worshipper and the performer of works) depart from 
his body. This is proTed bj the passage (Brih. 3, 2, 11) where 
the son of Ritabhäga asks Yäjüavalkya: '^ Yajnayalkya! so 
^said he, when such a man dies, do then the Tital breaths 
^depart from him or not? — No, said Yajnayalkya, eyen at th^ 
''very spot they are dissolved; ^'^ he swells, is bloated, bloated 
''lies the dead." — Here it is evidently the departure from the 
body, which is denied, and the above passage must also be 
explained in accordance with this, whether we read tasmad 
(that is, out of the body) or tasya (that is, of the sagej in 
the passage in question (p. 1100, 4). This explanation is 
further supported by the fact that in the passage in question, 
after the description of the departure from the body, it is 
said: ''So much for him who desires.— Now we have to speak 
"of him who does not desire" (above p. 194). This contrast 
would be meaningless if a departure of the Soul from the 
body were to be assumed in the case of one who does not 
desire (p. 1100, 12). Such a departure, finally, cannot be ad- 
mitted in the case of the knower of Brahman who has con- 
quered desire and works for this reason also, that there is no 
cause for it, since he who is liberated becomes Brahman at 
death, and Brahman is all-pervading (p. 1101, 2). In this 
sense the Smpti also says (Mahäbhäratam XII, 9667): — 

"Who of all nature has become the Self, 
"Whose vision folly pierces nature through, 
"His path is found not by the gods themselves, 
''Who trace the track of him who leaves no trace." 

2. The Dissolution of the Psychic Apparatus. 

As we have already frequently seen, the individual Soul is 
surrounded by a complicated apparatus of Upädhis^ which in 
part dwell with it in the heart (above p. 311), in part are 
concentrated in it at death (above p. 379), in order to depar. 

t'7 Qankara reads instead of Bafnavantf/ante, p. 1099, 12, mimaooifyamU. 
and instead of ueehvayati, p. 1099, 13. 14, uechayatit ued^ayana, whic- 
the Gloss explains as vahya^^yu-puranad vardhate. 

XKXVII. The dying Sage. 429 

along with the Soul. To this complex of Upädhis which 
accompanies the Soul in all its wanderings, there belong: 
Itidriyas, Manas, Pranay and Sükshmam Qatiram, which are 
as it were knit together into a knot that death cannot loose. 
This knot of the heart (if we may take hridaya-ffranthif 
Mupd. 2, 2, 8; cf. Eäth. 6, 15, in this concrete sense, which 
howeyer is unsupported by any authority) is cut for the Sage, 
and while at death others do indeed enter into the highest 
Godhead, yet they do so in such a way that a germ remains 
over for the new existence, which consists in this very ap- 
paratus, folded up and charged with the works of each par- 
ticular life (aboTe pp. 340. 373), thus while in them the seed- 
powers just named remain over as a residue (p. 1103, 3), the 
resolution of the dying sage into Brahman, on the contrary, 
takes place without residue {niravofesha) and he enters into 
indiTisibility with all his parts (p. 1103, 4). For thus says the 
scripture (Pra^na 6, 5): 

''Just as those flowing rivers, which take their course to 
"the ocean, when they have reached the ocean, come to rest, — 
** their names and forms perish and they are now called ocean 
"only—just so too the sixteen parts of the all-beholder [of 
"him who possesses the Samyagdarganam] which take their 
"course to the Spirit (purusha% after they have reached the 
" Spirit, come to rest, their names and forms perish, and they 
"are then called Spirit only; this is that partless, immortal 
" one." 

Br the ''sixteen parts" Qankara here understands ''the In- 
^driyaa called Pram and the Elements" (p. 1102, 4), of which, 
however, according to his system there are seventeen. In the 
passage of the Pra^na the following parts are originally meant: 
1. Pr&na, 2. Qraddhä, 3. Ether, 4. Air, 5. Fire, 6. Water, 
7. Earth, 8. the ten Indriyas, 9. Manas, 10. Food, 11. Force 
(viryam\ 12. Asceticism, 13. the Mantras of the Veda, 14. Works, 
15. the Worlds, 16. the Name. 

430 Fiftb and last Part: Mokiba or the Teaching of Liberation. 

3. Can the Liberated assume a new Body? 

An episode in 3, 3, 32, deals with the qnestion, wheUier 
the Sage, after his body has tamed to dost, can again 
assume a new body (p. 913, 2)? — True it is that from know- 
ledge (and we must here understand Samyagdarganam p. 915. 1) 
proceeds absoluteness (kaivalyam) yet the Itihasas and Puranas 
relate how some knowers of Brahman have yet come again to 
embodiment (p. 913, 7); thus Ap&ntaratamaSy VanäMkOj Bhrigu, 
SanaikumärOy Däksha, Närada and others (p. 913), as too 
SuldbhA during her life temporarily left her body (p. 915, 8 . 
and others again inhabited several bodies at the same time 
(p. 914, 2). Hence one might conclude that the knowledge of 
Brahman sometimes leads to liberation and sometimes oot 
(p. 914, 5); but that is not so; for if those whom we hare 
named returned to bodily existence, it was in fulfilment of a 
mission {adhikära)^ e.g. to promote the spread of the Veda 
for the good of the world (p. 914, 6). ^ As yonder holy Saviidr 
^(the sun), after hanng fulfilled his earthly mission through a 
^thousand world-periods, at length neither rises nor sets, ba; 
^enjoys absoluteness — as the scripture (Chand. 3, 11, 1) savs: 
'''but then after he has risen up, he will no longer rise nor 
'"set, but stand alone in the centre' [a prophesy fulfilled since 
"Copernicus], — and as also the living knowers of Brahman, 
"after the fruit of actions already entered on has been ex- 
''hausted, enjoy absoluteness, as it is said (Chand. 6, 14 2. 
"translated above p. 266): 'to this [world of action] I shall 
"'only belong until I am liberated, then shall I return home.* 
"—as we must assume that those glorious ones also, Apäti- 
^taratamas and others entrusted by the Most Glorious with 
"this or that mission, in spite of the fact that they possessed 
"full knowledge which is the condition of perfection, continaed. 
"their works not [yet] disappearing, so long as the mission 
"lasted, and [only] after its completion were they dispensed 
"therefrom** (p. 914, 8^915, 2). Wherein, we must assume, 
that, besides the work committed to them, no further work 
came into existence which could have served as the seed of a 
new life, as otherwise their liberation would have become 

XXXYIL TU ajiBf S^>e. 4SI 

illusory (p. 916, 11). But thmt libentioii should ooiM to «ft 
end, is Qnthinkable after the works, which mre the seed of 
fature existence, haye been burnt ap by the fire of knowledge; 
as the Smriti says (the first Terse in BhagaTadgiti 4^ 37): — 

*Ai fiery best to saliM tama tlie wood 
■'By knowledge mre all woito to aabee toived— 
■'At teed when it it bomt csn grow no morOi 
««So tbe Sool'a aufferiagt, by knowledge bemf* 

XXXVm. Condition of the Sage after Death. 

1. Entrance into the highest Light 

Ik the passage Ch&nd. 8, 7 — 12 (discussed chap. XII, 3, 
aboTe p. 183 ff.), with reference to the Soul that has become 
one with Brahman, whether temporarily, in deep sleep, or, 
— which is the case here — in the final condition of liberation 
after death, it is said (8, 12, 1 — 3): 

^ Of a truth this body is mortal, mighty one, and subject 
"to death; it is the dwelling place for that immortal bodiless 
"Self. The embodied is subject to pleasure and pain; for 
"because he is embodied no warding off of pleasure and of 
"pain is possible. But pleasure and pain touch not the bodi* 
"less. Bodiless is the wind; the cloud, the lightning, the 
"thunder are bodiless. Now as these arise from cosmic space 
" [in which they, like the soul in the body, are fettered], enter 
"into the highest light and thereby stand forth in their proper 
"forms, so also arises this perfect peace [that is, the 
"soul, properly in deep slumber, here in liberation] out of 
"this body, enters into the highest light and thereby 
"stands forth in its own proper form; that is the supreme 

One might think, so Qankara develops the thought 4, 4, 1—3, 
that by this "standing forth in its own proper form** some» 
thing new is added to the Soul, because after all liberation 
is also a fruit (reward), because this standing forth means a 
becoming something, and because its own proper form too was 
already proper to it in its former conditions (waking, dream, 
and deep sleep), from which its present condition is however 
different (p. 1137, 7). — But that is not so; the new condition 

XXXVni. Condition of the Htige after Death. 433 

consist»- rather in this, that the Soul, in its mere Self, without 
any other quality, becomes manifest; for '^its own proper form** 
denotes not a form which accidentally (ägantuka) belongs to 
the Self, but that form which the Self is, according to its own 
nature (p. 1138, 6). Liberation is a fruit only in this negative 
sense, that bondage is annihilated, not as if it had reference 
to the appendage of an Apurvam (aboTe p. 377) (p. 1139, 5); 
farther the standing forth is only a becoming in the sense 
that it is a cessation of the former state, as becoming healthy 
is only a cessation of sickness (p. 1139, 6); and the difference 
from its preyious existence consists in this, that the Soul up 
to that time, as the Chandogya passage describes it above, is 
affected with blindness, grief, and mortality, whilst now, liber- 
ated from its former blindness, it abides in its pure Self 
(p. 1138, 10). Accordingly the light, into which the Soul 
enters, is no created light (p. 1139, 12), for such light, like all 
created things would be afflicted; "what is different from 
*him is afflicted," as the scripture says (Brih. 3, 4, 2, above 
p. 142); rather that light is the very Self, the Ätman, of which 
it is said (Brih. 4, 4, 16, above p. 195) : 

"Him 'neath whose feet time^a rolling stream of days and year rolls past, 
"In whom all beings' fivefold host, with Space itself stands fast 
"Whom Gods as Light of Lights adore as Immortality, 
"The Brahman know I as my deathless Self, for I am he." 

2. Characteristics of him who has obtained 


From ,the passage quoted we also learn the characteristics 
of the liberated, as is said (Chand. 8, 7, 1, above p. 183): — 

^The Self, the sinless, free from death and free from suffer- 
"ing, without hunger and without thirst, whose wishes are 
^true, whose decree is true, that Self is to be sought out» 
'^that Self one must seek to know." 

In these predicates, to which are added omniscience and 
omnipotence, consist according to Jaiminif the characteristics 
of the liberated (p. 1141). 

On the other hand, Audulomi takes exception to the 
plurality of these predicates and thinks they can denote only 


434 Fifth and last Fart: Moksha or the Teaching of Liberation. 

negatively the freedom from all evil, while to the Atman as 
its only positive quality, belongs spirituality {caitanyamj 
(p. 1142, 5). Further, the attributes ^of true wish and of true 
" decree" cannot, he thinks, be conceived, apart from connection 
with the Upädhis, and can only serve, like the succeeding 
passage in Chand. loc. cit., wherein even laughing and playing 
are spoken of, to indicate freedom from all evil (p. 114S, 12). 
Hence the entire passage must mean that the Atman, * after 
^having cast off without exception the world of plurality, 
^stands forth in the unspeakable Self of Knowledge." 

Thus think Jaimini and AudtUomi, while Bädaräyana finds 
no contradiction between these two conceptions, since he regards 
as reconcilable (p. 1143, 5) (though in what sense it is not 
explained) the pure spirituality ascribed to the Atman, in the 
sense of the highest reality (päramärthika), and the lordship 
in Brahman predicated of it in the empirical sense (vyavor 
hära^apekskayä) [in other words the esoteric and exoteric 
doctrines] (p. 1143, 5). 

3. The Unio mystica. 

All that is changeable ultimately leads back to an un- 
changeable, to discover and learn to know which is the whole 
problem of metaphysics; wherefore in the domain of meta- 
physics there can be no becoming. For this reason too it 
cannot admit any union in the proper sense of the word: that 
which in its very nature is two, can never become one; that 
only can become one, which was one already, the comprehen- 
sion of which as two before, depended on an error. After 
knowledge has removed this error, and after the dissolntioc 
of the body, connected with it, has taken away the last sem- 
blance of it, then the eternally existent unity comes forth. In 
pointing to this unity the last word of Metaphysics has been 
spoken, a word which, from the very nature of the topic, u 

One must not imagine, says Qankara p. 1140, because in 
the last mentioned passage from the Chandogya an entering 
into, a circulating, etc. is spoken of, that the Soul therefore 

XXXVUL Condition of the Sage after Death. 435 

still exists separate from the highest Atman. The condition 

of the liberated is rather that of indiyisibility; for thus teach 

the words of the scripture: (Chand. 6, 8, 7) "That art thou;" 

(Brih. 1, 4, 10) «I am Brahman;" (BriL 4, 3, 23) «there is no 

second there, no other, different from him;" and for the 

elucidation of this state of indinsibility serre the similes, 

Eä(h.4, 15: 

"Ab water itill remaineth pure, 
''When into water pure ^tii poured, 
"E'en 10 'til with the Sage't bouL" 

and Mupd. 3, 2, 8 (cf. Chand. 6, 10, 1. Pra^na 6, 5, above 

pp. 264. 429):— 

''Ai rirert run and in the deep 
«Lose name and form, are lost to sight, 
''The Sage released from name and form, 
«Entert the highest spirit of light." 

The separation between the supreme and the individual Soul, 
which here seems to find expression, is not to be taken as 
such; this also the scripture indicates, when it is said 
(Chand. 7, 24, 1, above p. 203): ** Wherein, holy one, does 
«he stand? — He stands in his own majesty.'* 


XXXIX. The Passing of the Pious to BrahmaiL 

1. The Characteristics of the Pions. 

In the Doctrine of the Five Fires (chapter XXX), a dis- 
tinction is drawn between those who perform pious works and 
thereby are led along the Pitriy&na to their reward in the 
beyond and then to a new life upon earth, and those ^who 
^ know this, and those others who in the forest practise Faith 
^'and Penance (Brih.: Truth);" these latter ascend upward 
upon the Devayana and enter into Brahman, whence there ii 
no return (above p. 363). — Obviously, in the belief of the 
original authors of the doctrine entering into Brahman wis 
the highest goal of man. This it could no longer remaio 
when once on the basis of passages like Brih. 4, 4, 6 (above 
p. 427) which from their position appear older and from their 
stage of development more recent than the doctrine of the 
five fires, the esoteric doctrine had been reached, accordine 
to which Brahman is without attributes (nirgtinam)^ empirical 
reality together with Samsara an illusion, and the individaai 
soul is completely identical with the highest From this 
standpoint there could no longer be any question of a passing 
of the soul into Brahman, but only a knowledge of its iden- 
tity therewith, in which knowledge, as we saw, liberation con- 
sists. In contrast with this liberation in the strict esoteric 
sense of the word, there now appeared, as a lower form« the 
exoteric union with the attribute-possessing ($agunam) Brah- 
man, attainable upon the Devayana by entering into Brahman. 
and it was therefore termed Kramamtüctiy that is, '^progressive 
liberation" or ''gradual liberation" (above p. 398); as the former« 
esoteric liberation is the fruit of the ParavidycL, that is, of 

XXXIX. The Passing of the Pious to Brahman. 437 

Samyagdarganam, so Kramamukti forms the reward of the 
Äparavidyä^ that is, of the knowledge of sagunam brahma, of 
Brahman as, clothed with attributes, it usually appears per- 
sonified as God (tQvara) and is accordingly the object of 
worship (upäsanä) for the pious. 

^The passing [to Brahman]," says Qankara, p. 909, 7, ''has 
''a purpose only in the worship through attributes, as for 
* instance in the teaching concerning the throne (Kaush« 1), 
'^in which the ascent to the throne, the conrersation with 
''Brahman seated on the throne, the attainment of various 
"sweet odours etc, is described, in short, various rewards, 
"which imply motion in space. Here a passing is in place; 
"but no such goal can be admitted in the case of Samyog^ 
'^darganam. For there is nothing more to expect for those 
^who, knowing their unity with Atman, have already obtained 
"their desire here and have burnt up the seed of all troubles 
"without leaving a residue, except the consumption of the 
"sum of works whose retribution has already begun, and thus 
"a passing is purposeless, just as in life the traveller, on 
"arriving in a village, enquires about his further journey [but 
"not one who has reached his journey's end, and as the sick 
"man has recourse to medicine] but not he who has attained 
"health. And so a passing has its purpose in the Sagund 
" Tidydh^ but none in the Nirgunä Paramatmc^vidy&P It 
is true, it is said further, that the Devayäna is only mentioned 
in certain Saguna Vidyäh^ as in the Baryankavidyd (Kaush. 1), 
Fäncägnividyä (Bpih. 6, 2. Chand. 5, 3—10, above p. 362), 
Upakosalavidyä (Chänd. 4, 10 — 15, above p. 166), Daharavidyä 
(Ch&nd. 8, 1 — 6, above p. 162); in others again not, as in the 
Jladhuvidyä (Brih. 2, 5 or Chand. 3, 1—11), QandUyavidyA 
(Chand. 3, 14, above p. 152), Shodagakalavidyä (Pragna 6, above 
p. 429), Vaifvänaravidyä (Chand. 5, 11— 24, above p. 156); "yet 
" the path named Devayäna is equally valid in all the Saguna 
Tidydh^ as they have as their fruit the attainment of ascent ^'^ 

<>* abhyudaya, which therefore here (p. 911, 3) denotes the J&ama- 
wmkti on the Devas/dna path, while in all other pauages where the word 
oeenra (p. 26, 2. 112, 5. 203, 5. 352, 4. 396, 7. 754, 1. 868, 4. 7. 1073, 11« 

438 Fifth and last Fart: Moksha or the Teaching of Liberation. 

If we look at the connection of our system as a whole, 
without letting ourselves be misled by isolated contradictioDB. 
we have, as is well known, in the first place two doctrines of 
Brahman, the esoteric, philosophical (paravidyä) and the 
exoteric, theological (aparavidya); and, corresponding to these. 
two paths to liberation; the one, upon which the Sage, possess- 
ing Samyagdaj'ganam, attains the goal, we have already become 
acquainted with; it consists in the consciousness of identity 
with Brahman and of the unreality of all plurality; the other 
exoteric path of Kramamukti is for all such as, while they 
do not cling to the service of works belonging to the old 
Yedic gods but to the doctrine of Brahman, are yet unable 
to see through this unreality of the phenomenal world; and 
consequently know Brahman, not as the Self within them- 
selves, but as the Godhead opposed to themselves and 
accordingly worship Brahman in pious meditation. (By wor- 
ship is in general to be understood "that which produces an 
^increase of faith accompanied by awe;" p. 1071, 4. 10: ufo- 
sanam näma sa-mana'pratyaya'pravaha-karanam). Still all 
worship of the conditioned Brahman has not Kramamukti as 
its fruit, but according to p. 112, 5 part Kramamtikti part 
Abhyiidaya (note 138), part the success of sacrifice; according 
to p. 815, 6 part Kramamukti, part Aigvaryam (note 138', 
part annihilation of sins; according to 4, 1, 4, p. 1061, the 

1099, 1), the teiD|)orary felicity of the Pitriyina is to be nnderttood by 
it, either with certainty or probability in all. — With similar inconsisteiicy 
it is maintained on p. 148, 5, that the fruit of the Saguna Yüyäk ii 
limited to Sam$ära\ and similarly on p. 1133, 14 that Ai^varyam {Q^^^ 
8, 2, 1) is a aamsdragoearam eva phidam^ just as on p. 815, 5 this tctt 
Ai^aryam is opposed to the Kramamtdetif of which, as we shall tee io 
chapter XL, it forms an integral part.~The same inconsistency, depend- 
ing upon imperfect revision, of the entire Kramamukti of the D € 9aydm 
expresses itself finally in the fact that exoteric knowledge is sometisct 
reckoned as Vtäyä, and sometimes as Avi^fd. Thus the exoteric kaom 
is repeatedly called, in the description of the Devaydma^ 'vidoaM" 
(p. 1096, 11. 1134, 11), while on p. 1095, 15 it is said of him, that be hsi 
not completely burnt up Avidyd; p. 1133, 15: amwurtUatvdd «eui^i^^i 
p. 804, 1: the üpädhU through which Brahman becomes 
are said to be avidyä'pratyypoitkäpita. 

XXXIX. The PMsiBg of the Pious to Brahman. 439 

worship of Brahman under any symbol (pratikam)^ for example, 
as Manas, Akä^a, Sun, Name, etc., does not lead to the know- 
ledge of Atman, and according to 4, 3, 15—16 these worship- 
pers of symbols do not attain the world of Brahman (p. 1136, 1), 
but receive as recompense the reward attributed to each 
symbol in Chand. 7, 2, 14. With the exception of these wor- 
shippers of symbols, all worshippers of the lower Brahman 
enter into Him upon the Devayana, according to Badarayai^a, 
whose authority is here expressly invoked (p. 1134, 9. 1135, 1). 

Besides these exoteric possessors of knowledge and wor- 
shippers occupy a middle position between the possessors of 
perfect knowledge and the performers of works; according to 
p. 1082, 11 they have not as yet passed beyond the sphere of 
actions and are therefore further bound to works; according to 
p. 1047, 10 their worship admits of a more and a less and 
thereby conditions various fruits; according to p. 1077, 8 the 
law (yidhänam) still subsists for them, and as reward for its 
fulfilment, lordship [of the world of Brahman] awaits them and 
freedom from evil. — 

A more sharply defined conception of the nature of the 
worshipper of the lower Brahman is not to be obtained from 
the available materials. We now turn to the consideration 
of the fate which awaits him after death. 


2. The Departure of the Soul of the Pious. 

Just as in the case of the performer of works, so too in 
that of the pious, when he dies, the Indriyas enter into Manas^ 
Manas into IVäna, Präna into the individual Soul, which^ 
clothed in the subtle body, withdraws itself into the heart, 
the point of which becomes luminous, to light up the road. 
But now comes the parting of the ways; of the 101 chief 
arteries of the body, 100 serve to lead forth the souls of the 
performers of works from the body in all directions and to 
cause them to enter upon the Pitriydna; the (exoteric) knower, 
on the contrary, rises by the 101st artery (note 130) to the 
head, whence he enters upon the Devayäna, (For details see 
above chapter XXXI, 2, 3, 5.) 

440 Fifth and last Part: Moksha or the Teaching of 

For this artery and the Son are according to Chänd. 8, 6, 2. 
(above p. 162), constantly connected by a ray (rofmi)^ ^as 
''two Tillages are by a road" and by this the knower ascends 
(p. 1105, 12). Whether it is day or night when he dies, ii 
all the same, since this connection of the artery with the raj 
persists as long as the body (p. 1106, 7). And that this ray 
is present even at night, can be perceived by the fact that 
in summer it is warm at night also; at other seasons it is 
less noticeable because the rays are too weak (p. 1106, 12> 
Were the ray not present at night one would have to assonM 
either that the knower can ascend even without a ray, — in 
that case the ray would be altogether superfluous, — or that 
some of the knowers, those, namely, who die at night time, do 
not ascend at all, whereby the fruit of knowledge would be- 
come conditional (päkshika); which cannot be admitted (p. 1107. 
1. 4). And further it cannot be assumed that he who dies at 
night awaits the return of day, because by then, as the body 
is burnt in the meanwhile, there may no longer be any body 
capable of connection with the ray (p. 1107, 6; whence it 
seems to follow that the burning of bodies followed quickly 
upon the occurrence of death; cf. the note above p. 352). 

On the same grounds (because waiting is impossible, be- 
cause the fruit of knowledge cannot be conditional, and because 
the time of death is not determined) we must assume, thftt 
the knower, even if he dies during the period when the days 
are decreasing, reaches the goal; and when the Smriti (Bhaga- 
vadgita 8, 23 ff.) teaches that only those who die in the day- 
time and in the half-year in which the days increase, do not 
return, it is to be noted that this refers only to the foUowen 
of Toga (above p. 19), and, since it rests only on the Smriti. 
this has no validity in a doctrine founded on the Qrati 
(p. 1108, 13)J) 

3. The Stages on the Path of the Gods. 

The Devayana, which leads the pious affcer death to Brah- 
man, has a series of stages, which are differently given in the 
different accounts. Thus in Chand. 8, 6, 6 (above p. 162) all 

XXXTX, The Pauing of the Pious to Brahman. 441 

that is said is that the Soul ascends from the artery to the 
son by a ray (ragmi)^ while on the other hand Chänd. 6, 10, 1 
(above p. 362) as also previously Chand. 4, 15, 5 (above p. 166) 
the following stages are given: 1. Flame (arcis), 2. the Day, 
3. the half-month in which the moon increases, 4. the half- 
year in which the days increase, 5. the Year, 6. the Sun, 
7. the Moon, 8. Lightning, 9. Brahman. — With this agrees the 
parallel passage £;'ih. 6, 2, 16 (above p. 363), only that no. 5 
is not ^the year" but *^the world of the Gods," and no. 7 
^the moon" is wanting. — On the other hand we find Kaush. 
1, 3, as stages of the Devayana quite different ones named: 

I. Agniloka^ 2. Vayuloka^ 3. VarundLokOj 4. Indraioka, 5. Prajä- 
patUoka, 6. Brahmaloka. 

In view of these condradictions Qankara (p. 1110 ff.) insists 
on the fact that there is only one DevayänUy and consequently 
that one must combine the different accounts. How in so 
doing he pictures the relation between the "ray," which in 
Chand. 8, 6, 6 connects the artery and the sun, and the stages 
1 — 6, which according to Chand. 5, 10, 1 lead to the sun, is 
not clear from his remark p. 1112, 7, that both are not mu- 
tually exclusive; he further identifies "the Flame" Chand. 
5, 10, 1 with Agniloka Kaush. 1, 3, inserts Väyuloka Kaush« 
1,3 between "Year" and "Sun" Chand. 6, 10, 1, and then 
again Devaloka Brih. 6, 2, 15 between "Year" and Väyvloka, 
and likewise finally Varunaloka, Indraloka, Frajäpatüoka from 
Kaush. 1, 3 between "Lightning" and "Brahman" Chand. 6, 10 
(p. lllSffl). We thus get the following order of the stages of 
the Devayana: 1. The Flame » J.^ni7ofta, 2. the Day, 3. the 
Fortnight in which the moon increases, 4. the Half-year in 
which the days increase, 5. the Year, 6. the World of the 
Gods, 7. Vaytdoka, 8. the Sun, 9. the Moon, 10. Lightning, 

II. Varunaloka, 12. Indraloka, 13. I^ajäpatüokOy 14. Brahman. 
Now what meaning have these stages for the ascending 

Soul? Are they sign-posts or places of enjoyment? To this 
must be answered: they are neither one nor the other, but 
guides who conduct the Soul to Brahman. For after the Soul 
has reached the Lightning, it is said (above pp. 166. 363) 
" there indeed is a man (spirit), who is not as a human being. 

442 Fifth and last Fart: Moksha or the Teaching of Liberation. 

^he leads it to Brahman;" whence it is to be inferred that 
the preceding spirits: Flame etc. are of human nature (p. 1117. 
6). For the Soul, in this condition, when all its organs are 
drawn in, is in need of guidance, somewhat like a dmnkeB 
man or one whose senses are confused; this guidance is under- 
taken by the Flame, the Day etc.; wherefore we must under- 
stand by them not the natural phenomena which serre as 
signposts, for they would be incapable of leading him, but the 
Gods presiding over them; and also for the reason that Flame, 
Day, etc., are not always present, and waiting is impossible, 
as we saw (above p. 440). For the same reason too the stages 
named are not places of enjoyment for the Soul, as the 
designation Loka (world, place of enjoyment) might seem to 
indicate; to other Souls which dwell in them, they may serre 
as such places of enjoyment, but the Soul which is ascending 
through them is deprived of its organs and hence not capable 
of enjoying (p. 1118). After the Soul has come to the Light- 
ning, it is led onwards by the ^man who is not like a human 
^* being'' into Brahman, through VarundLoTca, Indrcdoka, iVa- 
jäpaiüoka; these are in some way or other helpful, either by 
removing obstacles, or by some other assistance (p. 1119). 

4. Brahman as Goal of the Path. 

After the description of the Devayana in Brih. 6, % it is 
said in conclusion: "there in the worlds of Brahman they 
"dwell faraway; for such there is no return."— Which Brah* 
man are we to understand here, the real uncreated, highest 
Brahman as such, or the created Qcäryam)^ lower, attribute» 
possessing Brahman (p. 1119, 10)? 

To this Badari replies that the highest Brahman cannot 
be meant, because an entering into it is impossible, since 
it is omnipresent and is the inner Soul of him who goes 
(p. 1130, 1), because the plural "the worlds of Brahman** in- 
dicates plurality, which does not pertain to the highest Brah- 
man, and because the expression "World" (Jioka) denotes a 
place of enjoyment, into which one enters, and therefore some- 
thing changeable (p. 1120, 7). But this place is termed Brahman 

XXX Ix. The Passing of the Pioas to Brahman. 443 

because of its near relationship to Brahman; "for the highest 
"Brahman becomes the lower Brahman (p. 1121, 2), through 
"association with pure determinations (viguddha-upädhi-Bamban- 
^dhät), when one conceiyes of it, for the purpose of worship, 
"as connected with certain qualities of the created Brahman 
"as 'Manas is its substance'" (Chand. 3, 14, 2, above p. 152) 
etc. (p. 1121, 2). Like all that is created, the world of the 
lower Brahman perishes at last, but by then its inhabitants 
have attained Samyagdarganam, and thus they then enter, 
together ¥rith Hiranyagarbha, the ruler of the world of Brah- 
man, into the highest, perfectly pure (pariguddJia) Brahman, 
"that highest seat of Vishnu^' (Käth. 3, 9); this is the Kramü' 
muktij of which the Smriti says: — 

^^ After the world^s deliverance has come, 
"And with it God^s; in union with him, 
''All pious folk, attaining Selfhood go 
"With him into the fields of perfect hliss." 

With this interpretation of Bädari is contrasted, in what 
follows (p. 4, 3, 12 — 14) that of Jaimini, who insists that not 
the lower, but the higher Brahman is to be understood, whence 
it seems to foUow that he did not go beyond the doctrine of 
the Five Fires and hence did not recognise at all the esoteric 
metaphysics of the Yedanta. "Several" adhered according to 
p. 1124, 9 to this view of Jaiminiy among them probably the 
compiler of the Brahmasütras (above p. 24) as he otherwise 
would probably not have left to Jaimini the last word on a 
question so vitally important for the system. This deviation 
on the fact of a portion of the Yedanta school gives Qankara 
occasion for the beautiful digression p. 1124—1134, which we 
have translated in full above p. 109 — 115 and in which the 
esoteric metaphysics of the Yedanta find clearer expression 
than anywhere else. 

XL. Heavenly Lordsliip and Final Liberation 

of the Pious. 

Süira8 4, 4, 8-22. 

1. Lordship (aigvaryam). 

The condition of those who have entered into Brahmin 
by the Path of the Gods is indicated by the word, deriTed 
from igvara (Lord), Tiz. aifvaryam: that is, being Lord or 
God. As a description of this condition may be taken among 
others the passage Chand. 8, 2 (above p. 161), where is de- 
scribed how he who has attained freedom (kämacära) enjon 
the fulfilment of all wishes. Should he desire intercourse with 
the departed, with fathers, mothers, brothers, sisters, friends, 
should his mind desire after sweet odours and garlands, food 
and drink, song and music, or women, — ''whatsoeTer goal he 
»may desire, whatsoever he may wish, that ariseth for him at 
^his wish, and that he obtaineth; therefore is he glad*" 

If it be asked whether the mere wish alone suffices for 
the fulfilment of the wish, or whether, besides that, some other 
special means are needed, it is to be noted that the scripture 
mentions the wish only and no other means besides for its 
fulfilment (p. 1144, 10); if however such other means cooperate, 
then it is certainly without any trouble, and without its being 
possible for the wish to be frustrated; moreover, in contrast 
with earthly wishes, the fulfilment is here not a passing ont 
but endures as long as its purpose (the satisfaction of the 
wisher) demands it (p. 1144, 14). Upon this fact, that tht 
wishes of the liberated are not in vain, depends also their 

XL. Heayenly Lordship and Final Liberation of the Pioiu. 445 

freedom, since no one, if he can aroid it, chooses to remain 
under a ruler (p. 1145, 3). 

2. The Existence of those who haTe obtained 


The power of wishing possessed by the Blessed presupposes 
that they also possess Manas, the organ of wishing. Whether 
they are besides provided with a body and with senses, is 
doubtful. Bädari disputes it, because otherwise it ought not 
to be said by way of exclusion: "with Manas he beholds 
"^ those wishes and rejoices in the world of Brahman;" Jaimini 
on the other hand maintains it, appealing to the passage: 
^he is one, he is threefold," etc. (Chand. 7, 26, 2); being three- 
fold presupposes a bodily existence; and even if the passage 
quoted is taken from the Bhümavidyä, that is, from a nir- 
guna vidyä, yet the aigvaryam to which it refers belongs to 
the fruit of the sagunä vidyäh (p. 1146, 5). Bädaräyana, 
finally, assumes, that, because the scripture teaches both, 
those possessed of lordship can subsist at pleasure either in 
bodily or in bodiless form (p. 1146, 10); in the latter case 
the enjoyment of wishes must be conceived as taking place 
as in dreaming, in the former as in the waking state (p. 1146, 
15. 1147, 4). — But how are we to conceive existence in three 
or more bodies at once? Are they to be conceived as being 
all animated, or rather, since the Soul cannot multiply itself, 
as all soul-less except one, like automata (wooden machines, 
daruyantram)? The answer to this is: as one light can 
divide itself into several lights, so he who has attained lord- 
ship can be in different bodies simultaneously, as without 
this their moving would be impossible; his Atman rules them, 
entering into them by means of a division of the üpädJiis; 
just as indeed the books of Yoga teach such a connection of 
the Yogin with several bodies (p. 1148, 10; cf. above p. 68). 
— We must not bring forward here the passages which teach 
the *^ unity without a second" of the Atman (above p. 435) for 
the lordship here described is only the ripened fruit of the 
branches of knowledge that ascribe attributes (p. 1149, 13). 

446 Fifth and last Part: Moksha or the Teaching of Liberation. 

3. Limits of Lordship. 

The lordship of the pious in the beyond extends withoat 
restriction to everything, with the exception of the gOTem- 
ment of the world. They thus possess the prefectionsi^' 
connected with aigvaryam, and only the ruling of the world. 
that is, its creation, guidance and destruction, is reserred to 
the eternally perfect Igvara because he is once for all ap- 
pointed for it, and because the aigvaryam of the others has 
not subsisted from eternity, but has a beginning in time. 
Otherwise, too, unpleasantnesses might occur, in that, for 
instance, one might wish the continued existence of the world 
and another its destruction; so that there belongs to the 
highest Igvara a supremacy over the others, in that he has 
to bring their wishes into harmony (p. 1151, 1). Their Free- 
dom (sväräjyam) ^rests^' upon that of the highest Tgvara; into 
him, who in this sense is named ^the Lord of wishes" (manO' 
saspati) (Taitt. 1, 6, 2), the pious enter, so that his lordship 
is conditioned by that of the highest Igvara (p. 1161, 14;. 

When, in Rigv. X, 90, 3 (above p. 168), it is said: — 

"However great ii naturell majesty, 

^'The Spirit it yet higher raised by far, 

** Of it but one foot do all beings make, 

^ Three feet of him are immortality in heaven,^* 

two forms of the highest God are here spoken ot the o&t 
changeable, belonging only to the realm of change (mkara- 
matra-gocara) and one unchangeable, to which all changes 
return {vikära'ävartin)^ of which it is written (Käth. 6, 15U 
^ after him, the Shining, shine all things, from his light shines 
^this whole world." From these two forms of existence, the 
changeless and the changing {avikrüam and haryaim 

1S9 As an example of these, Qafikara names, on p. 1150, 8 as 
p. 31 4, 7, animan. According to Gaadapada on Safikhyakariki r. S3 
there are the following eight: 1. animan^ 2. [garimon and] lagkim» 
8. mdhiman, 4. prdpti, 5. präkamyam^ 6. vagitvam, 7. tgUocsm^ 8. yatr^ 
Mma-ava;&6yitvam\ for the explanation of these expretttoBS tee above 
p. 89. 

XL. Heavenly Lordship and Final Liberation of the Pions. 447 

brahma, p. 1119, 11), which for Qankara coincide with the 
attributeless and attribute - possessing conceptions, ^^^ 
the pions, because they have looked only to the attribute- 
possessing Brahman, attain to that conditioned Brahman 
only (p. 1152, 6), because their insight {kratu) reaches only 
to it. And as they hare not attained the higher, attribute- 
less, but only the lower, attribute-possessing Brahman, there- 
fore eren within the latter their power is not boundless, but 
limited (p. 1152, 8), and only in respect of enjoyment does 
their lordships equal that of the highest t^vara (p. 1153, 2). 

4. Final Liberation of the Pious. 

But if this is so, if the lordship of the pious is not un- 
surpassable (ta^atigaya)^ must it not then also be finite, so 
that its possessors at last return to earth- life? — To this 
answers ^the renerable B&daraya^a" in the last Sütram of 
the work: "Ao return according to Scripture, no return accord- 
^ing to Scripture.^'* And the meaning of this is: "Those who 
"through artery and ray attain to the world of Brahman 
"described in the scripture, by the stages of the Flame etc., 
"upon the Path of the Gods, where are the lakes Ara- and 
^-nyam^ in the world of Brahman, in the third heaven from 
"^here, where is the lake Airammadtyam and the fig-tree 
"^ Scmavasanaj and the stronghold of Brahman Aparäjitäy and 
"the golden palace IVdbhuiimitam (Chand. 8, 5, 3), as it is 
"* described in many hymns and explanations (cf. Kaush. 1, 
"3 — 5), — those who have attained to it, do not return hke 
"" those in the world of the moon, on the expiration of eujoy- 
"'inent: 'Immortality attains he who ascends by it' (Chand. 
"8, 6, 6), — *for them there is no return' (Brih. 6, 2, 15), — 
"^ 'those who enter thereupon, return not again to this world' 
"(Chand. 4, 15, 6),— 'he goes to the world of Brahman and 
"'returns not again' (Chand. 8, 15, 1),— as the scripture says. 
"But rather, even when their lordship comes to an end, they 

110 Upon this oonfasion of the phenomenal forma aud the forms 
of preaentation of Brahman compare above p. 206. 

448 Fifth and last Part: Moksha or the Teaehiog of Liberation. 

''do not return, but go, as shown (abore p. 442), when Übt 
^transformed [Brahman] ceases to exist, pass with the ruler 
^thereof into the highest Brahman. Namely, after the dark- 
^ness [of their Ignorance] has melted away in Samyagdar- 
^ganam, then^ as the highest goal there opens before them 
^the eternal, perfect Nirvänam; in this they take their refdge 
^and therefore for such also as place themselres under the 
^protection of the attribute - possessing Brahman, there if 
"verily no return," 


On the left «re the namben of the pages in Qefikare't work» on the 
right thote of oar work; n. «- note; * transkted. 

♦5, 1—12, 1 — 58 

12, 1— H 5 — 54 
*14, 5—16,1 — 54n. 
ne, 1 *4 — 55 

16, 4—17, 1 — 56 
♦17, 2—18, 4 — 56n. 
*18, 4—20, 5 — 57 n. 
•20, 5—8 == 56 n. 
•JO, 8—21, 7 — 54n. 
*21, 7—22, 3 — 58 

24 = 78 

26—28 = 82 

28, 3 =*= 79—82 
•32, 4—36, 1 — 126 
♦38. 2—5 — 123 

40-45 — 95ff. 

47-48 -= 94 

61—65 — 402 
♦64, 7ff. — 401 

66—71 — 408 

69-71 — 85 
'71. 9—72, 9 — 403 

74—77 — 406 

76, 2—77, 8 — 82ff. 
♦78, 6—79, 5—127 
•84, 5—88, 1 — 419 
•90, 2—8 — 123 

9f>-110 — 184 ff. 
♦107, 12 ff. — 337 

111—114 — 120 n. 
•Ill, 2—3 — 102 
♦112, 2—8 — 104 

114r-129 — 137 ff. 
129—134 — 140 ff. 

♦133, 7—12 — 103 
134-138 = 145 
138—142 = 147 
142—154 — 168 

*148, 2-6 = 104 
154—166 = 177 ff. 
166—177 = 153 ff. 
177—179 = 150 
179—185 — 171 
186—194 = 164 ff. 
194—199 — 149 
200—209 — 131 
209—223 = 156 ff. 
224—233 — 200 
233—242 = 201 ff. 
242—244 — 134 
244—248 — 198 ff. 
249—260 — 158 ff. 
260—271 — 183 ff. 
271—275 = 130 
275-279 = 155 
280, 1—286, 6 = 67-69 

♦286, 7—287, 2 — 69 
288-289, 9 — 71 

♦289, 10-297, 7 = 72-76 
297, 9—298, 3 — 71 

♦301, 6 — 94 n. 

♦303,1—304,2 = 70.229 

♦307, 3—8 — 65 n. 

♦309,11— 310,8 — 65 ff. 

♦313, 8-314, 8 — 38-39 
315, 6-323, 2 — 60-64 
323—326 — 148 
326—328 — 188 
328—330 — 146 
330—333 — 188 ff. 
834—354 — 870 ff. 

♦342, 2—10 — 228 
370—377 — 129 
378—385 — 181 ff. 
385—396 — 172 
396-403 — 223 ff. 

♦403, 6—9 — 93 
418-434— 250 ff. 274 ff. 

435, 11—436, 5 — 91 

436, 5—437, 10 — 91 
♦437, 11—438, 1 — 92 

438—439 — 92 

443—456 — 267 ff. 
♦443, 12 — 261 
♦448, 6—12 — 55 n. 

456—471 — 256 ff. 

471-475 — 253. 280 
♦473, 13—14 — 106 

475_479 — 225 

479—486 — 252. 277 
♦481, 13-482, 5 — 93 

486-487 — 227 ff. 

487—488 — 252. 278 

488—491 — 222 
♦490, 11—491, 2 — 106 

491—495 — 252. 279 


♦BOO, 8-502, B = 125 
507 = 236 

♦586, 7—9 = 237 n. 
557-558 = 281 

♦586—579 == 242 ff. 
586—591 = 307 

♦595, 8—11 -= 93 
605-625 = 232 ff. 

♦619, 8—621, 3 = 127 
625—636 » 235 

♦627, 4-628, 10 = 124 
636—638 =» 237 
638—641 « 236. 327 
641—647 » 293 ff. 
647—649 » 295 
650— 668 »=308 ff. 330 
66a-672 » 316 

♦673—676 = 317 ff. 
676-680 ^ 320 
680-684 » 321 ff. 

♦682, 3—7 =. 86 

♦683, 2-684, 1 » 823 
684—695 » 297 ff. 
701—708 » 328 
708—715 » 329 
716—724 = 333 ff. 
725—728 «"388. 66 
729—732 -= 836 
732—738 » 240 
739— 749 »»370 ff. 379 


743 »241 

♦1009, 4 — 84 

749—751 — 385 

1010—1021 = 84 

751—762 — 387 

1017-1034 = 411 

♦760—762 -= 391 ff. 

1021-1024 — 85 

762—769 » 382ff. 

1084-1041 = 148 

768-769 = 239 

1042—1045 =- 84 

769—777 « 394 ff. 

1042—1048 = 415 

772—774 = 238 

♦1047. 7-1048. 1«1Wl 

778—802 — 837 

1049— 1075 «413 ft 

♦786, 7-787, 5 — 86 

♦1064, B-8 =- 96 

♦787, 9 ff. = 825 

1075—1078 « 421 

803—838 » 205ff: 

1078-1079 ^ 423 

♦803, 3-804, 5 = 102 

1080 1081 « 424 

♦806, 9-11 = 103 n. 

1081-1085 = 412n. 

♦815, 5—7 =- 104 n. 

1085-1086 - 436 

838—842 s= 877 

1087—1093 — 367ff 

♦843, 4^-844, 5 « 95 

1093-1098 «870 ft 375 

866 868 — 187 

1098—1103 « 427t 

♦867, 12-868, 8 -= 103 

1103—1105 « 379 

♦909, 7ff. — 437 

1105—1109 -« 440 

913—917 = 430 

1110—1119 — 441 

♦917, 5ff. « 418 n. 

1119-1124 — 442 

922-924 — 141 ff. 

♦1121, 1-4 - 108 

♦953 = 25 n. 


♦954—957 =» 287 ff. 

1134—1136 « 439 

973—988 =» 405ff. 

1137-1139 - 432 

984 == 376 

1140 »434 

1006-1012 c 411 

1141-1143 - 433 

♦1007, 1—3 » 88 n. 

1143-1153 ^ 444ft 

♦1008, 5—9 — 88 

♦1153-1156 - 44T 


I. Short Surrey of the YedlnU Systral. 
II. Index of all Qaotationi in Qa&kere^B CommenUry on the Brahma« 


III. Index of proper Kamei in Qa&kara's Commentary, 
ly. Terminology of the Ved&nta, etc. 


L Short Survey of the Vedanta System. 

1. Introdactory. 

§ 1. The fundamental thought of the Vedanta, most hriefly 
expressed by the Vedic words: tat tvam ash "that art thou" ^^^^'J*" 
(Chand. 6, 8, 7) and aham hrahma asmiy "I am Brahman" y«dtau. 
(Brih. 4, 10), is THB Identity of Brahbiak and the Soul ; 
this means that Brahman, i.e., the eternal principle of all 
Being, the power which creates, sustains and again absorbs 
into itself all worlds, is identical with the Atmant the Self or 
the Soul, ie., that in us which we recognise, when we see 
things rightly, as our very self and true essence. This soul 
of each one of us is not a part, an emanation of Brahman, 
but wholly and absolutely the eternal, indirisible Brahman 

§ 2. The statement contradicts experience {vyavahära)^ coat»- 
which shows us not that unity, but a plurality (nänätvam)^ an ,***^' J^ 
extension (prapatica) of names and forms (näma^^pej i.'e.j 
impressions of ear and eye, sense-impressions) and as a part 
of them our own Self in the form of our created and perish- 
able body. 

§ 3. But the fundamental dogma of the Yedanta is equally oonte». 
in contradiction with the canon of Vedic ritual; this it is true ^^"^^^f 
teaches the continued existence (vyatireka) of the soul after woru. 
the body, but it assumes a plurality of indiridual souls different 
from Brahman; they are entangled in unceasing transmigration 
{samtära) and at the death of each body pass into a new 

464 Appendix. 

body; iu this process the works (karman) of anyone life eoD- 
dition inexorably the succeeding life and its nature. 

ignoTMio« § 4. Both experience, as a result of worldly means of 
*"i»Sr^' cognition (pramänam) — perception {pratyaktihafn)^ inferenee 
(anumänam) etc. — , and the canon of the Vedic ritual with its 
commands and prohibitions, promises and threats rest on false 
knowledge (mühyärjnänam), an innate illusion (bhrätiUjj which 
is called Avidyä, Ignorance; what it tells us is, like the pic- 
tures of a dream, only true till the awakening comes. This 
innate Ävidyä is more accurately described by saying that 
the Ätman, the Soul, the Self is unable to distinguish itself 
from the Upädhis or limitations (t. e., the body, the psychic 
organs and works) with which the Soul is clad, and of which 
only a part — the body — is annihilated in death, the rest ac- 
companying the Soul on its migrations. — ^This Ävidyä is the 
contrary of Vidyäj knowledge, also called perfect knowledge 
(samyagdarganam), by yirtue of which the Ätman distinguishes 
itself from the Upädhis, and recognises that they are dependent 
on Ävidyä, a glamour (mäyä) or an illusion (Miimäna); while 
it is itself identical with the one Brahman, without a second, 
who comprehends all things in Himsel£ 

sonre« of § 6. Samyogdarganam, perfect knowledge can neither be 
^'**^***^* produced by worldly means of knowledge {pratyaksiiawiy amir 
manam, etc.), nor commanded by the canon of the Veda as a 
duty, because both are rooted in Ävidyä and do not lesd 
beyond it. The only source of Yidyä is rerelation, Qnäx 
(which we, not quite correctly, generally term "Scripture^) 
i.e., the Yeda, and of this in particular the part of know- 
ledge (jfldna-kända) which exists side by side with the psrt 
of works (karma-kända); and contains certain texts scattered 
through the Mantras and Brähmanas] but more especiiUj 
formed in the concluding chapter of the latter, the VedäMU 
(end of the Yeda), known as the Upanishads. — The whole ct 
the Yeda without distinction, that is the whole body of Jlsii- 
tras (Hymns and formulas) and Brähmanas (theological ei- 
planations) together with the Upaniskads is of diTine origin; it 

L Short Surrey of the Tedinte Syetem. 466 

was ^'breathed oat" by Brahman and only ''beheld" by the 
human authors (fishis). The world and the Oods with it pass 
away but the Veda is eternal; it outlasts the destruction of 
the world and continues to exist in the spirit of Brahman; in 
accordance with the words of the Veda, which contain the 
eternal archetypes of things, gods, men, animals, etc. are 
created by Brahman at the beginning of each world period; 
thereupon the Veda is reyealed to them by "Expiration" — the 
part of works as a canon of actions which hare happiness 
(abhyudaya) as their object, the part of knowledge as the 
source of Samyagdarfanam, the only fruit of which is bliss 
inihfreyasam) i. e^ liberation. — ^Perfect knowledge is not attain- 
able by reflection (tor&a), and just as little by tradition or 
Smriti (including the Vedic Sutras, Kapila, Manu, the Mahft- 
bhäratam, etc.); both of these, reflection and Smriti, can only 
in a secondary sense be considered a source of truth, so far 
as they are directed to the Veda and serve to clear up and 
complete its revelation. 

2. Theology. 

§ 6. The aim of man (pumsha-artha) is liberation (mok8ha)Bii^n9Ad 
i. e., the cessation of transmigration (samaära); and the ^ ^l^^^KMwi^Lra 
of the soul from its wanderings is brought about by man's 
own Self (dtman) being recognised as identical with the highest 
Self (parama^ätman)y t. e., the Brahman. The whole content 
of Vidyä is therefore knowledge of the Ätman or Brahman 
(they are interchangeable ideas). — But there are two sorts of 
knowledge of Brahman — the higher knowledge (pard vidyä); 
its aim is Samyagdarfanam and its one and only fruit is 
liberation; and the lower knowledge (apard vidyd) which 
does not aim at the knowledge but at the worship (updsand) 
of Brahman; it brings as its fruit, according to the steps of 
this worship, in part the prospering of works (karma^samriddhi)^ 
in part happiness {abhyudaya^ heavenly, perhaps also in the 
following birth), and finally in part kramamxiktiy i.e., gradual 
liberation. — ^The object of the higher knowledge is the higher 
Brahman {param hrahma) and of the lower the lower 
Brahman {aparam hrahma). 

466 Appendix. 

Higher and § 7. For the Scripture distinguishes two formB (rüpe) of 
BnhmL. Brahman; the higher, attributeless (param^ nirgunam) md 
the lower attribute-possessing (oparam, sagtinam) Brah- 
man. In the former case it is taught that Brahman is with- 
out any attributes (guna)^ differences (vife8ha)y forms {äkäray 
and limitations (upädhi) — in the latter, for the puipose of 
worship many attributes, differences, forms, and limitations are 
ascribed to him. 

Diff«r«ie» § 8. One and the same object cannot be at the same 
^*^Mm^ time with and without attributes, and with and without foim; 
in Himself (svatas) Brahman is therefore without attributes, 
forms, differences, and limitations; and this higher Brahman 
becomes the lower when Ignorance (avidyä) for the porpose 
of worship ascribes to him the limitations or Upädhis. That 
Brahman is subject to Upädhis is only an illusion (bhrama), 
just as much as it is an illusion to hold a ciystal for red i& 
itself because it is painted red. As the clearness of the crystal 
is not changed by the red colour, so the essence of Brahmaa 
is not altered by the limitations ascribed by Ignorance. 

Thtbigh«r § 9. The higher Brahman is in his own nature attri- 
«amot b« buteless (nirgunam), formless (niräharam)^ and without diffe^ 
pwetiTtd. ences (nirvigesham) and limitations (nirupäihikam). It is ^not 
'^ coarse, and not fine, not short, and not long," etc. (Bph. 
3, 8, 8); ''not to be heard, not to be felt, not formed, imperisb- 
''able" (Eäth. 3, 15); it is "not thus and not thus" (neti, näu 
Brih. 2, 3, 6) ; i, 6., no shape and no idea corresponds to its 
real being. Therefore it is "different from what we knov, 
"and from what we do not know" (Kena 1, 3); "the words 
"and thoughts turn back from it and find it not" (Taitt S,4); 
and the sage BäJiva met the question as to its essence bj 
silence (above p. 210). 

xtsMM of § 10. The only assertion that can be made of tike mttn- 

Bnhu^' buteless Brahman is that it is not not In this sense it is 

"the Existent" (sat)] but if this conception is taken in its 

empirical sense, Brahman is rather "the non-Ezistent" — The 

I. Short Survey of the Yed&nU System. 467 

Scriptare further defines the essence of Brahman as through 
and through pure spirituality (intelligence, eaitanyam) just 
as the lump of salt tastes salt through and through. But by 
this two characteristics (plurality) are not ascribed to Brah- 
man, because both are identical, so far as the essence of 
Being consists in spirituality, and of spirituality in Being. 
Bliss, änanda [attributed to Brahman as a third predicate 
by the later Vedänta in the name Sac-cid-änanda] is occasion- 
ally recognised as a limitation of the attributeless Brahman; 
it remains unmentioned howerer in the discussion of his being, 
perhaps because it can be regarded as a merely negatire 
quality, as painlessness, which is ascribed to Brahman alone, 
for ^what is different from him is afflicted'' (ato 'nyad äriam) 
as the Scripture (Brih. 3, 4, 2) says. 

§ 11. That the attributeless Brahman cannot be perceired Bnhmu 
depends on the fact that he is the inner Self {antar^&lman) ^ ^* *^*^ 
of all; as such he is on the one hand the greatest certainty 
of all and cannot be denied by anyone; on the other hand He 
is not to be perceired because in all perception He is the 
Subject {B6k8hin\ and can therefore nerer become the object 
— He is howeyer beheld by the sages in the state of Sam'^ 
r&ihanam (perfect satisfaction), which consists in a withdrawal 
of the organs from all external things, and a concentration 
on their own inner nature. On the consciousness of being 
this attributeless Brahman and on the accompanying conyiction 
of the unreality of all plurality of names and forms depends 

§ IS. The higher Brahman becomes the lower Brah-xh^iow« 
man by being connected with pure {viguMha) or perfect B»iun«n. 
{niraiiQaya) limitations. The lower Brahman is to be recognised 
wherever the Scripture ascribes limitations, attributes, forms 
or differences of any sort to Brahman. This happens when 
the aim is not knowledge but worship (upd^and), and the fruit 
of this worship is, like that of works, which are to be placed 
in the same category, not liberation {mdksha^ mhgreyatam) but 
happiness; this is, as it seems, mainly heayenly; it is howeTer 

458 Appendix. 

limited to the Samara (p. 148, 6) though the heafenly lord- 
ship (aifvaryam) attained after death by the path of the gods 
(devayäna) as a result of the worship of the lower Brahmiui 
leads by means of Kramamukti or gradual liberation to perfect 
knowledge and therefore complete liberation. This result hov- 
ever does not follow immediately, because the worshippers of 
the lower Brahman have not completely ^ burnt up" Ignorance; 
for it is this which ascribes the limitations to the higher Bnh- 
man and transforms it into the lower Brahman. The nature 
of Brahman is as little changed by these limitations as (in 
the already mentioned simile) the clearness of the crystal by 
the colour with which it is painted — as the sun by its images 
swaying in the water — as space by bodies moving or burning 
in it. — The richly developed ideas of the lower Brahman may 
be divided into three groups, according to whether they regard 
Brahman pantheistically as world soul, psychologically 
as principle of the individual soul, or theistically as a pa- 
sonal God. 

Th« lower § 13. The most important passages of the first group are 
Br»hm»a Chäud. 3, 14 which terms Brahman ^ all- working, all-wishing, 
■ouL *^ all-smelling, all-tasting [the principle of all action and sen- 
''suous perception], embracing the All, silent, ungrieved" (above 
p. 153); and Mu^d. 2, 1, 1 according to which sun and moon 
are his eyes, the cardinal points his ears, the wind his breath 
etc. (above p. 132). We bring under the same head Brahman 
as source of all light (p. 130); as the light beyond the skv 
and in the heart (p. 169); as the ether from which all things 
proceed (p. 145), and which holds asunder names and fonns 
(p. 146); as the life from which go forth all beings (p. 146). 
in which the whole world trembling moves (p. 148); as the 
inner ruler (p. 149) as the principle of the world-order; the 
bridge, which holds these worlds asunder that they do not 
blend (p. 162), by which sun and moon, heaven and earth, 
minutes, hours, days and years are kept apart (p. 133); finally 
as destroyer of the world, who swallows up all created things 
(p. 161). 

I. Short Snnrey of the YedlnU Syrtem. 459 

§ 14. With the dimensions expressed bj these ideas is tii« lown 
often contrasted the smallness which belongs to Brahman as ^'^^. 
psychic principle; as such he dwells in the stronghold of the dMisoia. 
body (p. 199), in the lotus of the heart (p. 160), as a dwarf 
(p. 60), a span large (p. 156), an inch high (p. 166), smaller 
than a grain of millet (p. 153), large as the point of an awl 
(p. 311), as principle of life (pp. 177, 182) as onlooker (p. 171); 
also as the man in the eye (pp. 140, 165) etc. 

§ 15. These ideas which assign attributes to Brahman Th« loww 
culminate in the conception of Him as Igvara, u 0., personal ^'**'*^ 
God. In the Upanishads this idea is relatively rare and little ood. 
dcTeloped (e,g., Iga 1; Brih. 4, 4, SS above p. 196; Kaush. 3, 8; 
Eäth. 4, 12); in the system of the Vedanta on the other hand 
it plays an important part; it is Igvara by whose permission 
Saipsära, and by whose grace {frasäda^ anugraha) the saving 
knowledge is conditioned; He decrees for the soul its works 
and sufferings, taking into consideration in this the works of 
the previous life, and causing the fate in the new life to pro- 
ceed from them as the rain produces the plant from the seed 
after its nature. The personification of Brahman as Igvara, 
Lord, Ruler, to whom is opposed the world as that which is 
to be ruled, is expressly limited to the standpoint rooted in 
Ignorance of worldly action, which has no reality in the highest 
sense (above p. 272). 

3. CoBmology. 

§ 16. The dual knowledge (aparä and para vidyä) ofTiMeapir- 
Theology (and as we shall see of Eschatology) has as ^^„m^^^ 
counterpart in the spheres of Cosmology and Psychology the «i uuma- 
dual standpoint: — the empirical {vyavahäroravasthäy literally, '^^^ 
standpoint of worldly action) which teaches a creation of the 
world by Brahman and a wandering of the soul rendered in- 
dividual by the Upadhis; and the metaphysical (paramärthO' 
avadhä, literally, standpoint of the highest reality) which 
maintains the identity of the soul with Brahman, and denies all 
plurality, and therefore the validity of the ideas of the creation 
and existence of the world, as well as the individuality and 

460 Appendix. 

wanderings of the soul.— To the detriment of clearness and 
logic this dual standpoint in Psychology and Cosmology is not 
always strictly adhered to. The system takes up the meta- 
physical standpoint as a rule and neglects the empirical, with* 
out however denying or being able to deny its relatire right 
of existence, it being the indispensable presupposition for the 
aparä vidyä of Eschatology. This apard vidyä treats the 
creation in the Cosmology very fiilly and regards it as real, at 
the same time we meet with the assertion again and again that 
tliis scriptural doctrine of the creation has only the purpose of 
teaching the Brahmanhood of the world; to support this view 
the idea of causality is transformed into that of identity; in 
Psychology the metaphysical doctrine of the identity of 
Brahman and the world is always in the foreground, and is 
defended against an opponent who generally speaking upholds 
the empirical standpoint indispensable for the Eschatology of 
the system, but also (e^g., in maintaining the creation of the 
soul) deviates from it, so that the relative recognition and i^ 
propriation of his arguments only concerns a part of them« 
and a complete theory of the empirical psychology is thus 
wanting. Still by bringing together occasional and scattered 
assertions a reliable picture of this part of the system too 
may be obtained. 

B«i«tionof § 17. The coherence of the system may prove to us that 

idndTof ^^® P^^^ vidyä in Theology and Eschatology forms with the 

^3M^u^9 paramärthchavasthä in Cosmology and Psychology an insepar- 

poiiito of* ^^^® unity of metaphysical doctrine; and that on the other 

▼i«w. hand the aparä vidyä of Theology and Eschatology with the 

vyavähära-avasthä of Cosmology and Psychology a connected 

picture of metaphysics viewed from the empirical standpoint 

of Avidyä (i. e., innate realism) and forms a system of popular 

religion for all those who cannot raise themselves to the stand* 

point of the doctrine of identity. — And it is clear that only 

a lower, not a higher Brahman can be conceived as creator 

of the world, firstly because the act of creation, as has been 

repeatedly insisted on, requires a plurality of powers (above 

p. 327), which can only be ascribed to the aparom brahman 

I. Short Survey of the Vedäntn System. 461 

and farther, because the passage bj which this plurality of 
creative powers is proved: ^all-working is he, all-wishing, all- 
*^ smelling, all- tasting" (Chand. 3, 14, 2) receives the preference 
as a proof of the doctrine of the lower Brahman. 

§ 18. According to the Upanishads Brahman creates the woria- 
world and then as individual soul {anena jivena ätmanä) enters '* ^ 
into it (Chand. 6, 3, 3. Taitt. 2, 6. Brih. 1, 4, 7. Kaush. 4, 20). 
There is no question either of an existence of individual souls 
before the creation, or of a periodically repeated creation. — 
In this view the germs of the empirical and metaphysical 
doctrine of the Vedanta are present in an undeveloped form 
side by side; the metaphysical part is the identity of the soul 
with Brahman, the empirical the extension of the world of 
sense. In the Vedanta system the two are separated; meta- 
physically we have the identity of the soul with Brahman 
but neither origin, persistence, nor destruction of the world; 
empirically on the other hand we have a creation of the 
world but no identity of Brahman and the soul; on the con* 
trary the individual soul with the Upadhis, which cause its 
individuality, has existed from all eternity and migrates (ex- 
cept in the case of liberation) from one body to another to 
all eternity; and the dogma of the creation of the world is 
transformed into that of a periodically alternating emanation 
of the world from Brahman and reabsorption in it; these 
processes repeat themselves not once only but countless times 
throughout eternity. Souls, like the elements, continue to 
exist, at the reabsorption of the world, potentially and as 
seed in Brahman, and at each new creation go forth from 
Him unchanged. The original sense of the doctrine of creation 
is thus completely abandoned; it is adhered to, in the modi- 
fied form in question, simply because the Veda teaches it; in 
the system there is a motive not for a creation of the world, 
but rather for its eternal duration; in place of this (to save 
the authority of Scripture) we have the periodical creation 
and reabsorption, which however must incessantly be repeated, 
and are not permitted to alter the order of the world; this 
is to satisfy the condition of eternal existence demanded by 

462 Appendix. 

the system, and is as we shall see, dependent on a moral 

TiM world § 19. The fundamental idea of the empirical Cosmology 
be^L^ ^^^ Psychology is that Saqis&ra (transmigration) has no 
beginning. There exists from eternity a plurality of in- 
dividual souls different from Brahman. What distingoiahes 
them from Brahman (with whom they are in the metaphysical 
sense identical) is the üpädhis in which they are clothed; by 
Upadhis are understood, in addition to the works, which ac* 
company the soul, the psychic organs (itidriyas, manas, mukhya 
präna\ the subtle body {sühahmam gariram) which bears them, 
and, in a more extended sense, occasionally the gross body 
together with external objects. Only the gross body is an- 
nihilated by death; the subtle body on the other hand with 
the psychic organs has existed from eternity as the Testment 
of the soul and accompanies it on all its wanderings. And 
the wandering soul is further accompanied by the works (ritual 
and moral) performed by it during life; and it is just these 
which prevent Saipsara from coming to a standstill. For every 
deed, good and evil, demands retribution, and therefore reward 
and punishment, not only in the Beyond but, besides that, in 
the form of another existence. Without works no human life 
is conceivable